Conflict-of-Interest Misconduct After a Partly Successful SDT Appeal: Censure and “No Order” Costs Where Dishonesty Allegations Fall Away

1. Introduction

O'Callaghan v Nirvanna Property Holdings Ltd and Anor [No. 2] (Approved) [2026] IEHC 275 is an ex tempore ruling of the High Court (Micheál O'Higgins J) addressing sanction and costs following the court’s earlier determination of a solicitor’s appeal from findings of misconduct by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT).

The SDT had originally upheld four misconduct findings and recommended a severe sanction (strike off). On appeal, the High Court upheld only one allegation—a conflict-of-interest misconduct in connection with a land transaction—and dismissed three other allegations, which included more serious, “highly charged” assertions (including dishonesty-type themes).

The central post-appeal questions were:

  • Sanction: what sanction is proportionate where only a conflict-of-interest finding remains?
  • Costs: how should costs be allocated where (i) the complainant succeeds on one misconduct finding, but (ii) the solicitor succeeds in overturning the more serious allegations and avoids strike off?

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Sanction

The High Court held that the SDT’s recommended sanction (premised on all four allegations being proved) could not stand once three findings were overturned. Accepting the Law Society of Ireland recommendation, the court imposed a censure as the appropriate regulatory outcome for the upheld conflict-of-interest misconduct, taking account of:

  • the narrowed misconduct basis post-appeal;
  • regulatory objectives (public protection and maintaining professional standards);
  • the solicitor’s prior disciplinary history (older restrictions involving client monies; a later issue regarding retention of client monies);
  • the seriousness of the original strike-off risk (as context, though not determinative of the final sanction).

2.2 Costs

The court made no order as to costs for both:

  • the SDT proceedings; and
  • the High Court appeal.

The court considered that neither side was fully successful. It would be unjust to order costs against the complainant (who did establish an important misconduct finding in a regulatory setting), but also unjust to order costs against the solicitor given the collapse of the dishonesty-themed allegations and the significant reduction from “strike off recommended” to “censure imposed”.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents cited and their influence

(a) “Professional disciplinary list” jurisprudence (President Kelly; Barniville P.)

The court located sanction within the established Irish professional discipline framework (referred to as the jurisprudence of the “professional disciplinary list”), emphasising classic regulatory aims: protection of the public, maintenance of confidence in the profession, and proportionality. While the judgment does not recite the full authorities, it expressly applies guidance associated with:

  • a decision of former President Kelly on factors relevant to sanction in regulatory proceedings; and
  • the current President, Barniville P., on the matters to be weighed in fixing sanction.

Practically, these references reinforce two points evident in the outcome: (i) sanction is not punitive in the criminal sense but regulatory and protective; (ii) once the misconduct “basis” changes on appeal, the sanction must be recalibrated accordingly.

(b) Little v. The Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53

The complainant relied on Little v. The Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53 (Murray J) to argue that the case bore hallmarks of public interest proceedings and that costs rules should not deter complainants of ordinary means from bringing regulatory complaints.

The High Court accepted the relevance of public-interest considerations but held that their force was reduced in light of the appeal outcome: the public interest is served by correctly premised allegations, and here the complainant failed on three serious strands. This calibration is important: the judgment treats “public interest” as a factor, not a trump card.

(c) Chubb European Group SE v. The Health Insurance Authority [2020] IECA 183

In discussing “who won” for costs purposes, the court referred to Murray J’s observations in Chubb European Group SE v. The Health Insurance Authority [2020] IECA 183, para. 18, rejecting an overly granular approach that would deny a party “the event” merely because it lost on many arguments.

Notably, the High Court used Chubb as part of a broader balancing exercise rather than as a decisive rule, because the case had “unusual crosscurrents”: each side could credibly claim success on different “events” (misconduct upheld versus dishonesty allegations collapsed and strike-off avoided).

3.2 Statutory framework and its role

(a) Section 7 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1960 (as amended)

The complainant argued that refusing costs would undermine the Oireachtas purpose in the statutory complaints/discipline architecture, by deterring complainants. The court did not reject that legislative objective, but held the point carried less weight where significant elements of the complaint were not sustained on appeal.

(b) Sections 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015

The costs submissions were expressly framed by reference to sections 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, including section 169(1). The court treated costs as a discretionary, criteria-guided assessment rather than a mechanistic “winner takes all” outcome. The result—no order—reflects an application of statutory criteria to a mixed-success regulatory dispute with high reputational stakes.

3.3 Legal reasoning

(a) Re-setting sanction after appellate narrowing of misconduct

The court’s first move was structural: once three SDT findings were overturned, the SDT sanction recommendation (strike off) was “off the pitch” because it was premised on misconduct findings that no longer existed. The court then identified the “remaining” misconduct—conflict of interest in a land transaction—and selected a sanction proportionate to that surviving ground, informed by the regulator’s stance and the protective objectives of professional discipline.

(b) The “binary” approach to findings for costs purposes

A significant reasoning point is the court’s insistence on legal certainty: for costs, misconduct findings are treated as binary—a charge is either upheld or dismissed—without discounting an upheld finding because it was reached by careful application of an exacting standard. This guards against post-hoc “grading” of success based on judicial language and preserves clarity in regulatory outcomes.

(c) Balancing deterrence, fairness, and reputational harm in a regulatory complaint

The costs reasoning balances two competing policy concerns:

  • Regulatory access/public interest: complainants who pursue discipline in the public interest (and do not seek damages) should not be unfairly deterred, particularly where misconduct is ultimately established.
  • Fairness to the practitioner: where the most serious accusations (here, dishonesty-themed allegations) are not sustained and the practitioner avoids a career-ending sanction, it may be unjust to burden them with the complainant’s costs—especially where those allegations were repeated in sworn materials and hung over the practitioner for years.

The “collapse” of the dishonesty allegation is identified as a feature to which the court accords “substantial weight” in the costs calculus, even while recognising that the complainant did establish a serious regulatory breach (conflict of interest).

(d) Practical causation: the “should have told the client to go elsewhere” point

Although the court dismissed a standalone duty-of-care misconduct charge, it noted that the upheld conflict-of-interest finding implicitly carried the proposition that the solicitor ought to have advised the client to consult another solicitor. The court remarked that had this occurred, the litigation would likely have been avoided. This observation functions as a regulatory lesson rather than a separate liability finding.

3.4 Impact and significance

(a) Sanction recalibration after partial success on appeal

The ruling underscores a practical appellate reality in SDT matters: when misconduct findings are reduced on appeal, the High Court will re-calibrate sanction to the surviving misconduct, and may accept a regulator-proposed outcome (here, censure) where consistent with protective aims and proportionality.

(b) Costs in mixed-outcome regulatory litigation: “no order” as a principled outcome

The decision provides a useful template for costs in disciplinary proceedings where:

  • the complainant proves some misconduct (supporting public-interest costs arguments), but
  • the practitioner successfully overturns the most serious allegations (supporting fairness and reputational-harm arguments).

The court’s solution—no order as to costs at both SDT and High Court stages—signals that “mixed success” in regulatory complaints may properly yield cost neutrality, especially where severe allegations fail.

(c) Messaging to complainants and respondents

For future complainants, the judgment suggests that public-interest framing helps but will not immunise a party from costs consequences if major allegations are not “correctly premised”. For practitioners, it confirms that successfully resisting unfounded dishonesty-type allegations can materially affect costs even where a different misconduct finding is upheld.

4. Complex concepts simplified

  • Censure: a formal expression of disapproval by the court in a disciplinary context. It is a regulatory sanction, less severe than suspension or strike off.
  • Strike off: removal from the roll of solicitors, effectively ending the ability to practise.
  • Conflict of interest (in conveyancing/transactions): a situation where a solicitor’s duties to one party conflict with duties to another or with the solicitor’s own interests, undermining independent advice and client protection.
  • Regulatory proceedings: proceedings aimed at protecting the public and maintaining professional standards, rather than awarding damages to a complainant.
  • Standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt”: the criminal standard. The court noted that, for costs purposes, it should not treat an upheld finding as “less weighty” merely because the standard is exacting or the court expressed caution in analysis.
  • “The event” (costs): the main outcome(s) that determine who is treated as successful for costs. The court treated success as mixed here, rather than choosing a single “winner”.

5. Conclusion

[2026] IEHC 275 is significant for two connected propositions in solicitor-discipline litigation:

  1. Where an SDT decision is substantially overturned on appeal, the High Court will re-set sanction to reflect only the misconduct actually upheld; a tribunal recommendation premised on discarded findings cannot simply be confirmed.
  2. In a mixed-outcome regulatory complaint—especially where dishonesty-type allegations fail but some misconduct is upheld—the court may conclude that justice is best served by no order as to costs, balancing public-interest access to discipline mechanisms against fairness to the practitioner.