Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 s.3: “In charge” can persist without presence where an omission causally permits the dog to be dangerously out of control

1) Introduction

In R v Twigg & Anor [2026] EWCA Crim 587, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) considered the scope of liability under section 3(1) and (4) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (“the 1991 Act”) in a tragic setting: a young child, Daniel, was fatally injured by large guarding-breed dogs (Sid, a Cane Corso, and Tiny, a Boerboel) while they were kept in a pen adjacent to the family’s accommodation on a farm.

The first applicant sought leave to appeal his conviction for being “for the time being in charge” of a dog dangerously out of control causing injury, arguing he could not be “in charge” because he was away at work when the attack occurred. The second applicant sought leave to appeal her 3 years and 6 months sentence for the same offence. Both had been acquitted of gross negligence manslaughter.

The core legal issue was whether a person can be “for the time being in charge” under s.3(1) even when not physically present at the time the dog is dangerously out of control, particularly where the prosecution case is founded on an earlier omission (here, allegedly inadequate security measures for the pen gate) said to have causally permitted the prohibited state of affairs.

2) Summary of the Judgment

• The Court held that whether a defendant is “for the time being in charge” is generally a question of fact and degree for the jury, and physical absence at the moment of the incident does not, of itself, preclude liability.
• The Court reaffirmed that s.3(1), while a strict liability offence, requires the prosecution to prove a “more than minimal” causal connection between an act/omission of the defendant and the dog being dangerously out of control (drawing on Robinson-Pierre).
• The Court approved directions allowing the jury to find more than one person “in charge” at the same time, including where responsibility is grounded in ongoing security arrangements rather than immediate physical control.
• Leave to appeal against conviction was refused (first applicant), and leave to appeal against sentence was refused (second applicant).

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Robinson-Pierre [2014] 1 WLR 2638

The judgment treats Robinson-Pierre as the “starting point” for construing s.3(1). The key proposition, quoted and applied, is that although s.3(1) is a strict liability offence, it is not liability for a prohibited state of affairs wholly divorced from the defendant’s conduct. Pitchford LJ’s formulation— that there must be “some causal connection” and proof of an act or omission that “to some (more than minimal) degree caused or permitted” the dog to be dangerously out of control—provided the doctrinal bridge enabling liability to attach to security omissions that precede the incident.

(b) R v Rawlings [1994] Crim LR 433

The first applicant relied heavily on Rawlings and commentary suggesting “charge” may pass when another person arrives and assumes actual control. The Court of Appeal, however, emphasised what Rawlings actually decided: the trial judge had erred by treating absence as irrelevant as a matter of law, thereby wrongly removing a factual issue from the jury. Kennedy LJ’s observation that there was “powerful evidence” the defendant remained in charge undermined the argument that absence necessarily divests “charge”. In short, Rawlings supports jury evaluation, not an automatic rule of transfer.

(c) DPP v Watkins [1989] 89 Cr App R 112 (Road Traffic “in charge”)

The first applicant invoked Watkins to argue a person relinquishes being “in charge” where (i) the thing is put into someone else’s charge, or (ii) the person ceases actual control with no immediate possibility of resuming it. The Court accepted motor-vehicle analogies can be relevant (as in Rawlings) but stressed an important statutory and factual distinction: for dogs, more than one person may be “in charge” simultaneously, so “relinquishment” is not the end of the matter; it remains fact-sensitive.

(d) L v CPS [2010] EWCA 341 (Admin)

L v CPS was decisive against the “single controller only” submission. There, the appellant handed a lead to another person who then let the dog off and encouraged an attack. Elias LJ held the District Judge was entitled to find the appellant remained in charge despite transferring physical control, and that both could be in charge at the relevant time. The Court of Appeal in Twigg treated the “short and temporary” nature of the transfer in L v CPS as contextual, not a universal prerequisite, and reaffirmed (via Rawlings) that physical co-presence is not necessary.

(e) R v Virdee [2023] EWCA Crim 786

While not analysed at length in the appellate judgment, Virdee formed part of the trial judge’s authority review supporting the propositions that: (i) “in charge” is typically for the jury; (ii) presence is unnecessary; (iii) multiple persons may be in charge; and (iv) ceding physical control does not necessarily end charge. The Court of Appeal endorsed the trial judge’s synthesis of these principles.

(f) R v Bezzina [1994] 1 WLR 1057 and “Greener’s case”

The Court referred to Robinson-Pierre’s clarification of earlier statements about “absolute liability” and the limits of s.3(1) where the prohibited state of affairs is wholly the responsibility of a third party. The doctrinal takeaway, as applied here, is that s.3(1) liability focuses on whether the defendant’s act/omission causally contributed, not on whether the defendant was physically managing the dog at the instant of danger.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps:

1. Text and structure of s.3(1): The statute criminalises the owner and, if different, “the person for the time being in charge”. The Court rejected an interpretation confining “in charge” to those with immediate physical control “acting together” at the relevant moment. Nothing in the statutory language compelled that restriction.
2. Causal connection as the control principle: Applying Robinson-Pierre, the Court treated causation (through act/omission) as the key limiting concept: the prosecution must prove something done or not done by the defendant “to some extent” caused or permitted the dog to be dangerously out of control. This allows responsibility to attach to ongoing arrangements—such as pen security—rather than momentary handling.
3. Fact-and-degree allocation to the jury: The Court confirmed that whether the first applicant remained “in charge” despite being away at work—given evidence of ongoing responsibility for dog security and awareness of the child’s ability to access the pen—was properly left to the jury. It was not a “only one possible answer” case. Accordingly:
   • the no case to answer submission failed; and
   • the jury directions (including that another person’s involvement is a factor, not necessarily a complete defence) were legally correct.

The Court also rejected the submission that s.3(2) (the owner’s “fit and proper person” defence) implies a non-owner in charge must escape liability upon leaving someone else with the dog. The Court treated s.3(2) as not re-writing the meaning of “in charge” in s.3(1); instead, liability still turns on the fact-sensitive causal connection and the jury’s evaluative conclusion.

3.3 Impact

The judgment is significant in clarifying (and, in practice, strengthening) the prosecution’s ability to prove “in charge” under s.3(1) where:

• Responsibility is relational and ongoing (e.g., security arrangements, containment systems, household/farm routines), not merely “hands-on” control.
• Multiple adults have overlapping responsibilities for keeping children or visitors safe from dogs, even if only one is physically present at the critical moment.
• The evidential focus will often be on foreseeability indicators (prior warnings, prior incidents, known risks of the breeds/individual dogs, known access by children) and on whether the defendant’s omissions “permitted” the dangerous out-of-control state.

For trial practice, the decision supports carefully structured jury directions (like those given here) identifying factors relevant to “in charge” and explicitly anchoring liability in the Robinson-Pierre causal connection requirement. It also indicates appellate reluctance to convert “transfer of charge” into a rigid rule: it remains a jury issue unless the evidence can only point one way.

3.4 Sentencing Observations

On sentence, the Court endorsed the judge’s categorisation under the offence-specific guideline as Category B (starting point 4 years, range 2–7 years) and accepted an uplift “at or near the top” of the category range was justified by multiple medium-culpability factors (including failure to respond to expressed concerns, failure to act on prior knowledge, absence of safety/control measures, and welfare failings connected to the offence). The Court held the eventual 3½ year sentence already reflected substantial mitigation (including trauma, remorse, and ongoing caregiving responsibilities), and it was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

“Dangerously out of control” (s.10(3))

A dog is dangerously out of control whenever there are grounds for reasonable apprehension it will injure someone—whether or not an injury actually occurs. If injury occurs, the offence becomes aggravated.

Strict liability (but not “absolute” liability)

“Strict liability” here means the prosecution need not prove intention to cause injury. But the prosecution must still prove a real link between what the defendant did/failed to do and the dog being dangerously out of control (the Robinson-Pierre requirement).

“For the time being in charge”

Not limited to ownership or physical handling. A person may be “in charge” through responsibility and arrangements that affect whether the dog can be kept under control. More than one person can be “in charge” at the same time.

No case to answer

A submission that the prosecution evidence is insufficient for a properly directed jury to convict. Here, because there was evidence of ongoing responsibility and an omission plausibly permitting the attack, the issue was left to the jury.

5) Conclusion

R v Twigg & Anor [2026] EWCA Crim 587 consolidates a practical and jury-centred approach to s.3(1) of the 1991 Act: a defendant may be “for the time being in charge” even when absent at the moment of the incident, provided the prosecution can prove an act/omission that more than minimally caused or permitted the dog to be dangerously out of control. The decision reinforces that “charge” can be shared, and that responsibility for containment and safety arrangements may ground liability alongside (or apart from) immediate physical control.