Ravichandran & Anor v London Borough of Lewisham

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an order of Her Honour Judge Faber in the Central London County Court dated 13 October 2009, dismissing the appellants' appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 ("the 1996 Act") against a review decision by the respondent local housing authority, the London Borough of Lewisham ("Lewisham"). Lewisham had upheld its decision that it no longer owed a duty to the appellants under section 193 of the 1996 Act.

The appellants were homeless, eligible for assistance, in priority need, and not intentionally homeless, thereby initially entitled to accommodation under section 193(1) and (2). Lewisham provided temporary accommodation at 74 Bell Green, London SE26. Subsequently, Lewisham made a final written offer of permanent accommodation under Part VI of the 1996 Act at a three-bedroom flat in Wakelin House, Brockley Park, London SE23.

The appellants refused the offer, citing medical issues and alleged racial abuse experienced during a viewing of the property. They requested a review under section 202 of the suitability of the accommodation. Lewisham conducted an initial review upholding the suitability and reasonableness of the offer and decided to discharge its duty under section 193(7). The appellants challenged this decision, raising further concerns including racial harassment, which were not addressed in the initial review. A subsequent review was conducted but again did not consider the racial abuse allegations. The appellants appealed the review decision, which was dismissed by Judge Faber. The present appeal challenges that dismissal and the legal basis for Lewisham's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether Lewisham was entitled to rely on section 193(5) of the 1996 Act to discharge its duty when the offer made was expressly under section 193(7).
2. Whether the review decision properly took into account the appellants' allegations of racial abuse in assessing the suitability and reasonableness of the accommodation offer under section 193(7).
3. Whether the judge correctly applied the decision in Omar v Birmingham City Council regarding the interplay between sections 193(5) and 193(7).
4. The nature and scope of the review rights under section 202 in relation to the cessation of duty under section 193(7), including the timing and content of such reviews.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The May 2009 review was flawed because Lewisham was not entitled to rely on section 193(5) when the offer was made under section 193(7).
• The review failed to consider the racial abuse suffered by the appellants during the property viewing, which was relevant to both suitability and reasonableness of the offer.
• The decision-maker erred in concluding that the racial abuse allegation was irrelevant to the suitability assessment.
• The judge misapplied the precedent set in Omar v Birmingham City Council.

Respondent's Arguments

• The initial review decision included consideration that the offer was reasonable for the appellants to accept.
• Even if the reasonableness was considered separately, it would not have changed the outcome.
• The review concerned the discharge of duty under section 193(5) as well as section 193(7), relying on the Court of Appeal decision in Omar v Birmingham City Council.
• The racial abuse allegations were not material to the discharge decision under section 193(5).

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by distinguishing the statutory provisions governing offers of temporary accommodation under section 193(5) and permanent accommodation under section 193(7). It emphasized that the requirements for discharge of duty differ significantly between these subsections, particularly noting that section 193(7F) imposes a dual requirement that the accommodation be suitable and that it would be reasonable for the applicant to accept it.

The court rejected the respondent's reliance on Omar v Birmingham City Council as binding authority for treating an offer expressly made under section 193(7) as if it were made under section 193(5). It held that the reasoning in Omar was limited to its facts, where the offer did not specify under which subsection it was made, and that it was not authority for the proposition that a failure to satisfy the reasonableness requirement under section 193(7F) can be circumvented by relying on section 193(5).

The court underscored the importance of clarity from local authorities in specifying under which subsection an offer is made, to avoid confusion and unfairness.

The court further analyzed the review rights under section 202, concluding that applicants are entitled to review not only of suitability but also of the reasonableness requirement and of the authority's decision to discharge its duty following refusal of an offer. It found that in this case, the initial review did not address the reasonableness requirement properly, nor did it consider the racial abuse allegations, which were relevant to both suitability and reasonableness.

The court held that the later review decision, which purported to confirm discharge of duty, also failed to take into account the racial abuse allegations despite their relevance and prior occurrence before refusal of the offer. This omission constituted a procedural flaw.

Finally, the court acknowledged the procedural difficulties faced by Judge Faber, who delivered her judgment within a restricted timeframe, and recommended that where time is limited, judges should reserve judgment to ensure thorough consideration of complex legal issues.

Holding and Implications

The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL.

The court ruled that Lewisham was not entitled to rely on section 193(5) to discharge its duty when the offer was expressly made under section 193(7), and that the reasonableness requirement under section 193(7F) must be properly considered. The court found that the reviews conducted by Lewisham were defective for failing to consider relevant evidence, including allegations of racial abuse, which impacted both suitability and reasonableness.

As a result, the decision to discharge the housing duty was set aside, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration in accordance with the clarified legal principles.

No new precedent was established beyond clarification and application of existing case law. The decision emphasizes the necessity for local authorities to clearly specify statutory basis for accommodation offers and to thoroughly consider all relevant factors, including personal circumstances and allegations raised by applicants, in their review decisions under the Housing Act 1996.