Factual and Procedural Background
On 30 July 2012, at Inner London Crown Court before His Honour Judge Bishop, the Appellant faced trial on an indictment containing four counts. Each count charged the Appellant with an offence of being the owner of a dog which caused injury while dangerously out of control in a public place, contrary to section 3(1) and (4) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. The original indictment named five victims in one count but was amended to four counts with a different victim named in each, all arising from a single incident on 22 March 2012.
Following a submission of no case to answer at the close of the prosecution case, the judge directed the jury to return a formal verdict of not guilty in respect of count 1, and the trial continued on the remaining counts. On 6 August 2012, the jury returned guilty verdicts on counts 2 to 4. The Appellant was sentenced on 17 January 2013 to concurrent terms of 22 months imprisonment and disqualified from owning a dog for five years. On the same day as the jury verdicts, the Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a prohibited dog, contrary to sections 1(3) and (7) of the 1991 Act, with no additional penalty imposed.
The Appellant has leave to appeal against conviction on the ground that section 3 of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 does not permit conviction of an owner who did not cause the dog to be in a public place or to become dangerously out of control by his act or omission. It was common ground at trial that the dog escaped confinement due to a deliberate act of a third party, raising the issue of the extent of strict liability under section 3(1).
On the morning of 22 March 2012, police executed a search warrant at the Appellant's home. Upon entry, the Appellant's pit bull terrier descended stairs and attacked several police officers, both inside the house and as they retreated into the front garden and onto the pavement, a public place. The dog was eventually controlled and destroyed. The Appellant was arrested and made statements denying fault, asserting the police should have knocked before entering. Each injured officer suffered injuries from the dog attack.
At trial, a submission of no case to answer was accepted for the count involving an attack occurring in a private place. The judge ruled the offence under section 3(1) is one of strict liability, not requiring proof of action or inaction by the owner to cause the dog to be in a public place or dangerously out of control. The remaining counts were left to the jury. The Appellant did not give evidence or call witnesses in his defence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Does section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 impose strict liability on a dog owner for the dog being dangerously out of control in a public place, regardless of the owner's act or omission?
- Is it necessary to prove that the owner caused or contributed by act or omission to the dog being in a public place and dangerously out of control?
- Does the intervention of a third party, which causes the dog to escape confinement, absolve the owner from criminal liability under section 3(1)?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Appellant kept the dog securely confined in a locked private dwelling and did not cause or contribute to the dog escaping into a public place.
- Section 3(1) creates a strict liability offence but requires some voluntary act or omission by the defendant that brought about the prohibited event.
- The dog escaped solely due to the police breaking in without warning, a deliberate act of a third party outside the Appellant’s control or knowledge.
- Reliance on the reasoning in Kilbride v Lake that even strict liability offences require the defendant’s voluntary act or omission to be causative.
- Reference to the Supreme Court decision in Hughes, emphasizing the need for some act or omission contributing to the prohibited event for criminal responsibility.
- Submission that without proof of causative act or omission by the owner, liability should not attach.
Respondent's Arguments
- Section 3(1) plainly creates a strict liability offence with no requirement for mens rea or causative act or omission by the owner.
- The offence is committed by the mere presence of a dog dangerously out of control in a public place owned by the defendant.
- The objective test in section 10(3) governs whether the dog is dangerously out of control, unrelated to the defendant’s state of mind.
- Relying on authority including Sweet v Parsley and Greener v DPP, the offence does not require proof of fault or causation by the owner.
- Submission that how the dog came to be dangerously out of control is irrelevant to liability.
- Alternatively, argued that the Appellant’s omission to intervene and control the dog after its escape contributed to the prohibited state of affairs.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Bezzina and others [1994] 99 Cr App R 356 |
Section 3(1) of Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 creates a strict liability offence; liability imposed without requiring mens rea. |
Court confirmed strict liability but reserved question whether liability applies if dog escapes solely due to third party intervention. |
| Sweet v Parsley [1969] 53 Cr App R 221 |
Presumption of mens rea in criminal offences unless clearly displaced by statute. |
Supported the strict liability interpretation of section 3(1) due to clear statutory language. |
| Gammon (HK) Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1985] AC 1 |
Criteria for strict liability offences; regulatory offences may dispense with mens rea. |
Used to confirm the strict liability nature of the offence under section 3(1). |
| Kilbride v Lake [1962] 590 |
Even in strict liability offences, defendant’s voluntary act or omission must causally contribute to the prohibited event. |
Considered as persuasive authority for requiring causative act or omission by defendant. |
| Hughes [2013] UKSC 56 |
Criminal liability for causing death by driving requires some act or omission contributing to the event. |
Distinguished from Dangerous Dogs Act but used to support argument that causation matters in strict liability offences. |
| Greener v DPP [1996] 160 JP 265 |
Offence under section 3(3) requires act or omission contributing to the prohibited state of affairs; no mens rea required. |
Supported that some contribution by defendant is required even in strict liability offences under Dangerous Dogs Act. |
| Larsonneur [1933] 24 Cr App R 74 |
State of affairs offence where defendant may be liable despite no causative act. |
Used to illustrate that Parliament can create absolute liability offences without causation. |
| Winzar v Chief Constable of Kent (1983) |
State of affairs offence upheld despite defendant’s lack of voluntary act causing the state. |
Illustrated principle that some offences impose liability for prohibited states of affairs regardless of causation. |
| Strowger v John [1974] RTR 124 |
Absolute liability offence; raised but left open question if third party intervention breaks causation. |
Considered in relation to whether third party intervention can absolve liability. |
| Ezeemo and others [2012] EWCA Crim 2064 |
Strict liability regulatory offence imposed absolute responsibility despite lack of knowledge. |
Confirmed policy rationale for strict liability offences to promote vigilance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court acknowledged that section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 creates a strict liability offence, not requiring proof of mens rea or fault. The offence is committed by the mere presence of a dog dangerously out of control in a public place owned or controlled by the defendant. However, the court considered whether liability under section 3(1) is absolute, such that no act or omission by the defendant contributing to the dog’s presence in a public place is required.
The court examined statutory provisions, including section 3(2), which provides a defence to owners who have placed the dog in the charge of a fit person, indicating Parliament did not intend absolute liability in all circumstances. The court contrasted section 3(1) with section 3(3), which expressly requires the defendant to "allow" the dog into prohibited private space, implying some act or omission is necessary there.
Reviewing authorities, the court noted that while strict liability offences dispense with mens rea, some require a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the prohibited state of affairs. The court considered persuasive authorities from other jurisdictions and cases, such as Kilbride v Lake, which held that even strict liability requires a voluntary act or omission causally connected to the offence.
The court rejected the Appellant's submission that absolute liability cannot exist without causation, affirming Parliament’s supremacy to create offences without requiring causative conduct by the defendant. However, it concluded that the wording and structure of section 3(1) imply that liability arises only if the defendant’s act or omission caused or permitted the dog to be dangerously out of control in a public place to some more than minimal degree.
The court found that in this case, the dog was securely confined in a locked house, which was forcibly entered by police, leading to the dog’s escape and attack in a public place. The judge at trial directed the jury that any act or omission by the Appellant was irrelevant once the dog was dangerously out of control in a public place, effectively removing the question of causation from their consideration.
The court held that this direction was incorrect because the facts raised the issue whether the Appellant had done or omitted to do anything contributing to the dog’s dangerous presence in a public place. The Appellant was not allowed to address this causation issue, and the court could not be sure the jury’s verdicts were safe without such consideration.
Holding and Implications
The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION.
The decision means that while section 3(1) is a strict liability offence, liability is not absolute and requires proof that the defendant’s act or omission causally contributed to the dog being dangerously out of control in a public place. The judgment clarifies that intervention by a third party causing the dog’s escape may negate liability if the owner did not contribute to the prohibited state of affairs.
This ruling directly affects the parties by quashing the Appellant’s convictions due to the unsafe jury verdicts but does not establish a broader precedent beyond confirming the limits of strict liability under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.