Section 44(1)(c) PMLA Committal Requires Prior Cognizance by the Special Court; Late-Stage Transfer Must Yield to Speedy Trial
Case: The Assistant Director v. Additional Superintendent of Police
Citation: 2026 MHC 3219 (Madras High Court)
Date: 04-08-2026
Bench: Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, CJ & G. Arul Murugan, J.
Proceeding: Crl.O.P.(MD) No.3792 of 2026 (challenge to rejection of ED’s Section 44(1)(c) PMLA committal request)
1) Introduction
This decision addresses the interface between a long-running disproportionate assets prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”)
and a subsequent money-laundering complaint under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”).
The Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Thoothukudi (“DVAC”) registered an FIR in 2006 against the second respondent (a former MLA and Minister)
alleging accumulation of assets disproportionate to known income. The final report culminated in Spl.C.No.3 of 2019 before the Principal District & Sessions Judge, Thoothukudi,
where the trial had virtually concluded: evidence on both sides was closed; prosecution arguments were complete; defence arguments had partly proceeded.
In parallel, the Directorate of Enforcement (“ED”) registered an ECIR and filed a PMLA prosecution complaint before the Special Court at Madurai
(A.No.122 of 2025). Critically, the Madurai Special Court had not taken cognizance; it issued a pre-cognizance notice under Section 223 BNSS, 2023 and had sought
prosecution sanction under Section 197(1) CrPC (now Section 218 BNSS), which ED had not produced.
ED then invoked Section 44(1)(c) PMLA before the Thoothukudi court, seeking committal of the scheduled offence case (PC Act) to the Madurai PMLA Special Court,
urging a “single forum” approach. The Thoothukudi court rejected the application. ED challenged that rejection before the High Court.
Key issues
- Statutory precondition: Does Section 44(1)(c) PMLA require that the PMLA Special Court must have already “taken cognizance” of the money-laundering complaint?
- Prematurity and sanction: Can committal be ordered when cognizance is not taken and sanction is pending?
- Stage-of-trial and prejudice: Should committal be refused where the scheduled offence trial is at the verge of conclusion, considering Article 21 speedy trial?
- Scope of Section 44 mechanism: Is Section 44(1)(c) an automatic transfer device, or does it involve discretion in the interest of justice?
2) Summary of the Judgment
The Madras High Court dismissed ED’s petition and upheld the Thoothukudi court’s refusal to commit the scheduled offence case under Section 44(1)(c) PMLA.
The Court held that:
- Section 44(1)(c) is triggered only when both courts have taken cognizance. On the “clear as day” text, committal applies only where the court trying the scheduled offence is different from the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the money-laundering complaint. Here, the Madurai Special Court had not taken cognizance, so ED’s committal request was premature.
- Pre-cognizance notice under Section 223 BNSS matters. Following Supreme Court guidance, cognizance for post-1 July 2024 complaints cannot be taken without Section 223 BNSS compliance; the Madurai matter had not crossed that stage.
- Absence of sanction reinforced prematurity. The Special Court had asked for sanction under Section 197(1) CrPC; ED had not produced it even after months, making cognizance unlikely at that time.
- Late-stage committal would cause real prejudice and defeat Article 21 speedy trial. With the PC Act trial essentially at its end, committal would unjustifiably delay the matter and harm the accused’s right to a speedy trial.
- Committal is not mechanical. Relying on Orissa High Court guidance, committal under Section 44 is discretionary and must serve the interest of justice, which it did not on these facts.
Consequentially, the High Court vacated its earlier interim stay, directed the Thoothukudi court to proceed expeditiously, and clarified it expressed no view on merits of either prosecution.
3) Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
ED relied on this Constitution Bench decision to underscore the legislative scheme and the 2012 amendments facilitating coordinated handling of scheduled offences and PMLA offences.
The High Court accepted the general proposition that the PMLA contemplates structured coordination, but held that Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India
does not dispense with the express statutory requirement in Section 44(1)(c) that the Special Court must have taken cognizance.
It was treated as clarificatory of how trials proceed once properly instituted, not as authorising anticipatory committal.
ii) Rana Ayyub v. Directorate of Enforcement
ED invoked paragraphs 27, 29 and 30 to argue that insisting on prior cognizance would defeat the purpose of Section 44(1)(c).
The High Court distinguished the reliance: in those passages, the Supreme Court treated cognizance by the Special Court as an accomplished fact, not as a dispensable formality.
Hence, Rana Ayyub v. Directorate of Enforcement could not be read to permit committal before cognizance.
iii) Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Enforcement Directorate
This decision was central to the respondents’ objection. The High Court relied on it for the proposition that for complaints filed after 1 July 2024,
cognizance cannot be taken until the accused is given an opportunity of hearing under Section 223 BNSS.
Since the Madurai Special Court had only issued a Section 223 pre-cognizance notice and had not taken cognizance, Section 44(1)(c) could not be triggered.
iv) Seeman v. Varun Kumar
The High Court noted this decision (of a Single Judge) as reinforcing the post-BNSS procedural position: Section 223 BNSS is a mandatory pre-cognizance safeguard.
It strengthened the finding that the Madurai matter was still at a pre-cognizance stage.
ED relied on this Madras High Court decision to contend that once Section 44(1)(c) is invoked, the scheduled offence court must transfer.
The High Court distinguished it on three fact-sensitive grounds expressly recorded:
- there, the Special Court had already taken cognizance (unlike here);
- both courts were within the same city and sessions jurisdiction (unlike here: Thoothukudi and Madurai were different sessions divisions);
- the scheduled-offence trial was still actively in progress (unlike here: it was practically concluded).
The decision thus supported, rather than undermined, the present Court’s emphasis on the statutory precondition and stage-of-proceeding considerations.
vi) Ranjit Singh Kothari v. State of West Bengal
ED cited this Calcutta High Court decision for the policy rationale: avoiding inconsistent findings by having one forum try both matters.
The Madras High Court did not dispute the legislative intention at a general level, but held it could not override:
(a) the express requirement of cognizance in Section 44(1)(c), and (b) the prejudice and delay caused by uprooting a near-finished trial.
This Orissa High Court decision was applied directly: committal under Section 44 PMLA is not an automatic, mechanical consequence; it calls for judicial discretion guided by
the “interest of justice.” The Madras High Court used this to justify refusal of committal where it would only delay and prejudice a near-concluded PC Act trial while the PMLA case had not even reached cognizance.
viii) Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
The Court invoked this Constitution Bench authority to anchor the Article 21 “speedy trial” dimension—particularly salient in disproportionate assets cases which are inherently document-heavy and time-consuming.
The Court reasoned that once such a trial has almost “reached its destination,” avoidable procedural diversions at the end are especially incompatible with Article 21.
ix) High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P.
Cited to explain principles relevant to vacating interim stays. The High Court found continuing the stay would unjustifiably prolong a trial it had earlier directed to be concluded within a time bound schedule,
especially since the parallel PMLA proceeding had not progressed towards cognizance.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
A) Textual construction of Section 44(1)(c) PMLA: “taken cognizance” is a condition precedent
The Court’s primary reasoning is a strict reading of the statutory text. Section 44(1)(c) contemplates two already-seized courts:
(i) the court that has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence; and (ii) the Special Court that has taken cognizance of the money-laundering complaint under Section 44(1)(b).
Only if these are different courts does the scheduled offence case get committed to the Special Court.
The Court rejected “anticipatory committal”: Section 44(1)(c) does not use language such as “likely to take cognizance” or “seized of the complaint.” It says “has taken cognizance.”
B) BNSS procedural shift: Section 223 pre-cognizance hearing blocks the Section 44(1)(c) trigger
On the admitted record, the Madurai Special Court issued a Section 223 BNSS pre-cognizance notice and had not taken cognizance.
By applying Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Enforcement Directorate (and noting Seeman v. Varun Kumar), the Court treated Section 223 compliance as mandatory before cognizance,
thereby foreclosing ED’s attempt to use Section 44(1)(c) at a pre-cognizance stage.
C) Sanction as a practical and legal impediment
The Court noted that the Special Court had demanded sanction under Section 197(1) CrPC (now Section 218 BNSS) for prosecuting the second respondent (a former Minister/MLA).
ED’s failure to produce sanction for nearly a year meant cognizance was not merely “not yet taken” but “not likely” to be taken at that time.
The Court treated this as an ED-side default that could not justify stalling an almost-finished scheduled offence trial.
D) Purpose-based restraint: Section 44(1)(c) is to prevent duplication, not to derail completion
While acknowledging that the PMLA framework seeks coherence, the Court held Section 44(1)(c) exists to save time and avoid inconsistent findings.
Using it “at the eleventh hour” would do the opposite: it would reopen logistics, shift a voluminous record, and delay the conclusion of a trial at its end—without even a cognizant PMLA proceeding ready to proceed.
E) Fact-sensitive differentiation from pro-transfer authorities
The Court carefully distinguished ED’s supportive authorities on their procedural posture:
where cognizance existed, proceedings were early, and practical convenience was high, committal might further the statutory design.
Here, absent cognizance and sanction, and given the advanced stage of the trial, committal would be legally premature and practically prejudicial.
F) Interim stay doctrine and case management
The Court linked the earlier stay’s effect—freezing a time-bound trial—to the principles in High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P.,
and vacated the stay since its continuation would only prolong proceedings without corresponding progress in the PMLA complaint.
3.3 Impact
-
Bright-line procedural gate for Section 44(1)(c) applications:
In this jurisdiction, the decision strongly signals that ED (or any “authority authorised to file a complaint” under PMLA) cannot seek committal of a scheduled offence case
unless the designated PMLA Special Court has already taken cognizance of the money-laundering complaint.
-
BNSS Section 223 becomes decisive in PMLA forum strategy:
Post-1 July 2024, Section 223 BNSS pre-cognizance hearing is not a minor step; until it is crossed and cognizance is actually taken,
Section 44(1)(c) committal will be vulnerable as premature.
-
Sanction delays cannot be “offset” by stalling the scheduled offence trial:
If sanction is a bottleneck for cognizance in the PMLA complaint, this judgment discourages attempts to compensate by freezing or uprooting advanced scheduled offence trials.
-
Stage-of-trial prejudice is a controlling factor:
Even where policy favours a single forum, courts will weigh the accused’s Article 21 speedy trial right, especially where evidence and arguments are substantially complete.
-
Committal is not purely mechanical:
By endorsing a discretionary, “interest of justice” lens (as in Pankajini Sahu v. Joint Director, Enforcement Directorate), the judgment equips scheduled-offence courts and High Courts
to refuse committal where it would be oppressive or counterproductive.
4) Complex Concepts Simplified
-
“Scheduled offence” (PMLA):
A predicate offence listed in the PMLA Schedule (here, corruption/disproportionate assets under PC Act) whose proceeds may constitute “proceeds of crime.”
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“Cognizance”:
The court’s formal act of taking judicial notice of an offence and deciding to proceed with the case.
It is not the same as merely receiving papers, issuing administrative directions, or issuing a pre-cognizance notice.
-
Section 223 BNSS (pre-cognizance opportunity):
A procedural safeguard requiring that, for certain complaints (including the post-2024 complaint regime discussed),
the proposed accused be given an opportunity before the court takes cognizance.
A “pre-cognizance notice” indicates the court has not yet taken cognizance.
-
“Committal” under Section 44(1)(c) PMLA:
A statutory mechanism to send (“commit”) the scheduled offence case to the PMLA Special Court when both courts have already taken cognizance and they are different courts,
allowing the Special Court to continue from the stage already reached.
-
Sanction for prosecution (Section 197(1) CrPC / Section 218 BNSS):
Prior governmental permission required in certain cases to prosecute public servants for acts connected with official duties.
The judgment treats the absence of sanction as a serious impediment to cognizance against the former Minister/MLA.
-
Article 21 “speedy trial”:
The constitutional right not to face undue delay in criminal prosecution.
The Court treated last-minute procedural maneuvers that stall a near-finished trial as potentially violating this right.
5) Conclusion
The Assistant Director v. Additional Superintendent of Police establishes a practical and textual rule for Section 44(1)(c) PMLA:
committal of the scheduled offence case is premature unless the PMLA Special Court has already taken cognizance of the money-laundering complaint.
Post-BNSS, the Section 223 pre-cognizance process further postpones the moment when Section 44(1)(c) can be invoked.
The judgment also reinforces that Section 44’s “single forum” objective cannot be weaponised to derail an almost concluded corruption trial,
particularly where the money-laundering case is stalled due to unmet prerequisites such as sanction.
By tying statutory interpretation to Article 21 and case-management principles, the Court signals that procedural coordination under PMLA must advance—rather than undermine—timely justice.