Unauthorised Decades-Long Occupation of Private Land for Highways: NHAI Must Initiate Acquisition or Restore Possession
1. Introduction
In Ch. Mohd. Sadiq v. Union of India th Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs and Ors
(OWP No. 1625/2020, decided on 24-02-2026), the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court (Jammu Bench)
addressed a recurring public-law problem: private land being used for public roads/highways for decades without any lawful acquisition and without compensation.
The petitioner, Ch. Mohd. Sadiq, claimed that land measuring 02 kanals comprised in
Khasra No. 299 (old) at Village Digiana, Jammu, owned by his predecessors and inherited by him and other legal heirs,
was occupied for highway purposes (initially by CPWD, later by PWD, and then by NHAI) without any acquisition proceedings.
The key issues were:
(i) whether the State/instrumentalities could continue to retain and use private land without “authority of law”;
(ii) whether delay/laches defeated the claim despite alleged occupation since the 1950s/1970s; and
(iii) what effective relief should be granted in writ jurisdiction where records showed occupation but no acquisition/compensation.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The Court found, on the basis of revenue verification and official reports, that:
(a) the land stood recorded as owned by the petitioner’s predecessors/heirs, while showing occupation by CPWD; and
(b) no acquisition record or compensation entry existed, and CPWD failed to produce any acquisition proceedings despite being asked.
Holding that continued possession and use of private property for public purposes without due process violates
Article 300A (constitutional right to property), the Court allowed the petition and directed:
-
NHAI (as the current user) to submit an indent for acquisition of the land to the Collector/Competent Authority
or alternatively restore possession to the landowners, within six weeks.
-
The Collector/Competent Authority, upon receiving the indent, to proceed under the applicable land acquisition law
and conclude proceedings within the statutory timeline.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
The Court’s approach is anchored in Supreme Court jurisprudence treating deprivation of property without lawful authority as a continuing constitutional wrong,
and recognising compensation as integral to lawful expropriation.
The High Court relied on the proposition that while the right to property is no longer a fundamental right,
it remains a constitutional right under Article 300A and a human right.
The quoted passage emphasises the core rule: no person can be deprived of property except by authority of law.
This case supplied the constitutional benchmark against which the State’s long occupation was measured.
The judgment also references Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel and Others (as noted in the extracted paragraph)
to reinforce the “human right” dimension of property protection, strengthening the normative condemnation of extra-legal occupation.
(b) Vidya Devi Vs. State of Himachal Paradesh and Ors, (2020) 2 SCC 569
This was the Court’s principal authority for two connected propositions:
-
Forcible dispossession without due process is violative of Article 300A and the State’s welfare obligations;
and where dispossession occurred when property was a fundamental right (pre-44th Amendment), the illegality is even starker.
-
Even though Article 300A does not expressly spell out compensation, the obligation to pay compensation is inferable
when the State exercises “eminent domain” and takes private property for public purpose.
The High Court used Vidya Devi to answer the respondents’ “delay and laches” submission in substance (even if not in a separately framed ratio):
where the State retains property without lawful acquisition, the grievance is not a stale money claim alone; it implicates a continuing constitutional breach.
Quoted within Vidya Devi, this decision articulates the classical limits of eminent domain:
interference with property is permissible only for public purpose and upon payment of reasonable compensation.
The High Court’s remedy—requiring acquisition initiation—directly operationalises this principle by compelling the State to move from de facto occupation to de jure acquisition.
This authority supports strict construction of any provision that seeks to divest property rights, consistent with Article 300A.
In the present case, it bolstered the conclusion that administrative convenience, departmental transfers, or old entries cannot substitute for lawful acquisition.
(e) Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P.& Ors.6
Cited (within the excerpt from Vidya Devi) for recognising property as an “indispensable safeguard” against tyranny,
this case contributed to the Court’s rights-oriented framing: the State’s prolonged unauthorised use of private land is not a mere technical lapse,
but an affront to rule of law and constitutional governance.
The extracted proposition—“if there is no law, there is no deprivation”—was central to the Court’s holding.
It forecloses any argument that long possession, bureaucratic handovers, or the “existence of a road” can ripen into lawful State title absent statutory backing.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
-
Fact-foundation via official records:
The Court relied heavily on the Deputy Commissioner’s verification that the land remained recorded in the name of the petitioner’s predecessors/heirs,
while being shown as occupied by CPWD, with no acquisition record. This official confirmation shifted the case from a contested private dispute
to an institutional failure of due process.
-
Accountability despite inter-departmental transfers:
CPWD argued it no longer controlled the road; PWD stated the road was handed over to NHAI in 2021; NHAI claimed the land was “State land” in its records.
The Court treated these as administrative rearrangements that do not extinguish the owner’s constitutional protection.
It fixed responsibility on the current user (NHAI) to regularise the position by initiating acquisition or restoring possession.
-
Article 300A as the controlling norm:
The Court characterised the occupation (for over 70 years) as legally impermissible, emphasising that property rights—whether once fundamental or now constitutional—
cannot be defeated by executive action unsupported by law.
-
Choice of remedy—“acquire or restore,” not direct quantification:
Rather than itself computing compensation (including interest from 1957/1971), the Court directed the statutory route:
acquisition under the “applicable law” on an indent, with timelines as per the relevant statute.
This reflects a structural principle: compensation must flow from lawful acquisition procedure, not ad hoc executive payments,
particularly where the governing regime (Land Acquisition Act-era, later frameworks, and current acquisition mechanisms for highways) may require formal determinations.
-
Delay and laches—subordinated to constitutional illegality:
Although the respondents urged dismissal due to the petitioner’s “deep slumber,” the Court prioritised the rule that
the State cannot legitimise an unlawful taking by passage of time,
especially when official records themselves reveal occupation without acquisition.
3.3 Impact
-
Regularisation mandate for legacy road occupations:
The decision is a clear warning that historical highway/road usage of private land—common in older alignments—must be regularised by
lawful acquisition or undone by restoration.
-
“Current user” principle:
By directing NHAI to initiate acquisition (despite CPWD/PWD having earlier custody), the judgment promotes administrative clarity:
the agency presently benefiting from and controlling the project must trigger statutory compliance.
-
Strengthened writ remedy under Article 300A:
The case reinforces that writ courts can intervene where the State’s possession lacks legal authority, even if factual origins are old,
so long as present deprivation continues and the State cannot produce acquisition/compensation records.
-
Project governance and risk allocation:
For infrastructure authorities, the ruling increases the compliance burden at DPR/ROW stages:
failure to ensure clean title and acquisition may invite judicial directions that disrupt schedules (acquire within timelines or restore possession).
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Article 300A (Right to Property)
-
A constitutional guarantee that property cannot be taken away unless a valid law authorises it and the procedure under that law is followed.
Executive convenience or long possession is not enough.
- Writ of Mandamus
-
A command issued by a constitutional court directing a public authority to perform a legal duty—here, to initiate acquisition or restore possession.
- Eminent Domain
-
The State’s power to take private property for a public purpose, but only through law and generally with payment of compensation.
- Indent for Acquisition
-
A formal requisition sent by the “requiring body” (here, NHAI) to the Collector/Competent Authority seeking initiation of acquisition proceedings.
- Delay and Laches
-
A doctrine under which courts may refuse relief if a petitioner unreasonably delays approaching the court.
This case illustrates that where the State’s unlawful occupation is ongoing and records show no acquisition, courts may still grant relief.
5. Conclusion
The High Court’s ruling crystallises a practical constitutional rule for public infrastructure disputes:
the State and its instrumentalities cannot retain private land for decades for roads/highways without lawful acquisition and compensation.
Where official records reveal occupation without acquisition, the writ court can compel compliance by directing the current project authority
to initiate acquisition promptly or restore possession.
In broader legal context, the judgment aligns local highway land-use realities with Supreme Court doctrine on Article 300A,
reinforcing that the rule of law—not administrative history—legitimises State possession of private property.