UGC Regulation 7.3 as an Entry 66 “Standard”: Mandatory Search Committee Composition for Vice‑Chancellor Appointments; Article 254 Repugnancy Inapplicable Where Parliament Exclusively Occupies the Field

1. Introduction

Case: S MOHAN v. SECRETARY TO THE CHANCELLOR, PUDUCHERRY TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY (2026 INSC 100), Supreme Court of India, decided on 30-01-2026.

The appeals arose from a common judgment of the Madras High Court setting aside the appointment of Dr. S. Mohan as the first Vice-Chancellor of Puducherry Technological University (“PTU” / “the University”). The High Court held that the constitution of PTU’s Search-cum-Selection Committee under Section 14(5) of the Puducherry Technological University Act, 2019 (“PTU Act”) was inconsistent with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations on Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education, 2018 (“UGC Regulations, 2018”), principally because it (i) omitted the UGC Chairman’s nominee and (ii) included a Government Secretary allegedly “connected” with the University.

Key issues before the Supreme Court were:

  • Whether UGC Regulation 7.3 is mandatory and binding on PTU in the matter of Vice-Chancellor selection.
  • Whether inconsistency between PTU Act provisions and UGC Regulations triggers Article 254 repugnancy analysis (and the debate around presidential assent), or instead raises a question of legislative competence given Entry 66, List I.
  • Even if the appointment process was illegal, whether the incumbent should be removed immediately, or protected to avoid stigma and institutional disruption.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s conclusion that PTU’s Search-cum-Selection Committee was constituted contrary to UGC Regulation 7.3 and that Section 14(5) of the PTU Act (to the extent it mandated an inconsistent committee composition) could not stand against the UGC Regulations, 2018 which are traceable to Parliament’s exclusive power under Entry 66 of List I.

However, exercising Article 142 powers “to do complete justice”, the Court protected Dr. Mohan from immediate ouster and directed that he may continue till the end of his tenure (December 2026) or until a new Vice-Chancellor is selected in accordance with law, whichever is earlier. The Court also clarified that Dr. Mohan may participate in any fresh selection process without prejudice from the impugned judgment.

Crucially, the Court held that Article 254 repugnancy analysis was not attracted because the UGC Act/Regulations occupy an exclusive Union field (List I), not a concurrent field. In such a case, the State/UT law fails for want of competence (or to the extent it trenches upon the exclusive field), rather than due to repugnancy cured (or not) by presidential assent.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(A) Cases informing the High Court’s repugnancy/assent approach (and why the Supreme Court treated them as unnecessary)

  • Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. & Another v. National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. & Others (2002) 8 SCC 182:
    The High Court used this Constitution Bench decision to insist that presidential assent under Article 254(2) requires conscious consideration of repugnancy. The Supreme Court, however, held that this entire enquiry became academic because Article 254 applies only when both laws are within the Concurrent List.
  • Rajiv Sarin & Another v. State of Uttarakhand & Others (2011 ) 8 SCC 708 and Gram Panchayat, Jamalpur v. Malwinder Singh (19 85) 3 SCC 661:
    Invoked by the appellant to argue that “general assent” validates the State law broadly. The Supreme Court declined to engage this line of authority because it found Article 254(2) inapplicable on the facts once the Central instrument was placed under Entry 66 List I.

(B) Core education/Entry 66 authorities

  • Dr. Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P. (1999) 7 SCC 120:
    Cited for the proposition that although States can legislate on education (Entry 25, List III), they cannot impinge upon “standards” in higher education, which fall within Parliament’s exclusive domain under Entry 66 List I. The Supreme Court relied on this constitutional structure but proceeded beyond “repugnancy” to legislative field allocation.
  • Gujarat University, Ahmedabad v. Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar 1962 SCC OnLine SC 146:
    Relied upon by respondents to argue that “coordination” and “standards” under Entry 66 are broad and include steps necessary to prevent disparities. The Supreme Court’s holding that UGC Regulation 7.3 is a “standard” is consistent with this expansive understanding.
  • University of Delhi v. Raj Singh 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 516:
    Cited to support the idea that appointment norms for academic posts can fall within Entry 66. Respondents argued this applies “a fortiori” to Vice-Chancellors; the Supreme Court effectively accepted that VC-selection architecture can be part of standards.
  • R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore (1964) 6 SCR 368, Modern Dental College v. State of M.P. (2016) 7 SCC 353 and T.N. Medical Officers' Association v. Union of India (2021) 6 SCC 568:
    Cited by the appellant to argue that Entry 66 is confined to “standards” and not university governance/administration. The Supreme Court did not accept that the composition of a VC Search Committee is merely “governance” divorced from standards; it treated Regulation 7.3’s committee requirements as integral to maintaining standards in higher education leadership appointments.

(C) Authorities on binding nature of UGC Regulations and invalidity of appointments made in breach

  • Praneeth K. v. UGC (2021) 14 SCC 241:
    Used by the High Court (and echoed in the Supreme Court’s reasoning trajectory) to support that UGC Regulations have binding force in their operative sphere.
  • Gambhirdhan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC 179:
    The Supreme Court treated this as important authority for two propositions: (i) UGC Regulations are subordinate legislation with statutory force, laid before Parliament; and (ii) appointments contrary to UGC Regulations can be quashed (including through quo warranto).
    The appellant attempted to distinguish it on facts (qualifications diluted, grants received, etc.). The Supreme Court used it primarily for the regulatory-status and enforceability point.

(D) The decisive authority on Article 254’s limited domain

  • Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45:
    This was the doctrinal pivot. The Supreme Court invoked it to hold that repugnancy under Article 254(1) arises only where both laws are within the Concurrent List. Where the alleged overlap is between List I and List III/List II, the State law fails due to lack of legislative competence (or trenching upon an exclusive Union field) under Article 246, not because of repugnancy.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) Constitutional architecture: Entry 25 List III “subject to” Entry 66 List I

The Court begins from the text of Entry 25, List III, which permits State/UT legislation on education, but expressly makes it “subject to” Entries 63–66 of List I. It then foregrounds Entry 66, List I—coordination and determination of standards in higher education—as an exclusive Union field.

(ii) UGC Regulations, 2018 as instruments of Entry 66

The Court treated UGC Regulations, 2018 as emanating from the UGC Act, 1956, framed under sections cited in the judgment (Sections 26(1)(e), 26(1)(g) read with Section 14), and therefore as occupying the “standards” domain under Entry 66. On this foundation, the Court reasoned that PTU’s statutory scheme must conform to Regulation 7.3.

(iii) Regulation 7.3’s “mandatory framework” and the two non-compliances found

The Court identified two direct conflicts:

  • Absence of UGC Chairman’s nominee: Regulation 7.3(ii) requires that “One member of the Search cum-Selection Committee shall be nominated by the Chairman, University Grants Commission…”. PTU’s committee under Section 14(5) lacked such a nominee. This alone was treated as a fatal deviation.
  • “Connected with the University” disqualification: Regulation 7.3(ii) further requires members “shall not be connected in any manner with the University concerned or its colleges.” The proviso to Section 14(5) included the Secretary (Higher & Technical Education) as a member for the first VC appointment; the Court accepted the “connection” concern (Pro-Chancellor role/earlier governing body involvement) as a conflict with the Regulation’s independence requirement.

As a result, the Court endorsed the High Court’s outcome: the Search Committee’s constitution was illegal, and the appointment process was thus vitiated.

(iv) The Court’s crucial move: shifting from “repugnancy” to “competence/field occupation”

While the High Court had discussed Article 254 and presidential assent, the Supreme Court held that no repugnancy analysis is required because the two enactments trace to different lists:

  • UGC Act/UGC Regulations, 2018: Entry 66, List I (exclusive Union domain)
  • PTU Act: Entry 25, List III (concurrent, but “subject to” Entry 66)

Relying on Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, the Court held Article 254 applies only where both laws are within the Concurrent List. Here, the Central instrument was anchored in List I, so a conflicting State/UT provision is not “void due to repugnancy”; it fails because it trenches upon an exclusive Union field (or cannot override it).

This doctrinal choice also explains the Court’s explicit statement that it need not reconcile Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. & Another v. National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. & Others and Rajiv Sarin & Another v. State of Uttarakhand & Others on presidential assent: once Article 254 is out, assent debates are irrelevant to outcome.

(v) Remedy: strict legality tempered by Article 142 equity

After upholding illegality, the Court turned to consequences. It emphasised:

  • No allegation against Dr. Mohan’s qualifications, integrity, or performance.
  • He had served since December 2021; abrupt ouster could cause stigma and disrupt university functioning.
  • Fresh selection compliant with Regulation 7.3 would take time.

Accordingly, using Article 142, the Court crafted a transitional remedy: continuance till tenure end or lawful replacement, and permission to participate in fresh selection without prejudice.

3.3 Impact

(A) Normative impact on Vice-Chancellor selection processes

This judgment reinforces (and extends in practical effect) the proposition that UGC Regulation 7.3 is not advisory when viewed as a “standard” under Entry 66. Universities established by State/UT statutes must ensure:

  • Mandatory inclusion of the UGC Chairman’s nominee on the Search-cum-Selection Committee where Regulation 7.3 applies.
  • Committee members must be demonstrably independent and not “connected in any manner” with the university—an expansive phrase that can capture statutory/ex officio roles and prior governance connections.

(B) Doctrinal impact: limiting Article 254 in education-standard conflicts

The Court’s reliance on Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar clarifies that when UGC Regulations are treated as rooted in Entry 66 List I, conflicts are best analysed as field occupation/competence issues under Article 246, rather than as “repugnancy” disputes under Article 254. Practically, this reduces the scope for States/UTs to defend non-conforming university governance provisions via presidential assent arguments, at least where the Court characterises the disputed norm as a “standard” within Entry 66.

(C) Remedial impact: continuity orders in leadership litigation

The Court’s use of Article 142 signals that even where a selection process is unlawful, the Court may protect an incumbent Vice-Chancellor from immediate removal where:

  • there is no personal ineligibility or misconduct,
  • the illegality is structural/procedural, and
  • public interest requires continuity pending lawful selection.

At the same time, the Court preserved the primacy of legality by directing that a fresh selection “in accordance with law” can replace the incumbent earlier than tenure end.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Entry 66 (List I) vs Entry 25 (List III): List I subjects are for Parliament only. List III subjects are shared. Education is in List III (Entry 25), but it is expressly “subject to” Parliament’s special power in Entry 66 to set standards in higher education.
  • “Standards” in higher education: Not limited to syllabus or grading. Courts have treated “standards” as including regulatory conditions that ensure quality and uniformity in higher education—here, the Court treated the VC search committee composition as part of that standards framework.
  • Article 254 (repugnancy): Applies when both Parliament and State legislate on the same Concurrent List subject and conflict. If the Central law is in List I (exclusive), Article 254 is not the main tool; the State law fails because it cannot intrude into List I at all.
  • Presidential assent under Article 254(2): A mechanism that can allow a State law to prevail in that State despite conflict with an earlier Parliamentary law on a Concurrent List subject. The Court held this mechanism was irrelevant here because the conflict was treated as List I vs List III.
  • Subordinate legislation with statutory force: UGC Regulations are rules/regulations made under the UGC Act. Because the Act requires them to be laid before Parliament, courts treat them as having binding legal force within their scope.
  • Writ of quo warranto: A judicial remedy questioning by what authority a person holds a public office. In VC appointment disputes, courts use it to invalidate appointments made contrary to statutory/regulatory requirements.
  • Article 142 “complete justice”: A special Supreme Court power to craft equitable remedies beyond strict legal outcomes—used here to avoid stigma and disruption while still requiring future compliance.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision delivers a two-level message: strict compliance in principle, and measured continuity in remedy.

  • On principle, it treats UGC Regulation 7.3—especially the requirement of a UGC nominee and independence of committee members—as a binding “standard” norm grounded in Entry 66 List I. Any inconsistent State/UT statutory prescription (here, Section 14(5) of the PTU Act) cannot govern VC selection.
  • Doctrinally, it reaffirms that Article 254 repugnancy is not the correct frame for List I vs List III overlaps, relying on Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar and making presidential assent debates beside the point in such cases.
  • Remedially, it demonstrates the Court’s willingness to use Article 142 to prevent avoidable stigma to an incumbent and institutional disruption, while still mandating that future appointments be made only through a committee constituted strictly as per Regulation 7.3.

In the broader legal context, the ruling strengthens the enforceability of UGC’s VC-selection architecture and signals that States/UTs must align university statutes with UGC’s standards-facing regulations, failing which courts may invalidate processes—even while temporarily protecting incumbents in the public interest.