Returning “Home” in International Child Relocation:
E v L [2025] IEHC 687 on Welfare Assessment, Prior Assurances and Post‑Brexit Enforcement

1. Introduction

The decision of Jordan J in E v L [2025] IEHC 687 is a significant High Court judgment on international child relocation in the context of divorce and ancillary relief. It arises from an appeal against a Circuit Court order permitting a mother to relocate with two young children from Dublin to a town in the United Kingdom (“Town Z”), where the family had previously lived for many years and where the children were born.

The case sits at the intersection of several themes that have been prominent in Irish relocation jurisprudence:

  • The centrality of the child’s welfare and the structured “welfare assessment” under Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, s.3 and s.31;
  • The absence of any presumption for or against relocation, as emphasised in SK v AL and K v K;
  • The treatment of relocation where the moving parent seeks to return to a former family base abroad rather than move to an entirely new jurisdiction;
  • The role of parental credibility, good faith and conduct (especially attempts to manipulate the evidential landscape) in assessing the child’s best interests;
  • The impact of post‑Brexit international enforcement (via the 1996 Hague Convention) in cross‑border family law orders;
  • The need to prioritise timely determination of relocation applications within the court system.

The judgment ultimately:

  • Upholds the Circuit Court’s decision permitting relocation to Town Z;
  • Confirms a decree of divorce and makes detailed ancillary orders (custody, access, maintenance, property and pension adjustment);
  • Offers a nuanced application of the Court of Appeal’s guidance in SK v AL [2019] IECA 177 and K v K [2022] IECA 246.

While the decision does not purport to create a radically new test, it clarifies and develops existing principles in several practical ways, particularly where a primary carer seeks to return “home” to a jurisdiction where the family had previously been settled and where a move to Ireland was undertaken on the basis of implicit assurances that a return was possible.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Parties and factual background

  • The parents married in the United Kingdom in 2013. They have two children, A (born 2016) and B (born 2018).
  • The couple met at university in 2007, moved to Town Z in 2008, and lived there for about ten years, purchasing a home jointly. Both children were born in the UK.
  • Shortly after B’s birth, the family moved to Ireland in October 2018. After renting initially, they bought a family home in Dublin in around March 2020.
  • The mother is a UK citizen; the father is Irish. Both have good employment.
  • The marriage has broken down. The parents and children still live under the same roof in Dublin but are “separate and apart”; these arrangements are described as “very difficult” for all concerned (para 2).

2.2 Proceedings and appeal

  • The mother issued:
    • Guardianship proceedings under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964,
    • Judicial separation proceedings under the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989 and Family Law Act 1995, and
    • Divorce proceedings in May 2024 under the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996.
  • A central and highly contentious issue throughout was the mother’s application to relocate with the children to Town Z in the UK.
  • Relocation proceedings were issued first, followed by judicial separation and then divorce. The proceedings were consolidated and determined in the Circuit Court, which in May 2025 granted a decree and allowed relocation.
  • The father appealed to the High Court by way of a full rehearing, but the core issue remained relocation. Evidence on appeal focused mainly on:
    • The father’s opposition to relocation and
    • The mother’s wish to return to Town Z with the children.

2.3 Legal framework and authorities

Jordan J adopts the well‑established approach to relocation cases grounded in:

  • The Constitution and statutory law, in particular:
    • Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 (especially ss.3, 31 and 32);
    • Children and Family Relationships Act 2015 (which inserted Part V into the 1964 Act, including s.31);
    • Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 (especially ss.5, 13, 14, 17, 18(10), 20).
  • Key appellate and persuasive authorities:
    • SK v AL [2019] IECA 177 (Whelan J);
    • K v K [2022] IECA 246 (Whelan J & Collins J);
    • Payne v Payne [2001] EWCA Civ 166 (Butler‑Sloss P’s guidance);
    • Re G (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation) [2013] EWCA Civ 965 (McFarlane LJ);
    • K v K (Children: Permanent Removal from Jurisdiction) [2011] EWCA Civ 793 (Moore‑Bick LJ);
    • Kirby J’s comments (from overseas authority) on the risks of allowing “status quo” to dominate relocation outcomes;
    • The Washington Declaration on International Family Relocation (2010) as soft‑law guidance.

These authorities establish that:

  • The best interests and welfare of the child are paramount and there is no presumption in favour of or against relocation;
  • Relocation cases are an exercise in welfare assessment, involving a comparative evaluation of competing options;
  • The moving parent bears the burden of demonstrating that the proposed move is in the child’s best interests and that the relationship with the left‑behind parent can be effectively maintained;
  • The child’s views must be ascertained and considered where practicable, but are not controlling;
  • Courts must avoid allowing the status quo to become a de facto presumption against relocation, particularly where it could unfairly immobilise the primary carer.

2.4 Factual findings central to the decision

Jordan J makes a series of important factual findings, including that:
  • The family’s life was deeply rooted in Town Z:
    • The parents lived there for about ten years;
    • They bought a home there;
    • Both children were born there; and
    • The mother has an extensive family and friendship network in and around Town Z.
  • The mother was reluctant to move to Ireland in 2018 and raised concerns at the time.
  • The court accepts the mother’s evidence that the father gave her to understand that a move back to the UK was possible if things did not work out in Ireland. The father’s initial “trenchant denial” of any such assurances was found to be unreliable; he is described as an “unreliable historian” with an “uncompromising personality” (paras 21, 25).
  • The mother has not settled in Ireland and feels isolated, with significantly less family support and a weaker social network than in Town Z.
  • The father has engaged in conduct the court finds unwise and, in context, tactical:
    • Discussions with the GP and a report to Tusla about the mother which lacked substance (para 26);
    • Secret audio recordings of the mother aimed at painting her negatively as a parent (para 27);
    • Over‑scheduling the children’s sporting activities (six days a week) and extended visits to his mother’s home, in a way seen as marginalising the mother (para 28);
    • Telling the children about the Circuit Court decision allowing relocation, and recording that conversation, while an appeal was pending (para 29).
    These actions are viewed as significantly motivated by his opposition to relocation rather than by the children’s welfare (paras 26–30).
  • The mother is found to have greater insight into the children’s emotional needs (para 26) and her parenting has not been driven in the same way by litigation tactics.
  • Both parents are loving, committed and hands‑on, and the children are “thriving and happy” (para 34(c), (k)).
  • The children have a settled life in Dublin with friends, school and numerous activities. They do not wish to move to the UK, as captured in the report of Ms F (para 34(d)).
  • Nonetheless, expert evidence (Ms H) and the court’s own assessment lead to the conclusion that the children will adapt successfully to relocation and that their welfare is better served by moving back to Town Z (para 35(c)).

2.5 Application of the welfare test and result

Applying the s.31(2) checklist and the broader authorities, the court concludes:

  • The children’s best interests are served by relocation to Town Z (para 39). The move will:
    • Re‑embed them in a community and extended family environment which historically formed the core of the family’s life;
    • Support the mother’s emotional and psychological well‑being by relieving her isolation in Ireland, which is itself a relevant welfare factor;
    • Still allow for “extensive” and structured contact with the father through clear access arrangements.
  • The children’s wishes, while important, are not determinative, particularly given their young age, predictable aversion to change and the emotional turbulence of parental separation (para 34(d), 35(b)).
  • Article 6 (fair trial) and Article 8 (family life) ECHR do not add materially to the statutory and constitutional analysis; the relocation order is a proportionate interference with the father’s rights (para 36).
  • Despite Brexit, the court is satisfied that enforceability in the UK is adequately addressed via the 1996 Hague Convention (para 38).
  • The court notes that relocation cases were subject to system delays in the Circuit Court and stresses that such applications should be prioritised (para 37).

The High Court therefore affirms the Circuit Court’s decision in substance, with some adjustments to the financial and property orders, and makes the following principal orders (para 42):

  • Decree of divorce under s.5(1) of the 1996 Act;
  • Joint custody with primary day‑to‑day care to the mother;
  • Liberty to relocate to Town Z with the children, on a specified date;
  • An extensive, detailed access schedule for the father, plus “such further or other access as may be agreed”;
  • Arrangements for Irish and UK passports, with shared responsibility and cost allocation;
  • Child maintenance of €250 per child per month (indexed to the Consumer Price Index), plus shared medical and third‑level education costs;
  • A property adjustment order whereby the mother’s interest in the Dublin family home is to be transferred to the father in return for a payment and removal from the mortgage, failing which the home is to be sold and proceeds equally divided;
  • Pension provisions with a focus on death‑in‑service benefits for the children;
  • Mutual exclusion from succession claims under s.18(10) of the 1996 Act;
  • Partial lifting of the in camera rule to implement the orders, including disclosure to financial institutions;
  • No order as to costs and liberty to apply.

3. Precedents and Authorities: How They Shaped the Outcome

3.1 K v K [2022] IECA 246

The judgment in K v K is Jordan J’s main Irish appellate reference on relocation. Whelan J’s key principles, quoted in E v L, include:

  • Relocation decisions are essentially binary:
    “The choices confronting the court in a relocation application are binary. The primary aim must be to minimise, in so far as practicable, the rupture in the unsuccessful parent's relationship with the children…” (para 9).
  • The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the benefits of the proposed move while also satisfying the court that the relationship with the left‑behind parent will be maintained through “sufficiently comprehensive and extensive contact” (para 9).
  • Stability and certainty in contact arrangements are “especially important” where relocation is allowed (para 10).
  • The court must assess the bona fides and motivation of the relocating parent and the likelihood that he or she will respect the child’s rights and welfare, including maintaining a constructive relationship with the left‑behind parent (para 10).

Collins J’s judgment in K v K further drew heavily from Whelan J’s analysis in SK v AL, emphasising:

  • The absence of any presumption for or against relocation;
  • The need for a comparative welfare assessment of all realistic options (para 11; paras 83–91 of K v K);
  • The importance of ascertaining and weighing the child’s views (para 85 in the passage cited);
  • The role of the 1996 Hague Convention and the Washington Declaration as supporting structures for international relocation decisions (para 88–89 of K v K).

In E v L, Jordan J faithfully applies these principles:

  • He treats the case as a pure welfare assessment (para 13, adopting Whelan J and Collins J);
  • He methodically compares the two options: remaining in Dublin versus relocating to Town Z;
  • He scrutinises the mother’s motivation and concludes it is genuine and reasonable (returning to family and a long‑standing home base, rather than an opportunistic flight);
  • He structures contact arrangements in line with the guidance that access should, as far as practicable, preserve and vindicate the child’s relationship with the non‑relocating parent.

3.2 SK v AL [2019] IECA 177

SK v AL is foundational to the current Irish approach to relocation:

  • Whelan J described relocation decisions as an exercise in welfare assessment, with no presumption for either parent (paras 11, 83–91 as quoted in E v L).
  • The case highlighted a wide array of factors:
    • Child’s emotional dependence on the primary carer;
    • Relationships with the left‑behind parent and extended family;
    • Reasonableness and motivation for relocation;
    • Practical consequences of granting or refusing the application;
    • Importance of expert evidence and the child’s voice via s.32 reports.

Jordan J follows this template. In particular:

  • He emphasises the need to consider the children’s views (para 35(b)) but notes they are “important but not determinative”.
  • He relies on expert opinion (Ms H and Ms F) while treating expert witnesses effectively as assisting the court rather than advocating for either side, consistent with Whelan J’s characterisation in SK v AL.
  • He engages in a detailed consideration of the practical consequences of relocation and non‑relocation for both parents and the children, including the mother’s isolation and the father’s ability to move or maintain a base in the UK.

3.3 Payne v Payne [2001] EWCA Civ 166

Though an English authority, Payne v Payne has long influenced Irish thinking on relocation. The key elements of Butler‑Sloss P’s summary (para 12) are cited:

  • The child’s welfare is paramount;
  • No presumption in favour of the applicant parent;
  • The “reasonable proposals” of a primary carer wishing to relocate carry great weight but must be scrutinised carefully to ensure genuine motivation;
  • The impact on the primary carer if refused, and on the child if deprived of contact with the left‑behind parent, are very important considerations;
  • Opportunities for continuing contact with the left‑behind parent may be “very significant”.

In E v L:

  • The court finds that the mother’s proposals are reasonable, genuine and carefully formulated:
  • The move is a return to a known, previously chosen family environment, not an experimental relocation;
  • Her motivation is not to undermine the father’s relationship with the children but to alleviate her isolation and re‑establish support structures;
  • The court explicitly weighs the (and consequential harm to the children) if she is effectively compelled to remain in Ireland (para 35(h));
  • It also recognises the harm to the children in terms of reduced contact with the father but seeks to mitigate this through an extensive access framework.

3.4 Re G and K v K (Children: Permanent Removal from Jurisdiction)

The judgment cites McFarlane LJ’s observation in Re G that welfare evaluations must:

“…identify and evaluate the available options, carrying out a ‘balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and weigh its own internal positives and negatives and each option is then compared, side by side, against the competing option or options’.” (para 13).

And Moore‑Bick LJ’s remark in K v K (Children: Permanent Removal from Jurisdiction) that:

“…the circumstances in which these difficult decisions have to be made vary infinitely and the judge in each case must be free to weigh up the individual factors and make whatever decision he or she considers to be in the best interests of the child” (para 90 of the cited text).

Jordan J’s approach mirrors this:

  • He undertakes a granular review of circumstances in each jurisdiction (family networks, schooling, housing costs, cultural identity, parental conduct, emotional stability);
  • He then directly compares the “stay in Dublin” option with the “return to Town Z” option, rather than treating either as presumptively preferable.

3.5 Kirby J and the “status quo” problem

The judgment references Kirby J’s critique (para 13, quoting paras 144–145 of the foreign authority) that:

“…treating the maintenance of the status quo as an alternative proposal… effectively meant that the wife's application for relocation would never really be determined on its merits, given that the status quo involved the advantage of continued access by both parents. Courts… ‘should not ignore the disproportionate burden typically placed upon women by their being effectively immobilised as the custodial/residence parent.’”

This is important context for E v L. Without explicitly adopting a “pro‑relocation” stance, Jordan J:

  • Recognises that the status quo in Dublin is not a neutral baseline. It is the result of a prior move that the mother was reluctant to make and which she undertook on the basis that return to the UK was possible;
  • Notes the “stand‑out” fact that Town Z was historically the primary family base, making relocation effectively a re‑establishment of a prior status quo rather than a wholly new venture;
  • Expressly acknowledges that forcing the mother to remain in Ireland would likely generate “resentment, a sense of injustice and ongoing frustration” (para 35(h)), which would in turn negatively affect the children;
  • Mentions that the father has real options – he could potentially live and work near the children in the UK or maintain a base there whilst working in Ireland (para 34(o)).

In effect, the court gives real content to Kirby J’s warning by resisting the temptation to treat “no move” as the obvious or safe default in circumstances where remaining immobilises the primary carer and perpetuates a situation contrary to earlier understandings within the marriage.

3.6 Washington Declaration and the 1996 Hague Convention

Following SK v AL and K v K, Jordan J notes that the Washington Declaration on International Family Relocation is not binding but its factors “resonate” with the Irish statutory framework (para 88–89 of the text from K v K).

In addition, the judgment addresses post‑Brexit enforcement:

  • The UK is no longer part of the EU regime of automatic recognition and enforcement of judgments;
  • However, the court is reassured that the 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children continues to operate fully between Ireland and the UK (para 38);
  • The father will therefore have mechanisms to enforce access and custody rights in the UK if necessary.

This explicit confirmation is particularly valuable for relocation litigation in the post‑Brexit environment.

4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Depth

4.1 The welfare test and s.31(2) checklist

Section 3(1) of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 requires the court to regard the best interests of the child as the “paramount consideration” in decisions concerning custody, access and guardianship. Section 3(2) refers the court to Part V of the Act (inserted by the 2015 Act), including s.31.

Section 31(2) provides a non‑exhaustive list of factors for determining best interests. Jordan J walks through these factors specifically (paras 35(a)–(k)), applying them to the facts:

  • Relationship with each parent and extended family (s.31(2)(a), (d), (j))
    • The children have close, loving relationships with both parents and both extended families, including a particularly strong bond with their paternal grandmother (para 35(a), (d)).
    • The court recognises that relocation will change – but not end – those relationships. It emphasises the need for a clear, generous contact regime to maintain meaningful relationships, especially with the father and paternal family.
    • The father’s capacity and willingness to facilitate the children’s relationship with the mother is questioned in light of his attempts to sideline her, whereas the mother is seen as more willing to support the children’s bond with their father (paras 26–30, 34(k), 35(j), (k)).
  • Children’s views (s.31(2)(b))
    • The children, via Ms F’s report, clearly express that they do not want to move to the UK (para 34(d)).
    • The court acknowledges the clarity of their wishes but notes:
      • Their age and developmental stage;
      • The natural desire for stability in the midst of parental separation;
      • The fact that children often wish to preserve the familiar even where another option may better serve their long‑term welfare.
    • Their views are treated as important but not decisive, consistent with Irish and international norms (para 35(b)).
  • Physical, psychological and emotional needs; effect of change (s.31(2)(c), (h))
    • The court recognises that:
      • Any relocation will cause upheaval and emotional strain;
      • So too will the breakdown of the marriage, regardless of where the children live.
    • Importantly, it finds that:
      • The children are resilient and likely to adapt to relocation successfully, especially with appropriate support (para 35(c));
      • Forcing the mother to remain in Ireland would “likely increase her sense of isolation and create for her resentment, a sense of injustice and ongoing frustration” (para 35(h));
      • These emotional burdens on the mother would in turn impact the children negatively – an indirect but real form of “harm” in the sense contemplated by s.31(2)(h).
  • Cultural, linguistic and religious upbringing (s.31(2)(e))
    • The father has immersed the children in the Irish language and GAA, whereas the mother is concerned that their English heritage is sidelined (para 34(i)).
    • The court acknowledges both cultural identities and explicitly states that the children’s Irish heritage cannot be given pre‑eminence over their English heritage (para 35(e)).
    • It notes that the country of residence inevitably influences cultural identity but that dual heritage can be maintained – especially given ongoing contact with the father in Ireland.
  • Social, intellectual and educational needs (s.31(2)(f), (g))
    • The children are thriving academically and socially in Dublin, with strong school and extracurricular connections (para 34(d), (g)).
    • The court accepts that:
      • Town Z offers good schools;
      • The children are intelligent and adaptable;
      • There is no real evidence that education outcomes would be worse in the UK (para 34(f), 35(f)).
    • Overall, their educational and social needs could be well served in either jurisdiction (para 35(f)).
  • Proposals for custody and access; capacity to co-operate (s.31(2)(i), (k))
    • Both parents put forward detailed proposals showing they understand the need for a clear access structure (para 35(i)).
    • There has been high conflict and low trust, exacerbated by the stress of co‑habiting post‑separation (para 34(j)).
    • The court believes that once separate households are established and a court order is in place, there is a reasonable prospect of improved co‑operation (para 35(j)).
    • However, the father’s “uncompromising approach” and attempts to sideline the mother indicate an area where he must improve to meet the standard of collaborative parenting required (para 35(k)).

4.2 The special significance of Town Z as the former family base

One of the most distinctive aspects of E v L is the court’s emphasis on the fact that:

  • Town Z was not a new or speculative destination;
  • It was the place where the parents chose to live for many years, bought a home, and had their children (para 16, 32);
  • The mother was reluctant to leave Town Z in 2018 but did so partly on the understanding that the move to Ireland could be reversed if it did not work out (paras 17–21, 32–33);
  • The father had lived and worked in the UK for many years and has demonstrated the ability to build a life there (paras 16, 34(b)).

Jordan J explicitly characterises this as a “stand‑out feature” of the case (para 32). This has two key implications for the welfare assessment:

  1. Reliability of the proposed environment
    Relocation is often complex because the proposed new jurisdiction is unknown, with uncertain schooling, social networks and housing. Here, by contrast:
    • Town Z is a tested and familiar environment for both parents;
    • The mother has a strong, proven support network there;
    • The father previously functioned well there, including employment and social engagement.
    This reduces the risk that relocation will expose the children to unforeseen instability.
  2. Fairness and expectations within the marriage
    The court finds that the mother’s relocation to Ireland was undertaken against her preference, influenced by the father’s implicit assurance that a return was possible. To now deny her the ability to return, and effectively lock her into Ireland, would:
    • Conflict with the understandings on which she agreed to move;
    • Contribute to her isolation and sense of injustice;
    • Ultimately undermine the emotional environment in which the children are being raised.
    The court treats these relational and fairness considerations as relevant circumstances in the welfare analysis (para 25, 32–33, 35(h)), without displacing the child‑centric nature of the test.

4.3 Parental credibility, litigation conduct and welfare

The father’s conduct is carefully scrutinised and found wanting in several respects:

  • Initial trenchant denial of any assurance about the possibility of returning to the UK, later softened under judicial questioning (paras 18–19, 25);
  • Making unfounded complaints to professionals (GP and Tusla) about the mother (para 26);
  • Secret audio recordings of the mother and of the conversation with the children about the Circuit Court judgment (paras 27, 29);
  • Arranging the children’s activities and time in a way that appears designed to exclude the mother from their lives to some degree (para 28).

Jordan J describes these as “unwise and without substance” and sees them as significantly motivated by the father’s wish to bolster his opposition to relocation (paras 26, 30). This behaviour informs two key aspects of the welfare assessment:

  1. Reliability as a historian and witness
    The court explicitly labels the father an “unreliable historian” whose uncompromising personality undermines his credibility (para 25). This shapes the court’s acceptance of the mother’s version of events about the move to Ireland and the assurances given.
  2. Capacity to facilitate the children’s relationship with the other parent
    Under s.31(2)(j) and (k), the court must consider each parent’s ability and willingness to:
    • Encourage a close relationship between the children and the other parent;
    • Communicate and co‑operate on issues relating to the children.
    The father’s attempts to sideline the mother, and his tactical deployment of professional and recorded evidence, are seen as red flags in this regard. By contrast, the mother’s conduct is seen as more child‑centred. This balance favours the conclusion that the children’s long‑term welfare is better served with the mother as primary day‑to‑day carer in an environment where she is supported.

4.4 Children’s wishes versus objective welfare

The children’s expressed wish not to move might, at first glance, appear to weigh heavily against relocation. The court, however, contextualises these views:

  • The children are still relatively young (born 2016 and 2018);
  • They are going through parental separation and naturally seek to maintain the familiar and avoid additional change (para 34(d));
  • Views expressed in such a context need careful interpretation and cannot be treated as determinative, particularly when expert evidence suggests that relocation will serve their deeper, longer‑term welfare interests (paras 35(b)–(c)).

The court’s stance is fully consistent with s.31(2)(b) (requiring the child’s views to be considered where ascertainable) and the jurisprudence following SK v AL: children’s voices must be heard but not allowed to fix the outcome in circumstances where broader welfare factors point elsewhere.

4.5 ECHR Articles 6 and 8; proportionality

Jordan J briefly addresses the European Convention on Human Rights:

  • Article 6 (right to a fair hearing) and Article 8 (respect for family life) “do not really raise any issues that are not covered” by the statutory and constitutional analysis (para 36);
  • Allowing relocation is held to be a proportionate measure in all the circumstances;
  • The structured application of s.31, detailed factual findings and comprehensive access arrangements display a proportionate balancing of the father’s Art.8 rights with the children’s best interests.

While succinct, this confirms that relocation – even where it significantly alters a parent’s day‑to‑day contact with children – can satisfy ECHR requirements where a robust, child‑centred and evidence‑based welfare assessment has been performed.

4.6 System delays and procedural priorities

The court notes that the relocation application “fell victim to system delays” in the Circuit Court and “ought to have been dealt with much earlier” (para 37). Jordan J states that relocation applications “by their very nature require to be given priority within the system.”

This is not merely a passing comment. Delay in determining relocation:

  • Can entrench the status quo in a way that unfairly disadvantages the moving parent;
  • Prolongs uncertainty and tension for children and parents alike;
  • May impact the logistical feasibility of relocation (school calendars, housing markets, employment start dates).

The judgment therefore has an administrative and procedural dimension: it implicitly calls on courts and case‑management systems to treat relocation proceedings as time‑sensitive and to prioritise early, final determination.

5. Impact and Future Significance

5.1 Consolidation and refinement of relocation principles

E v L consolidates the line of Irish authority culminating in SK v AL and K v K, applying it in a full High Court rehearing. Future relocation cases will likely cite it for:

  • The reaffirmation that relocation decisions are a comparative welfare assessment with no presumption in favour of either parent;
  • The clear, structured application of the s.31(2) checklist to a complex international scenario;
  • The articulation of the moving parent’s burden of proof and the importance of comprehensive, genuine proposals;
  • The emphasis on maintaining the child’s relationship with the left‑behind parent through practical, generous contact arrangements.

5.2 Increased weight where relocation is a return to a former family base

A particularly novel emphasis is the weight accorded to relocation that involves a return to the former family home jurisdiction, especially where:

  • The family lived there for many years;
  • The children were born there;
  • The moving parent’s reluctance to migrate to the current jurisdiction was mediated by an understanding that the move could be reversed.

Future litigants and courts can point to E v L as authority that such a context is a “stand‑out feature” with genuine weight in the welfare analysis. It may, in practice, distinguish cases in which:

  • Relocation is truly a new step into the unknown, versus
  • Relocation reconstructs a previously stable and successful family environment.

5.3 Parental conduct and credibility as welfare factors

The judgment also strongly reinforces that:

  • Attempts to manipulate evidence, weaponise professional referrals or marginalise the other parent may significantly damage a parent’s position in a relocation case;
  • Such conduct speaks directly to:
    • Credibility regarding disputed events (e.g., assurances about moving back);
    • Capacity and willingness to facilitate the child’s relationship with the other parent, as required by s.31(2);
    • The parent’s ability to adopt a child‑centred rather than litigation‑centred mindset.

Practitioners advising parents in relocation disputes will need to stress that tactical behaviours of this kind can backfire dramatically and influence the welfare assessment against the parent concerned.

5.4 Dual cultural identity and cross‑border parenting

The explicit recognition that the children’s Irish and English cultural identities are of equal value is an important statement in the context of Anglo‑Irish families. The judgment underscores that:

  • Residence in one jurisdiction does not nullify the child’s heritage from the other;
  • Parental influence and cross‑border contact can sustain dual identity, especially where both parents are committed to it.

In similar cases, courts are likely to follow this balanced approach rather than allowing national or cultural preferences of one parent to drive the outcome.

5.5 Post‑Brexit enforceability and system prioritisation

On the international plane, E v L offers two key reassurances:

  1. Enforceability via the 1996 Hague Convention
    The judgment reassures litigants that, notwithstanding Brexit:
    • Orders regarding custody and access remain enforceable in the UK;
    • The 1996 Hague Convention supplies a robust framework, albeit not as automatic as the former EU regime.
    This is likely to be cited in future cross‑border cases involving the UK.
  2. Priority treatment for relocation cases
    The express criticism of “system delays” and the statement that relocation applications should be given priority may inform case‑management practice. It underlines that:
    • Prolonged uncertainty is itself harmful to children;
    • Delay can unfairly entrench a non‑relocation status quo, contrary to the neutral, comparative assessment required by law.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 What is a “relocation application”?

A relocation application arises where one parent proposes to move with a child to another jurisdiction (or a distant part of the same jurisdiction), and the other parent objects. The court must then decide whether the child should:

  • Remain in the current location, or
  • Move with the applying parent.

In international cases, issues of cross‑border enforcement, cultural adjustment, schooling and immigration status may all arise. The court’s duty is to focus on the child’s welfare, not on which parent “deserves” to win.

6.2 What does “welfare assessment” and “best interests of the child” mean?

A welfare assessment is a holistic evaluation of everything that affects a child’s life and development. “Best interests” is not a narrow concept; it includes:

  • Physical safety and health;
  • Emotional and psychological stability;
  • Relationships with parents, siblings and extended family;
  • Education and social development;
  • Cultural, linguistic and religious identity;
  • Short‑term and long‑term impacts of staying or moving.

In relocation cases, the court must compare realistically how these interests would be served in each of the competing scenarios.

6.3 What is the s.31(2) “checklist”?

Section 31(2) of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 sets out a list of factors the court must consider when deciding what is in a child’s best interests. These include:

  • Relationship with each parent and extended family;
  • Child’s own views (if ascertainable);
  • Physical, emotional and psychological needs;
  • History of care and upbringing;
  • Cultural, religious and linguistic needs;
  • Educational and social needs;
  • Risk of harm, including from domestic violence;
  • Proposals for custody and access;
  • Each parent’s willingness and ability to support the child’s relationship with the other parent.

The list is not exhaustive, and the court can give different weight to different factors depending on the case.

6.4 How are children’s views taken into account?

Irish law and the Constitution require that a child’s views be considered, “where practicable” and having regard to age and maturity. This can be done via:

  • Direct judicial interview (used in some cases);
  • Reports under s.32 of the 1964 Act (typically prepared by a psychologist, social worker or other expert);
  • Evidence from guardians ad litem (in some proceedings).

However, a child’s view is not an instruction to the court. The court must weigh it alongside other welfare factors. Particularly with younger children, the court recognises that:

  • They may naturally resist change, even where it is beneficial in the long run;
  • Their views may be influenced (sometimes unconsciously) by the attitudes of one or both parents.

6.5 What is meant by “status quo” and why is it controversial?

The status quo means the current living arrangements – where the child is living, going to school, etc. Courts are naturally cautious about disrupting a stable status quo, especially for young children.

However, as Kirby J and others have warned, giving too much weight to the status quo can:

  • Make it almost impossible for a primary carer to relocate, even where the move is well‑planned and beneficial;
  • “Immobilise” the primary carer (often the mother) by tying them permanently to the current jurisdiction;
  • Undermine the neutral, comparative welfare assessment required by law.

In E v L, the court recognises that the current status quo (life in Dublin) was itself the product of a contested move from Town Z, and that returning to Town Z may, in a real sense, be a return to an earlier, more natural status quo for the family.

6.6 What is the 1996 Hague Convention and why does it matter post‑Brexit?

The 1996 Hague Convention (formally, the Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co‑operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children) is an international treaty that:

  • Sets out rules for which country’s courts have jurisdiction over child protection and custody matters;
  • Provides mechanisms for recognition and enforcement of custody and access orders between member states.

Post‑Brexit, the UK is no longer part of the EU’s Brussels II regime. However, both Ireland and the UK are contracting states to the 1996 Hague Convention. This means:

  • Irish custody and access orders can still be recognised and enforced in the UK (and vice versa);
  • Parents retain legal tools to protect and enforce their rights and their children’s welfare across borders.

6.7 What is meant by lifting the “in camera” rule?

Family law proceedings in Ireland are generally heard in camera, meaning in private, with reporting restrictions designed to protect the privacy of the parties and children.

In E v L, the court makes an order lifting the in camera rule “to the extent necessary” to:

  • Allow disclosure of the orders to financial institutions and others who must implement aspects of the judgment (e.g., banks, pension providers).

This is a common, narrowly tailored exception which allows practical implementation of orders while preserving overall confidentiality.

7. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

E v L [2025] IEHC 687 is a carefully reasoned High Court judgment that both applies and refines the now‑settled Irish approach to international relocation. Its key contributions can be summarised as follows:

  • Welfare remains paramount, with relocation decisions framed as a comparative, evidence‑based welfare assessment under s.31(2) GIA 1964, without presumption for or against the moving parent.
  • The judgment accords particular weight where the relocation is a return to a former, stable family base (Town Z), especially where:
    • The current jurisdiction was adopted reluctantly by the primary carer; and
    • That move was made on the basis of an implicit understanding that a return would be possible.
  • The court highlights how parental conduct and credibility – including unfounded professional referrals and covert recordings – can materially affect the welfare assessment, particularly under the factors dealing with capacity to facilitate the child’s relationship with the other parent.
  • The children’s express resistance to relocation is taken seriously but not allowed to override a considered judgment that their long‑term welfare is best served by moving with their primary carer, with strong access to the other parent.
  • The judgment provides reassurance on post‑Brexit enforceability of Irish orders in the UK via the 1996 Hague Convention and urges that relocation cases be prioritised to avoid harmful delays.
  • It recognises and respects the children’s dual cultural identity, rejecting any hierarchy between Irish and English heritage in the welfare analysis.

Ultimately, E v L reinforces that international relocation disputes are not about vindicating parental rights in the abstract, but about crafting the arrangement that will best promote the children’s holistic welfare in the real world, taking into account:

  • The emotional well‑being and support networks of the primary carer;
  • The capacity of each parent to foster the child’s relationship with the other;
  • The practical realities of work, housing, schooling and cross‑border contact.

By situating its reasoning firmly within the modern statutory and appellate framework, while bringing nuanced attention to the specific facts of a “return home” relocation, the judgment will likely serve as a leading High Court authority for future international relocation cases involving Ireland and the UK, and more broadly for domestic courts grappling with the tensions between stability, mobility and the best interests of children.