3.1 Precedents Cited
(a) In reference (suo moto) vs State of M.P. : Writ Petition No. 5184 of 2025 decided on 20.02.2025
This Division Bench decision functioned as the procedural catalyst. The present case was treated as a
suo motu petition based on a letter, reflecting an institutional approach to ensure timely access to
reproductive healthcare for vulnerable victims, especially minors and sexual assault survivors, without being
trapped in procedural delays.
(b) A vs State of Maharashtra, reported in (2024) 6 SCC 327
The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s articulation of the MTP Act’s legislative intent: (i) the health of
the woman is paramount; (ii) restricting legal access does not prevent abortions—rather, it prevents
safe abortions. The High Court’s directions on risk disclosure, expert care, and sensitive handling align with
this emphasis on safety, accessibility, and dignity.
The quotation in A vs State of Maharashtra also highlights a systemic barrier: the fear of prosecution among
registered medical practitioners (RMPs). The High Court’s criticism of routine court-approaches can be read as a
judicial response to this barrier—reminding medical authorities that statutory compliance, not judicial permission,
is the governing standard within prescribed limits.
(c) X v. State (NCT of Delhi) [X v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 9 SCC 433]
Cited within the extract from A vs State of Maharashtra, this precedent is invoked to underscore that provider
hesitancy and over-legalisation can obstruct access to safe abortion services. The High Court’s insistence that
authorities act under Section 3 rather than shifting the burden to courts directly addresses this access problem.
(d) Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn. [Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn., (2009) 9 SCC 1]
This landmark decision, also quoted through A vs State of Maharashtra, establishes that reproductive choice is
a facet of Article 21—grounded in privacy, dignity, and bodily integrity—and that consent is paramount. The High
Court’s approach reflects these principles: it foregrounds the victim’s and guardian’s consent (as required by
Section 3(4)(a) for minors) and frames termination as a right-based healthcare decision rather than a discretionary
indulgence requiring judicial sanction within the statutory framework.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
The Court’s reasoning proceeds on three interlinked tracks:
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Statutory entitlement under the MTP Act, 1971:
The pregnancy was about 10 weeks—well within the thresholds contemplated by Section 3. The Court reproduced
relevant portions of Sections 3 and 5, emphasising that termination up to 20 weeks may be performed by a
registered medical practitioner (subject to statutory conditions), and between 20–24 weeks by two registered
medical practitioners for prescribed categories.
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Presumption of grave mental injury in rape cases (Explanation 2 to Section 3):
The Court noted the prosecutrix is a rape victim. Under the Act, where pregnancy is alleged to have been caused
by rape, the anguish is presumed to constitute grave injury to mental health—supporting termination decisions
within the statutory scheme.
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Consent and minor’s protection:
The Court recorded that consent for termination was given by the prosecutrix and her mother on 04.07.2026.
For a minor, Section 3(4)(a) requires guardian’s written consent. The Court treated consent as central, consistent
with the Supreme Court’s rights-based jurisprudence on reproductive autonomy.
Having satisfied itself on gestational age, medical feasibility, and consent, the Court permitted termination and
added safeguards for medical risk management, dignity-centric handling, and evidentiary preservation (DNA sample).
The judgment’s distinctive doctrinal-administrative move lies in paragraphs 11–13: the Court explicitly questions
the practice of seeking judicial permission for MTP where the statute itself authorises it, observing that such cases
are urgent and that “time is being wasted” by routing through district courts/high court. The Court thus attempts to
recalibrate institutional behaviour: act under the Act; do not treat court orders as a prerequisite.