Welfare-Centric Use of Section 528 BNSS in POCSO Cases: Counselling-Guided Scrutiny of Alleged Misuse, Section 22 Enquiries, and Statewide “Singapen Sensitisation Workshops”

1. Introduction

This decision is framed as a “compendium of child-welfare oriented orders under the POCSO regime”. The High Court heard four quash petitions under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) (expressly noted as corresponding to Section 482 Cr.P.C.). Though the fact-patterns differed, the Court identified a shared systemic concern: children drawn into POCSO proceedings were being exposed to procedural insensitivity, repeated narrations, family conflict, stigma, and inadequate psycho-social support—sometimes in cases where allegations later appeared compromised, manipulated, or weaponised by adults.

The parties included accused persons (one being a doctor; another a father accused of aggravated penetrative sexual assault; others in a village rivalry), child/victim complainants or their guardians, and—importantly—multiple authorities were suo motu impleaded (Social Welfare, Home, Law Department, District Collector, senior police leadership, and Bar Councils) to enable welfare and institutional directions beyond the immediate quash question.

2. Summary of the Judgment

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The principal precedent expressly relied upon is State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp(1) SCC 335). The judgment uses Bhajan Lal as the doctrinal anchor for exercising inherent/quash jurisdiction where the prosecution appears to be an abuse of process or where the allegations and materials cumulatively fail to justify continuation.

• How Bhajan Lal influenced the outcome: In Crl.O.P.(MD) No.21788 of 2025, the Court explicitly concluded that the case fell within Bhajan Lal categories due to institutional insensibility and the likelihood of a fabricated/counterblast POCSO narrative, thereby justifying quashment to prevent misuse of the process and further harm to a child.
• Bhajan Lal as a restraint and a tool: Across the compendium, Bhajan Lal operates not as a routine quash lever but as a safeguard—invoked where the Court is satisfied that continuation will (i) serve no justice purpose and (ii) itself become a source of child harm (secondary victimisation).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) Section 528 BNSS as a child-welfare jurisdictional tool (not merely a quash power)

The Court treats Section 528 BNSS (akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C.) as authorising intervention to “secure the ends of justice” and “prevent abuse of process”. What is notable is the Court’s insistence that “ends of justice” in POCSO matters is inseparable from the child’s dignity, emotional safety, educational continuity, and rehabilitation. Thus, the Court’s reasoning expands the conventional quash inquiry (prima facie offence/likelihood of conviction) into a structured welfare inquiry supported by counselling reports and institutional directions.

(ii) Compromise/retraction is not a universal key in POCSO cases

• Refusal to quash on compromise alone: In Crl.O.P.(MD) No.3628 of 2026, the Court held that POCSO offences “ordinarily cannot be quashed merely on the basis of compromise” because the statute is child-centric and grounded in public interest. The victim’s minority at the time of occurrence remains a controlling fact.
• But retraction can trigger a different judicial response: Retractions and contradictory statements were not treated as automatic grounds to quash; rather, they prompted the Court to ask “why” (coercion? manipulation? stigma? dependence?)—leading either to quashment (where continuation itself became abusive) or to an independent enquiry (where competing narratives needed investigation).

(iii) Evidentiary significance of Section 183(6)(a) BNSS statements

In Crl.O.P.(MD) No.3924 of 2026, the Court found it “shocking” that an exculpatory statement recorded under Section 183(6)(a) BNSS was not meaningfully addressed by the investigating agency, yet a final report was filed and cognizance taken “mechanically”. The Court used this procedural failure as a key indicator of abuse of process—especially when supported by counselling material indicating adult pressure on the complainant.

(iv) Section 22 POCSO: shifting focus from the child to adult instigators

A central legal move in the compendium is the Court’s consistent invocation of Section 22 of the POCSO Act (false complaint/false information). The Court emphasises Section 22’s safeguard that children are protected from prosecution for false complaints, and therefore, when “false narrative” is suspected, the system’s attention must move to: (a) adult instigation, (b) coercion, (c) fabrication, and (d) misuse of institutional processes.

This is why, even while quashing in three cases (3924/2026, 3769/2026, 21788/2025), the Court simultaneously ordered time-bound preliminary enquiries to identify whether adults orchestrated the allegation, rather than ending the matter with a purely adversarial “accused vs. complainant” closure.

(v) Counselling and clinical psychology as decision-support (not ornamental)

The judgment is notable for integrating counsellor assessments and, in one matter, clinical psychological evaluation, as part of a welfare-centric adjudicatory method:

• It used counselling reports to detect vulnerability, coercion cues, inconsistencies, and fear-driven non-cooperation.
• It treated such inputs as triggers for either quashment (to prevent further harm) or further enquiry (to detect manipulation), while clarifying they are not “conclusive judicial findings”.
• It also converted counselling from a one-off event into a continuing rehabilitation direction (especially in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.3924 of 2026).

(vi) Institutional accountability: police “mechanicalness” and the court’s remedial directions

The Court repeatedly criticises mechanical registration/prosecution, particularly the registration of “case and counter case” POCSO complaints like “ordinary factional FIRs”. In response, it issued remedial directions—most prominently the statewide training mandate (“Singapen Sensitisation Workshop”)—targeting police, psychologists, social welfare officers, protection officers, and Child Welfare Committees.

(vii) Professional integrity and the Bar Council verification direction

In Crl.O.P.(MD) No.3628 of 2026, the Court goes beyond the criminal case record to address systemic risk where alleged manipulation is linked to the legal profession. By requesting the Bar Council of Kerala to verify enrolment records, the Court frames professional authenticity as part of “public confidence in the justice delivery system”. This is a significant institutional move: misuse concerns are not limited to litigants; they can involve professional gatekeeping failures, and courts may call for independent verification by regulators.

3.3 Impact

(i) Doctrinal impact on quash jurisprudence in POCSO matters

• Reinforced principle: POCSO cases are not ordinarily quashable on compromise because the wrong is public and child-centric, not merely private.
• Operational nuance added by this judgment: Where continuation itself becomes demonstrably harmful and abusive—especially in the face of exculpatory statutory statements, counselling-supported coercion indicators, or collapse into hostile trial—the High Court may quash but still preserve child welfare through monitoring and rehabilitation directions.

(ii) Administrative/systemic impact: training as a judicially prompted reform

The “SINGAPEN SENSITISATION WORKSHOP” direction may influence how Tamil Nadu structures stakeholder capacity-building under Sections 39 and 43 of POCSO. Future litigants may cite this decision to seek:

• trauma-sensitive investigation protocols,
• reduced repetitive narration by children,
• mandatory counselling integration, and
• accountability for mechanical case registration, particularly in rival-family disputes.

(iii) Child welfare as an enforceable post-quash agenda

The judgment demonstrates a model where quashment does not mean abandonment of the child’s welfare: periodic monitoring by DCPU, confidential reporting to Special Courts, counselling of the alleged adult wrongdoer for behavioural reform, and education-continuity oversight by district administration. This may shape future court practice in crafting “protective exit orders” even when criminal proceedings are terminated.

(iv) Section 22 POCSO enquiries may become more common

By repeatedly ordering preliminary enquiries into Section 22-related conduct when manipulation is suspected, the judgment signals that “misuse prevention” can coexist with child protection, provided the system avoids prosecuting the child and focuses on adult instigators and fabricated evidence networks.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 528 BNSS: The High Court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of court process and secure justice (functionally like Section 482 Cr.P.C.). It is not a “mini-trial” power, but it can stop proceedings where continuing them would be unjust.
• Quashment: The court terminates criminal proceedings at an early stage. In this compendium, quashment is treated as an exceptional remedy, used with special caution in child sexual offence cases.
• Section 183(6)(a) BNSS statement: A magistrate-recorded statement (akin in function to a Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement), often treated as significant because it is recorded judicially.
• Section 22 POCSO: Addresses false complaints/false information. The judgment highlights that children are protected from prosecution for “false complaint” and the correct enquiry is into adult instigation/coercion.
• Secondary victimisation: Trauma caused not by the original incident, but by the process—repeated questioning, stigma, adversarial exposure, and institutional insensitivity.
• Suo motu impleadment: The Court adds parties on its own motion (e.g., welfare departments, senior police, Bar Council) so it can pass effective, system-linked directions.
• In-camera interaction: The court interacts privately (not in open court) to protect a child’s privacy and reduce stress.

5. Conclusion

This judgment is significant not merely for its case-specific outcomes (three quashments and one disposal with stay and enquiries), but for the legal methodology it models: a welfare-centric, trauma-informed exercise of inherent powers in POCSO proceedings. It reaffirms that compromise cannot routinely erase POCSO allegations, yet it recognises that mechanical prosecution can itself become unconstitutional when it harms children through secondary victimisation or when adults weaponise the statute for vendetta.

By integrating counselling and psychological assessment, ordering Section 22-focused enquiries into adult manipulation, mandating rehabilitation and educational continuity, and directing statewide stakeholder sensitisation (“Singapen Sensitisation Workshops”), the Court positions child protection as a constitutional ecosystem—where enforcement, empathy, and institutional competence must operate together. The compendium’s enduring contribution lies in this shift: the success of POCSO adjudication is measured not only by convictions, but by whether children emerge from the justice system safer, heard, rehabilitated, and emotionally secure.