Termination of a Registered Sri Lankan Tamil Refugee Employee Solely for Non‑Citizenship After Long Service Held Arbitrary Under Article 14; Writ Maintainable Under Article 226
1. Introduction
The Madras High Court in SMT.G.THIRUKALYANAMALAR v. STATE BANK OF INDIA (W.P.No.18835 of 2013, decided on 23.01.2026)
examined whether the State Bank of India (SBI) could terminate an employee—identified during document scrutiny as a Sri Lankan national—
on the ground that the original recruitment advertisement (01.10.2007) required Indian citizenship.
The petitioner, a registered Sri Lankan Tamil refugee, entered India in 1990, studied in Tamil Nadu, and was appointed in 2008 as
Officer–Marketing and Recovery (Rural). After policy developments relating to absorption of contract officers and continued service under
interim protection, SBI terminated her services by order dated 28.06.2013, citing ineligibility based on nationality.
Two central issues arose:
- Maintainability/Locus standi: Can a non-citizen/refugee maintain a writ petition under Article 226 challenging termination as arbitrary/discriminatory?
- Merits: Whether termination solely due to non-citizenship, after long uninterrupted service and lawful residence, is arbitrary and violative of Article 14.
2. Summary of the Judgment
- The Court held the writ petition maintainable: while Articles 15/16/19 rights are citizen-specific, remedies for violations of Articles 14 and 21 are available to “persons,” including non-citizens and refugees.
- On merits, the Court quashed SBI’s termination order dated 28.06.2013, holding that termination solely because the petitioner is not an Indian citizen—given the peculiar facts including long service, lawful stay, and absence of suppression—was arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Article 14.
- The Court emphasized that it did not adjudicate the general validity of restricting bank employment to Indian citizens and stated that the order was passed on the peculiar facts and “shall not be treated as a precedent.”
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
A. Locus standi and non-citizens’ constitutional protections
The Court’s maintainability reasoning substantially relied upon Supreme Court authority recognizing that certain fundamental rights are not
confined to citizens.
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Louis De Raedt Vs. Union of India [1991] 3 SCC 554
The Court extracted the principle that foreigners do not enjoy Article 19 rights, but Article 21 protection extends to all persons,
enabling challenges to state action affecting life and personal liberty, subject to “procedure established by law.”
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National Human Rights Commission Vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh [1996] 1 SCC 742
Treated as decisive for refugee protections: refugees, though non-citizens, are entitled to full protection under Article 21, and the
State bears a constitutional obligation to safeguard life and liberty irrespective of nationality. The Court used this to reinforce that refugees
may invoke constitutional remedies against arbitrary/unlawful action.
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Chairman, Railway Board and Others Vs. Mrs.Chandrima Das and Others, AIR 2000 SC 988
Cited (through discussion of the Bombay High Court decision) to draw a constitutional line: Article 14 applies to “persons” (citizens and non-citizens),
whereas Articles 15 and 19 use “citizen” deliberately to exclude non-citizens.
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Stelmakh Leonid Iuliia Vs. Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs, Mumbai and another 2011 (1) Mh.L.J 893
Relied on by SBI to emphasize that Article 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment) is citizen-only; the Madras High Court accepted this as a correct
proposition but distinguished it by holding the petitioner’s challenge was anchored in Article 14 arbitrariness/discrimination, not a direct Article 16 claim.
How these precedents influenced the decision: They enabled the Court to formulate a structured set of propositions:
(i) non-citizens cannot enforce citizen-only rights (Articles 15, 16, 19); but (ii) they can invoke Article 226 where state action is arbitrary or discriminatory
violating Articles 14/21. This cleared the threshold objection and allowed merits adjudication.
B. Employer’s reliance on fraud/suppression and eligibility cases
SBI relied on the following decisions (listed in the judgment) to support termination on ineligibility/suppression:
Role in the Court’s reasoning: While the judgment does not undertake a point-by-point ratio extraction of each,
it addresses the underlying themes advanced through them—ineligibility, suppression, and the employer’s right to enforce recruitment conditions.
The Court neutralized the “suppression/fraud” line by finding a crucial fact: the application form had no specific column for citizenship/nationality,
and the petitioner had disclosed Columbo, Sri Lanka as place of birth. Hence, the Court declined to infer suppression and treated the termination as
resting “solely” on non-citizenship, not on proven fraud.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
A. Maintainability under Article 226: “for any other purpose” and rights of “persons”
The Court began by emphasizing the text of Article 226: writs may issue not only for enforcing fundamental rights but also “for any other purpose.”
It then mapped fundamental rights into two groups:
- Citizen-only rights: Articles 16 and 19 (and the Court also referenced Article 15’s “citizen” language in the Chandrima Das discussion).
- Person-based rights: Article 14 and Article 21, available to all persons including non-citizens/refugees.
Applying this, the Court held that the petitioner’s grievance—termination as arbitrary and discriminatory—squarely invoked Article 14.
Therefore, despite being a non-citizen, she had locus to maintain the writ.
B. Lawful residence and refugee regularization under immigration law
A significant feature of the judgment is its integration of the petitioner’s refugee status with the contemporary immigration framework:
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Section 3 of the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025 requires a passport/travel document and (for foreigners) a visa.
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Section 33 empowers the Central Government to grant exemptions.
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Under the Immigration and Foreigners (Exemption) Order 2025, Section 3(2) exempts registered Sri Lankan Tamil nationals who took shelter
in India up to 9 January 2015 from passport/visa requirements for stay/exit.
The Court concluded that the petitioner’s presence was not illegal and her residence stood “regularized and protected” by the 2025 exemption.
This finding mattered because it removed any “illegality of stay” rationale that might otherwise justify exclusion from employment.
C. Recruitment condition (citizenship) versus fairness after long service
The Court acknowledged SBI’s general entitlement to restrict recruitment to citizens. However, in the “peculiar facts,” it found termination unjustified because:
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No suppression inferred: birthplace in Sri Lanka was disclosed; no citizenship column existed in the application.
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Long uninterrupted service: appointed in 2008 and continued for years, including under an interim status quo order.
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Performance and incentives: petitioner asserted she achieved targets and received incentives—supporting suitability.
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Legitimate expectation: continuation in service over a prolonged period created an expectation of fair treatment, especially where the employer
allowed service to continue and later sought to terminate purely on nationality.
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Livelihood impact: termination would deprive the petitioner of her only source of livelihood and cause hardship, including to her children
(Indian citizens) and family circumstances (marriage to an Indian citizen).
On this cumulative basis, the Court held that termination “solely” for non-citizenship at that stage was arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory,
thus violating Article 14.
D. Use of service/eligibility frameworks beyond SBI’s notification
The Court reinforced the non-absolute nature of nationality restrictions by citing:
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Handbook on Personnel Officers, 1987 (Chapter VII), permitting appointment of certain non-citizen categories (including persons of Indian origin migrating from Sri Lanka)
subject to a certificate of eligibility (with IFS excluded).
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Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1955 (Regulation 4) and
Indian Forest Service (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1967 (Regulation 4), which allow eligibility to be extended by Central Government notification.
While these did not directly govern SBI employment, they were used illustratively to show that Indian law is not conceptually closed to employing
certain non-citizens/persons of Indian origin, and that a rigid nationality bar is not always the only permissible model.
3.3 Impact
A. Immediate effect
- Termination order quashed; petitioner continues in service; writ allowed without costs.
B. Doctrinal significance (despite “not a precedent” caveat)
The judgment expressly states it “shall not be treated as a precedent.” Formally, that limits its binding use. Practically, however, it is likely to have
persuasive significance in similar fact patterns because it:
- Affirms a clear maintainability pathway for non-citizens/refugees under Article 226 when invoking Articles 14/21.
- Signals heightened judicial scrutiny where an employer seeks to undo long-standing employment solely on nationality, particularly when the individual’s stay is lawful and there is no proven misrepresentation.
C. Administrative/HR implications for public sector employers
- Recruitment design: If citizenship is a core eligibility requirement, application forms and verification processes must capture it explicitly at the outset.
- Early verification: Delayed scrutiny increases exposure to “arbitrariness” findings when termination occurs after years of service.
- Reasoned decision-making: Where exclusion is based on nationality, employers may need to show statutory/regulatory compulsion and proportionate handling, especially if they previously permitted employment.
D. Refugee employment and equality norms
The judgment aligns refugee protection (lawful stay and person-based rights) with employment fairness concerns. It does not create a general right for refugees
to demand public employment (which would implicate Article 16), but it does caution against arbitrary termination where the State instrumentality itself
facilitated employment and allowed it to continue for a long period.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Certiorarified Mandamus
- A combined writ remedy: the court first quashes an unlawful order (certiorari) and then directs the authority to do what law requires (mandamus).
- Locus standi / Maintainability
- The legal capacity to approach the court. Here, a non-citizen can approach the High Court when alleging violation of rights available to “persons” (e.g., Articles 14/21), even if citizen-only rights (Articles 16/19) are unavailable.
- Article 14 vs Article 16
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Article 14 (equality before law) applies to “persons” (citizens and non-citizens). Article 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment) is framed around citizens.
The Court treated the case as an Article 14 arbitrariness challenge, not as enforcement of Article 16.
- Legitimate expectation
- If an authority’s consistent conduct leads someone to reasonably expect continuation of a benefit, sudden reversal without fair justification can be treated as unfair/arbitrary. The Court used long, uninterrupted service and employer conduct to support this expectation.
- Status quo interim order
- A temporary court direction to maintain existing conditions while the case is pending. Here, it enabled continued service during litigation.
- Regularized stay via exemption order
- Even if general law requires passports/visas for foreigners, the government can exempt categories. The 2025 Exemption Order protected registered Sri Lankan Tamil refugees from passport/visa requirements, making their stay lawful.
5. Conclusion
The Madras High Court held that a registered Sri Lankan Tamil refugee may maintain a writ under Article 226 when alleging arbitrariness/discrimination under Article 14,
even though citizen-only rights like Article 16 cannot be invoked. On facts, SBI’s termination—based solely on non-citizenship after long service, lawful residence,
absence of proved suppression, and continued employment under court protection—was found arbitrary and discriminatory, leading to quashing of the termination order.
Although the Court cautioned that the decision is confined to its peculiar facts and “shall not be treated as a precedent,” it offers a significant analytical framework
for courts and public sector employers on (i) refugees’ access to constitutional remedies under Articles 14/21, and (ii) the fairness constraints on belatedly enforcing
nationality-based eligibility conditions after years of sanctioned service.