Endorsement-Sheet Signatures and “Foot or End”: Valid Execution of Pre-Printed Wills under s.78 Succession Act 1965

1) Introduction

In The estate of Catherine Rigney Deceased, Re [2026] IEHC 582, the High Court (Ms Justice Siobhán Stack; judgment delivered 4 August 2026) determined whether a completed pre-printed “Eason’s” will form dated 11 August 1999 (the “1999 Will”) had been validly executed under s.78 of the Succession Act 1965, notwithstanding that the deceased did not sign on the dotted signature line in the testimonium clause.

The probate difficulty arose because the deceased’s signature appeared only on the fourth page “backing sheet”/endorsement of the folded form (a page intended to identify the document externally when folded), while the attestation clause bore the signatures of two witnesses (both deceased by the time of the application).

A prior home-made will dated 29 May 1982 (the “1982 Will”) existed only in copy (the original having been lost), and it made equal provision among the three children. The 1999 Will materially changed the disposition of the dwellinghouse, leaving it to the daughter. Accordingly, the execution point determined which instrument would govern roughly half of an €800,000 estate.

2) Summary of the Judgment

The Court held that the 1999 Will was validly executed in compliance with s.78 and should be admitted to probate. The deceased’s signature on the backing sheet was sufficient:

  • as a signature at the “foot or end” of the will (s.78, rule 1, amplified by rules 3 and 4); and
  • because it was apparent on the face of the will that the deceased intended, by that signature, to give effect to the writing as her will (s.78, rule 3).

The Court preferred a purposive, anti-technical approach consistent with the statutory history (Wills Act 1837; Wills (Amendment) Act 1852) and with authorities emphasising that genuine execution should not be defeated by formalistic objections absent fraud.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

(i) Statutory purpose: avoiding excessive technicality

The Court located s.78 within the historical correction of overly strict “foot or end” decisions following the Wills Act 1837. Relying on Jarman on Wills, the judgment emphasised that the “foot or end” requirement was originally aimed at preventing fraud (e.g., additions after a signature), not at invalidating genuine wills for minor misplacement of a signature.

This purposive lens framed the Court’s use of authorities:

  • In the Estate of Bean [1944] P. 83, 2 All E.R 348 — cited for the proposition that the 1852 reforms invited “a very wide construction” of “at the foot of the will”. While Bean turned on an envelope signature rather than an endorsement signature, it supported the overall anti-technical trajectory.
  • In re Rice [1870] 5 I.R. Eq. 176 — authority that it is the Court’s duty to give effect to a genuine act of execution within reasonable construction and presumption.
  • In the Goods of William Jones 9 (1865) 4 Sw. & Tr. 1 — cited via Rice for the principle that an unusual signature placement should not defeat a will where intention and witnessing are clear.
  • In re Ellison [1907] 2 I.R. 480 — used to demonstrate judicial willingness to uphold wills despite irregular witnessing placement (witnesses signing in the wrong space), reinforcing that formal execution rules are to be applied sensibly.

(ii) Endorsement/backing-sheet signatures: conflicting lines of authority

The central comparative materials concerned signing on an endorsement/backing sheet:

  • Re Dytrych [1928] V.L.R. 144 — an Australian Victorian appeal decision refusing probate where the testator signed only the backing sheet. The Court in Rigney expressly declined to approve the reasoning, criticising any sharp distinction between signing to “identify” a will and signing to “give effect” to it (particularly where witnessing is present), and noting the difficulty of understanding why witness evidence as to intention was rejected in Dytrych.
  • In Re Eaglestone Deceased [1942] S.A.S.R. 257 — preferred by the High Court. The South Australian Supreme Court upheld execution where the testatrix signed the endorsement under words like “the will of”, emphasising that the Court should “go to all lengths to save a genuine act of execution” within reasonable construction.
  • In re DeGruchy, Deceased (1941) 56 B.C.R. 271 — Canadian support for the Eaglestone approach.
  • In the Goods of Mann [1942] P. 146 — envelope-signature case illustrating the breadth of the “foot or end” concept and the importance of intention and acknowledgement. It was not directly on point (the envelope was missing in Rigney), but it underscored that execution can be validated even when signature placement is unconventional.

(iii) Inferences from the document and presumption of due execution

  • In the Goods of McLean [1950] I.R. 180 — relied upon for the proposition that probate courts may draw inferences from circumstantial evidence, including features apparent on the face of the will, especially where witness evidence is unavailable or unreliable.
  • Clarke v. Early [1980] I.R. 223 — cited for the presumption of due execution where (1) there is an intention to do a formal act and (2) an absence of credible evidence that due formality was not observed. The Court treated the presumption as supportive chiefly on the “intention” aspect (given the witnesses’ attestation and the evident purpose of the document), while recognising it cannot “cure” a document that fails the statutory requirements on its face.

B. Legal Reasoning

(i) “Foot or end”: applying s.78 rules 1, 3 and 4

The Court divided the s.78 inquiry into two overarching requirements: (a) signature at the “foot or end”; and (b) intention apparent on the face of the will where the signature is not in the standard place.

On the first requirement, the Court accepted that the endorsement signature was not “opposite” the end in any ordinary sense, given the folding/orientation of the backing sheet. However, it held the signature was clearly “after” or “following” the end for the purposes of s.78, rule 3.

Critically, the Court relied on s.78, rule 4(d), which states that validity is not affected where the signature is on a page/portion containing no disposing words above the signature. Because the backing sheet contained no dispositive clauses and formed part of the same paper “containing the will”, it fell squarely within rule 4(d). The Court also referenced rule 4(c) (signature after witness names) as reinforcing that the statute tolerates non-standard sequencing and positioning.

The Court further noted the proviso at the end of rule 4 (no restriction on rule 1) and, drawing on In the Goods of Mann, accepted that the statutory scheme is designed to prevent “ejusdem generis” narrowing: unusual signatures may still comply if they satisfy the overall “foot or end” requirement read purposively.

(ii) “Apparent on the face of the will”: intention to give effect

The more contested point was whether it was “apparent on the face of the will” that signing the backing sheet was intended to execute the will rather than merely label it.

The Court’s conclusion that the intention requirement was met rested on a cumulative evaluation of document-internal indicators:

  • The nature of the document: a pre-printed will form with a revocation clause, executor appointment, and disposing clauses, making the testamentary character unmistakable to those present.
  • Careful completion: the deceased filled out dispositive provisions clearly (including a significant change from the earlier will), evidencing deliberate testamentary intention rather than a draft or incomplete act.
  • Witnessing event: two witnesses signed the attestation clause; one witness lived at driving distance, supporting an inference of planned execution rather than casual handling of paperwork.
  • Mistake as to signing location: the Court rejected an argument that the deceased “deliberately” did not sign; the more plausible explanation was an execution mistake (a known feature of lay use of these forms).
  • Corroborative circumstantial evidence: the deceased wrote the 1999 date on the backing sheet of the earlier (1982) will, strongly suggesting both documents were out together during the 1999 exercise and that the deceased was using/understanding backing sheets as part of the execution/endorsement process—supporting an inference that she believed signing the backing sheet was the operative act.

Adopting the approach in In Re Eaglestone Deceased, the Court clarified that “face of the will” does not mean the physical “front page”; it means whether intention is deducible from the document as a whole, including the back of the same sheet.

(iii) Fraud-prevention remains the controlling rationale

The judgment repeatedly returned to the central policy behind execution formalities: preventing fraud by requiring writing and appropriate witnessing, not providing a technical trap about the precise location of a signature where the act of execution is otherwise genuine. In the absence of any suggestion of forgery or suspicious circumstances, the Court considered it consistent with s.78’s purpose to uphold the will.

C. Impact

Although arising in a non-contentious probate application, The estate of Catherine Rigney Deceased, Re offers practical guidance for Irish probate practice on a recurring problem: execution of pre-printed “Eason’s” wills where the testator signs the endorsement/backing sheet rather than the testimonium line.

The likely effects include:

  • Clarified Irish approach to endorsement signatures under s.78: a signature on the backing sheet can satisfy “foot or end” and rule 3 intention, depending on the document’s overall features.
  • Reduced technical litigation in probate: the judgment encourages an evidence-based, purposive assessment rather than categorical invalidation.
  • Heightened importance of document-internal indicators where witnesses are unavailable: careful completion, attestation, executor nomination, and surrounding physical features may be decisive.
  • Limits preserved: the decision does not relax the core anti-fraud safeguards—two-witness attestation and the requirement that intention be apparent from the will itself remain central. The judgment also implicitly maintains that the presumption of due execution cannot rescue a document that fails s.78 on its face.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Foot or end”: not a demand for a signature immediately under the last dispositive words; s.78 allows a wide range of placements so long as the signature is sufficiently positioned to authenticate the will and reduce fraud risk.
  • Endorsement/backing sheet: the outer page visible when a folded paper will is closed, used to identify the document without opening it. This case holds it can also function as the execution location.
  • Testimonium clause: the “IN WITNESS whereof…” clause typically preceding the testator’s signature line.
  • Attestation clause: the clause signed by the witnesses confirming the testator signed/acknowledged the signature in their presence.
  • “Apparent on the face of the will”: whether the intention to give effect to the document as a will can be inferred from the will itself (including its back/endorsement), without relying on external speculation.
  • Presumption of due execution (Clarke v. Early): where a document looks like a formal will and there is no credible evidence of non-compliance, the court may presume the required formalities were observed; but it cannot override clear statutory non-compliance.

5) Conclusion

The High Court admitted the 1999 Will to probate, holding that a testator’s signature placed on the backing sheet of a pre-printed will can satisfy s.78’s “foot or end” requirement and the rule 3 requirement that it be apparent on the face of the will that the signature was intended to give effect to the writing as a will. The decision reinforces a purposive, fraud-focused interpretation of execution formalities and provides a practical precedent for the treatment of commonly used pre-printed will forms in Irish probate practice.