Manchester City Council v Tabbasam

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant is the registered owner and landlord of a residential property identified in the proprietorship register of Company B as the property's address ("the property"). In March 2019 tenants complained to Company A about disrepair. Company A checked Company B's proprietorship register (which showed the Appellant's address as the property) and its own council tax records (which showed a different address). Company A sent a series of communications, including an inspection notice, an Improvement Notice (dated 14 May 2019) and notices relating to a proposed and final financial penalty. Most of those documents were sent to the property address recorded at Company B and to a second past address; they were not received by the Appellant because the tenants did not forward them and the Appellant did not live at the recorded past address.

The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) found the Appellant guilty of the offence under s.30 Housing Act 2004 for failing to comply with the Improvement Notice, rejected a defence of reasonable excuse, and imposed a reduced financial penalty of £15,000. The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), which allowed the appeal, finding a reasonable excuse. Company A obtained permission to appeal to the higher court. The court below (the appeal court writing this opinion) was asked to determine whether the judge in the Upper Tribunal was wrong in concluding that the Appellant had a reasonable excuse for non-compliance because she had not in fact received the notice served at the address shown on the proprietorship register.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a person on whom an improvement notice has been validly served at the address recorded in the proprietorship register can nevertheless have a defence of "reasonable excuse" under s.30(4) HA 2004 because they did not in fact receive the notice.
2. Whether a failure by a registered proprietor to keep the address for service at Company B up to date necessarily precludes reliance on non-receipt as a reasonable excuse.
3. Whether acceptance of a reasonable excuse on facts like these would conflict with s.233 Local Government Act 1972 and binding authority (in particular the decision in Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council v Tanna).

Arguments of the Parties

Company A's Arguments

• The objective test for "reasonable excuse" requires asking whether the Appellant's conduct was reasonable for a responsible landlord; keeping Company B's address for service up to date is a fundamental obligation.
• The Appellant could not rely on ignorance of a basic obligation (keeping the address up to date) as a reasonable excuse.
• Allowing the defence in these circumstances would undermine the utility of service at the proprietorship register and conflict with the approach in Tanna and other authorities.

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant did not receive the Improvement Notice because it was sent to the property address and the tenants did not pass on correspondence; she genuinely did not know of the notice.
• The relevant question is whether there was a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the Improvement Notice (non-receipt), not whether she had a separate reasonable excuse for any failure to update Company B or council tax records.
• It would be disproportionate to treat providing the property's address on the proprietorship register as necessarily wrongful such that non-receipt can never found a reasonable excuse.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed its role as reviewing whether the Upper Tribunal judge erred in law in (a) concluding that the FTT misapplied the law or (b) in remaking the decision. The court accepted that the FTT had erred in its application of Oldham v Tanna: Tanna addressed the sufficiency of enquiries for effective service (and the proprietor's obligation to keep an address for service at Company B updated), not the separate question whether non-receipt could amount to a reasonable excuse to comply with a statutory notice.

The court adopted the Perrin/Archer structured approach to assessing reasonable excuse: identify asserted facts, decide which are proven, and then objectively assess whether those facts amount to a reasonable excuse in light of the defendant's attributes and the circumstances. Applying that approach, the court found no legal barrier to a defence of reasonable excuse where a notice was validly served at the proprietorship address but was not in fact received.

The court analysed the facts: the Appellant had not received the Improvement Notice because the tenants did not pass on correspondence; the use of the property address on Company B's register was not necessarily wrongful (Rule 198 allows an address for service and need not be the proprietor's residence); there was no evidence of deliberate evasion; and Company A ultimately located the Appellant at her true home address for enforcement. The immediate cause of non-receipt was the tenants' failure to forward mail. The court therefore concluded the Upper Tribunal judge was entitled to find that the Appellant had a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the Improvement Notice. The court rejected Company A's arguments that this approach impermissibly undermined s.233 or created unacceptable uncertainty for local authorities, noting the defence remains fact-specific.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

The appeal by Company A was dismissed. The court held that the Upper Tribunal judge was entitled to conclude that the Appellant had a defence of reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the Improvement Notice because she had not in fact received it and the circumstances did not preclude reliance on that defence. The direct effect is that the Appellant succeeds on the reasonable excuse defence as found by the Upper Tribunal; no broad automatic rule was established denying reasonable excuse to proprietors who have recorded an address at Company B, and the decision emphasises the fact-specific nature of the defence rather than creating a new general precedent.