Private Rented Sector Offers Automatically End the Main Housing Duty on Acceptance or Refusal

1. Introduction

In R (on the application of Bano) v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2026] UKSC 22, the United Kingdom Supreme Court clarified when a local housing authority’s “main housing duty” under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 comes to an end after a private rented sector offer.

The appellant, a homeless applicant with children, had been accepted by the respondent authority as being owed the main housing duty. The authority later offered her private rented accommodation in Derby. She refused the offer and did not request a statutory review within 21 days. Years later, she sought judicial review, arguing that the duty had never ended because the authority had not made and notified a later decision that the offer had been accepted or refused and that the duty had ceased.

The central issue was whether section 193(7AA) requires a further post-offer decision by the authority, or whether the duty ends automatically when the applicant accepts or refuses a compliant private rented sector offer.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that:

  • Under section 193(7AA), the main housing duty ceases automatically when an applicant accepts or refuses a compliant private rented sector offer.
  • The local authority does not need to make a further decision after acceptance or refusal, nor does it need to notify the applicant of such a further decision.
  • The offer letter itself is the reviewable decision for the purposes of section 202, because it records the authority’s decision that the offer will bring the main housing duty to an end if accepted or refused.
  • The appellant could have requested a review under section 202 within 21 days, including on the ground that the offer letter was defective because it failed fully to explain the effect of section 195A.
  • Because a suitable statutory remedy had been available, judicial review was inappropriate.
  • However, later letters from the authority merely confirming its earlier position did not create fresh review rights. On that point, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning was corrected.

3. Precedents Cited and Their Role

3.1 Review procedure and the scope of statutory review

The Court relied on earlier authorities explaining that a section 202 review is not narrow or purely historical. In Mohamed v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [2001] UKHL 57; [2002] 1 AC 547 and Sahardid v Camden London Borough Council [2004] EWCA Civ 1485; [2005] HLR 11, the courts held that reviewing authorities may consider matters arising after the original decision.

These cases supported the Supreme Court’s view that the statutory review scheme is intended to be a practical and substantive remedy. It was therefore a suitable route by which the appellant could have challenged the offer letter and its consequences.

3.2 County court appeals and judicial review

In Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2003] UKHL 5; [2003] 2 AC 430, the House of Lords explained that a county court appeal under section 204 is appellate in form but similar in substance to judicial review. The judgment also referred to Nipa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 306, where the Court of Appeal described the legislative policy as transferring much homelessness decision-review work from the High Court to the county court.

These authorities reinforced the conclusion that the statutory review and appeal scheme should normally be used instead of judicial review.

3.3 Alternative remedy principle

The Supreme Court referred to R (Glencore Energy UK Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] EWCA Civ 1716; [2017] 4 WLR 213, where Sales LJ described judicial review as a remedy of last resort where Parliament has provided a specialist statutory procedure.

It also referred to In re McAleenon [2024] UKSC 31; [2025] AC 1362, which reaffirmed that where Parliament has created a statutory appeal route, that route will ordinarily be treated as a suitable alternative remedy.

Applying those principles, the appellant’s failure to request a section 202 review within time prevented her from later using judicial review to reopen the same issue.

3.4 Decisions that a housing duty has ceased

The Court examined Warsame v Hounslow London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 696. In that case, the Court of Appeal held that a local authority decision that it no longer owes the main housing duty is reviewable under section 202(1)(b), because it is a decision about what duty is owed.

The Supreme Court accepted that principle, but distinguished it from the present issue. Warsame did not decide that a further post-refusal decision is always required before the duty can cease.

The Court also considered Ravichandran v Lewisham London Borough Council [2010] EWCA Civ 755, [2011] PTSR 117. The Court of Appeal in that case had suggested that a decision that a duty had ended could be reviewable even if only confirmatory of an automatic discharge. The Supreme Court accepted that an offer letter may be reviewable, but rejected the idea that later purely confirmatory letters create fresh review rights.

In Wandsworth LBC v Young [2025] EWCA Civ 1336; [2026] PTSR 729, the Court of Appeal had held that the legislation does not impose a duty to notify an applicant of a right to review a decision that the main housing duty has been discharged. The Supreme Court’s reasoning is consistent with that approach.

3.5 Defective private rented sector offers

Norton v Haringey London Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1340; [2022] PTSR 1802 was important because it held that failure to give the required statutory information about section 195A can prevent a private rented sector offer from ending the main housing duty.

The respondent authority accepted that its offer letter had failed fully to explain section 195A(2), and that a timely review would probably have succeeded. But because no timely review was requested, the decision stood.

3.6 Statutory interpretation authorities

The Court cited several modern statutory interpretation cases: R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3; [2023] AC 255, News Corp UK & Ireland Ltd v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2023] UKSC 7; [2024] AC 89, R (N3) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 6; [2025] AC 1473, Darwall v Dartmoor National Park Authority [2025] UKSC 20; [2025] AC 1292, and X v Lord Advocate [2025] UKSC 44; [2026] 2 WLR 43.

These cases supported the orthodox approach: the court must interpret statutory words in their context and in light of the purpose of the legislation.

3.7 Absurdity and practical consequences

The appellant argued that automatic cessation would produce unfair or absurd results. The Court considered R (PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] UKSC 28; [2023] 1 WLR 2594, which recognises that courts should avoid interpretations leading to unworkable or impracticable outcomes.

The Court rejected the argument. It held that the statutory scheme remained workable: applicants can accept an offer and still request a review of suitability, and authorities can extend time for review where appropriate.

3.8 Procedural fairness and communication of decisions

The appellant and Shelter relied on R (Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 36; [2004] 1 AC 604, which establishes that an adverse administrative decision generally must be communicated before it can take legal effect against the person affected.

The Supreme Court held that this principle did not assist the appellant because the offer letter itself communicated the relevant decision: namely that the offer would end the main housing duty if accepted or refused.

3.9 Missing offer letters

The Court referred to Khan v D'Aubigny [2025] EWCA Civ 11; [2025] Ch 168 in discussing whether section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 might deem an offer letter served by post. The Supreme Court did not decide the point finally, but held that, in this statutory context, the applicant must actually receive the offer before it can be accepted or refused.

3.10 Academic appeals

The appeal had become academic for the appellant personally because she had later obtained accommodation. The Court nevertheless decided the appeal, applying the approach in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Salem [1999] 1 AC 450, because the issue was of public importance and likely to affect many homelessness cases.

4. Legal Reasoning

4.1 The wording of section 193(7AA)

The Court began with the statutory text. Section 193(7AA) says that the authority “shall also cease to be subject” to the duty if the applicant accepts or refuses a private rented sector offer after being informed in writing of the required matters.

The provision does not say that the authority must “decide”, “determine”, or “be satisfied” after the applicant’s response. Nor does it require a later notification. The Court considered that omission deliberate.

4.2 Contrast with section 193(5)

Section 193(5), dealing with certain non-Part 6 and non-private rented sector accommodation, expressly requires the authority to notify the applicant that it regards itself as ceasing to be subject to the duty.

The absence of equivalent wording in section 193(7AA) strongly indicated that Parliament did not intend a further notification requirement for private rented sector offers.

4.3 The offer letter as the reviewable decision

The Court held that the offer letter is not merely a statement of future intention. It is the authority’s operative decision that the offer satisfies the statutory requirements and will end the duty if accepted or refused.

Therefore, the 21-day time limit for requesting a review under section 202 runs from notification of the offer letter.

4.4 No fresh right from confirmatory letters

The Supreme Court rejected the idea that later letters repeating the authority’s view generate new review rights. Allowing confirmatory letters to restart time would undermine the statutory objective of finality and would bypass the authority’s discretion to extend time.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Main housing duty

This is the duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 requiring a local housing authority to secure that accommodation is available for a qualifying homeless applicant.

Private rented sector offer

This is an offer of an assured shorthold tenancy from a private landlord, approved by the authority, usually for at least 12 months, made with the aim of ending the authority’s homelessness duty.

Section 202 review

This is the statutory internal review mechanism by which an applicant can challenge homelessness decisions, including suitability of accommodation and whether a duty is owed.

Suitable alternative remedy

If Parliament has provided a specific statutory route to challenge a decision, such as a section 202 review followed by a section 204 county court appeal, the High Court will usually refuse judicial review.

Automatic cessation

This means the legal duty ends because the statutory conditions have occurred, without the authority needing to make a further decision afterwards.

6. Impact of the Judgment

The decision is significant for homelessness law. It gives local authorities clarity that, where a compliant private rented sector offer is made, the main housing duty ends automatically on acceptance or refusal.

For applicants, the judgment underlines the importance of acting quickly. If an applicant wishes to challenge the suitability or validity of a private rented sector offer, they should request a section 202 review within 21 days of receiving the offer letter.

The judgment also limits attempts to reopen old homelessness decisions through later correspondence. A later letter confirming the authority’s previous position will not normally create a fresh right of review.

However, the Court preserved important safeguards. If an offer letter is not received, there can be no acceptance or refusal, so the duty will not cease. If a later substantive decision is made on a separate reviewable matter, that decision may itself be challenged.

7. Conclusion

The Supreme Court established that a private rented sector offer under section 193(7AA) can itself be the operative and reviewable decision that brings the main housing duty to an end upon acceptance or refusal. No further decision or notification is required.

The key lesson is procedural: applicants must use the section 202 review mechanism promptly. Judicial review will not normally be available where that statutory remedy was available but not used.