Pre-s.15C Naturalisation Refusals: Duty to Give Intelligible Reasons and to Consider Exceptional Circumstances in “Continuous Residence”

Case: Ozkaya v The Minister For Justice (Approved)
Citation: [2026] IEHC 268
Court: High Court of Ireland
Judge: Gearty J.
Date: 9 March 2026

1. Introduction

This judicial review concerned a refusal of a certificate of naturalisation under s.15 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (as applicable before the commencement of s.15C on 31 July 2023). The applicant, a Turkish national resident in Ireland since 2016, applied for naturalisation on 8 March 2022. The Minister refused the application on 14 September 2023 on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy the requirement of one year’s “continuous residence” immediately preceding the application.

The challenge focused on two core themes:

  • Misapplication of the “continuous residence” test and failure to consider relevant matters, particularly asserted exceptional family circumstances and COVID-19-related travel disruption; and
  • Inadequate and misleading reasons, including reference to a “residency calculator” that was not attached and, in fact, did not exist, and the absence of any explanation as to how the applicant’s representations were treated.

The applicant also sought an extension of time under O.84, r.21 RSC, having issued outside the time limit, contending it was reasonable to await responses to post-decision letters seeking clarification.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Gearty J.:

  • Extended time to bring the judicial review application (O.84, r.21 RSC), applying the principles in Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v. Health Products Regulatory Authority [2022] IECA 109.
  • Quashed the refusal decision by certiorari on two grounds:
    • Inadequate reasons (including a misleading reference to a non-existent “residency calculator” and absence of an intelligible explanation); and
    • Failure to consider relevant matters, notably whether exceptional circumstances warranted discretion under the pre-s.15C regime.
  • Remitted the matter under O.84, r.27(4) RSC to the Minister for reconsideration:
    • Applying the law in force at the time of the original application (pre-s.15C); and
    • Permitting consideration of relevant matters for discretion, including residence since March 2022.

The Court rejected the Minister’s “practical utility” submission that remittal would be pointless because refusal was inevitable given the scale of absences.

3. Analysis

3.1 Statutory and policy setting: pre-s.15C “continuous residence” and discretion

Section 15(1)(c) of the 1956 Act required one year’s “continuous residence” immediately preceding the application (alongside a broader multi-year residence condition). The Court emphasised that, at the relevant time, there was no statutory specification of how many days’ absence were permissible in that year.

The evidence disclosed an administrative backdrop:

  • a historic tolerance of roughly six weeks for ordinary travel; and
  • a further, non-quantified possibility of discretion for exceptional circumstances (e.g., illness abroad, work travel).

The judgment also noted a publicly stated “FAQ” indicating that a pragmatic approach would be taken for COVID-19 disruption—an important feature because the applicant relied on pandemic-related impediments to returning. A central legal failure identified by the Court was that the decision did not transparently articulate the operative policy or explain how (or whether) such considerations were assessed.

While s.15C (inserted by the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2023) later introduced explicit limits (70 days plus up to 30 for exceptional circumstances), Gearty J. treated this as context rather than a governing rule: the applicant’s case pre-dated commencement and therefore remained within the pre-s.15C discretionary landscape.

3.2 Precedents cited and their influence

(a) Jones v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IECA 285

The Court adopted Jones as the leading authority on the meaning of “continuous residence” in the naturalisation context:

  • “Continuous” does not require literal uninterrupted presence or a complete travel ban.
  • However, it imposes a stricter physical-presence emphasis than the multi-year residence criterion.
  • In Jones, 79 days of holiday absences were held capable of grounding a lawful refusal, underscoring that “continuous” must be given “real meaning”.

Gearty J. did not treat Jones as supplying a numerical threshold for all cases. Instead, it functioned as an interpretive anchor: physical presence matters greatly, but the decision-maker must still lawfully apply the test, including consideration of any discretion that exists in the applicable regime.

(b) Hicsonmez v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2025] IEHC 436

Both sides relied on Hicsonmez, but Gearty J. distinguished it because it was governed by s.15C. Under s.15C, discretion exists within a defined corridor (70 days + up to 30 for exceptional circumstances), and Hicsonmez involved absences (177 days) far beyond that statutory range.

The key doctrinal contrast drawn by Gearty J. was:

  • In the s.15C world, there is an express statutory “outer limit” to the exceptional-circumstances discretion.
  • In the pre-s.15C world, there is no express demarcation; the Minister cannot treat an undefined discretion as though it is irrelevant or non-existent without engaging with the representations and explaining why discretion will not be exercised.

(c) Reasons and fair procedures: Mallak v. Minister for Justice, R (Ermakov) v. SSHD, 1996 All E.R. 3021, and M.N.N. v. Minister for Justice [2020] IECA 187

The judgment applied established Irish administrative law principles:

  • Reasons must be given in a form that enables the affected person to understand why they lost and to consider whether to challenge (Mallak v. Minister for Justice).
  • Reasons cannot be retrofitted by litigation affidavits; post hoc rationalisations do not cure an absence of intelligible reasons (R (Ermakov) v. SSHD, 1996 All E.R. 3021 was invoked as part of the “no retrospective reasons” theme).
  • Even though naturalisation is a “privilege”, applicants are not entitled to inferior legal protection; submissions must be accurately captured and considered (M.N.N. v. Minister for Justice [2020] IECA 187).

These authorities underpinned the Court’s conclusion that a bare statement of ineligibility, coupled with an erroneous reference to a “calculator”, was legally inadequate—particularly where the applicant had advanced a specific exceptional-circumstances explanation.

(d) Extension of time: Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v. Health Products Regulatory Authority [2022] IECA 109

Applying Arthropharm, the Court weighed multiple factors, including:

  • the conduct of both parties and comparative “blameworthiness”;
  • steps taken after the decision (here, two letters seeking clarification);
  • the significance of the impugned decision for the applicant; and
  • the public interest in prompt public law litigation.

Although the applicant’s letters contained an incorrect reference number, the Court found the respondent’s failure to provide meaningful reasons, to identify the operative policy, and to respond in any way to correspondence was more blameworthy in context; time was extended to the filing date.

3.3 Legal reasoning: what, precisely, made the decision unlawful?

(a) Inadequate (and misleading) reasons

The refusal letter did not explain:

  • how the absence days were calculated (beyond an implied conclusion);
  • what policy or thresholds were applied; or
  • whether the applicant’s asserted exceptional circumstances were considered and, if so, why rejected.

The decision was also affirmatively problematic because it referred to and purported to attach a “residency calculator” that was neither attached nor existed. The Court treated this as materially undermining the intelligibility and candour of the decision-making record communicated to the applicant.

Affidavit evidence from a non-decision-maker (that the days were calculated by a clerical officer and refusal followed because absences were extensive) could not supply the missing reasoning, nor cure the defect that the communicated decision gave the applicant no meaningful basis to understand or test the lawfulness of refusal.

(b) Failure to consider discretion and relevant considerations in the pre-s.15C regime

The Court accepted that “continuous residence” is demanding and that 159 days’ absence is substantial. The unlawfulness lay elsewhere: the Minister proceeded as if the magnitude of the absences meant that discretion did not arise, without demonstrating any engagement with:

  • the reasons for the absences (family illness and travel impediments);
  • the Department’s own stated practice of discretionary allowances for exceptional circumstances; and
  • the public COVID-19 “pragmatic approach” indication on the relevant website.

In a regime without a statutory cap (unlike s.15C), the Minister could ultimately still refuse, but had to do so through a process that (i) considered the representations and (ii) explained why they were insufficient.

(c) Fair procedures as a cumulative failure

Gearty J. treated the procedural unfairness as cumulative: misleading reference to a tool that did not exist, opacity as to applicable standards, non-engagement with exceptional circumstances, and failure to respond to letters seeking clarification. Even acknowledging the misnumbering of the letters, the Court regarded it as a significant administrative failure that no response issued (even a basic notification that the file could not be located).

(d) “Practical utility” and remittal

The Minister argued that remittal was futile because the absences were so extensive that refusal was inevitable. The Court rejected that submission on two related bases:

  • Legality and process matter: the applicant is entitled to a lawful decision with fair procedures and reasons, even if refusal is likely.
  • Non-inevitability in discretionary contexts: under the pre-s.15C regime, the Minister may lawfully consider relevant circumstances, including subsequent residence history when exercising discretion, rather than treating the matter as “frozen in time” solely by reference to the twelve-month window.

Importantly, the Court did not direct any particular substantive outcome and expressly declined to assess the merits of granting naturalisation.

3.4 Impact

(a) Practical effect for pre-31 July 2023 applications

Although the judgment states it does not set a direct precedent for post-2023 cases (because s.15C now governs many applications), it is significant for:

  • legacy applications assessed under the pre-s.15C framework; and
  • any decision where the Minister invokes “continuous residence” without a statutory numeric threshold and where a claim of exceptional circumstances is advanced.

The decision reinforces that, absent an express statutory cap, the Minister must not collapse assessment into a purely arithmetic exercise without addressing whether discretion exists and, if so, why it is not exercised.

(b) Reasons discipline in high-volume administrative decision-making

The Court’s criticism of the “residency calculator” reference signals a broader administrative law lesson: standard-form refusal letters and automated/templated reasoning must still be accurate, transparent, and tethered to the actual decision path taken. A reference to non-existent material is not merely a technical error; it can render the decision unintelligible and procedurally unfair.

(c) COVID-19 policy statements and legitimate administrative expectations

The judgment stops short of a full “legitimate expectation” analysis, but treats public-facing statements (the COVID-19 “pragmatic approach” FAQ) as relevant context that the decision-maker must engage with and either apply or rationally distinguish. This encourages consistency between published guidance and individual decisions, or at minimum an explanation for departure.

(d) Time extensions where the decision-maker fails to clarify reasons

The extension of time analysis shows that where an affected person promptly seeks clarification and the public authority’s own failures contribute to delay or opacity, a court may be more willing to extend time under O.84, r.21—particularly where the consequences for the individual are significant.

4. Complex concepts simplified

  • “Continuous residence” (naturalisation): Not “never leaving Ireland”, but a stricter test than ordinary residence; physical presence in the immediately preceding year is given heavy weight.
  • Discretion (pre-s.15C): Where the statute does not fix a numeric threshold, the Minister may operate policies (e.g., six-week tolerance) and consider exceptional circumstances. The key is that the Minister must actually consider the representations and explain the outcome.
  • Duty to give reasons: The decision must tell the affected person, in a meaningful way, why they lost—enough to decide whether there is a basis to challenge. Reasons generally cannot be invented later in court affidavits.
  • Certiorari and remittal: Certiorari quashes an unlawful decision; remittal sends the matter back to the original decision-maker to decide again lawfully, without the court substituting its own view on the merits.
  • Extension of time in judicial review: Courts weigh multiple factors (including fault, prejudice, public interest in promptness, and the seriousness of the impact) rather than applying a single rigid test.

5. Conclusion

[2026] IEHC 268 is a pointed administrative law reminder in the naturalisation context: even where “continuous residence” is stringent and absences are substantial, the Minister must provide intelligible and accurate reasons, must consider relevant representations (including exceptional circumstances and applicable published guidance), and must not proceed on the premise that discretion is irrelevant merely because the arithmetic looks unfavourable. The High Court quashed the refusal and remitted the matter for lawful reconsideration under the pre-s.15C regime, while also extending time due to the overall procedural deficiencies and the parties’ post-decision conduct.