Costs Consequences of an Unstateable Interlocutory Injunction and of Mootness in Plenary “Environmental” Litigation

Case: Croghan and Ors v Collins and Ors (Costs Ruling)
Citation: [2026] IEHC 22 (High Court, Holland J, ex tempore 15 January 2026)
Context: Planning & Environment / Judicial Review (but proceedings were plenary and not judicial review)

1) Introduction

This ruling determines costs after the substantive proceedings were struck out as moot. The plaintiffs (Alan Croghan, Amanda Farrelly, and Melissa Kelly) brought plenary proceedings seeking to prevent the development and use of the former Crown Paints site in Coolock, Dublin as IPAS accommodation. The “Townbe” defendants (Paul Collins, Tanya Hennigan, and Townbe Unlimited Company) were treated collectively as the intending developer group. Multiple State parties and Dublin City Council were also defendants.

The litigation had several key procedural milestones: (i) an October 2024 interlocutory injunction application refused in Croghan et al v Collins et al [2024] IEHC 607; (ii) a July 2025 judgment holding much of the case moot and declining to hear it, with a possibility of surviving issues (Croghan et al v Collins et al [2025] IEHC 413); and (iii) a November 2025 ex tempore ruling that nothing remained to be heard and final orders striking out the proceedings.

The principal costs issues were:

  • Interlocutory costs: whether costs should follow the defendants’ success on the failed injunction application, and whether any discretion should displace that result.
  • Mootness costs: whether the unilateral State decision to abandon the project warranted costs in favour of Ms Kelly for the proceedings generally.
  • Scope of costs for a lay litigant: the extent to which a self-represented party could recover costs.
  • Costs protection: whether statutory environmental/planning costs regimes applied to immunise the plaintiffs from adverse costs.

2) Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Orders made

Issue Result
Costs protection (Planning/Environmental statutory regimes) No costs protection applied.
Interlocutory injunction costs (State defendants) One set of interlocutory costs awarded to the State defendants, payable by all plaintiffs jointly and severally.
Interlocutory injunction costs (Dublin City Council) Council awarded its interlocutory costs, payable by all plaintiffs jointly and severally.
Interlocutory injunction costs (Townbe defendants) Townbe awarded only 60% of a single set of interlocutory costs, payable by all plaintiffs jointly and severally (a proportionate sanction for misleading/untrue information conveyed to the Court).
Costs of proceedings generally (moot proceedings) No order for or against Townbe or the Council; Ms Kelly’s application for costs against the State refused; “no other order as to costs”.

2.2 Core holdings

  • Interlocutory costs follow the event: applying the statutory framework and appellate guidance, the defendants’ success on the injunction application presumptively carried costs.
  • Impecuniosity/hardship is not generally a reason to refuse costs: personal hardship did not justify departing from the default rule.
  • Costs of a moot focus on the cause of mootness, not merits: the Court applied the Hughes framework, but declined to award Ms Kelly costs notwithstanding the State’s unilateral act and limited evidence as to its reasons.
  • Proportionate costs response to litigation misconduct: Townbe’s interlocutory costs were reduced to 60% to mark the Court’s disapproval where untrue information about roof removal was conveyed on instruction to the Court.
  • Lay litigant costs are limited: even if successful, a lay litigant’s recoverable costs are limited to expenses/outlays, not compensation for time/effort.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents cited and their influence

A. Ex tempore judgment methodology

  • Walsh v Walsh [2017] IEHC 181, [2017] 2 JIC 0207: cited to explain that the written version conforms to principles governing ex tempore judgments, underscoring that substance and orders are unchanged.

B. Costs recoverable by lay litigants

  • Re Irish Life and Permanent Plc, Dowling v Minister for Finance [2023] IEHC 33
  • Dawson v Irish Brokers Association [2022] 2 ILRM 210
  • Tracey v District Judge McCarthy [2021] IESC 37
  • Tracey v McDowell [2021] IESC 38
  • Gilroy v O'Leary and Google [2025] IECA 42

Holland J treated this line of authority as establishing a settled principle: a lay litigant who obtains a costs order may recover only expenses and outlays, not “costs” representing the value of their time, expertise, or personal effort. The ruling uses this as a practical constraint on Ms Kelly’s costs ambition: even if she had succeeded, recovery would likely have been materially less than that of a legally represented party.

C. Statutory framework and the “costs follow the event” starting point (including interlocutory applications)

  • Pembroke Equity Partners v Corrigan [2022] IECA 142
  • Godsil v. Ireland [2015] IESC 103, [2015] 4 IR 535
  • Daly v Ardstone Capital [2020] IEHC 345
  • Smith v Cisco Systems [2023] IECA 238

The ruling reads ss.168–169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (together with Order 99 rule 2 RSC) through the lens of appellate authority. From Pembroke Equity Partners v Corrigan [2022] IECA 142 (itself relying on Godsil) the Court extracted the proposition that “costs follow the event” is the “overriding start point”. It also used Smith v Cisco Systems [2023] IECA 238 as confirmation that the same statutory starting point governs interlocutory costs and that the court should generally determine interlocutory costs at that stage on the basis that the successful party gets its costs unless a justified departure is shown.

The practical consequence here was straightforward: because the plaintiffs lost the interlocutory injunction application, the State defendants and Council were entitled to costs, absent a sufficient “particular nature and circumstances” basis to displace that entitlement under s.169(1).

D. Responsibility for pleadings and sworn material

  • Simpson v The Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2021] 2 IR 338
  • Shelly Morris v Bus Átha Cliath [2003] 1 IR 232

These authorities were used in two distinct ways:

  1. Attribution of pleadings: the Court reiterated that what is pleaded is imputed to the party making the plea, limiting attempts by individual plaintiffs to distance themselves from the content of the plenary summons.
  2. Proportionate costs control for misconduct: Simpson was treated as supporting a “nuanced and proportionate response” where the integrity of the court process is engaged—here, by reducing Townbe’s costs to mark the Court’s disapproval rather than wholly depriving the successful party of costs.

E. Impecuniosity and hardship as a costs argument

  • McFadden v Muckno Hotels (as quoted in Smith v Cisco Systems [2023] IECA 238)
  • James v Watters [2023] IECA 144

The Court treated these as stating a firm general principle: inability to pay is ordinarily separate from whether a costs order should be made. While the Court accepted the plaintiffs’ personal circumstances factually, it held hardship did not displace the default costs rule in circumstances where the interlocutory application was unstateable and the conduct was criticised.

F. Costs in moot proceedings

  • Hughes v The Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 5, [2023] 3 IR 393
  • PT v Wicklow County Council [2019] IECA 346
  • Cunningham v President of the Circuit Court [2012] IESC 39, [2012] 3 IR 222

Holland J treated Hughes v The Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 5, [2023] 3 IR 393 as the primary modern guide. The Court emphasised Hughes’s central teaching: costs of a moot are not allocated by hypothesising the merits; rather they turn on the cause of mootness and whether it arose independently, by unilateral action, or in a statutory body context. The Court also relied on Hughes’s explicit warning—drawn from PT—that these propositions are a framework, not rigid rules, and must be applied with an “overriding discretion”.

Cunningham was treated as consistent with that framework: where the State’s unilateral act moots the case, and the State supplies little evidence of external reasons, the applicant may be awarded costs. But the Court also stressed that the discretion remains fact-sensitive and may yield a different outcome where broader political and multifactorial explanations are a more plausible inference.

3.2 Legal reasoning

A. Statutory and rules-based costs architecture

The Court anchored its approach in:

  • s.168 Legal Services Regulation Act 2015: jurisdiction to make costs orders “at any stage”.
  • s.169(1) Legal Services Regulation Act 2015: presumptive entitlement of an “entirely successful” party to costs unless the court orders otherwise having regard to the nature/circumstances and conduct.
  • Order 99 rule 2 RSC: costs discretion and (rule 2(3)) a default expectation that interlocutory costs will be awarded when the interlocutory application is determined.

Against that framework, the Court identified the “event” for interlocutory purposes as the defendants’ success on the injunction application. The Court regarded attempts to re-litigate the interlocutory merits (or to argue that the judge was wrong) as irrelevant at the costs stage absent an appeal overturning the earlier decision.

B. Unstateable interlocutory injunctions and conduct-driven discretion

A notable feature of the ruling is the weight placed on the October 2024 finding that the interlocutory case was “unstateable” (based on the plaintiffs’ reliance on the precautionary principle and Aarhus Convention as framed). The Court treated that as independently sufficient to justify awarding costs “following the event” against all plaintiffs.

The Court then dealt with two common costs-stage arguments:

  • “Hardship should excuse costs”: rejected as a general basis to displace the default rule, especially given the Court’s criticism of the pleadings/evidence and the seriousness of bringing sworn allegations without supporting evidence.
  • “The real issue was asbestos / planning exemption / environmental harm”: treated as beside the point where the issue was not pleaded at the time and the injunction failed on the legal basis actually advanced.

C. Proportionate reduction of a successful party’s costs for misleading information to the Court

The Court’s most practically significant discretionary intervention concerned Townbe. Although Townbe succeeded and would normally receive its full interlocutory costs, the Court found that instructions conveyed to the Court on 24 October 2024 about whether external roof removal was intended were later shown (by a February 2025 affidavit required by the Court) to be false. The Court:

  • Accepted counsel was incorrectly instructed and attached no blame to counsel.
  • Found Townbe responsible for the untrue information tendered on its instruction.
  • Considered the misinformation relevant to the broader planning-exemption narrative (internal works/exempted development).

Using Simpson v The Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2021] 2 IR 338 as authority for proportionate measures to protect the integrity of process, the Court reduced Townbe’s recoverable interlocutory costs to 60%, balancing: (i) the seriousness of the misinformation, (ii) the fact it did not cause the plaintiffs’ loss on the injunction, and (iii) the Court’s severe criticisms of the plaintiffs’ pleaded basis and conduct.

D. Mootness costs: applying Hughes, but exercising discretion against an award

The Court held mootness resulted from the State’s unilateral act (abandoning the project). Under Hughes, that typically points toward costs against the unilateral actor unless it shows its action was not prompted by the proceedings. Holland J noted the evidential weakness: the State largely relied on assertions in correspondence rather than admissible sworn evidence fully explaining its reasons.

However, the Court leaned heavily on Hughes’s “framework not fixed rules” caution and declined to award costs to Ms Kelly because:

  • The abandonment likely sat within a much broader “mosaic” of political and public controversy, not reducible to litigation pressure.
  • The announcement by email to multiple public representatives suggested political motivation.
  • The State had already issued a motion to dismiss and continued to press to proceed, which was inconsistent with “fear” of the proceedings.
  • The mootness finding was made by the Court of its own motion, and not sought as a tactical step by the State.
  • Ms Kelly’s conduct/pleadings (as criticised earlier) properly weighed against granting her costs as a matter of discretion.

Importantly, the ruling clarifies that even where the “unilateral act” analysis is engaged and the evidential onus may not be fully discharged, the court may still refuse costs where the overall justice of the case—especially conduct and broader causal context—points away from rewarding the applicant.

3.3 Impact

  • Sharper costs risk for activist-style plenary litigation: the ruling reinforces that where interlocutory relief is sought on an unstateable legal basis, the costs consequences are likely to be immediate and adverse, even if the wider controversy later dissipates.
  • Limits of “environmental proceedings” costs protection: the Court’s approach underlines that not all disputes with an environmental flavour are protected; the claimant must fit within the specific statutory wording (here, the claim was framed as absence of licence/permission rather than enforcement/breach).
  • Evidence discipline for successful defendants: Townbe’s partial costs penalty signals that being the “successful party” does not immunise a litigant from costs consequences where inaccurate instructions or affidavits compromise candour to the court.
  • Mootness costs remain discretionary and context-driven: despite the structured framework in Hughes, this decision illustrates that courts may infer multifactorial political causation and refuse costs where awarding them would be unjust in light of conduct and the broader context.
  • Practical note for self-represented parties: even a “win” on costs may yield only limited recovery (outlays/expenses), which should inform litigation strategy and expectations.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Moot” proceedings: a case becomes moot when the underlying dispute has ceased to exist in a way that makes a court decision unnecessary or inappropriate (e.g., the project challenged is abandoned).
  • “Costs follow the event”: the party who wins an application typically gets its legal costs from the losing party, unless the court finds a good reason to depart from that.
  • Interlocutory application: a mid-case application (here, for a temporary injunction) decided before any full trial.
  • “Unstateable” case: a claim so deficient in law (as pleaded/argued) that it cannot support the relief sought; it fails even before factual disputes are examined.
  • Joint and several liability for costs: each plaintiff can be pursued for the full amount of the costs order; a paying defendant cannot recover more than what is due overall, but the risk to each ordered party is the full sum.
  • Lay litigant costs: a self-represented party generally cannot recover a notional fee for their time; recoverable amounts typically cover documented out-of-pocket expenses (e.g., court fees, copying, travel) depending on adjudication.
  • Costs protection regimes: special statutes sometimes shield parties (often environmental litigants) from adverse costs, but only where the proceedings fall within defined categories and criteria.

5) Conclusion

Croghan and Ors v Collins and Ors [2026] IEHC 22 is a costs decision with practical bite. It (i) applies ss.168–169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 and Order 99 to confirm that interlocutory costs generally follow success; (ii) rejects hardship as a general basis to avoid costs; (iii) clarifies that environmental/planning costs protection is not triggered by broad “environmental” framing but by statutory fit; (iv) demonstrates a proportionate integrity-based reduction of a successful party’s costs where untrue information was conveyed to the court; and (v) shows that even where mootness is caused by a unilateral act and evidential explanations are thin, the court may refuse costs in its overriding discretion—especially where broader political causation and litigation conduct make an award unjust.