Remittal After Partial Quashing in Planning JR: s.50A(9A) Applies and “Publication” Is Distinct from “Consideration” of Prior Materials

1. Introduction

This consequential judgment concerns what happens after a planning consent has been partially quashed. In the principal judgment (D'Alton v. An Coimisiún Pleanála (No. 1) [2026] IEHC 414), the court quashed part of the Commission’s order granting approval for upgrading a pedestrian and cycle route (a “greenway”) in Passage West, Co. Cork. The post-judgment issues were practical and procedural: the precise extent of partial quashing; whether any amendment under s. 50A(9) was needed; whether (and how) remittal should occur under s. 50A(9A); and, critically, what status an inspector’s report has on remittal—especially in light of statutory publication duties.

The parties are best understood by role: the applicants (local challengers), the respondent (An Coimisiún Pleanála), and the notice party (Cork County Council).

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Partial quashing—agreed operational boundaries

The court recorded an agreed/acceptable delineation of partial quashing by “chainage” (per drawing GA0011), designed to preserve historic features (a wall and stile) and avoid immediate disruption to a car park where the parties had unresolved disagreements about parking loss:

• Quash demolition between chainage 1610 to 1780 (wall and stile remain in entirety).
• Quash widening between chainage 1660 to 1740 (car park remains).

That order was made on 9 July 2026.

2.2 No s.50A(9) “amendment” pursued

Although s. 50A(9) allows the court to make “consequential amendments” to the remainder of a decision after partial quashing, the Council’s proposed amendment was withdrawn when it proved unacceptable to the applicants, and no amendment was required to address junction details. The court noted that amendment could in principle be done of the court’s own motion, but there was no reason to do so here.

2.3 Remittal—likely, even where quashing is partial

The central legal question was whether remittal under s. 50A(9A) (inserted by the 2022 Act) should apply where only part of a decision is quashed. The court indicated that:

• s. 50A(9A) is capable of covering partial quashing, and purpose/context support that reading;
• even if the text were read narrowly, pre-2022 caselaw supports a presumption in favour of remittal (including partial remittal) where requested;
• arguments that partial remittal takes matters “out of context” were unpersuasive, because the realistic alternative is a new application for the quashed part, which is not materially more “in context”;
• the legality of consenting “in parts” is settled, provided EU assessments cover the full project “at each stage”.

2.4 Stage of remittal—caution against over-direction, but new rule allows specification

While parties sometimes seek judicial directions specifying the procedural “stage” to which a matter returns, the Supreme Court in Crofton Buildings v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 12 cautioned against unnecessary directions and emphasised the presumption that the Commission will act lawfully and fairly. Humphreys J. aligned with that approach, noting that absent a pressing reason the court would be inclined not to specify a stage—subject to resolving a further issue about the inspector’s report.

He also noted a relevant procedural development: O. 103 r. 36(1) RSC, enacted after Crofton, now expressly permits the court (having heard parties) to specify the stage in Planning & Environment proceedings, and mandates directions in certain information-access remittals under Directive 2003/4/EC.

2.5 Inspector’s report on remittal—publication vs consideration; request for clarification

The court identified a decisive distinction:

• Publication: what documents must be made available (notably under s. 146 of the 2000 Act); versus
• Consideration: what materials may properly be relied on in the remitted decision-making process.

The Commission’s apparent administrative approach is to keep the original file online under the original case number, assign a new case number on remittal, and structure the “new file” so as to exclude materials that must be disregarded. The court requested written clarification from the Commission on whether, in a partial-quashing remittal like this, the original inspector’s report would form part of the remitted file and/or be otherwise considered. Depending on the answer, further relief (potentially including partial quashing of the report or directions) might have to be considered—though the court indicated such measures should not usually be necessary.

Directions were set for written responses (Commission by 24 July 2026; other parties by 31 July 2026) and a further listing on 21 September 2026.

3. Analysis

3.1 The statutory architecture: partial quashing, amendments, and remittal

• s. 50A(9) (2000 Act): allows partial invalidation/quashing “without” quashing the remainder, and permits “consequential amendments” to the remainder. The judgment illustrates a practical use-case: partial quashing can be engineered to preserve some development benefits while addressing identified illegality.
• s. 50A(9A) (inserted by 2022 Act): introduces a mandatory remittal obligation where the developer requests it, unless remittal would be unlawful. The judgment’s key move is interpretive: treating “quash a decision” as including partial quashing, consistent with the statutory purpose and with established practice pre-2022.

3.2 Precedents cited and how they shape the ruling

(a) Quinn v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 699

Quinn is used to contextualise s. 50A(9A)’s legislative rationale. Humphreys J. recalls Quinn’s observation that the purported rationale—alleged judicial reluctance or inconsistency in remittal—was not borne out by the caselaw. In this judgment, that discussion supports two points:

• there is (and historically was) a strong baseline tendency to remit where lawful and requested; and
• s. 50A(9A) should not be read in a way that arbitrarily restricts remittal where partial quashing has occurred, absent clear statutory command.

(b) Connolly v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2026] IEHC 224 and Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28

These authorities support the proposition that a development can be sought and consented “in parts” provided that EU environmental assessments (Habitats and EIA) cover the full project at each stage. This matters because the applicants’ “in the round” objection to partial remittal effectively challenges the feasibility or legality of dealing with components separately after partial quashing. The Supreme Court’s endorsement in Treascon is treated as settling the point.

The judgment further notes (drawing on Treascon) that the High Court may grant unpleaded relief if it comes “strictly within the pleaded grounds”—a point raised in the context of potentially quashing an inspector’s report (in whole or part) if it would continue to influence the remitted process.

(c) Crofton Buildings v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 12 and O. 103 r. 36(1) RSC

Crofton supplies a discipline of restraint: avoid over-prescriptive remittal directions, trust the decision-maker to act lawfully, and recognise that what is remitted may depend on procedure. Humphreys J. accepts that framework but notes that O. 103 r. 36(1) RSC now provides an explicit procedural basis for specifying the stage on remittal (discretionary in planning cases, mandatory direction-giving in certain access-to-information remittals). The judgment therefore positions Crofton as the “default posture” and the new rule as an enabling tool where needed.

(d) Aarhus / EU law: Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej republiky, C-240/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:125

The judgment explains why Aarhus-related procedural reforms can carry EU-law significance: the Aarhus Convention, approved by the EU, forms part of the EU legal order. The citation to C-240/09 underlines that “UN convention” arguments do not answer the EU-law effect. This contextualises the discussion of r. 36(1)(b) and the role of international compliance concerns in domestic procedural rule-making.

(e) Publication obligations and “contamination”: Environmental Trust Ireland v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2026] IEHC 387, Carrownagowan Concern Group, Rumberger & Henley v. An Bord Pleanála & Futurenergy [2024] IEHC 300, and Clonres CLG v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2021] IEHC 303, [2021] 5 JIC 0706

These cases are deployed to clarify the breadth of “documents relating to the matter” under s. 146 of the 2000 Act and the treatment of altered/withdrawn/quashed materials. Humphreys J. revisits his earlier suggestion (in Carrownagowan and Clonres) that quashed decisions and invalid submissions might fall outside publication duties. He accepts that Environmental Trust usefully reframes the issue: publication after the decision does not retroactively “contaminate” decision-making, which highlights that the real safeguard is controlling reliance on improper material, not suppressing historical documents from the public record.

He maintains, however, a strict distinction for invalid submissions: if something was never part of the process, it is to be disregarded from the outset and does not fall to be published as a process document. By contrast, documents that were in fact part of the process for a time (even if later withdrawn/amended/quashed) remain “documents relating to the matter” and should be published—potentially with an annotation.

3.3 The court’s legal reasoning: why partial remittal is coherent and lawful

• Text and purpose of s. 50A(9A): although s. 50A(9) explicitly addresses “part only” of a decision and s. 50A(9A) speaks of quashing “a decision”, the court treats the latter as capable of including partial quashing. This is reinforced by purpose: facilitating lawful continuation of development processes after judicial intervention, rather than forcing unnecessary restart.
• Reality-based comparator: the applicants’ “out of context” critique is answered by comparing remittal to the realistic alternative (a new application for the quashed portion), which is equally “partial” in practical terms.
• EU assessment guardrails remain: the court emphasises that the legality of “phased” consenting depends on ensuring Habitats/EIA compliance for the overall project at each stage, so remittal of part does not imply a legally fragmented environmental assessment.
• Procedural restraint on remittal directions: consistent with Crofton, the court is reluctant to micro-manage remittal unless needed; but it recognises modern procedural rules that permit stage specification.
• Integrity via file-management and reliance control: the court steers toward a functional solution—keep full publication for transparency, but ensure the remitted decision-maker does not rely on material that must be disregarded. The request for clarification from the Commission is directed precisely to that implementation detail.

3.4 Potential impact

• Normalising remittal after partial quashing: the judgment strengthens the practical proposition that partial quashing does not create a remittal “gap”. This matters for complex projects where only a discrete defect is found.
• Sharper separation of transparency vs decision-integrity: by distinguishing publication from consideration, the court signals that transparency obligations (publishing prior versions, withdrawn reports, and even quashed materials) can coexist with fair remitted decision-making—provided the Commission’s internal process prevents improper reliance.
• Remittal directions will remain exceptional: Crofton restraint remains the default, but courts now have an express procedural toolkit (O. 103 r. 36(1)) to specify stages when justified.
• Forward-looking implications for document access under newer legislation: the discussion of s. 385 of the Planning and Development Act 2024 flags potential future disputes, particularly if publication obligations appear narrower than under s. 146 of the 2000 Act.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Partial quashing: the court cancels only the unlawful portion of a planning consent, leaving the rest standing (here defined by chainage along the route).
• Remittal: sending the matter back to the planning decision-maker to reconsider it, usually to fix the legal flaw identified by the court.
• s. 50A(9) “consequential amendments”: after partial quashing, the court can adjust the surviving parts of the decision so the remainder works coherently (not used here because no party sought it).
• “In the round” vs “overall assessment at each stage”: the law does not require every element of a large project to be finally decided in one single decision, but it does require that environmental assessments consider the overall project impacts whenever any part is being approved.
• Publication vs consideration: a document may have to be publicly available for transparency (publication), yet still be excluded from what the decision-maker is allowed to rely upon in a new/remitted process (consideration).

5. Conclusion

D'Alton and Ors v An Coimisiun Pleanala and Anor [2026] IEHC 487 is a procedural but important planning-law decision. It indicates that remittal under s. 50A(9A) is available (and in principle appropriate) even where a consent is only partially quashed; it reinforces that phased project consenting is lawful where EU assessments cover the whole project at each stage; it aligns with Supreme Court guidance against over-directing remittals while acknowledging new procedural rules enabling stage specification; and it crystallises a key administrative-law distinction for remitted planning processes: transparency-driven publication duties do not dictate what materials may lawfully be relied upon when reconsidering the matter.