Inherent Jurisdiction to Exclude Persistently Disruptive Courtroom Attendees While Preserving Open Justice Through Remote Access

1. Introduction

In The Board Of Management Of Wilson's Hospital School v Burke [No. 8] [2026] IEHC 509, the High Court (Cregan J.) addressed whether it should exclude three members of the defendant’s family—Mrs Martina Burke, Ms Ammi Burke and Dr Isaac Burke—from physically attending future High Court hearings in any case involving Mr Enoch Burke where the litigation relates (directly or indirectly) to his dismissal for gross misconduct from Wilson’s Hospital School and related disputes (including matters involving the Teaching Council’s processes, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the Minister for Education).

The core issues were:

  • whether the High Court has power (inherent jurisdiction and/or statute) to impose a forward-looking exclusion order against disruptive courtroom attendees;
  • whether such exclusion violates the constitutional requirement of public administration of justice under Article 34.1;
  • whether the judge’s prior criticism of the Burke family’s courtroom conduct undermined impartiality;
  • whether sufficient notice and particulars of alleged misconduct had been provided.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court held that:

  • the High Court possesses an inherent jurisdiction to maintain order and protect the administration of justice, including the power to exclude disruptive persons from courtrooms and from future hearings;
  • the constitutional principle of justice administered in public does not grant any individual a right to physically attend while disrupting proceedings; excluding specific persons does not convert proceedings into an in camera hearing;
  • no issue of partiality arose: the judge’s views were formed from repeated courtroom conduct over a prolonged period and did not establish disqualifying bias;
  • the family members had ample notice and opportunity to make submissions; further particulars were unnecessary given the repeated, well-documented disruptions and prior judgments detailing events.

Accordingly, the Court made an order prohibiting Mrs Martina Burke, Ms Ammi Burke and Dr Isaac Burke from attending in person at future High Court hearings in the defined set of Mr Enoch Burke-related cases, while allowing them to attend remotely to see and hear proceedings. Breach would be treated as contempt.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

(a) Walsh v. the Minister for Justice and Others [2019] IESC 15

This decision provided the principal doctrinal foundation for the order. Cregan J. relied on O’Donnell J.’s (as he then was) explanation that maintaining order is central to the court’s capacity to administer justice and to provide a fair hearing. Two aspects were particularly influential:

  • Order as an essential condition of fair hearing: disruption is not merely discourteous; it can amount to “bullying” and, when coordinated, “menacing and intimidatory,” undermining other parties’ ability to be heard.
  • Source and scope of the removal power: the power to remove and exclude persons “probably flows” from the same common-law source as contempt—maintaining order—and does not require an antecedent contempt finding. The constitutional requirement of public justice is satisfied so long as proceedings remain public; exclusion of particular individuals does not negate public access in principle.

(b) Common-law and secondary authorities referenced via Walsh

  • R v. Webb ex p. Hawker (The Times, 24 January 1899): cited for the longstanding proposition that courts may order removal of persons interrupting or hindering proceedings.
  • Willis v. Maclachlan (1876) 45 L.J.Q.B. 689: cited for the practical power to ensure justice is administered unhindered and with decorum, including expulsion where necessary.
  • Arlidge, Eady and Smith on Contempt (5th edn., 2017) and the article ‘Contempt in the face of a court of summary jurisdiction’ (1939) J.Crim.L. 291: referenced to illustrate the doctrinal lineage and practical necessity of summary courtroom-control measures.

(c) The Court’s own earlier decisions in the Burke litigation

Cregan J. treated the recurring disruptions as a matter of judicial experience on the record, reinforced by earlier judgments:

  • Board of Management of Wilsons Hospital School v. Burke [2025] IEHC 365: referenced for a detailed narrative of multiple disrupted hearings and directions to leave the courtroom.
  • Burke v. Ó Longáin [2026] IEHC 132: relied upon for further particulars of misconduct and for the fact that Mrs Martina Burke and Ms Ammi Burke had been found in contempt and sentenced to two weeks’ imprisonment.
  • Burke v. Pike and Others: referenced as an example of continued disruption even after imprisonment, supporting the need for a protective, prospective measure.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Jurisdictional basis: inherent jurisdiction (without needing statutory reliance)

The Court located the power to impose this type of exclusion order in the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to secure the proper administration of justice. While section 11 of the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2020 was mentioned as a possible basis, the judge held it unnecessary to decide statutory questions given the adequacy of inherent jurisdiction.

(b) Open justice under Article 34.1: “public” does not mean “unconditional physical admission for each individual”

The Burkes argued that Article 34.1 created a constitutional right for them, as members of the public, to attend. The Court rejected this by drawing a distinction between:

  • the public nature of proceedings (a structural guarantee against secret justice), and
  • an individual entitlement to remain physically present regardless of conduct.

The Court emphasised that excluding three named individuals does not make proceedings in camera, because the hearings remain open to the public generally. The remote-access feature further reduced any claim of deprivation, as it preserved the ability to see and hear proceedings while preventing disruption.

(c) Proportionality and tailoring: narrow scope + remote attendance

A key feature of the reasoning was the Court’s framing of the order as narrow: it applied only to High Court physical attendance, only to these three persons, and only to cases involving Mr Enoch Burke connected to the defined dispute-locus. Remote attendance was presented not as a concession to the Court, but as a mechanism to preserve the legitimate observer function (watching and listening) while eliminating the practical capacity to interfere with proceedings.

(d) Fair procedures: notice, opportunity to be heard, and the practicality of courtroom control

The Court detailed multiple steps giving notice and opportunity to submit written objections (including extensions of time). It also relied on the proposition in Walsh that removal/exclusion measures must be capable of being implemented reasonably summarily; otherwise the process of “fair procedures” would itself become a tool for continued disruption and unfairness to compliant court users.

(e) Impartiality and recusal: criticism based on observed conduct does not equal bias

The impartiality argument was rejected on the basis that the judge’s critical comments arose from repeated, direct observation of conduct in court over many months and multiple hearings/judgments. The Court also identified an alleged pattern of recusal requests against judges perceived as unlikely to deliver favourable decisions, treating this context as relevant to evaluating the substance of the impartiality complaint.

3.3 Impact

  • Clarifies the operational content of open justice: Article 34.1 protects the public character of adjudication, but does not immunise individuals from exclusion where they repeatedly obstruct proceedings.
  • Affirms a preventive tool beyond contempt: the judgment underscores that exclusion can be justified as a courtroom-management measure even without a fresh contempt adjudication at the moment of exclusion, particularly where the pattern of disruption is established.
  • Normalises remote-access as a constitutional “bridge”: the order uses remote attendance to preserve transparency interests while protecting fairness for parties, counsel, witnesses, court staff, and other court users.
  • Signals tolerance limits for coordinated disruption: the Court characterises coordinated barracking as bullying/intimidation that undermines adversarial fairness, indicating strong judicial willingness to restrain repeat actors to protect the hearing process.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Inherent jurisdiction: powers that superior courts possess by virtue of their constitutional role, enabling them to control proceedings and prevent abuse even where no specific statute addresses the precise situation.
  • Contempt vs. exclusion: contempt is a finding of disobedience or interference that can be punished; exclusion is a protective step to ensure proceedings can continue fairly and orderly, and may be used even without a contemporaneous contempt ruling.
  • Open justice (Article 34.1): the default rule that courts sit in public to ensure transparency and accountability; it does not guarantee any particular person the right to remain in the courtroom regardless of misconduct.
  • Recusal/impartiality: judges must be, and appear to be, impartial; however, forming adverse views based on a party’s or attendee’s observed conduct in court does not automatically disqualify a judge.
  • Mootness: when a case no longer requires determination (e.g., because the live controversy has ended), the court may not make orders in that proceeding—prompting the court here to consider the issue in a live set of proceedings instead.

5. Conclusion

The Board Of Management Of Wilson's Hospital School v Burke [No. 8] [2026] IEHC 509 reinforces that the High Court’s duty to provide a fair hearing includes robust power to maintain order. The judgment treats persistent, coordinated courtroom disruption as a direct threat to the administration of justice and holds that Article 34.1’s guarantee of public justice is not a licence for individuals to derail proceedings. By combining exclusion from physical attendance with remote access, the Court articulated a practical model for reconciling open justice with the protection of court processes and the rights of other participants to be heard.