Factual and Procedural Background
On 30 January 2024 at the Crown Court at The City the Appellant was convicted of attempted murder, wounding with intent and aggravated burglary. The Appellant was sentenced on 4 March 2024 to 27 years' imprisonment for attempted murder, with concurrent terms of 10 years and 8 years for the other offences. Ancillary restraining orders were made in respect of the victims.
There were two co-defendants, Co-Defendant A and Co-Defendant B, both convicted of other offences and sentenced to terms of imprisonment of 9 years and 7 years respectively; they were subject to restraining orders in the same terms as the Appellant.
The Appellant appealed with limited leave; the sole ground of appeal related to the imposition of the restraining orders.
Facts relevant to the offences (as found at trial): on the relevant date Victim A was at home at [Number] Main Street, The City, with Victim B and Victim C. The Appellant and Co-Defendant A, wearing balaclavas and armed, forced entry; Victim A was shot in the back and assaulted; a small safe was taken. Co-Defendant B was identified at the scene and was known to Victim A from prior drug dealings. A handgun later recovered from Witness A's address was forensically linked to the shooting with the Appellant's blood on the packaging and the Appellant's DNA on the grip. Items linking the Appellant to the scene were also recovered nearby and at the Appellant's home. Victim personal statements from Victim A and Victim B described ongoing fear, anxiety and sleep disturbance.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the restraining orders imposed on conviction under the Sentencing Act 2020 (section 360) were lawfully made in the circumstances of this case.
- Whether the judge erred in failing to seek the views of the persons to be protected before making restraining orders.
- Whether the terms, scope and indefinite duration of the restraining orders were clear, necessary and proportionate.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Relying on R v Debnath, the Appellant's attorney (Attorney Quaife) submitted that a restraining order's purpose is to prevent particular conduct to protect victims and to prevent further offences under sections 2 or 4 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; thus a restraining order requires satisfaction that it is necessary to prevent a future course of conduct amounting to harassment or causing fear of violence.
- Argued no course of conduct had been pursued and, given the lengthy custodial sentence, no future course of conduct was realistically possible, so the statutory test for imposing a restraining order was not met.
- Submitted the court should have taken into account the views of the persons to be protected before imposing orders.
- Contended the restraining order was unnecessary given the sentence length and licence conditions on release; also challenged particular terms as unnecessary.
Prosecution's Position
- The prosecution applied for restraining orders prohibiting contact, prohibiting going to premises where the victims reside or work, and excluding entry to The City as outlined on a map; the orders were to last until further order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Rex v Thompson [2025] EWCA Crim 1462 |
Cited regarding the need for full information (eg, pre-sentence report) when dangerousness is an issue in sentencing. |
The court observed that a pre-sentence report should have been ordered because dangerousness was an issue and the judge lacked fullest information to reach decisions on that issue. |
| R v Debnath [2005] EWCA Crim 3472 |
Set out principles for restraining orders under the Protection from Harassment Act (purpose: prohibit conduct to protect victims and prevent further offences; clarity of terms; practical framing; proportionality). |
The Appellant relied on Debnath; the Court held that reliance on Debnath was misplaced in parts because statutory amendments (post-2009 and the Sentencing Act 2020) changed the scope of the power to impose restraining orders. |
| R v Ross [2020] RTR 19 |
Stated that a judge must consider whether a restraining order is necessary to protect a victim and that there must be an evidential basis that the offender is likely to act so as to harass or cause fear of violence. |
The Court distinguished Ross on the facts: unlike Ross, the present offences were targeted and planned, there was an evidential basis (including victim statements, involvement of co-defendant in identifying address, convictions and antecedents) supporting the making of restraining orders. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by rejecting the Appellant's reliance on principles from Debnath insofar as those principles were applied in a pre-2009 legislative context. The Court explained that statutory amendments and the Sentencing Act 2020 broadened the power to make restraining orders: section 360 permits a restraining order to be made on conviction for any offence to protect victims from conduct amounting to harassment or causing fear of violence, and there is no requirement of a prior course of conduct or that the order only address future courses of conduct.
The Court emphasised that although no specific statutory test is set out in section 360, any prohibition must be clear, necessary and proportionate.
The Court considered R v Ross and its requirement of an evidential basis for necessity. It found that Ross was distinguishable: in the present case the attack was planned and targeted (Co-Defendant B identified Victim A's address), the Appellant was the lead offender in an attack carried out in the victim's home, and there was supporting evidence including forensic links to the firearm, recovered property, victim testimony, victim personal statements describing ongoing fear, and the Appellant's significant antecedents. These factors provided an evidential basis from which a judge could properly conclude a restraining order was necessary to protect the victims.
On the submission that the judge should have sought the victims' views, the Court held this was not necessary here because the judge had victim personal statements from two of the three victims and had heard evidence at trial; the judge could infer the victims' views without further evidence.
On the terms and duration of the restraining orders, the Court analysed the prohibitions: (1) prohibition on direct and indirect contact was proportionate and could operate while the Appellant was in custody (contact via third parties or from prison was possible); (2) prohibition on going to premises where the named persons were believed to live or work was proportionate to prevent attempts to approach victims; and (3) the order's clarity, limitation and indefinite duration were held to be acceptable in the circumstances. The Court noted that potential licence conditions were speculative and did not render the order unnecessary.
Separately, the Court observed that the sentencing judge should have ordered a pre-sentence report given the issue of dangerousness and that the sentence passed appeared lenient relative to the Sentencing Guidelines, but this observation did not form part of the appeal determination on the restraining orders.
Holding and Implications
GROUND OF APPEAL DISMISSED
Holding: The Court dismissed the sole ground of appeal and upheld the restraining orders as imposed by the sentencing judge.
Implications: The restraining orders remain in force in their existing terms; the Court found them clear, necessary and proportionate on the evidence before it. The Court did not set aside the sentence on this appeal, though it recorded that a pre-sentence report should have been obtained and that the sentence appeared lenient in light of the guidelines. The decision does not purport to establish a novel legal rule beyond applying section 360 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and existing case law to the facts; no new precedent was declared.