Statutory Oath in Local Self-Government: “In the name of God” Means Exactly That—No Substitution or Expansion

1. Introduction

The Kerala High Court (P.V. Kunhikrishnan, J.) decided two connected writ petitions raising a common issue about the legality of oaths taken by elected representatives in local self-government institutions.

  • WP(C) No.1502 of 2026: filed by an elected Councillor of the Thiruvananthapuram Municipal Corporation challenging the validity of oaths taken by respondent Councillors (Respondents 4–23), who swore not “in the name of God” or by “solemn affirmation” but in the name of “Mother India”, “martyrs of my organisation/movement”, “Gurudeva”, and various deities of their choice.
  • WP(C) No.48425 of 2025: filed by an elected member of Vadakkencherry Grama Panchayat challenging the oath taken by the 6th respondent who swore “by God’s blessing in the name of Oommen Chandy”.

The core question was whether these oaths complied with the statutory forms under: Section 143 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 (read with the Third Schedule) and Section 152 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (read with the Second Schedule), both of which prescribe an oath “in the name of God/solemnly affirm”.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  1. The Court held that the impugned oaths were not valid because the statutory form allows only two options: swear “in the name of God” or make a solemn affirmation, and does not permit substituting or expanding “God” with other names, causes, persons, or political references.
  2. WP(C) 1502/2026 (Municipality): the oaths of Respondents 4–23 were declared invalid; they were directed to retake oath in accordance with law within four weeks. However, their past acts were protected by Section 531 of the Kerala Municipality Act.
  3. WP(C) 48425/2025 (Panchayat): the 6th respondent’s oath was declared invalid; he was directed to retake oath within four weeks. Since the Panchayat Raj Act lacks a provision analogous to Section 531, the Court held that all acts of the 6th respondent “as a member” till then were invalid.
  4. No penalty was imposed under Section 512 of the Kerala Municipality Act or Section 258 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, because those provisions require the person to act knowing that they are not entitled; the Court treated the respondents as acting in a bona fide belief until the Court’s declaration.
  5. The Court emphasised that invalid oath does not automatically annul the democratic mandate; instead, representatives must be given an opportunity to correct the illegality by taking oath afresh in the prescribed form.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Haridasan Palayil v. Speaker, Kerala Legislative Assembly [2003 KHC 1078]

This decision was the central authority adopted by the Court. The Division Bench in Haridasan Palayil held that where the Constitution prescribes a form of oath, it offers only limited options, and no deviation is permissible: if a person chooses oath, it must be “in the name of God”, and “none else”. The present judgment treats the statutory forms under the Municipality Act and Panchayat Raj Act as in pari materia with the constitutional oath under Article 188 and the Third Schedule.

The High Court here expressly “respectfully agree[d]” with Haridasan Palayil and applied its logic to local government oaths: once the legislature has fixed a form, elected members can fill in the blanks (name/designation/office) but cannot alter the substance.

(b) Madhu Parumala v. The Speaker and others [2006 KHC 848]

The Election Commission relied on this later Division Bench decision, which upheld oaths taken “in the name of Allah”, reasoning that “God” in the constitutional form can be understood as the oath-taker’s God and that oath-taking is personal.

The present judgment critically limits that reasoning. It distinguishes Madhu Parumala factually (Allah as the God of a faith community) and warns that extending its logic would justify oaths in the name of any person/idea (parents, teachers, political leaders, even notorious figures), thereby defeating the purpose of prescribing a uniform statutory form.

Importantly, the Court suggested that Madhu Parumala did not consider the Supreme Court’s repeatedly affirmed principle that when a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done that way alone—leading the Court to treat Haridasan Palayil as the safer guide.

(c) Supreme Court line on “particular manner” compliance

The Court relied on multiple Supreme Court decisions to reinforce the “strict compliance” rule:

These authorities were used to frame oath-taking as a statutorily conditioned entry into office: where the law prescribes the form, the form is mandatory, and alternative methods are “necessarily forbidden.”

(d) Per incuriam doctrine: Bilkis Yakub Rasul v. Union of India [2024 KHC 6020]

The Court invoked Bilkis Yakub Rasul to explain that decisions rendered in ignorance of a statute or binding authority can be per incuriam and lack precedential value. This doctrinal discussion supports the Court’s preference for Haridasan Palayil over Madhu Parumala, suggesting that the latter did not account for the binding “particular manner” rule.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Textual mandate of the statutory form: Sections 143 and 152 require oath/affirmation “in the form” in the schedules. The schedule text contains only “do swear in the name of God/solemnly affirm”. The Court treated this as an exhaustive choice.
  2. No legislative permission to substitute words: The Court held that “God” is not an open placeholder to be replaced with any object of belief (political leaders, martyrs, movements, national personifications). The form permits only “God” or “solemn affirmation”.
  3. Uniformity rationale: Echoing Haridasan Palayil, the Court reasoned that allowing deviations produces limitless variations, eroding the discipline and standardisation intended by the statutory oath.
  4. Handling conflicting Division Bench views: The Court noted the general rule to follow the latter decision when two Division Bench decisions conflict, but stated that a Single Judge may distinguish/reconcile, or if irreconcilable, follow the decision “better in point of law or more elaborate in reasoning.” Applying this, the Court adopted Haridasan Palayil.
  5. Consequences calibrated to democratic mandate: While declaring the oaths invalid, the Court refused to treat the illegality as a ground to nullify election outcomes. Instead, it ordered re-oath within a fixed time.
  6. Past acts—divergent statutory design:
    • Municipality: Section 531 insulated municipal proceedings from invalidation “merely by reason of” defect/vacancy/illegality in election/disqualification. The Court applied this to protect acts done till date despite invalid oath.
    • Panchayat: no parallel provision; hence the Court held it could not “save” actions of the member who had not properly entered office through a valid oath.
  7. No penal liability without knowledge: Sections 512 and 258 require action “knowing” the disqualification/non-entitlement. The Court held bona fide belief until judicial declaration negated the mental element for penalty.

3.3 Impact

(a) On oath-taking practice in Kerala local bodies

  • The decision establishes a strict compliance regime: oath must be taken exactly in the statutory form—either “in the name of God” or “solemn affirmation”— and not in the name of any other person, deity-name, political symbol, movement, or leader.
  • Administratively, it places responsibility on convening authorities and the State Election Commission’s guidance (like Ext.P1 circular) to ensure oath scripts and protocols prevent deviations at the ceremony stage.

(b) On validity of actions already taken

  • The ruling creates a sharp statutory contrast: municipal acts protected by Section 531, but panchayat acts vulnerable in the absence of a saving clause.
  • This may trigger future litigation challenging panchayat decisions taken with participation/voting by members who did not take a valid oath. The judgment itself states the consequence in WP(C) 48425/2025: actions “till today are invalid”.

(c) On precedent and bench-discipline concerns

The judgment’s preference for Haridasan Palayil over Madhu Parumala—including its observation that the latter appears not to have considered binding Supreme Court principle—may invite requests for a reference to a larger Bench in future cases, especially where parties contend that “Allah/Jesus/other faith terms” are merely linguistic equivalents of “God”.

(d) Legislative and policy implications

  • The absence of a Panchayat Raj Act analogue to Section 531 could prompt legislative attention to prevent administrative chaos when oath irregularities occur.
  • The case also underscores the practical need for a standardised oath-reading mechanism (verbatim script, pre-approved translations) to avoid inadvertent deviations.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Oath vs. Solemn Affirmation
An oath is a pledge invoking “God”; an affirmation is a secular pledge without invoking God. The statutes permit only these two routes.
“Form prescribed in the Schedule”
When an Act says an act must be done “in the form set out” in a Schedule, the wording is usually mandatory. The person can fill blanks (name/office) but cannot rewrite the operative text.
In pari materia
Provisions are “in pari materia” when they deal with the same subject in a similar way. The Court treated the local-body oath forms as comparable to the constitutional oath form.
Saving clause (Section 531 of the Municipality Act)
A statutory protection that prevents municipal acts/proceedings from becoming invalid due to certain defects (like disqualification/illegality). This is why municipal actions were protected despite invalid oath.
Per incuriam
A decision given in ignorance of a statute or binding precedent. Such a decision may lose precedential force. The Court used this concept to justify preferring the stricter approach consistent with Supreme Court principles.
Quo warranto
A writ asking “by what authority” a person holds a public office. Here, petitioners sought it on the footing that invalid oath means the person never validly assumed office.

5. Conclusion

This judgment lays down a clear operational rule for Kerala’s local self-government institutions: where the statute prescribes an oath “in the name of God/solemnly affirm”, elected representatives must adhere to that form strictly and cannot substitute or expand it. The Court balanced this strictness with democratic legitimacy by allowing re-oath rather than voiding elections.

Equally significant is the judgment’s consequences framework: municipal governance is cushioned by a saving clause (Section 531), while panchayat governance—without a comparable statutory protection—faces the risk of invalidation of acts done by members who have not properly entered office. The decision thus functions both as a compliance mandate for oath-taking and as a spotlight on a structural gap in the Panchayat Raj Act.