Date: Dec 11, 2025

R v Ahmed: Admissibility of a Third Party’s Terrorism Convictions and Preparatory Conduct to Prove a Defendant’s “Knowledge or Belief” under Terrorism Act 2000 s.38B

1. Introduction

R. v Ahmed [2025] EWCA Crim 1778 concerns a renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction following refusal by the single judge. The applicant (aged 23 at appeal) had been convicted at the Crown Court at Woolwich of two counts of failing to disclose information about acts of terrorism contrary to section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000.

The alleged non-disclosure arose from her relationship and extensive messaging contact with a young man, Al-Arfat Hassan, who presented himself in messages as intending a mass-casualty terrorist attack with a knife and/or improvised explosive device. The prosecution case was that the applicant had information which she knew or believed might be of material assistance (i) to prevent an act of terrorism (count 1) and (ii) to secure Hassan’s prosecution/conviction for terrorism-related offending (count 2), and failed to disclose it as soon as reasonably practicable.

The defence position at trial was not that she had a “reasonable excuse” for non-disclosure, but that she never possessed the requisite knowledge or belief: she said she understood Hassan as an online rap persona and did not take the messages seriously (a “fantasist” narrative).

The appeal focused on (a) the refusal of a no case to answer submission, (b) the admissibility of evidence about Hassan’s terrorism convictions and internet searches, and (c) alleged inadequacies in jury directions (including Article 9/10 ECHR, reasonable excuse, knowledge/belief, good character, and use of the disputed evidence).

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) refused leave. It held that none of the proposed grounds was arguable and that the convictions were not arguably unsafe.

No case to answer: The case turned on jury evaluation of extensive messaging material; a reasonable jury could infer the requisite knowledge/belief and “might be of material assistance”.
Admissibility: Hassan’s convictions and evidence of his internet searches/purchases were relevant to whether he was a real would-be terrorist (not a fantasist) and to the applicant’s state of mind as inferred from their exchanges; no basis for exclusion under s.78 PACE 1984.
ECHR directions: No need for a bespoke Article 9/10 direction; in any event the judge’s “Assumptions” direction sufficiently neutralised prejudice.
Reasonable excuse: Not left because it was not raised and lacked an evidential foundation.
Other directions: Knowledge/belief direction correctly distinguished suspicion; good character direction adequate; directions on the disputed evidence were adequate and proportionate.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

R v G and F [2012] EWCA Crim 1756

The Court relied on R v G and F [2012] EWCA Crim 1756 to articulate the threshold governing a “no case to answer” submission in a fact-sensitive inference case. The key point extracted was that the question is whether a reasonable jury (not all reasonable juries), properly directed and taking the prosecution case at its highest, could be entitled to draw the inference necessary to convict.

In Ahmed, the prosecution case depended on interpretation of a voluminous messaging timeline and competing contextual material. By invoking R v G and F [2012] EWCA Crim 1756, the Court confirmed that where the prosecution evidence is capable of supporting the required inference, disputes about meaning, tone, and context are quintessentially for the jury.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The “no case” challenge and the jury’s role in interpreting communications

A central theme in the judgment is that modern terrorism-related disclosure cases may be proved largely (and sometimes almost entirely) through digital communications, presented in timelines and agreed facts. The applicant argued that the prosecution’s interpretation was “tenuous” when viewed against defence-selected context. The Court treated this as a paradigmatic jury issue: determining meaning, sincerity, and the applicant’s subjective state of mind from messages.

The Court also underlined that the statutory test in s.38B is that the information “might” be of material assistance, not that it “would” be. On the Court’s analysis, admissions or assertions by Hassan of terrorist intent are plainly capable of meeting that “might assist” threshold.

(b) Count 2 and the “post-arrest opportunity” to disclose

For count 2, the defence suggested that after Hassan’s arrest the authorities already had what they needed and that nothing material depended on her disclosure, especially once her phone could be accessed. The Court rejected the premise: the applicant’s knowledge was not confined to a device; it included what was “in her head”. Moreover, the arrest could rationally strengthen the inference that she had grounds to believe Hassan’s claims, and thus that her information might assist prosecution/conviction.

(c) Admitting Hassan’s convictions and internet searches: relevance to “fantasist” versus “real” terrorist

The applicant’s defence required the jury to accept that she reasonably dismissed the content as posturing or jokes. Against that, the prosecution sought to show that Hassan was in truth a “serious would be terrorist”. The Court endorsed the trial judge’s approach: Hassan’s convictions (with short factual summaries) and his internet searches/purchases were admissible because they:

Provided necessary background to assess whether Hassan was merely performing a persona or actually engaged in terrorist preparation;
Supported the prosecution inference about what the applicant could have believed from the tenor and detail of their exchanges;
Rebutted the specific defence contention that she thought he was a fantasist (i.e., they were not led merely to show “bad character” of a non-party, but to illuminate a live issue).

Importantly, the Court accepted that the applicant did not need to have known the details of the ISIS video or chemicals for the evidence to be relevant: the evidence helped the jury decide whether the “fantasist” interpretation was plausible. The Court further held there was no basis for exclusion under s.78 PACE 1984, emphasising that fairness was protected by a clear limiting direction: Hassan’s convictions did not mean the applicant was guilty.

(d) Excluding “flip side” defence evidence

The Court upheld the exclusion of: (i) cannabis found in the car of Hassan’s brother (irrelevant and speculative as to Hassan), and (ii) evidence that Hassan sent similar jihadi-themed messages to seven other young women. On (ii), the Court’s reasoning is crisp: the jury’s task was to determine this applicant’s subjective knowledge/belief. What other recipients did or did not do, without evidence of their perceptions or reasons, did not logically bear on the applicant’s state of mind and risked collateral and confusing inquiry.

(e) Articles 9 and 10 ECHR: qualified rights and proper framing

The Court rejected the submission that prosecution under s.38B interfered with Articles 9 or 10. The reasoning rests on two linked propositions:

Articles 9 and 10 are qualified; they do not protect conduct amounting to non-disclosure of information that might prevent terrorism.
The case was not about criminalising religious discussion, but about alleged non-disclosure of information about planned terrorism.

The Court also held that a bespoke ECHR direction was unnecessary given the judge’s “Assumptions” direction, which explicitly warned against media-driven connotations of terms like “jihad” and reminded jurors of legitimate protected religious expression.

(f) “Reasonable excuse” under s.38B(4): evidential foundation required

The Court held that the statutory defence of “reasonable excuse” was not left because it was not advanced and lacked evidential support. The applicant’s case was binary: she asserted absence of the disclosure duty because she lacked knowledge/belief and did not think the information might assist. That is conceptually distinct from accepting the duty arose but claiming an excuse for not complying.

The Court’s approach reinforces orthodox criminal practice: a judge should not leave a defence to the jury in the absence of an evidential basis (here, for example, no medical evidence suggested incapacity to disclose).

(g) Knowledge/belief direction: suspicion is not enough

The Court approved the direction distinguishing mere suspicion from knowledge/belief, while permitting the jury to consider “shutting one’s eyes” as potentially evidential of belief when deciding what the applicant truly thought. The Court treated this as appropriately tailored: the pivotal factual question was whether she believed Hassan’s expressed intentions.

(h) Good character and directions on the disputed evidence

The Court rejected complaints that the good character direction was “lost in the narrative” and found it conventional and adequate, especially as the judge later reminded the jury of the supporting evidence in the summing up.

On the disputed evidence (Hassan’s convictions and searches), the Court accepted the judge struck the correct balance: he noted the limited nature of Hassan’s convictions and made clear the applicant’s lack of knowledge of searches/purchases, while allowing the jury to use the material for the legitimate purpose of understanding Hassan’s reality and thus evaluating the applicant’s claimed disbelief.

3.3 Impact

Although this is a leave decision rather than a full merits appeal, it is significant in the following practical ways:

Contextual admissibility in s.38B trials: Where the defence runs a “fantasist/persona” case, courts are likely to admit cogent evidence showing the communicator’s real-world terrorist engagement (including convictions and preparatory searches), subject to careful limiting directions.
Digital-message cases remain jury-centric: Even where voluminous communications can support competing interpretations, appellate courts will be slow to characterise the prosecution case as “tenuous” if it is capable of supporting the necessary inference.
Article 9/10 arguments require focus: Courts will distinguish protected religious/expression debate from discussion of planned violence and from statutory duties to disclose potentially preventative information.
Reasonable excuse must be properly raised: Defendants cannot expect a “reasonable excuse” route to be left to the jury without an evidential platform and a case theory consistent with that defence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 38B Terrorism Act 2000 (failing to disclose information): Creates an offence where a person has information they know or believe might materially assist (a) preventing terrorism, or (b) securing prosecution/conviction for terrorism offences, and they fail to disclose to police as soon as reasonably practicable.
“Might be of material assistance”: A low(er) threshold than “would assist”. The question is whether the information could realistically help authorities, not whether it would have changed the outcome.
Knowledge or belief vs suspicion: Suspicion is an uneasy feeling that something may be true; belief is acceptance that it is true. Jurors must be sure the defendant believed or knew the information might assist, not merely that they had a vague worry.
No case to answer: A mid-trial legal submission that the prosecution evidence is insufficient for any reasonable jury to convict. If a reasonable jury could convict on one view of the evidence, the case proceeds.
s.78 PACE 1984: Gives the trial judge power to exclude prosecution evidence if admitting it would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings that it ought not to be admitted.
Articles 9 and 10 ECHR (qualified rights): Protect freedom of religion and expression, but allow lawful restrictions for public safety and prevention of crime. They do not provide immunity from disclosure duties aimed at preventing terrorism.
“Reasonable excuse” (s.38B(4)): A statutory defence: even if the duty to disclose arose, the defendant may avoid liability if they had a reasonable excuse. It must be supported by evidence before it is left to the jury.

5. Conclusion

R v Ahmed confirms a robust, practical approach to s.38B prosecutions built on digital communications: where the jury must assess whether a defendant truly believed another’s violent messaging, appellate courts will treat competing interpretations as matters for the jury unless no reasonable jury could convict.

The decision also underscores that, in a “fantasist” defence, the prosecution may properly adduce reliable evidence that the principal was in fact engaged in terrorism-related activity (including convictions and preparatory searches), provided fairness is safeguarded by clear limiting directions. Article 9/10 arguments will gain no traction where the case concerns non-disclosure of potentially preventative information rather than the mere expression of religious or political views, and “reasonable excuse” will not be left absent an evidential foundation.