“Assess” vs “Take Account”: When IPAT Must Demonstrably Engage with an Appellant’s Case (and When a General Consideration Statement Suffices)

1. Introduction

S.G. (Albania) sought judicial review of a decision of the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT) dated 3 July 2024 (communicated 5 July 2024), which affirmed an International Protection Office (IPO) recommendation refusing both refugee status and subsidiary protection.

The applicant, an Albanian national from a designated safe country of origin, claimed he and his family were targeted in a long-running family dispute involving threats, assaults, and a firearm incident in April 2021. The refusals turned on adverse findings regarding credibility, plausibility, coherence, and specificity.

Leave was granted on tightly-defined grounds: (i) alleged inadequacy of reasons for key credibility/plausibility findings and (ii) alleged failure to take proper account of submissions made in the appeal (solicitor’s letter of 24 January 2024). A preliminary issue arose as to extension of time under s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (as amended).

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • Extension of time granted: the proceedings were filed one day late; the Court held there were good and sufficient reasons to extend time.
  • Judicial review refused on the substantive grounds:
    • The Tribunal’s reasons for rejecting the core account (masks, escape, political connections) were adequate for s. 46(6) purposes and for judicial review reviewability.
    • The applicant did not demonstrate that IPAT failed to take account of the appeal submissions; the submissions largely amounted to disagreement with credibility characterisations rather than supplying materially new explanatory content that was ignored.
  • The Court emphasised it could not decide issues beyond the leave grounds (notably, broader “reasonableness” or the refusal of an oral hearing).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(A) Procedural boundaries: the case confined to the leave granted

The Court relied on A.P. v DPP [2011] 1 I.R. 729 for the proposition that judicial review must be determined within the scope of the pleaded and permitted grounds; applicants may seek to amend, but cannot “press a case beyond what is reasonably contemplated by the grant of leave”. This was decisive in the Court’s refusal to entertain arguments that drifted towards “reasonableness” review or the merits of the oral-hearing refusal.

(B) Extension of time under s. 5 of the 2000 Act

The governing approach was taken from P. (Zimbabwe) v IPAT and Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 403, which the Court treated as correctly distinguishing:

  • the “good and sufficient reason to make the application within time” formula found elsewhere, from
  • the s. 5 test: whether there is “good and sufficient reason” for extending time.

The Court also adopted the structured, factor-based approach (analogous to Order 84, rule 21 RSC considerations), including public policy favouring expedition in immigration-related judicial review.

(C) Standard of review in international protection: “thorough review”

The Court anchored heightened scrutiny in AAA v Minister for Justice [2017] IESC 80, where the post-Meadows flexibility of judicial review was held capable of meeting the “thorough review” requirement (linked to EU law).

It also relied on the CJEU in X v. IPAT, Case C-756/21, emphasising the need for “vigilance and care” because protection claims implicate integrity of the person, liberties, and EU fundamental values.

(D) Adequacy of reasons

The Court applied Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2021] 2 IR 752 (Clarke C.J.) as the leading framework: reasons must (i) let the affected person know in general terms why the decision was made, (ii) allow consideration of whether to seek judicial review, and (iii) enable the reviewing court to engage properly—while remaining context-sensitive.

(E) Credibility findings and judicial review restraint

The Court treated I.R. v. Minister for Justice [2015] 4 IR 144 as the “touchstone” for reviewing credibility assessments. It highlighted Cooke J.’s principles (including assessment “in the round”, avoidance of conjecture/speculation, and the need for cogent reasons connected to facts), but stressed an important procedural point in this case: the applicant had not pleaded a general “reasonableness” challenge to credibility outcomes.

(F) Papers-only appeals and oral hearings

While not directly challenged, the Tribunal’s approach referenced: V.J. v. Minister for Justice [2019] IESC 75 (no automatic entitlement to an oral hearing merely because credibility is in issue), and High Court authorities S.K. v. IPAT [2021] IEHC 781 and M.A. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 528 regarding credibility assessment on a papers-only appeal and the Tribunal’s capacity to take a different view from the IPO.

(G) Must IPAT engage with explanations? Reconciling authorities with Rana & Ali

The applicant relied on a line of High Court cases indicating that where an applicant offers an explanation answering an adverse first-instance credibility point, the appellate body must consider and assess that explanation, particularly on a papers-only appeal: Bujari v. Minister for Justice [2003] IEHC 18; Zebry v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2005] IEHC 462; M.G.D. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 566; K.F.D. (Togo) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 788.

The respondents relied on Rana & Ali v Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46, arguing that a general statement that materials were considered will suffice unless there is an evidential basis to doubt that statement.

The Court’s synthesis is a central doctrinal contribution of the judgment:

  • “Assess” obligations (notably under s. 28(2)–(3) of the 2015 Act) require demonstrable engagement with the elements of the application (including reasons for applying for protection).
  • “Take account” obligations (e.g., s. 28(4), and documentation/representations) may, depending on context, be satisfied by a statement that materials were considered—consistent with Rana & Ali—unless there is a concrete basis to conclude that something materially relevant was ignored.

The Court explained that cases like K.F.D. (Togo) and M.G.D. are best understood as “material ignored” scenarios: where there was good reason to believe a substantive explanatory response or objective material went unaddressed. The Court linked this concept to “core claim not considered” reasoning, citing M.M. v. Chief International Protection Officer & Ors [2022] IECA 226.

The Court also reaffirmed, via M.A.R.A. (Nigeria) v Minister for Justice [2014] IESC 71, that the appeal is de novo and must involve a “full and thorough enquiry” into documentary evidence and submissions on points actually appealed.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Extension of time: good and sufficient reason found

Applying P. (Zimbabwe), the Court granted an extension where: (i) delay was minimal (one day), (ii) the applicant acted with expedition, (iii) no prejudice was identified, (iv) overall case delay was not attributable to the late filing (listing and opposition timeline dominated), (v) the application was not manifestly doomed.

(B) Adequacy of reasons: “why” is not “whether right”

The applicant’s adequacy-of-reasons challenge was, in substance, an attack on the internal logic of the plausibility findings. The Court drew a sharp line: adequate reasons under s. 46(6) and constitutional justice do not require the Court to accept the reasoning as persuasive; they require that the applicant and reviewing court can understand what was decided and why in general terms.

Reading the decision as a whole, the Court held IPAT explained:

  • the threats narrative (2016–2021) was “vague” and generic;
  • the April 2021 event was implausible and lacking detail (advance phone call; masks; escape after striking the gun);
  • the asserted political/police “connections” were generic and inconsistently presented, including inability to identify the politician.

Therefore, the reasons were sufficient to enable an informed judicial review decision, even if one might dispute the plausibility assessment.

(C) Alleged failure to consider appeal submissions: not made out on the facts

The Court accepted the principle that ignoring a material explanatory response can vitiate a decision, but found it did not arise here. The solicitor’s letter mostly:

  • asserted the IPO’s “vague/implausible” characterisation was wrong;
  • advanced reasonableness-style critique (“benefit of the doubt”, “opaque and perfunctory”);
  • added very limited new factual content (notably the “three metres to bushes” detail).

In that context, the absence of an express reference to the “three metres” point did not justify an inference that IPAT failed to consider it. IPAT’s analysis remained directed to the account’s overall plausibility and lack of detail; the applicant’s submissions largely did not supply the missing specificity but simply contested the adverse evaluation. On the evidence, there was no basis to displace IPAT’s express statement that it had considered the notice of appeal and documentation.

3.3 Impact

(A) Practical pleading discipline in protection judicial review

The judgment is a cautionary authority on the scope of leave: applicants must either (i) plead and obtain leave on “reasonableness” grounds (or other merits-adjacent grounds) or (ii) apply to amend. Courts will not permit a drift from “reasons/consideration” grounds into substantive re-litigation of plausibility/credibility.

(B) Clarified pathway through Rana & Ali for “consideration” challenges

The judgment gives a structured reconciliation between Rana & Ali v Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 and older High Court authorities on ignored explanations. Future challenges will likely need to show:

  • a material explanation or objective document was put forward,
  • it bore directly on a credibility/plausibility finding treated as important to the outcome, and
  • there is an evidential basis—beyond mere absence of explicit reference—to infer it was not engaged with.

(C) Submissions that merely dispute adverse characterisations may not generate an “engagement deficit”

The case underscores a practical distinction: where an appeal submission is primarily argumentative (asserting the decision-maker’s assessment is wrong), rather than explanatory (supplying new detail answering a specific concern), it is harder to convert “non-mention” into “non-consideration”.

(D) Extension of time: one-day delays remain fact-sensitive but may be readily excused

Applying P. (Zimbabwe), the Court’s approach signals that minimal delay coupled with expedition and absence of prejudice can satisfy s. 5, but the analysis remains contextual and policy-aware (expedition in immigration litigation).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Safe country of origin: a statutory designation meaning claims from that country are generally presumed less likely to succeed, but still require an individual assessment.
  • Refugee vs subsidiary protection: refugee status requires a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason; subsidiary protection addresses a real risk of “serious harm” even without a Convention nexus.
  • Papers-only appeal: an appeal determined on documents rather than an oral hearing. An oral hearing is not automatic merely because credibility is in issue.
  • Adequate reasons: not “the best reasons” or “convincing reasons”, but enough to understand why the decision went against you and to allow effective judicial review.
  • “Assess” vs “take account” (as used in the judgment): “Assess” implies demonstrable evaluative engagement with key elements; “take account” may be satisfied by a general confirmation of consideration unless there is a solid basis to think something material was ignored.
  • Certiorari: the judicial review remedy that quashes an unlawful decision.

5. Conclusion

S.G. (Albania) v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Anor [2025] IEHC 739 reinforces two core propositions in international protection judicial review:

  1. Adequate reasons are about intelligibility, not correctness: the Court will not convert a reasons challenge into a merits review where leave did not permit it.
  2. Non-mention is not non-consideration: while IPAT must genuinely engage with the elements it must “assess”, a general statement that submissions/documents were considered will often be accepted—consistent with Rana & Ali—unless the applicant can point to a materially explanatory response or core item that appears to have been ignored.

The judgment’s most notable contribution is its structured reconciliation of “ignored explanation” case law with Rana & Ali, through the lens of the statutory language of the International Protection Act 2015—a framework likely to shape how future “failure to consider” challenges are pleaded, argued, and adjudicated.