Video Conferencing Is Not a Fundamental Right: High Court’s Power to Curb RTI Misuse and Impose Exemplary Costs for Obstructing Judicial Administration

Case: Vemula Venkata Vinay Babu Alias Vinay Vemula v. State Of Up And 3 Others
Court: Allahabad High Court
Date: 05-08-2026
Coram: Hon’ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, J.
Proceeding: Writ - C No. 547 of 2024

1. Introduction

The petition arose from a challenge to an order dated 28.07.2023 passed by the Commissioner, State Information Commission, U.P., Lucknow, by which the petitioner’s appeal under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI Act”) was dismissed on the footing that the information sought had already been supplied by registered post dated 11.01.2023.

While the writ petition formally concerned the RTI dispute, the case quickly acquired a second, more consequential dimension: the petitioner’s courtroom conduct as a litigant-in-person, including (i) repeated insistence that appearance by video conferencing is a “fundamental right”, (ii) non-compliance with a direction to appear in person, and (iii) filing numerous RTI applications seeking internal court-administration material (logs, rosters, file movement registers, Webex session logs, etc.), which the Court found to be obstructive and irrelevant to the adjudication of the writ petition.

The case therefore presented two key issue clusters:

  • RTI merits: whether the petitioner could seek interference under Article 226 when the requested information had already been provided and/or was not available with the authority.
  • Process and administration of justice: whether the Court could refuse/curb the petitioner’s attempt to use RTI filings to interfere with court functioning; whether video conferencing can be claimed as of right; and whether exemplary costs were warranted for abuse of process and incorrect, misconceived applications.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • Misc. Application No. 7/25 dismissed with cost of Rs. 50,000/- as misconceived and contrary to record (counter affidavit of Respondent-2 had already been filed and served; and there was no direction to Respondents-1, 3 and 4 to file affidavits).
  • Misc. Application No. 3/25 partly construed: counsel discharged and petitioner permitted to appear in-person; however, an “absolute right” to appear only through video conferencing was rejected.
  • Video conferencing held to be a discretionary सुविधा (convenience), not a fundamental right; where the Court directs in-person appearance, it must be complied with absent unreasonable excuse.
  • RTI applications targeting court administration curtailed: the Court found the petitioner to be misusing the RTI Act by filing 24 applications (04.06.2026 to 17.07.2026) seeking vague/internal operational data; directed such applications to be consigned to record and imposed Rs. 5,000/- per application (total Rs. 1,20,000/-).
  • Writ petition dismissed on merits: the Court held the required information had already been provided; the petitioner cannot insist on information not available with the authority.
  • Further exemplary cost of Rs. 5,00,000/- imposed to discourage disturbance of court proceedings and obstruction of administration of justice.
  • Total costs: Rs. 6,70,000/- payable to the High Court Legal Service Committee within four weeks, with enforcement through the Registrar General upon default.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

No specific reported case-law precedents are cited by name in the text of the judgment. The Court does make a general observation that “Recently, not only Supreme Court but in various High Courts and in this High Court also there are instances…” regarding unruly conduct by litigants-in-person using video recordings to malign courts; however, it does not rely on or quote any identifiable titled decision.

Consequently, the judgment is best read as an exercise of first-principles reasoning grounded in (i) the Court’s control over its procedure and courtroom discipline, (ii) the nature and limits of RTI entitlements, and (iii) the High Court’s writ jurisdiction and power to prevent abuse of process through costs and case-management directions.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  • (A) Video conferencing: discretionary mode, not an enforceable “fundamental right”.

    The Court drew a clear doctrinal line: video conferencing is a mode of appearance meant to facilitate and expedite adjudication, but it cannot be demanded as a matter of right. It is for the Court to decide when and how it will allow virtual appearance. Where the Court issues a direction to appear in person, the litigant must comply unless there is an “unreasonable excuse”.

    The Court also factually undermined the petitioner’s “logistics” plea by recording that he had, on several occasions, come to Prayagraj to swear affidavits and pursue applications, including before the Oath Commissioner.

  • (B) Misuse of RTI against court administration: treated as hindrance to administration of justice.

    The Court relied on the nature of the RTI requests filed against the High Court’s internal functioning (logs, file movements, roster notes, backend records, reasons for “passed over”, etc.) and concluded that they were vague, not concerned with the petitioner’s substantive case, and had the effect of consuming staff time and interfering with the Court’s functioning.

    This reasoning culminated in a strong case-management sanction: the applications were directed to be consigned to record, and the petitioner was burdened with per-application costs. This reflects an approach that treats RTI as a transparency tool, not as a litigation weapon to harass institutions or derail proceedings.

  • (C) Misconceived interlocutory application and incorrect statements: deterrent costs.

    Misc. Application No. 7/25 sought punishment of Respondents-1, 3 and 4 for not filing a counter affidavit. The Court examined the record and found:

    • a counter affidavit on behalf of Respondent-2 (the contesting respondent) was already filed and served;
    • the direction to file counter affidavit was for the State; and
    • Respondents-1, 3 and 4 were not directed to file affidavits.

    Given the application was “misconceived” and “based on incorrect statement and contrary to record”, the Court imposed Rs. 50,000/- cost, signalling that careless/allegation-driven motion practice will attract financial consequences.

  • (D) RTI merits: no writ interference where information supplied / not available.

    On the core RTI dispute, the Court noted that the petitioner did not deny receipt of information by registered post and did not place that information on record. The Court examined the queries and replies annexed to the petition and held that the “requisite information has already been provided”. Further, the petitioner cannot insist that authorities provide information “which is not available with concerned authorities”.

    The High Court therefore declined to interfere with the State Information Commission’s order and dismissed the writ petition.

  • (E) Exemplary costs for abuse impacting judicial administration.

    Over and above the application-specific costs, the Court imposed an additional Rs. 5,00,000/- to discourage conduct that disturbs proceedings and hampers administration of justice—indicating that where a litigant’s behaviour crosses from persistence into systemic obstruction, courts may respond with heavier deterrent costs.

3.3 Impact

  • On virtual hearings: The judgment reinforces that virtual appearance is not a litigant-controlled entitlement; it is a court-controlled facility. This is particularly significant for litigants-in-person who may seek to dictate procedure by framing convenience claims as constitutional rights.
  • On RTI strategy in ongoing litigation: The decision signals intolerance for RTI filings aimed at court logistics/administration, especially when they appear designed to generate pressure, delay, or collateral narratives rather than to secure genuinely necessary information.
  • On costs jurisprudence in writ proceedings: The decision exemplifies an escalating-cost framework: (i) costs for a specific misconceived application, (ii) per-instance costs for repeated institutional harassment (24 RTIs), and (iii) global exemplary costs for broader abuse obstructing justice.
  • On record-based adjudication: The Court’s refusal to entertain claims without denying receipt or placing supplied information on record underscores that Article 226 relief is unlikely where the petitioner’s own pleadings and annexures show compliance by the authority.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Video Conferencing is not a fundamental right”: The Court held that virtual appearance is a facility used to make hearings easier/faster, but it is not an enforceable constitutional guarantee that a litigant can demand. The Court decides whether to allow it.
  • “Abuse of process”: This refers to using legal procedures (applications, RTIs, allegations) not to resolve the real dispute, but to harass, delay, or interfere with the system. Courts can respond by dismissing such actions and imposing costs.
  • “Costs”: Money a court orders a party to pay because their conduct wasted judicial time or unfairly burdened the other side/system. Here, costs were used as a deterrent.
  • “Consigned to record”: The Court directed that the RTI applications be placed/kept on record rather than processed forward as live demands—functionally freezing their operational effect in the circumstances.
  • “Writ petition under Article 226”: A constitutional remedy where High Courts review legality of administrative action. It is discretionary; courts can refuse relief where the claim lacks merit or is tainted by misuse.

5. Conclusion

The Allahabad High Court’s decision in Vemula Venkata Vinay Babu Alias Vinay Vemula v. State Of Up And 3 Others is notable less for the RTI merits (where the Court found the information had already been provided) and more for the procedural principle it articulates: virtual hearing is a court-regulated convenience, not a litigant’s fundamental right, and RTI mechanisms cannot be weaponised to hinder court administration.

By combining dismissal on merits with layered deterrent costs (Rs. 6,70,000/- in total) and directives targeting repetitive, vague institutional RTI demands, the judgment stakes out a strong position on preserving courtroom discipline, protecting administrative capacity, and discouraging litigant-driven disruption—especially in litigant-in-person contexts.