Summary of Opinion by Judge Spencer

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was tried before Judge Kinch and a jury at The Court and, on 25 April 2024, was convicted of two counts of failing to disclose information about acts of terrorism, contrary to section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000. On 16 July 2024 the trial judge sentenced the Appellant to 12 months' custody suspended for two years, with a 12‑month licence period; because the offences were listed in Schedule 6 to the Counter Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 the sentence took the form of a suspended special custodial sentence for an offender of particular concern pursuant to section 28 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Community requirements and a ten‑year notification requirement under the Counter Terrorism Act 2008 were imposed.

The offences arose from the Appellant's contact with the Defendant. The prosecution alleged that between November 2021 and March 2022 the Defendant revealed intentions and plans to commit a mass casualty attack and that the Appellant had information which she knew or believed might be of material assistance to prevent such an act (count 1) and, after the Defendant's arrest on 9 March 2022 and remand to The Prison, information which might assist in his prosecution or conviction (count 2). The Appellant did not disclose the relevant messages to the police and continued contact with the Defendant until at least 31 March 2022 when her phone was seized.

The Defendant had been previously convicted (in separate proceedings) of offences relating to possession of terrorist material and later pleaded guilty to possessing articles for a terrorist purpose (relating to chemicals). The Appellant's trial involved extensive prosecution and defence timelines comprising thousands of entries and contemporaneous communications.

The Appellant applied for leave to appeal against conviction; a single judge refused leave and this is a renewed application for leave to appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the submission of no case to answer should have been upheld (i.e. whether, taking the prosecution case at its highest, a reasonable jury could properly convict).
2. Whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant's prior convictions and related factual summaries (ground 2) and internet searches/purchases for chemicals and knives (ground 3).
3. Whether the trial judge erred in excluding certain defence evidence (cannabis found in a relative's car and messages the Defendant sent to other women) (ground 4).
4. Whether the judge failed to give appropriate directions regarding Articles 9 and 10 ECHR and should have left the statutory defence of "reasonable excuse" (ground 5).
5. Whether directions on knowledge or belief (ground 6), the good character direction (ground 7), and directions concerning the Defendant's convictions and searches (ground 8) were inadequate.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Attorney Brimelow)

• The prosecution case was tenuous and conflicted with other evidence; on Galbraith there was no case to answer.
• The Defendant's prior convictions and searches were irrelevant to the Appellant's state of mind and wrongly admitted.
• Excluded defence evidence would have shown the Defendant was not a genuine extremist and was therefore relevant to the Appellant's belief.
• The trial judge failed to direct the jury properly on Articles 9 and 10 ECHR and should have left the statutory defence of reasonable excuse.
• The judge's directions on knowledge/belief, good character, and the use of the Defendant's convictions/searches were inadequate and prejudicial.

Respondent's Arguments (Prosecution; Attorney Sandiford)

• There was extensive direct evidence in the prosecution timeline from which a reasonable jury could infer the Appellant's requisite knowledge or belief.
• The Defendant's convictions and internet searches were relevant to show he was radicalised and to rebut the Appellant's claim that she treated his assertions as fantasy.
• Excluded defence items were irrelevant to the Appellant's subjective state of mind and thus properly excluded.
• The judge's directions adequately addressed Articles 9 and 10 and the statutory defence was not raised or supported by evidence.
• The jury directions on knowledge/belief, good character and the Defendant's background were legally sufficient and appropriately tailored to the facts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered each ground in turn and upheld the single judge's refusal of leave to appeal for the following reasons.

Ground 1 (no case to answer): The court applied the test from R v G and F and concluded that issues of interpretation of the extensive prosecution and defence timelines were questions of fact for the jury. The prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, could support a reasonable jury's inference that the Appellant had the requisite knowledge or belief for both counts. In relation to "material assistance" the court emphasised the statutory wording ("might" be of material assistance) and concluded the Defendant's admissions to the Appellant could have been of material assistance. Arguments based on Articles 9 and 10 were rejected as the offences charged concerned planned terrorism rather than mere religious discussion. The court also rejected the contention that, after the Defendant's arrest and disclosure of the phone PIN, there was nothing further the Appellant could have done; the court observed relevant information also resided in the Appellant's knowledge.

Grounds 2 and 3 (admission of Defendant's convictions and internet searches): The court agreed the convictions and brief factual summaries were admissible to show the Defendant was radicalised and thus relevant to the Appellant's state of mind; they also rebutted the Appellant's claim that she regarded him as a fantasist. The internet searches and purchases were similarly admissible to show the Defendant's seriousness and the possible material assistance of the Appellant's information. The court held there was no basis under section 78 PACE to exclude this relevant evidence and that trial fairness was preserved by appropriate jury directions.

Ground 4 (excluded defence evidence): The court held the cannabis found in a relative's car had no evidential connection to the Defendant and was irrelevant. Messages to other young women were inadmissible because they were not probative of the Appellant's subjective state of mind; there was no evidence what those women thought or why they took no action.

Ground 5 (Article 9/10 directions and reasonable excuse): The court found the judge's directions, including an explicit warning that terms like "jihad" can have legitimate religious meaning, were sufficient to prevent misconception. The statutory defence of reasonable excuse was not raised by the Appellant, carried an evidential burden on her, and there was no evidence (for example medical evidence) to support it; exclusion of that point was therefore proper.

Ground 6 (knowledge or belief direction): The judge's direction made clear that suspicion alone was insufficient while explaining how other matters could be taken into account; the court found this to be a proper, fact‑tailored direction.

Ground 7 (good character direction): The judge gave a conventional good character direction and later reminded the jury of the Appellant's evidence and witnesses; the court rejected the submission that the point was lost in the narrative.

Ground 8 (directions regarding the Defendant's convictions and searches): The judge appropriately treated the Defendant's convictions and searches as a discrete topic, distinguished what the Appellant knew from material she did not know, and avoided confusing the jury by reference to offences not pursued; the direction was adequate.

Holding and Implications

The renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction is refused.

Direct consequences: the Appellant's convictions and sentence, including the suspended special custodial sentence, the community requirements and the ten‑year notification obligations, remain in force. The court concluded none of the grounds raised an arguable basis to render the convictions unsafe and the trial was not unfair. The opinion did not purport to establish any new legal precedent beyond applying existing principles to the facts of this case.