Section 69 BNS Targets Deceit (Not Disappointment): Consensual Relationships and Implausible “Promise to Marry” Allegations Warrant FIR Quashment at the Threshold

1. Introduction

This decision of the Karnataka High Court (M. Nagaprasanna J.) arose from two connected petitions filed under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 (the quashing jurisdiction akin to the former Section 482 CrPC), seeking quashment of FIR/Crime No.789/2024 registered by the Byadarahalli Police.

The FIR alleged offences under Sections 3(5), 318(2), 351(2), 69, 89, 64(2)(m) of the BNS, 2023. The gravamen was that accused No.1 (a practising advocate) allegedly induced the complainant into a sexual relationship on a promise of marriage, continued the relationship for about two years, allegedly caused two abortions, and later backed out. Accused Nos.2 and 3 (relatives) were also arrayed, essentially on the allegation that they did not support the marriage.

The core legal issue was whether, accepting the complaint on its face value (and considering undisputed official records placed before the Court), the allegations disclosed offences of rape/sexual exploitation by “promise to marry” under the BNS—or whether the criminal process was being deployed to convert a failed relationship into prosecution.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed both petitions and quashed the FIR in Crime No.789/2024.

  • The complaint, even taken at face value, described a prolonged consensual relationship. A subsequent rupture or refusal to marry did not, by itself, transform consensual intimacy into rape.
  • The Court treated the complainant’s “promise of marriage” narrative as inherently implausible when viewed alongside official records indicating continuing domestic association/claims of marital status and the presence of two children.
  • For Section 69 BNS, the Court stressed that the provision punishes deceit (false promise without intention to fulfil), not mere disappointment or a relationship turning sour.
  • The Court found the inclusion of relatives (accused Nos.2 and 3) to be tenuous and reflective of an attempt to expand criminality through “facile insinuation”.
  • Relying on quashing principles (including State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal as applied in MAHMOOD ALI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH), the Court held the FIR fell within categories warranting interference at the threshold (including inherent improbability and mala fides).

While observing that the case appeared fit even for “proceedings for malicious prosecution”, the Court consciously refrained from issuing such directions.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and their Influence)

(a) The consent/“promise to marry” line of cases

The Court anchored its analysis in a consistent Supreme Court line drawing a doctrinal distinction between rape and consensual sex in the context of alleged promises to marry:

  • DR. DHRUVARAM MURLIDHAR SONAR v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA: The High Court extracted and applied the principle that courts must distinguish a false promise (made with mala fide intent from inception) from a breach of promise; prolonged consensual intimacy does not become rape merely because marriage did not happen.
  • SHAMBHU KHARWAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH: The decision reinforced that at the quashing stage, if FIR/charge-sheet lacks the essential ingredients—particularly falsity of promise at inception and nexus to consent— criminal prosecution under rape provisions cannot continue merely by labelling the dispute “a question of fact”. The High Court used this to justify threshold scrutiny and intervention.
  • Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra (as quoted in SHAMBHU KHARWAR), along with Sonu v. State of U.P.: These authorities supply the test: consent is vitiated only if (i) the promise was false and made in bad faith with no intent to marry at the time it was made, and (ii) that promise had a direct nexus with the decision to engage in the sexual act.
  • XXXX v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH: The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s emphasis that where the complainant is married during the alleged period, the “promise to marry” narrative can collapse on facts, and consensual relations in such a scenario may not satisfy rape ingredients—particularly where the complainant’s own timeline is contradicted by official records.
  • JASPAL SINGH KAURAL v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI (building on Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi)): The High Court treated this as squarely supporting the proposition that mere promise-and-failure is not rape; and where the complainant is mature, and the relationship is prolonged, the inference of coercion/deceit is weakened absent concrete material showing fraudulent intent at inception.
  • SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA: The Court drew from the “stern caution” against criminalising failed relationships and the warning that indiscriminate invocation of rape provisions trivialises the offence and inflicts grave injustice. It used this to characterise the present FIR as an attempt to convert personal discord into prosecution.
  • BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR ANURAG v. STATE OF TELANGANA: Cited to show that courts may look to surrounding circumstances (including contemporaneous materials) to detect manipulation/vindictiveness; backing out from marriage does not automatically equal rape/false promise.
  • AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA: Particularly influential for the proposition that where the complainant is already married, a promise to marry may be ex facie unenforceable/implausible, undermining claims that consent was induced solely by such promise; and that a souring relationship is not a ground to invoke criminal machinery.
  • The judgment also traversed the broader Supreme Court landscape referred within those cases, including Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, Mahesh DamuKhare v. State of Maharashtra, Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), and Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, as part of the same doctrinal thread (false promise at inception + direct nexus to consent).

(b) Quashing/FIR-stage interference jurisprudence

  • State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa: Used to frame the quashing power as sparing, careful, but available to prevent abuse of process, including by examining whether any offence is made out even if allegations are accepted in toto.
  • MAHMOOD ALI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (applying State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal): This was pivotal to justify “looking more closely” at artfully drafted FIRs and considering attending circumstances beyond the pleadings, since complainants with ulterior motives often draft FIRs to facially satisfy ingredients. The High Court expressly placed the case within Bhajan Lal parameters (notably 1, 5 and 7).
  • State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy and R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab: Cited (through MAHMOOD ALI) to explain the permissible scope: the Court may consider materials that manifestly undermine the accusation without conducting a mini-trial or appreciating evidence.
  • The High Court also noted the High Court’s reliance in another context on Ganga Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, but clarified that even if a specific “consent defence” is not articulated in a memo, consent can be discerned from the FIR’s own narrative where it plainly depicts voluntary meetings and sustained intimacy.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) Face-value reading still disclosed consensual intimacy over time

The Court treated the complaint as describing a relationship that developed from acquaintance to intimacy, and continued over a significant period. Even accepting allegations of a “promise of marriage”, the narrative did not disclose the indispensable element: that the promise was false at inception and made solely to obtain consent. This mirrors the Supreme Court’s repeated insistence that criminality cannot be inferred merely from a later refusal to marry.

(ii) Attending circumstances and official records undermined plausibility

The Court did what MAHMOOD ALI authorises: it looked beyond the drafting of the complaint to the surrounding circumstances, particularly official/public documents produced, including:

  • Birth certificates indicating two children (one allegedly from an earlier relationship, and another with Yathish Kumar T. R. in 2020).
  • The annulment decree (22-10-2016) juxtaposed with the subsequent birth record (21-08-2020), suggesting continuing association.
  • A prior missing-child complaint leading to Crime No.602 of 2022 under Section 363 IPC, in which the complainant described herself as married and settled with another person.
  • Crl.Misc.No.1467 of 2023 (disposed 20-01-2024), where the complainant described herself as “W/o. Sri. Yathish Kumar”.

Cumulatively, the Court found it difficult to accept that the complainant’s consent was founded on a bona fide “promise of marriage” with accused No.1, when official records suggested continuing domestic/marital association and family circumstances inconsistent with that theory.

(iii) Section 69 BNS: “deceit” is the gravamen; the Court rejects retroactive criminalisation of breakups

A significant feature of the judgment is its early interpretive approach to Section 69 BNS (“Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc.”). The Court read Section 69 as targeting: fraudulent inducement (including a promise to marry made without intention of fulfilling the same), and not as a vehicle to criminalise a relationship simply because it ended.

The Court’s formulation is pointed: Section 69 punishes deceit, not disappointment; fraud, not failed affection; exploitation, not the collapse of relationship. On its reasoning, where the alleged “promise of marriage” is inherently implausible on admitted/official circumstances, Section 69 cannot be invoked to convert consensual intimacy into a distinct offence.

(iv) Section 89 BNS, Section 318(2) BNS, and family-member roping-in

The Court held that Section 89 BNS (akin to the former Section 313 IPC) was not made out on the pleaded facts as examined through the governing Supreme Court approach. It also held that Section 318(2) BNS (akin to cheating under the former Section 420 IPC) cannot be sustained merely because marriage did not materialise; criminal cheating requires dishonest intention at inception, which was not evident.

The roping in of accused Nos.2 and 3 (relatives) was treated as a classic overreach: non-cooperation with a proposed marriage does not, without more, constitute participation in sexual offences/cheating. This reinforced the Court’s view of misuse and harassment.

(v) Threshold quashment under Section 528 BNSS was justified

The Court applied the Bhajan Lal framework (as reiterated in MAHMOOD ALI) to hold that continuing investigation/prosecution would be an abuse of process because the allegations were inherently improbable when tested against undisputed records and the complaint’s own tenor.

3.3 Impact

(a) Early judicial signalling on Section 69 BNS

While rooted in established rape/consent jurisprudence, the judgment is notable for treating Section 69 BNS as a deceit-centric provision requiring demonstrable fraudulent intent—thereby resisting an interpretation that would criminalise ordinary relationship failures by default. This is likely to be cited in future Section 69 prosecutions as a guardrail against overbreadth.

(b) Reinforced permission to consider “attending circumstances” at FIR stage

By expressly invoking MAHMOOD ALI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, the Court strengthens the practice of scrutinising not only FIR drafting but also undisputed surrounding materials (especially public/official records) to detect mala fides. This may influence how High Courts handle “promise to marry” prosecutions at the quashing stage under BNSS.

(c) Deterrence against roping in relatives in intimate-partner prosecutions

The decision disapproves the practice of naming family members on thin allegations tied to disapproval of marriage, signalling a stricter approach to “omnibus” arraignment in relationship-based FIRs.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Quashing (Section 528 BNSS): A High Court power to stop criminal proceedings at inception where allowing them to continue would be unjust, for example when no offence is disclosed even if the complaint is assumed true, or the prosecution is malicious.
  • Consent and “misconception of fact”: Consent is invalid if it is obtained by deception on a fact that directly caused the person to consent. In “promise to marry” cases, courts require proof that the promise was false from the start and directly induced consent.
  • False promise vs breach of promise: A false promise is made with no intention to keep it at the time it is made; a breach can occur even when the person initially intended to marry but later did not. Only the former can potentially vitiate consent in this doctrinal framework.
  • Section 69 BNS: A new offence addressing sexual intercourse obtained by “deceitful means”, including a promise to marry made without intention to fulfil. The Court read it as targeting fraudulent exploitation, not penalising every failed relationship.

5. Conclusion

The Karnataka High Court quashed the FIR by applying settled Supreme Court doctrine on consent, false promise, and the impermissibility of criminalising failed adult relationships. The judgment’s distinctive contribution lies in its approach to Section 69 BNS—emphasising that the provision is aimed at deceit, and cannot be used to retrospectively criminalise consensual intimacy after a breakup.

Equally significant is the Court’s reliance on MAHMOOD ALI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH to justify FIR-stage intervention where public records and attending circumstances reveal inherent improbability and mala fides. The ruling thus operates as a dual safeguard: it preserves the gravity of sexual-offence law for genuine coercion/deception, while preventing the criminal process from becoming a tool of retaliation in intimate disputes.