Settlement-Based Quashing Depends on the Real Victim, Not Merely the Informant

Case: ANAND KUMAR @ SANJJAY LALWANI v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Citation: 2026 INSC 928 | Court: Supreme Court of India | Date: 31 August 2026

Coram: K. V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli, JJ.

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court considered whether criminal proceedings arising from an alleged forged power of attorney, partnership deed and land mutation could continue after the person who allegedly suffered the principal loss had settled with the accused and disowned any grievance.

The dispute concerned 54.48 acres owned by Pradeep Singh Mehta. Subhash Chandra Lalwani, the complainant, asserted that 7.50 acres had been given to him. He alleged that Anand Kumar alias Sanjay Lalwani and others forged Mehta’s power of attorney, constituted M/s Paradise Farms and obtained mutation of the entire land in the firm’s name.

The central question was whether the complainant’s refusal to settle prevented quashing when Pradeep Singh Mehta—the alleged owner and principal victim—had entered into a genuine compromise with the accused.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

  • Subhash Chandra Lalwani filed a complaint under Section 200 CrPC alleging offences under Sections 406, 420, 466, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC.
  • Pradeep Singh Mehta initially stated on oath that his signature on the power of attorney had been forged and that 7.50 acres had been given to the complainant.
  • The Magistrate took cognizance, and the proceedings were ultimately committed to the Sessions Court as ST No. 459 of 2018.
  • In the first round of litigation, the High Court refused to quash the case against the principal accused. It nevertheless found that the complainant had produced no documentary proof establishing a transfer of 7.50 acres in his favour.
  • In 2019, the appellant again approached the High Court after settling with Pradeep Singh Mehta.
  • Mehta filed an affidavit affirming that he had contributed the land to M/s Paradise Farms, that the appellant had completed the formalities on his instructions and that he had no grievance against any accused.
  • The High Court’s Registrar verified that the compromise was genuine and voluntary.
  • The High Court nevertheless refused quashing because the complainant had not joined the settlement and treated the application substantially through the restrictions governing compounding under Section 320 CrPC.

3. Issues Before the Supreme Court

  1. Whether compounding an offence and quashing criminal proceedings because of settlement are legally distinct.
  2. Whether a settlement must be made with the complainant or with the person who is the actual victim.
  3. Whether Pradeep Singh Mehta was the real victim of the alleged offences.
  4. Whether Subhash Chandra Lalwani was independently a victim whose refusal to settle required continuation of the prosecution.
  5. Whether continuation of the proceedings would amount to abuse of process.

4. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed ST No. 459 of 2018 against all accused. It also dismissed the connected revision seeking the framing of additional charges.

The Court laid down the following principles:

  • Compounding and settlement-based quashing are different powers. Compounding is governed strictly by Section 320 CrPC, now Section 359 BNSS. Quashing under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction depends upon the ends of justice, the likelihood of conviction and whether continuation would be an abuse of process.
  • The relevant party to a settlement is the real victim, not necessarily the informant. A person may set criminal law in motion without personally suffering the alleged loss or injury.
  • A non-victim informant cannot settle away the rights of the true victim. Conversely, an informant’s refusal to settle does not automatically prevent quashing when the true victim has settled and no independent case is established for the informant.
  • Settlement cannot justify quashing every offence. Heinous crimes, offences affecting society and offences involving serious public wrongdoing ordinarily cannot be quashed merely because the parties have compromised.

5. Analysis

5.1 Compounding and Quashing Are Not Interchangeable

The High Court treated the application as if the appellant were seeking compounding under Section 320 CrPC. The Supreme Court held that this misunderstood the relief sought.

In compounding, the criminal court is confined to the offences, persons and conditions specified by statute. Settlement-based quashing is an exercise of inherent jurisdiction. The court asks whether, notwithstanding the formal non-compoundability of the offence, prosecution would serve any legitimate purpose or merely cause injustice and waste judicial resources.

The controlling considerations are:

  1. the nature and societal effect of the offence;
  2. whether the dispute is predominantly private, civil, commercial or familial;
  3. whether the settlement is genuine and voluntary;
  4. whether there remains a realistic possibility of conviction; and
  5. whether continuation would constitute an abuse of judicial process.

5.2 Victim and Informant Are Distinct

The Court relied on the statutory definition of “victim” in Section 2(wa) CrPC and Section 2(y) BNSS. A victim is the person who has suffered loss or injury because of the accused’s alleged act or omission. An informant is simply the person who reports the offence or initiates the criminal process.

These roles may overlap, but need not. The Court warned that allowing a non-victim informant to settle could leave the actual victim without a remedy. Accordingly, it is the real victim who must authorize a settlement relied upon for quashing.

5.3 Why Pradeep Singh Mehta Was the Real Victim

The complaint’s central allegation was that Mehta’s signature had been forged and his 54.48 acres had been diverted into a partnership without authority. The alleged injury therefore directly concerned his title, signature and property. He was plainly a “victim” within the statutory meaning.

Mehta’s later affidavit fundamentally altered the evidentiary position. He affirmed that:

  • he had contributed the land to M/s Paradise Farms;
  • the appellant had completed the partnership and mutation formalities under his authority;
  • the firm had operated for years to his satisfaction;
  • the contemplated transfer of 7.50 acres to the complainant had never matured;
  • he had no grievance against the accused; and
  • he voluntarily sought termination of the criminal case.

As Mehta was also the prosecution’s principal witness concerning the alleged forgery and want of authority, his position made conviction highly unlikely. The Court described the evidentiary outcome as clear: the prosecution’s star witness would no longer support its central allegations.

5.4 The Position of Subhash Chandra Lalwani

The Court first noted the High Court’s earlier finding that Lalwani had no transfer deed, gift deed, sale deed or family settlement establishing an interest in the claimed 7.50 acres.

Even assuming that Lalwani could be treated as a victim, the complaint did not sufficiently establish criminal wrongdoing by the appellant against him. There was no specific allegation that the appellant knew the disputed 7.50 acres had been transferred to Lalwani. Moreover, the alleged transfer itself depended upon Mehta, who denied that it had matured.

Thus, Lalwani’s refusal to compromise could not sustain a prosecution whose factual foundation had disappeared.

5.5 Nature of the Dispute

Although the allegations included forgery-related offences, the Court assessed the substance rather than merely the statutory labels. It found that the dispute arose from a private land, partnership and mutation arrangement, carried predominantly civil and commercial overtones, and had no wider repercussions for society.

The genuine settlement, lack of a viable prosecution case and private character of the controversy brought the matter within the category of proceedings that could properly be quashed.

6. Precedents Cited

Naushey Ali and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 78

This decision reaffirmed that quashing on the basis of settlement is distinct from statutory compounding. It supplied the immediate doctrinal basis for correcting the High Court’s treatment of the appellant’s petition as a request under Section 320 CrPC.

Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303

This was the principal authority governing the inherent power to quash non-compoundable offences. It established that proceedings may be quashed where a predominantly private, civil, mercantile, commercial, partnership, matrimonial or family dispute has been genuinely settled and conviction has become remote.

It also supplies the essential limitation: serious offences such as murder, rape, dacoity, offences of mental depravity, corruption and other crimes having a substantial societal impact cannot ordinarily be erased through private compromise.

Applying that framework, the Court classified the present controversy as a private property and partnership dispute with civil and commercial features, rather than an offence having serious public consequences.

Jagjeet Singh and Others v. Ashish Mishra alias Monu and Another (2022) 9 SCC 321

This authority established that “victim” and “complainant/informant” have distinct meanings. A stranger may report an offence, while the actual victim may not be the informant. The principle enabled the Court to reject the assumption that Lalwani’s status as complainant automatically gave him exclusive control over settlement-based quashing.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Compounding of an offence
A statutory process under which specified offences may be settled by the person named in the law. Courts cannot expand the statutory list.
Quashing of criminal proceedings
Termination of proceedings through the High Court’s inherent power when continuing them would be unjust, futile or an abuse of process.
Victim
The person who actually suffered loss or injury from the alleged offence, including a guardian or legal heir where applicable.
Informant or complainant
The person who reports the alleged crime or initiates the complaint. That person may or may not be the victim.
Abuse of process
Use or continuation of legal proceedings in a manner that no longer serves justice, such as pursuing a prosecution with no realistic prospect of conviction.
Civil flavour
A criminal allegation rooted mainly in a private dispute concerning property, contracts, business, partnership or family arrangements.
Mutation
An alteration of land or revenue records. Mutation generally records possession or revenue liability and does not by itself conclusively create title.

8. Impact of the Judgment

  • Identification of the true victim: Courts must determine who actually suffered the alleged loss instead of assuming that the complainant necessarily controls settlement.
  • No automatic veto for an informant: A non-victim informant’s opposition will not by itself defeat quashing after the real victim has entered into a genuine settlement.
  • Protection of victims: A non-victim informant equally cannot compromise an offence to the prejudice of the actual victim.
  • Substance over offence labels: Courts may examine the factual character of the dispute, while remaining cautious where the alleged conduct has serious public or societal consequences.
  • Judicial economy: Futile prosecutions may be terminated where the foundational witness no longer supports the case and conviction is demonstrably remote.
  • Continuing safeguards: The ruling does not permit private settlements to extinguish heinous offences, corruption or crimes substantially affecting society.

9. Conclusion

The judgment clarifies that settlement-based quashing is governed by the identity of the real victim, the nature of the offence, the genuineness of the settlement and the practical prospects of conviction—not merely by whether the named complainant consents.

Because Pradeep Singh Mehta was the principal alleged victim, had voluntarily affirmed the underlying transactions and no longer supported the prosecution, continuation would have been futile and abusive. The complainant had neither established an independent proprietary interest nor disclosed a sustainable criminal case against the accused. The Supreme Court therefore quashed the proceedings against all accused and brought the connected revision to an end.