Plenary Proceedings as an Impermissible “Appeal” from a County Registrar Will Be Struck Out for Want of Jurisdiction; LLP/Firms May Validly Enter an Appearance; Escalating “Lawfare” Justifies Robust Abuse-of-Process Controls (Including Consideration of an Isaac Wunder Order)

1) Introduction

This second judgment (No. 2) of Cregan J concerns two sets of High Court plenary proceedings brought by Mr Patrick McGreal (a litigant in person):

  • McGreal v. Concannon and Browne (Record No. 2024/6852P) (“the Concannon proceedings”), against Ms Bridin Concannon (County Registrar) and Ms Maria Browne (Chief State Solicitor’s Office).
  • Proceedings against Courts Service staff, the Chief Executive Officer of the Courts Service, the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and individual gardaí (Record No. 2024/6645P) (“the Courts Service proceedings”).

The broader factual background, already addressed in the first judgment (7 July 2025), arose from a dispute about court stamp duty/fees under S.I. 492/2014. The dispute escalated: the judgment records repeated contentious interactions with Central Office staff, attendance with a group of supporters, and threats to “arrest” court officials and others. Against that backdrop, this judgment addresses two principal procedural themes:

  1. Challenges to appearances entered for the defendants (including objections to state-funded representation and to an LLP entering an appearance).
  2. Strike-out applications on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and/or abuse of process, including the court’s consideration of further protective orders (injunctive restraints and an “Isaac Wunder” order).

The case is notable not only for its application of procedural rules (Order 12 RSC) but for the court’s emphatic articulation that litigation cannot be used as a vehicle to intimidate court staff, lawyers or judges, and that repeated misuse may justify strong prospective controls on further proceedings.

2) Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Challenges to appearances rejected

  • The court held that the defendants in the Concannon proceedings were acting within the scope of their roles (County Registrar / CSSO solicitor) and were therefore entitled to representation by the Chief State Solicitor’s Office.
  • The court held that Mason Hayes and Curran LLP could validly enter an appearance for defendants in the Courts Service proceedings; there is no requirement that an appearance be entered only in the name of an individually-named solicitor.
  • The court confirmed (as the plaintiff himself sought) that the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and the Chief Executive Officer of the Courts Service are entitled to state-funded representation on vicarious liability principles, and reasoned that the same logic necessarily extends to employees acting in the course of their employment.

2.2 First set of proceedings struck out: want of jurisdiction and abuse of process

  • The Concannon proceedings were found, in substance, to be an attempted appeal (or re-litigation) of a County Registrar’s handling of a motion in Circuit Court election petition proceedings.
  • The High Court held it had no jurisdiction to entertain what was in substance an appeal from a County Registrar “dressed up as new plenary proceedings”; the proper route was an appeal to a Circuit Court judge.
  • The proceedings were also struck out as a collateral attack and therefore an abuse of process.

2.3 Second set of proceedings struck out as abuse of process

  • The Courts Service proceedings (including claims against gardaí) were struck out as an abuse of process, grounded in a pattern the court described as “lawfare”, intimidation, and repeated non-bona fide litigation tactics.

2.4 Prospective controls foreshadowed

  • The court indicated it was considering an order restraining Mr McGreal from threatening to arrest or attempting to arrest Courts Service officials and/or solicitors, and invited an application (or undertakings).
  • The court indicated it was considering an “Isaac Wunder” (litigation restriction) order requiring prior judicial permission before instituting further proceedings against the Courts Service and/or the Gardaí.
  • The court also proposed hearing from the LSRA regarding Mr McGreal’s claimed role as a “Justice Facilitator” (possible unqualified legal services), and from the DPP regarding “private prosecutions” activity.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(A) Killeen v. Higgins [2025] IEHC 582

This authority was central to the court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s technical attack on the validity of appearances entered by a firm/LLP. The plaintiff argued that Order 12 required the name of an individual solicitor, and that an LLP could not file an appearance.

Cregan J adopted the reasoning of Simons J in Killeen v. Higgins [2025] IEHC 582, which held:

  • Order 12’s use of the singular (“solicitor”) must be read with Order 125 RSC (singular includes plural and vice versa).
  • Where a defendant is represented by a firm (including an LLP), it is appropriate to endorse the firm’s registered name and address/email on the memorandum of appearance.
  • There is no requirement that the appearance be signed by an individual solicitor rather than in the firm/LLP name.

The practical effect is to shut down a form of procedural point-taking that could otherwise be used to manufacture “default” scenarios or disrupt proceedings by insisting on formalities inconsistent with modern regulated practice (including LLP structures).

(B) Promontoria (Field) DAC v. Brendan Mahon [2019] IEHC 218

This case was used to support the court’s jurisdictional conclusion: where a litigant attempts to repackage an appeal route as fresh plenary litigation, the High Court may lack jurisdiction to entertain it, because the correct statutory/procedural pathway must be followed.

Cregan J applied the principle from Promontoria (Field) DAC v. Brendan Mahon [2019] IEHC 218 to hold that the Concannon proceedings were, “in substance”, an impermissible appeal from the County Registrar’s handling of a Circuit Court matter. The appropriate remedy was to appeal to the Circuit Court judge, not to launch a new High Court plenary action.

The precedent’s influence lies in its insistence that courts will look to the substance of proceedings, not their labels, when determining jurisdiction and abuse of process.

(C) Delany and McGrath, Civil Procedure (5th edition)

While not a judicial precedent, this text was cited to underscore the procedural importance of an appearance: it is an acknowledgement of proceedings and generally signals an intention to defend. The citation reinforced the court’s view that disputes about appearances are ordinarily mundane procedural matters—yet here they were being weaponised as part of a broader pattern of abusive litigation conduct.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Appearances and representation: scope of employment and the irrelevance of the plaintiff’s “funding” objection

A key move in the judgment is the court’s repeated return to what the plaintiff’s own pleadings and the surrounding facts showed: the impugned acts (refusing to accept documents without fees; processing/entering appearances; managing Central Office access and safety; garda attendance) were paradigmatic acts within the course of employment.

The court treated the plaintiff’s “private capacity/personal misconduct” framing as unsustainable, because:

  • The Concannon proceedings attacked actions taken “while acting as a County Registrar”.
  • The claim against Ms Browne arose from her acting as a CSSO solicitor in litigation.
  • The Courts Service defendants’ acts were routine Central Office functions in the context of a stamp duty dispute.
  • Garda actions (escorting/removing/detaining) were, on the evidence, policing actions undertaken in the line of duty.

On that basis, the plaintiff’s attempt to disqualify state-funded representation—invoking Article 11 constitutional language about public monies—failed at the threshold: the foundational premise (acts outside official duties) was rejected.

(B) Order 12 RSC: “solicitor” includes firm/LLP

The court’s reasoning here is deliberately straightforward: Order 12 requires the name of the defendant’s solicitor; by interpretation provisions (Order 125 RSC; section 18(a) Interpretation Act 2005) and the statutory definition in the Solicitors Act 1954 (as amended), a “solicitor” includes a firm of solicitors. This doctrinal chain, reinforced by Killeen v. Higgins [2025] IEHC 582, defeats the argument that only an individually-named solicitor may enter an appearance.

The court also emphasised the practical absurdity that would follow if large-scale litigation could be derailed by insisting that each appearance must identify a single individual rather than the regulated entity.

(C) Jurisdiction and collateral attack: the High Court will not entertain a disguised appeal route

The Concannon proceedings were struck out on two overlapping bases:

  • Lack of jurisdiction: because the proceedings were, in substance, an attempted appeal from a County Registrar’s decision in Circuit Court proceedings; the appropriate route was an appeal to the Circuit Court judge.
  • Abuse of process: because re-litigating or undermining an existing order through separate plenary proceedings constitutes an impermissible collateral attack.

The judgment’s approach is functional: courts will identify the real target of litigation and will prevent procedural routes being manipulated to bypass the hierarchy of appeals.

(D) Abuse of process: intimidation, “lawfare”, and the court’s protective function

The most striking aspect of the judgment is the court’s description of a sustained pattern: threats to arrest officials, attempts to mobilise supporters to “invade” the Central Office, threats to arrest a High Court judge, attempted arrests of a District Court judge and a solicitor, accusations of perjury and criminality against opposing lawyers, and the institution of multiple sets of proceedings against gardaí (noted as having been struck out on consent in other matters).

The court conceptualised this behaviour as an interference with the administration of justice and a paradigm abuse of process. The strike-out of the Courts Service proceedings is grounded not only on deficiencies in party selection (suing individual staff rather than the employing body where vicarious liability is accepted), but on the conclusion that the proceedings were not bona fide and formed part of a strategy of harassment and intimidation.

(E) Prospective remedies: restraint and “Isaac Wunder” order

The judgment foreshadows (without yet finally imposing, pending further steps) two protective measures:

  • Restraining order/undertakings to prevent threats or attempts to arrest Courts Service staff or solicitors performing their functions.
  • An Isaac Wunder order (litigation restriction order) requiring leave before further proceedings are instituted against specified defendants/classes.

The court’s framing is important: such measures are presented as directed to protecting court processes and participants—not as preventing lawful complaints to the Gardaí or preventing legitimate litigation, but as preventing repeated misuse of proceedings as instruments of coercion.

(F) Citizen’s arrest: the court’s treatment of the Criminal Law Act 1997 argument

The judgment quotes sections 2 and 4 of the Criminal Law Act 1997 and records the plaintiff’s reliance on these provisions to justify threats to “commission an arrest without warrant”. The court’s response is emphatic: the plaintiff was not acting in good faith and was attempting to engineer confrontations. The legal significance is that the court treated the plaintiff’s reliance on citizen’s arrest powers as part of an abusive pattern when directed at judges, court staff, and lawyers carrying out official/professional duties.

3.3 Impact

(A) Procedural certainty: appearances by LLPs/firms

The judgment consolidates (in line with Killeen v. Higgins [2025] IEHC 582) a clear procedural position: an appearance may properly be entered in the name of a firm/LLP. This reduces the scope for tactical “technical objections” aimed at undermining representation or manufacturing procedural defaults.

(B) Jurisdictional discipline: preventing “appeal by plenary summons”

The strike-out of the Concannon proceedings signals strong judicial intolerance for attempts to bypass the proper appellate route from County Registrar decisions in Circuit Court matters. Litigants are reminded that the High Court will look to substance and will not permit collateral plenary proceedings to function as a substitute for the prescribed appeal process.

(C) Abuse-of-process jurisprudence in the context of harassment and intimidation

The decision illustrates an increasingly explicit judicial willingness to characterise certain patterns of litigant conduct—especially threats, harassment, and the use of serial litigation to pressure public officials—as “lawfare” and to respond by strike-out and potential prospective restrictions. The contemplated injunction and the proposed Isaac Wunder order illustrate an escalation pathway: from case-specific dismissal to court-controlled gatekeeping when necessary to protect the administration of justice.

(D) Institutional knock-on effects: safety, access and court administration

The court placed weight on the operational disruption described in evidence (Central Office safety measures, Garda presence, refusal to accept documents in person). Future courts may cite this case when balancing:

  • public access to court offices,
  • staff safety and employer duties, and
  • the need to prevent intimidation of court personnel.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

Appearance (Order 12 RSC)
A formal document filed by (or for) a defendant acknowledging the proceedings and usually indicating an intention to defend. It is filed in the Central Office and must identify the defendant’s solicitor (which can be a firm/LLP).
Vicarious liability
A legal principle under which an employer (or institutional head sued in that capacity) may be liable for wrongful acts committed by employees in the course of their employment. It often makes the employer/institution the appropriate defendant rather than individual staff members.
Collateral attack
An attempt to undermine an existing decision/order indirectly by bringing fresh proceedings, instead of using the correct appeal route. Courts treat this as abusive because it destabilises finality and the structure of appeals.
Want of jurisdiction
The court lacks legal power to determine the dispute because the matter must be taken by a different procedure or to a different court/level (here, an appeal to a Circuit Court judge rather than new High Court plenary proceedings).
Abuse of process
Using court proceedings for an improper purpose—such as harassment, intimidation, or re-litigating decided issues—rather than to resolve a genuine legal dispute. Courts can strike out proceedings to protect the integrity of justice.
Nemo iudex in causa sua
“No one should be a judge in their own cause.” A natural justice principle requiring decision-makers to avoid conflicts of interest. The court here noted that the factual basis for this complaint was doubtful on the documents.
Isaac Wunder order
A litigation restriction order: a mechanism used to control persistent vexatious or abusive litigation by requiring prior leave of the court before issuing further proceedings of a defined type.
Citizen’s arrest (Criminal Law Act 1997)
A limited power allowing a person (not a garda) to arrest without warrant in tightly constrained circumstances, including a requirement of “reasonable cause” and further limits (notably that non-garda arrests are restricted and the person must be handed to Garda custody as soon as practicable). The court treated the plaintiff’s attempted use of this concept against officials/judges/lawyers as indefensible and abusive.
LLP (limited liability partnership)
A regulated business structure used by some solicitors’ practices. The court confirmed an LLP may act as a solicitor on the record and enter an appearance in its registered name.

5) Conclusion

Cregan J’s judgment is a robust procedural and institutional response to litigation used as an instrument of disruption. It clarifies and applies three core propositions:

  1. No “appeal by plenary summons”: where proceedings are in substance an appeal from a County Registrar’s decision in Circuit Court litigation, the High Court will strike out for want of jurisdiction, and will also treat the tactic as a collateral attack and abuse of process.
  2. Appearances are not vulnerable to contrived technical attacks: a firm/LLP may validly enter an appearance; Order 12’s reference to “solicitor” is not confined to a single named individual, consistent with Killeen v. Higgins [2025] IEHC 582.
  3. Abuse of process can justify escalating controls: intimidation of court staff, lawyers, and judges—and serial “lawfare”—may justify strike-out and consideration of injunctions and an Isaac Wunder order to protect the administration of justice.

The judgment’s broader significance lies in its insistence that the courts remain open to litigants, including litigants in person, but that openness is not a licence to weaponise procedure, threaten participants, or destabilise the orderly operation of the justice system.