Telephonic Attempts to Influence a Presiding Officer and Threats of Complaint as Prima Facie Interference with Justice (Criminal Contempt) — Even Where the Transfer Plea Turns Infructuous
1. Introduction
This decision of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench (Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, J.) dated
21.08.2026 arises from a Transfer Application (Civil) No. 165 of 2026
moved under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure by
Jyoti Vidya Mandir Anandpuri Chhawni Sarkar Thru Manager Dayanand Mishra (applicant),
seeking transfer of Regular Suit No. 721 of 1997 (permanent injunction) from Gonda
to another division (Faizabad/Lucknow), alleging undue pressure on the trial court by the opposite parties.
The application gained significance because it was supported by a letter/report dated 04.08.2026
written by the then Presiding Officer (learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gonda) to the
learned District Judge, Gonda, narrating alleged telephone calls and language attributed to a
senior government functionary who was a litigating party (the Divisional Commissioner, arrayed as opposite party no. 3).
The case, therefore, presented two intertwined issues: (i) whether the transfer prayer survived once the case
had already been moved by administrative order within the district; and (ii) whether the allegations disclosed
a prima facie attempt to influence/pressurize a judicial officer warranting contempt scrutiny.
2. Summary of the Judgment
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The High Court noted that the learned District Judge, Gonda had already withdrawn the suit from the court of the concerned
Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gonda and transferred it to another court of equivalent jurisdiction
(Civil Judge (Senior Division)/F.T.C. Naveen/ACJM, Gonda).
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Consequently, the High Court held that the transfer application had “lost its efficacy” and declined further transfer “at this stage,”
consigning the application to record (i.e., treating it as infructuous).
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The applicant was granted liberty to move an appropriate application before the learned District Judge, Gonda, and the District Judge was
directed to consider it on merits, uninfluenced by the High Court’s dismissal of the transfer application.
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Importantly, the High Court refused to “shut its eyes” to the contents of the Presiding Officer’s letter and the
admitted/non-denied factum of telephone calls by the Divisional Commissioner; it expressed shock at a litigating party approaching the court in that manner.
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Relying on Supreme Court authority, the High Court held that the material prima facie warranted indulgence by the contempt court and directed
placement of the matter before the appropriate court dealing with criminal contempt after administrative directions from the Hon’ble Chief Justice/Hon’ble Senior Judge.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
The High Court extracted paragraphs 41–42 to reinforce a core constitutional value: judicial independence requires insulation of judges
from threats, intimidation, or coercive tactics arising out of how they conduct proceedings.
The cited portions declare that threats of filing a complaint against a judge in respect of judicial proceedings constitute a
“positive attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice,” and that such conduct can amount
to criminal contempt because it tends to lower the dignity of the court and erodes the edifice of justice.
The High Court used this precedent to categorize the reported “threat” of complaint/case transfer and the tone of telephonic exchanges
as conduct that potentially crosses from mere impropriety into contempt territory.
(b) Dr. D. C. Saxena's case (supra)
Although not independently discussed with full citation in this order, it was relied upon through the extracted Supreme Court passage in
IN RE: Ajay Kumar Pandey to support the proposition that threatening prosecution/complaint against a judge for judicial acts
can amount to criminal contempt because it lowers the dignity of the court and chills fearless adjudication.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
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Infructuousness of the Section 24 CPC transfer plea:
The High Court treated the applicant’s prayer—transfer “out of the division”—as overtaken by events because the immediate complaint of the
concerned Presiding Officer being subjected to improper contact had already resulted in an administrative transfer by the District Judge
from that officer’s court to another competent court. Once that protective step occurred, the High Court found no justification for a further inter-divisional transfer “at this stage.”
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Preservation of the applicant’s remedy:
Even while declining further transfer, the High Court preserved procedural fairness by granting liberty to apply afresh to the District Judge,
emphasizing the District Judge’s duty to decide on merits and insulating that consideration from any prejudice arising from the High Court’s dismissal.
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Independent judicial concern beyond the transfer dispute:
The High Court separated the fate of the transfer application from the institutional concern arising from the Presiding Officer’s letter.
It observed that the described calls and language gave a “direct impression” that the Presiding Officer was attempted to be influenced,
and recorded that the State could not deny the making of the phone call by opposite party no. 3.
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High Court’s supervisory obligation to protect subordinate courts:
The order articulates a structural principle: the High Court is obliged to protect lower courts from insult or pressure so that proceedings are conducted “in an ordinary fashion”
and Presiding Officers can act “fearlessly.”
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Triggering contempt jurisdiction:
By applying IN RE: Ajay Kumar Pandey, the High Court concluded that the alleged threats/pressure and insulting language towards the judge,
in relation to a pending matter, prima facie interfered with the administration of justice. Hence, notwithstanding dismissal of the transfer application,
it directed the matter to be placed before the appropriate contempt court.
3.3 Impact
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Clear signal against ex parte “back-channel” contact by litigating parties (including high officials):
The order underscores that a litigating party’s direct phone contact with a judge about a pending case—especially when accompanied by tone, threats, or insinuations—
is institutionally unacceptable and may attract contempt scrutiny.
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Transfer relief can become infructuous, but accountability issues survive:
Even where the immediate transfer grievance is neutralized by administrative action, the High Court may still proceed (or set in motion proceedings)
to protect the integrity of the justice system.
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Protection of subordinate judiciary as a constitutional function:
The order may be cited in future to justify swift court-driven responses (including contempt references) when subordinate judges report intimidation or pressure.
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Practical litigation takeaway:
Parties seeking transfer should focus on lawful processes; attempts to “expedite” or “manage” outcomes through personal outreach can backfire,
creating exposure to contempt and disciplinary consequences.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Section 24 CPC (Transfer Power)
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A provision enabling the High Court or District Court to transfer a case from one court to another competent court.
It is meant to secure a fair trial, convenience, or the ends of justice—not to facilitate forum shopping.
- Status quo order
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An interim order directing parties to maintain the existing state of affairs (e.g., possession/use of property) until the court decides otherwise.
- Infructuous petition
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A petition becomes infructuous when the relief sought has already been achieved or the circumstances have changed so that the court’s order is no longer necessary.
Here, the suit had already been transferred away from the complained-of court, so the specific transfer request lost practical utility.
- Criminal contempt (in substance)
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Conduct that tends to interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice—such as intimidating a judge, threatening complaints to influence judicial conduct,
or using abusive language to undermine judicial authority. The High Court treated the reported conduct as prima facie fitting this description.
- Why “threat of complaint” matters
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Courts treat threats to complain/prosecute a judge for actions taken in court as coercive because they may deter judges from deciding independently.
This is why the Supreme Court’s articulation in IN RE: Ajay Kumar Pandey is central to the High Court’s referral.
5. Conclusion
The High Court’s order does two distinct things: it disposes of the transfer application as infructuous because the District Judge had already shifted the suit
to another competent court, while simultaneously affirming an important institutional principle—any attempt by a litigating party to influence or intimidate a judge,
including by telephonic pressure and threats of complaint, strikes at the administration of justice.
By invoking IN RE: Ajay Kumar Pandey and referring the matter for contempt consideration, the decision reinforces that judicial independence is not merely aspirational:
it is protected through enforceable processes, and the High Court will act to shield subordinate courts from coercion even when the underlying transfer dispute itself no longer survives.