Restraining Orders on Conviction under Sentencing Act 2020 s.360: No “Course of Conduct” Requirement, but Necessity Requires an Evidential Basis
1. Introduction
Amoah, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 1770) is an appeal in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) confined to the
imposition of restraining orders following convictions for attempted murder, wounding with intent and
aggravated burglary.
The appellant, Mr Amoah, received a 27-year sentence for attempted murder (with concurrent terms on the other counts).
His two co-defendants were acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of other offences and received shorter custodial terms; all three were made subject
to restraining orders protecting the three victims (Jaroslavas Gavorskis, Terry Madden, Luke Hocking), including a geographical exclusion from Redruth as
defined on a map.
The central issue was whether the sentencing judge was entitled to impose restraining orders (including for an unlimited duration) where the appellant argued
there was no proven “course of conduct”, and where the lengthy custodial term and future licence conditions were said to make an order unnecessary.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that the appellant’s reliance on R v Debnath [2005] EWCA Crim 3472 was misplaced because
the statutory framework has changed. Under section 360 of the Sentencing Act 2020, a restraining order may be made on conviction for any offence
where it is necessary to protect persons from conduct that amounts to harassment or will cause a fear of violence.
The Court reaffirmed (by reference to R v Ross [2020] RTR 19) that necessity requires an evidential basis: the order must be at least likely
to protect against future harassment or fear of violence. On the facts, there was such a basis given the targeted home invasion, the background of criminality,
the victims’ expressed fear, and the appellant’s antecedents (including prior violence and breaches/intimidatory behaviour).
It was not necessary to obtain additional statements from the victims requesting restraining orders: the trial evidence and victim personal statements were sufficient.
The Court also upheld the scope and indefinite duration of the order, noting that prohibited contact can occur from custody as well as after release and that
future licence conditions were speculative.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
The appellant relied heavily on R v Debnath [2005] EWCA Crim 3472, particularly the proposition that restraining orders (as then understood)
were tied to preventing further offences under sections 2 or 4 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and were conceptually linked to a
“course of conduct” amounting to harassment.
The Court treated Debnath as important for drafting clarity and proportionality (clear terms, practical framing, maps, and proportionality),
but emphasised that it was a pre-2009 decision addressing a statutory scheme that has since been materially expanded. The Court therefore rejected any
argument that Debnath imported a requirement that the offender must have been convicted of (or previously engaged in) a harassment “course of conduct” before
an order can be made on conviction.
R v Ross [2020] RTR 19
R v Ross [2020] RTR 19 provided the modern controlling principle for “necessity”:
before making a restraining order the judge must consider whether it is necessary to protect from harassment or fear of violence, and
an order cannot be necessary unless it is at least likely the offender will act in such a way; there must be an evidential basis.
The Court distinguished Ross on its facts. In Ross, the victim was an unintended victim of reckless driving, unknown to the offender, and the restraining order
was imposed merely to allay fear rather than to respond to an evidentially grounded risk of targeted future conduct. Here, by contrast, the offending was a
planned, targeted armed intrusion into a home, with serious violence and a clear criminal context.
Rex v Thompson [2025] EWCA Crim 1462
Rex v Thompson [2025] EWCA Crim 1462 was cited not on restraining orders but on sentencing process, specifically the need for adequate information
when assessing issues such as dangerousness. The Court commented that dangerousness was “very much an issue” and that a pre-sentence report should have been ordered.
Although not determinative of the restraining order appeal, Thompson reflects the Court’s broader insistence on proper evidential foundations for decisions
that manage risk—an approach consistent with the “evidential basis” requirement reiterated from Ross in the restraining order context.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:
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Correct statutory source and scope. The Court located the modern post-conviction power in
section 360 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (not the repealed section 5 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997). It treated the statutory evolution
(including the 2009 amendments described in the judgment) as decisive: restraining orders on conviction are not confined to harassment offences and are available
“when dealing with an offender for an offence” provided the protective purpose in s.360(2) is met.
Note: the judgment refers at one point to “section 36” in discussion; read in context this is plainly a reference to section 360.
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No “course of conduct” precondition; the question is necessity for protection. The Court rejected the submission that an order requires proof of
a prior “course of conduct” or must be aimed only at preventing a future “course of conduct” as such. The statutory purpose is broader:
protecting against conduct that amounts to harassment or will cause fear of violence.
Even a single serious targeted incident can generate a rational protective need if there is an evidential basis of likely future risk.
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Evidential basis and proportionality on these facts. Applying Ross, the Court found a sufficient evidential basis for likely future harmful conduct:
a planned, targeted attack in the victim’s home; the criminal milieu; the victims’ continuing fear (supported by victim personal statements);
and the appellant’s antecedents, including violence, threatening behaviour, breaches of orders, and (historically) intimidation.
It considered the terms “clear, limited and entirely proportionate”, and it upheld indefinite duration.
Crucially, the Court reasoned that the order’s utility was not negated by the long sentence because contact can occur indirectly and
from prison (including via third parties), while licence conditions on eventual release were speculative and could not be assumed to provide equivalent protection.
3.3 Impact
The decision consolidates several practical propositions likely to influence future sentencing practice:
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Debnath is not a “gateway test” case under the modern framework: while helpful on drafting and proportionality, it does not confine the
Sentencing Act 2020 power to harassment offences or to cases with an established “course of conduct”.
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Ross supplies the key constraint: necessity requires an evidential basis of likely future conduct that would amount to harassment
or cause fear of violence. Orders cannot be imposed merely to provide reassurance where the factual matrix does not support risk.
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Long custodial sentences do not make restraining orders redundant. Courts may treat in-custody risk (direct/indirect contact, third-party messaging)
as a legitimate basis for immediate protective terms, and may decline to rely on unknown future licence conditions.
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Victim request is not a prerequisite. Where the court has adequate material (trial evidence, victim personal statements), it may infer protective need
without requiring specific “application statements” from victims—though the Court acknowledged that in other contexts (notably familial relationships) victim views may be more central.
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Indefinite duration can be proportionate where ongoing risk is evidenced and the terms are sufficiently precise and bounded.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Restraining order (on conviction) under Sentencing Act 2020 s.360
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A criminal court order made at sentencing to protect named persons from the offender’s future conduct that would amount to harassment or would cause fear of violence.
Breach is a criminal matter.
- “Harassment” and “fear of violence”
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These are protective concepts. The order can target conduct that would harass (unwanted, oppressive contact/behaviour) or that would make a person fear violence,
even if the original conviction was not for a harassment offence.
- “Course of conduct”
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A concept central to offences under sections 2 and 4 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (typically requiring repeated behaviour).
This case clarifies that a restraining order under s.360 does not require the offender to have been convicted of such a course of conduct.
- “Necessary” and “evidential basis” (from Ross)
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“Necessary” is not a mere desirability test. There must be evidence supporting that it is at least likely the offender will engage in conduct that the order prevents.
Without that evidential footing, an order is wrong in principle.
- Proportionality and clarity
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The order’s restrictions must be no more than needed for protection and must be drafted so the offender can clearly understand what is prohibited
(for example, defined locations and maps for exclusion zones).
5. Conclusion
Amoah, R. v confirms that restraining orders on conviction under section 360 of the Sentencing Act 2020 are a flexible protective tool:
they are not limited to harassment convictions and do not require proof of an existing harassment “course of conduct”.
The controlling safeguard is necessity grounded in evidence (per R v Ross [2020] RTR 19), coupled with clarity and proportionality
in drafting (themes consistent with R v Debnath [2005] EWCA Crim 3472).
On the facts—targeted home invasion, serious violence, criminal context, victims’ ongoing fear, and the appellant’s antecedents—the Court held there was a proper evidential basis
for protection, upheld the terms (including geographic exclusion), and accepted that an unlimited duration order can be justified even alongside a very long custodial sentence.