Non-receipt of a Properly Served Improvement Notice May Constitute a “Reasonable Excuse” under Housing Act 2004 s.30

Case: Manchester City Council v Tabbasam
Citation: [2026] EWCA Civ 361
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Date: 26 March 2026

1. Introduction

This appeal addressed a narrow but practically important question for housing enforcement: where a local authority validly serves an improvement notice at the landlord’s address for service as recorded at HM Land Registry (here, the tenanted property), can the landlord nonetheless have a “reasonable excuse” for failing to comply because the notice was never in fact received?

The appellant was Manchester City Council (the “Council”). The respondent was Ms Naila Tabbasam, landlord and registered proprietor of 58 Ollier Avenue. After tenant complaints of disrepair (including a category 1 hazard: inadequate heating), the Council served an Improvement Notice and later imposed a financial penalty for non-compliance. Ms Tabbasam’s case was that she did not receive the communications because (a) service was directed to the tenanted property (Ollier Avenue) and (b) letters sent to a council tax address (Barlow Road) did not reach her; she had lived elsewhere (Kedlestone Avenue) since 2014, and the tenants did not forward correspondence.

The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) upheld the offence under Housing Act 2004 (“HA 2004”) s.30 and rejected reasonable excuse, largely on the basis that Ms Tabbasam could not rely on her own failure to keep the Land Registry address updated. The Upper Tribunal (UT) allowed Ms Tabbasam’s appeal. The Council then appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Key issue

• Whether non-receipt of a validly served improvement notice can found a reasonable excuse defence under HA 2004 s.30(4)/(5), even where the notice was served at the landlord’s Land Registry address for service and the landlord could have reduced the risk of non-receipt by providing an alternative address.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Council’s appeal. It held that:

• The FTT erred in law by treating Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council v Tanna [2017] EWCA Civ 50 (“Tanna”) as establishing that a landlord cannot rely on their own failure to update Land Registry details as a reasonable excuse.
• Tanna concerned valid service and the extent of a local authority’s duty to make inquiries, not the separate statutory defence of reasonable excuse.
• The UT judge was entitled, on the accepted facts, to find that Ms Tabbasam had a reasonable excuse because she never received the improvement notice, and the fact that she used the tenanted property as an address for service was not inherently wrongful or negligent.
• Proper service under Local Government Act 1972 s.233 establishes the offence element (service), but it does not foreclose reliance on non-receipt to establish the statutory defence of reasonable excuse.

3. Analysis

A. Legislative framework and the structure of liability

The decision turns on maintaining the conceptual separation between: (1) service (an element of the offence) and (2) reasonable excuse (a statutory defence).

• HA 2004 s.30(1): once an improvement notice has become operative, the person served commits an offence if they fail to comply.
• HA 2004 s.30(4)/(5): provides a defence of reasonable excuse for failing to comply.
• HA 2004 s.249A and Schedule 13A: enable financial penalties and set notice of intent/final notice procedures.
• Local Government Act 1972 s.233: governs service by local authorities; service may be effected by post to the person’s “proper address”, defined as their “last known address”.

The Court of Appeal accepted (as all parties did) that the improvement notice was correctly served. The determinative question was whether Ms Tabbasam proved (to the civil standard) the defence.

B. Precedents cited (and how they influenced the outcome)

1) Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council v Tanna [2017] EWCA Civ 50

The FTT treated Tanna as effectively barring a landlord from relying on their own failure to update Land Registry details as a reasonable excuse. The Court of Appeal held this was a misreading.

In Tanna, the issue was whether service of a planning notice under Town and Country Planning Act 1990 s.215 was valid, where it was posted to the proprietor’s Land Registry address that was no longer current and the letter was returned. Lewison LJ reasoned that, as a general rule, a local authority’s obligation to make reasonable inquiries may go no further than checking the proprietorship register, and that “It is the responsibility of the registered proprietor to keep his address up to date”.

The Court of Appeal in Tabbasam emphasised that this statement in Tanna was directed to the adequacy of service and the server’s inquiry obligation, not to the scope of a distinct statutory defence. Tanna therefore did not support an inflexible rule that “own default” defeats reasonable excuse.

2) Serpes v City of London [2017] EWHC 11241 (Ch); Rushmoor Borough Council v Reynolds (1991) 23 HLR 495; Birmingham City Council v Bravington [2023] EWCA Civ 308; [2023] KB 421

The Council relied on these as illustrating that non-receipt does not prevent valid service and that harsh consequences can follow. The Court of Appeal treated them as distinguishable because none involved a statutory reasonable excuse defence. They show the effect of service rules where the statute provides no safety valve; they do not answer how a “reasonable excuse” defence operates where Parliament has expressly provided one.

3) Marigold and others v Wells [2022] UKUT 33 (LC) and Perrin v HMRC [2018] UKUT 156 (TCC)

The UT had referenced these in discussing how “reasonable excuse” may sometimes accommodate ignorance of a legal requirement. Perrin (quoted in the judgment) rejected a categorical view that “ignorance of the law is no excuse” necessarily defeats reasonable excuse; it depends on circumstances and objective reasonableness.

The Court of Appeal accepted the general sense of Perrin’s structured approach, but considered that this case was not truly an “ignorance of law” scenario: Ms Tabbasam’s problem was not ignorance of the statutory obligation triggered by the notice; it was ignorance of the notice’s existence because it did not reach her.

4) Archer v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2023] EWCA Civ 626; [2023] 1 WLR 3558 and The Clean Car Co Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs [1991] VATTR 234

These were used to anchor the objective nature of reasonable excuse. The Court of Appeal cited the Perrin framework (endorsed in Archer) and the Clean Car Co formulation: whether what was done was reasonable for a responsible person intending to comply, but with the taxpayer/defendant’s relevant attributes and situation.

Importantly, the Court of Appeal did not dilute objectivity; rather, it rejected the Council’s attempt to convert “objective test” into an inflexible rule that failure to provide a different address is necessarily unreasonable.

5) Thurrock Council v Daoudi [2020] UKUT 209 (LC) and D'Costa v D'Andrea [2021] UKUT 144 (LC)

These HMO licensing cases were relied on by the Council to argue that ignorance of obligations is generally not enough, absent some “supervening factor”. The Court of Appeal held they did not carry the Council’s argument:

• They concern ignorance of the primary legal duty (e.g. needing an HMO licence), whereas here the immediate issue was non-receipt of the improvement notice that triggers compliance steps.
• The alleged “obligation” to keep the Land Registry address updated to a residence address was not as clear-cut as the Council suggested, especially given the Land Registration Rules allow an address for service that is not the owner’s home.

C. Legal reasoning (why the Court reached this result)

1) The FTT’s error: collapsing service and defence

The FTT reasoned that because Ms Tabbasam’s non-receipt flowed from her own administrative failure to update address details, she could not rely on that failure as a reasonable excuse. The Court of Appeal held that this approach was legally flawed because:

• It treated Tanna (a service case) as if it governed a reasonable excuse defence.
• It adopted an impermissibly inflexible “cannot rely on own default” rule, which the Council ultimately conceded was too rigid.

2) Non-receipt can be relevant to “reasonable excuse” even where service is valid

The Court drew a clear line:

• Ms Tabbasam could not argue “no service” (service was effective under s.233).
• But she could argue “reasonable excuse” based on the fact of non-receipt, because Parliament chose to provide that defence in s.30.

3) Address for service at Land Registry: not inherently wrongful to use the tenanted property

The Court rejected the Council’s characterisation that a responsible landlord must provide their home address at the Land Registry. Key points:

• Under Land Registration Rules 2003 (including Rule 198), the proprietor must provide an address for service; the rules do not require it to be a residential address.
• Using the tenanted property as an address for service is not necessarily unreasonable; a landlord may reasonably expect tenants to forward correspondence addressed to the landlord.
• While it may have been sensible to add another address once tenants became uncooperative, not doing so did not automatically amount to wrongdoing or negligence that defeats reasonable excuse.

4) Immediate cause and overall factual evaluation

The Court treated the “immediate cause” of non-receipt as the tenants’ failure to pass on the correspondence sent to the property. In that factual context, the UT judge was entitled to conclude (objectively assessed) that Ms Tabbasam had a reasonable excuse.

5) Council tax address point was a “red herring”

The Court also rejected the Council’s reliance on letters being sent to “Barlow Road” (a prior address). The Court observed:

• The Council could not identify a legal obligation requiring Ms Tabbasam to keep the council tax address updated in the manner suggested.
• Reference was made to Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 s.16 (information request power/offence for non-compliance), but no such request had been made.
• Accordingly, this did not support the Council’s “basic obligation” argument.

6) “Uncertainty for local authorities” is inherent in defences, not a legal error

The Council argued that recognising reasonable excuse here creates unacceptable uncertainty. The Court held:

• Service remains straightforward; authorities can rely on s.233 and Land Registry addresses for service.
• But where communications go unanswered, it “may be worth a little further checking”.
• Uncertainty about whether a defendant can make out a defence is inherent in any statutory defence and is not a reason to narrow it by judicial fiat.

D. Impact (practical and doctrinal)

1) For housing enforcement and local authorities

• Service rules remain intact: councils can continue to serve at the Land Registry address for service and rely on s.233 for validity.
• But enforcement may need evidential resilience: where a landlord does not engage at all, councils should anticipate that non-receipt may be raised as a reasonable excuse and should consider proportionate additional checks (especially before imposing large penalties), because tribunals may find reasonable excuse on credible evidence.
• No “deemed knowledge” shortcut: valid service does not automatically equate to “deemed knowledge” for the purposes of evaluating reasonable excuse.

2) For landlords and property professionals

• The case does not encourage evasion; rather, it underscores that tribunals can distinguish between deliberate avoidance and non-receipt without evasion.
• It nevertheless highlights prudent practice: landlords can reduce risk by providing multiple addresses for service (permitted under Land Registry rules) and maintaining reliable arrangements for mail handling.

3) For tribunals applying “reasonable excuse” in HA 2004 contexts

• Fact-specific evaluation is mandatory; inflexible rules (e.g. “own default always defeats reasonable excuse”) are impermissible.
• The decision reinforces a structured approach consistent with Perrin/Archer: identify asserted facts, decide what is proved, and then assess objective reasonableness in context.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Improvement Notice” and when it bites

An improvement notice under the HA 2004 requires specified remedial works. It becomes operative (generally) 21 days after service. Failure to comply once operative can be a criminal offence (HA 2004 s.30), and can also ground a financial penalty (s.249A and Schedule 13A).

“Valid service” vs “actual receipt”

Valid service means the authority has complied with statutory service rules (here, s.233). Actual receipt is whether the person truly saw or received the document. Statutes sometimes treat valid service as enough to trigger consequences. But where Parliament provides a defence like reasonable excuse, non-receipt can be relevant to whether the person had a fair, objectively reasonable explanation for not complying.

“Reasonable excuse” (objective, but contextual)

The test is objective, but it is applied to the proved circumstances of the particular defendant (their situation and relevant attributes). It is not a rigid rule; it is an evaluative judgment.

“Second appeal” and the Court of Appeal’s role

The Court of Appeal was reviewing whether the UT judge made an error of law in setting aside the FTT’s decision and remaking it. It was not conducting a free-standing rehearing of all facts; it assessed legal correctness and whether the UT’s evaluative conclusions were open to it.

5. Conclusion

Manchester City Council v Tabbasam clarifies that, in HA 2004 s.30 proceedings, valid service and reasonable excuse are legally distinct. Tanna establishes a general rule about the limits of a local authority’s duty to make inquiries for service, but it does not dictate the outcome of a statutory reasonable excuse defence.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that a landlord may, in appropriate circumstances, rely on non-receipt of an improvement notice as a reasonable excuse for non-compliance, even where the notice was properly served at the address for service recorded at HM Land Registry—particularly where use of the tenanted property as an address for service was not inherently wrongful and there is no evidence of deliberate evasion.