Mixed WRC Proceedings: Private Industrial Relations Disputes Do Not Displace the Public Hearing Default for Statutory Complaints—“Special Circumstances” Must Be Explained and Kept to What Is Necessary

1. Introduction

In Adeyanju v Workplace Relations Commission and Anor (Approved) (Rev1) [2026] IEHC 538, Simons J (High Court) considered whether an adjudication officer lawfully directed that a set of interrelated Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) matters be heard otherwise than in public.

The applicant was an employee; the notice party was the Chief State Solicitor’s Office as employer. The underlying WRC file combined (i) statutory “employment rights” complaints referred for adjudication under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, and (ii) two disputes processed under section 13 of the Industrial Relations Act 1969, which are subject to a statutory privacy requirement.

Although neither the WRC nor the employer opposed the judicial review, the Court emphasised (following Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 4) that the applicant still bore the burden of establishing that the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction should be exercised.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • The Court quashed (by certiorari) the direction insofar as it required section 41 complaints under the Workplace Relations Act 2015 to be heard otherwise than in public.
  • The Court held that the adjudication officer’s stated rationale—privacy applicable to Industrial Relations Act disputes and “some overlap” in the factual matrix—did not, without more, justify excluding the public from the statutory complaints.
  • The Court declined to grant a declaration concerning an alleged requirement that members of the public provide personal information/ID to attend a WRC hearing, due to (i) an insufficient evidential basis and (ii) fair procedures concerns (including the absence of a proper contradictor on that systemic issue).
  • The Court proposed remittal of the matters to the WRC to be heard by a different adjudication officer, with the Industrial Relations Act disputes to be investigated in private in accordance with section 13(8).

3. Analysis

3.1 Statutory and constitutional context: openness as the default

The case turns on section 41(13) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, which makes public hearings the default: proceedings “shall be conducted in public” unless the adjudication officer determines that, due to “special circumstances”, the proceedings (or part) should be conducted otherwise than in public.

The Court situated section 41(13) in its post-Zalewski v. Adjudication Officer [2021] IESC 24, [2022] 1 IR 421 constitutional setting. In Zalewski, the Supreme Court characterised WRC adjudication as the exercise of limited judicial functions permissible under Article 37 of the Constitution, but only if core components of justice—including openness—are respected. Openness is not an optional attribute; it is part of the constitutional standard of justice that must not fall below that administered in courts under Article 34.

3.2 The central defect: conflating two procedural regimes in “mixed” WRC files

The impugned direction was justified in a letter stating, in substance, that the hearing would resume in private because the employee wished to pursue Industrial Relations Act disputes, there was some factual overlap, and the Industrial Relations Act required a private investigation.

Simons J accepted that the Industrial Relations Act disputes were required to be dealt with privately (noting an immaterial mis-citation to section 13(9), whereas the first-instance privacy requirement lies in section 13(8)). However, the Court held that:

  • The private character of section 13 disputes does not automatically displace the statutory requirement that section 41 complaints be heard in public.
  • Equally, the public default in section 41(13) does not dictate the manner in which Industrial Relations Act disputes must be heard.
  • A “mixed” case file cannot be treated as procedurally homogeneous “by default”; the adjudication officer must explicitly confront how the distinct regimes interact in practice.

3.3 Proportionality and “least-intrusive means” within section 41(13)

The Court read section 41(13) as requiring a calibrated approach: even where special circumstances exist, any departure from openness must be no more than is required to protect the countervailing interest. This is reinforced by the statutory phrase “or part thereof”, which contemplates partial measures (e.g., closing only a segment of evidence).

Simons J added an important practical point: where the concern is not the hearing process but the publication of identifying information in the eventual decision, section 41(14) may provide a less intrusive mechanism than closing the hearing itself. A decision to close all of the statutory complaints therefore demands reasons explaining why lesser measures would not suffice.

3.4 Adequacy of reasons as a condition of lawful departure from openness

The Court treated the giving of intelligible reasons as central to legality in this context, drawing on two Supreme Court authorities:

  • Gilchrist v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2017] IESC 18, [2017] 2 IR 284: exceptions to open justice must be strictly construed, both as to the circumstances capable of justifying the exception and the extent of the departure. This informed the Court’s insistence on necessity and tight tailoring under section 41(13).
  • Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 IR 752, [2018] 2 ILRM 453: reasons must (i) tell an affected person, at least in general terms, why a decision was made, and (ii) provide enough information to decide whether to appeal or seek judicial review, and to allow a reviewing court to engage properly in review. The judgment underscored that an “inscrutable” decision cannot insulate the exercise of statutory power from supervision.

Applying these principles, the Court found the reasons inadequate because the adjudication officer:

  • Did not identify what overlapped (issues/evidence) between the private disputes and the public complaints;
  • Did not explain why the matters could not be treated separately (or sequenced) in a practicable and fair way;
  • Did not explain how a public hearing of the statutory complaints would compromise the integrity of the private referrals;
  • Did not consider whether a lesser measure (partial closure, redaction/anonymisation, or section 41(14)) would suffice.

In consequence, the Court could not be satisfied that section 41(13) had been correctly understood and applied, and the direction—so far as it closed the section 41 complaints—was unlawful.

3.5 Declaratory relief on public access/identification requirements: why the Court refused

The employee also sought a declaration that requiring personal details/identification to enter the hearing had a “chilling effect” on attendance, particularly for minority and migrant communities. Simons J refused relief on two grounds:

  1. Evidence was too thin: the affidavit evidence did not specify what data were requested, whether ID was demanded, whether information was merely checked or recorded/retained, or who demanded it (the WRC versus building reception/security in a multi-occupancy building). Without such detail, the Court could not assess compatibility with open justice in a fact-sensitive area where legitimate constraints (fire safety, evacuation counts, prioritising press access) may exist.
  2. Fair procedures / proper contradictor: given how the case was expedited and the WRC’s stated non-participation on the main issue, it would be unfair to determine the legality of systemic access practices without giving the WRC a proper chance to participate with evidence and argument. The Court noted that an issue of that constitutional weight might also warrant notice to the Attorney General, depending on how it arose.

The refusal was expressly without prejudice: the Court did not endorse any particular identification/sign-in regime, nor did it decide the underlying constitutional questions about practical access to “public” administrative justice.

3.6 Practical and doctrinal impact

The decision is likely to influence WRC practice in three concrete ways:

  • Mixed-case management: where section 41 complaints and Industrial Relations Act disputes proceed together, adjudication officers must actively design procedures that respect both regimes, rather than letting the private regime “absorb” the public one.
  • Reasoned necessity: any exclusion of the public from statutory complaints must be justified by identified “special circumstances”, explained by reference to the actual overlap/risk, and limited to what is necessary (including consideration of partial measures).
  • Litigation risk and standards of decision-making: the judgment signals that a bare recital (“overlap exists; integrity requires privacy”) may be vulnerable to judicial review. The discipline of reasons is not a formality; it is integral to legality and reviewability.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Open justice” / hearing “in public”
The principle that adjudicative hearings should be accessible to the public and press. It promotes accountability, fairness, and confidence in the process. Departures must be justified and limited.
“Special circumstances” (section 41(13))
A statutory threshold that must be met before the default of a public WRC hearing can be displaced. The decision-maker must explain what the circumstances are and why they necessitate the particular restriction.
“Or part thereof”
Indicates that restrictions can be targeted: for example, closing only a portion of evidence or argument, rather than excluding the public from the entire case.
Certiorari
A judicial review remedy quashing an unlawful decision.
Legitimus contradictor
The appropriate party to defend a measure in court. Even if parties to an individual dispute are indifferent, systemic practices typically require that the relevant public body be afforded an opportunity to defend their legality, sometimes with the Attorney General involved for constitutional issues.
Remittal
Sending the matter back to the original decision-making body to be decided again lawfully—here, by a different adjudication officer.

5. Conclusion

[2026] IEHC 538 reinforces that, after Zalewski v. Adjudication Officer [2021] IESC 24, [2022] 1 IR 421, the WRC’s adjudicative function must adhere to the constitutional core of justice, including openness. Where a WRC file mixes private Industrial Relations Act disputes with public section 41 complaints, the statutory privacy attaching to the former does not automatically justify closing the latter. Any departure from the public-hearing default under section 41(13) must be supported by intelligible, reviewable reasons demonstrating necessity, fair calibration, and consideration of lesser measures.

The judgment also signals caution in litigating broader “public access” issues: challenges to identification or sign-in arrangements will depend on detailed evidence and must be determined with fair procedures, including a proper contradictor and (where appropriate) constitutional notice.