Section 28-A Re-determination Must Follow the Final Appellate Award: Second Application Maintainable on High Court/Supreme Court Enhancement
1. Introduction
ANDANAYYA AND ORS. v. DEPUTY CHIEF ENGINEER AND ORS. (Supreme Court of India, 25-03-2026)
concerns land acquisition for the Hubballi–Ankola Broad Gauge Line. The appellants (landowners) did not seek a reference
under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“the Act”), but invoked Section 28-A to obtain parity with other landowners
who secured enhanced compensation.
The core controversy arose because: (i) the Reference Court enhanced compensation, on which the appellants successfully obtained
re-determination under Section 28-A; (ii) later, the High Court further enhanced compensation for similarly placed landowners; and
(iii) the appellants filed a second Section 28-A application seeking parity with the High Court’s enhanced rate, which was rejected.
The Karnataka High Court (Division Bench) upheld rejection relying on Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State Of Gujarat, (2018) 16 SCC 445,
holding Section 28-A could not be founded on an appellate judgment.
The Supreme Court addressed whether Section 28-A permits re-determination based on the final compensation fixed by appellate courts
(High Court/Supreme Court) and whether a second Section 28-A application is maintainable when the first was allowed on the Reference Court award.
2. Summary of the Judgment
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The Supreme Court set aside the Karnataka High Court Division Bench judgment and the Collector/LAO’s rejection order dated 30.11.2013.
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It held that for Section 28-A, the term “Court” is not confined to the Reference Court alone; it includes the High Court and the Supreme Court,
because the award ultimately operative is the one attaining finality through the appellate hierarchy.
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A second Section 28-A application filed after an appellate enhancement is maintainable, and prior receipt of re-determined compensation
based on the Reference Court award does not bar a further re-determination on parity with the appellate award.
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The Court declared Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State Of Gujarat, (2018) 16 SCC 445 to be not a binding precedent (effectively
per incuriam) for having omitted material aspects, including Union Of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736, the object of Section 28-A,
and the doctrine of merger.
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Directions were issued to re-determine compensation for the appellants in light of the High Court’s judgment dated 22.07.2013 (MFA Nos. 3289 and 3291 of 2007)
within eight weeks.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
The judgment relied on Babua Ram for an important administrative discipline: when an award under Section 26 is under appeal, the Collector/LAO
should “stay his hands” on Section 28-A re-determination until the appellate process concludes, because finality of compensation is attained
only with the appellate decree. The Supreme Court also noted that respondent No.2’s conduct (deciding the first 28-A application while landowners’ appeals were pending)
ran contrary to this principle.
While Babua Ram contained observations about limitation running from the “first award,” the present judgment treats that aspect as overtaken by later authority
(particularly Union Of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736) on the “first award” point; but it preserves Babua Ram’s merger/finality logic and the
Collector’s duty to wait for appellate outcomes.
Pradeep Kumari is treated as the controlling interpretive authority on Section 28-A’s beneficent purpose—removing inequality suffered by inarticulate and poor
landowners who do not pursue Section 18 references. The Court extracted and applied its principle that Section 28-A must be construed to extend benefits,
not curtail them by reading in limiting words.
Crucially, the present judgment clarified the “only one application” condition mentioned in Pradeep Kumari:
it was framed in the context of multiple awards by the Reference Court, and does not prohibit a further application when the compensation
is later altered by the High Court or Supreme Court as part of the same proceeding (where merger operates and only one final award can remain operative).
The Court treated Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese as arising on a different footing (time-barred applications), and noted that earlier discussions about
whether successive appellate determinations can trigger Section 28-A were left open for an appropriate case. The present judgment held that such a reference is unnecessary
given that the doctrine of merger, continuation of proceedings in appeal, and the statutory object were not previously placed or weighed in the required manner.
Bharatsing was used for two linked propositions: (i) Section 28-A is a beneficial provision; and (ii) the Collector should not decide 28-A claims
while appeals are pending on the relied-on awards.
Importantly, the present judgment questioned Bharatsing’s “stray observation” that a second 28-A application based on a High Court judgment is not maintainable,
pointing out that Pradeep Kumari was dealing with multiple Reference Court awards—not appellate enhancement within the same acquisition litigation chain.
The High Court had relied on Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai to hold that Section 28-A is confined to awards of the “Court” as defined in Section 3(d)
(Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction), thereby excluding appellate judgments.
The Supreme Court rejected that limitation, holding the decision failed to consider: (i) Union Of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736;
(ii) the Act’s object (including the 1984 Amendment’s Statement of Objects and Reasons, para (ix)); and (iii) the doctrine of merger and appeal-as-continuation.
Hence, it was held to be not a binding precedent.
Banwari was adopted as reinforcing authority that Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai did not notice Pradeep Kumari and was therefore
per incuriam. The present judgment aligned with Banwari and applied its reasoning to the Section 28-A issue at hand.
This case was used to restate the doctrine of merger and the principle that there cannot be more than one operative decree/order on the same subject at a time.
It anchored the conclusion that once the High Court (and potentially the Supreme Court) determines compensation, that appellate determination is the operative one into which the
Reference Court award merges.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
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Beneficial-object interpretation of Section 28-A:
The Court emphasized Section 28-A’s legislative aim (1984 amendment) to eliminate inequality between landowners under the same Section 4(1) notification—especially where
poorer or inarticulate landowners do not pursue Section 18 references. An interpretation excluding appellate enhancements would defeat parity and dilute Section 28-A’s purpose.
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Meaning of “Court” in Section 28-A in the scheme of the Act:
Although Section 3(d) defines “Court” as a principal civil court of original jurisdiction for reference proceedings, the Supreme Court held that a conjoint reading of
Sections 3(d), 28-A, and 54 (appeals) shows that appellate courts are part of the same compensation adjudicatory continuum. The Court reasoned that restricting Section 28-A
to Reference Court awards alone would create irrational disparity: parity would be achieved only up to the first judicial tier, but not up to the final compensation actually payable.
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Section 54 and “appeals from original decrees”:
By noting Section 54’s linkage to CPC principles for appeals from original decrees, the Court treated appellate determinations as continuation and culmination of the original
compensation proceeding—supporting the conclusion that final compensation is what matters for parity under Section 28-A.
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Doctrine of merger as the structural key:
Once the High Court enhances compensation, the Reference Court award “ceases to exist” independently and merges into the appellate award; the same occurs if the Supreme Court
later decides. Therefore, for Section 28-A parity, the relevant benchmark must be the final operative award, not an earlier tier that no longer governs.
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Maintainability of a second Section 28-A application after appellate enhancement:
The Court drew a firm line between:
- Multiple Reference Court awards (context of Pradeep Kumari’s “one application” condition), and
- A later appellate enhancement within the same hierarchy of proceedings (present case).
It held that filing and receiving payment on the first 28-A re-determination does not foreclose seeking parity with the final appellate award.
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No estoppel/waiver/acquiescence against statutory parity:
The Court held that acceptance of compensation already re-determined does not create a bar in the teeth of Section 28-A’s statutory design. The governing idea is equality with
similarly placed landowners, not private-law finality via waiver.
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Collector/LAO’s procedural obligation during appeals:
The Court criticized the Collector/LAO for deciding the first 28-A application while landowners’ appeals were pending, reiterating that applications should be held pending until
the appellate process is complete—both to avoid incongruity and to align with the final payable compensation.
3.3 Impact
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Parity extends to the final compensation:
The decision cements that Section 28-A parity is not truncated at the Reference Court level; it must align with the ultimate appellate compensation for the same notification.
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Second 28-A applications become viable in a defined situation:
Where a landowner already received re-determination based on the Reference Court award, a subsequent application can be maintained if it seeks parity with later High Court/Supreme Court
enhancement arising from the same acquisition proceedings.
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Administrative realignment for Collectors/LAOs:
Authorities must avoid premature 28-A determinations when appeals are pending and should structure processing to reflect finality—reducing inconsistent awards and follow-on litigation.
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Precedential correction:
By treating Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State Of Gujarat, (2018) 16 SCC 445 as non-binding/per incuriam on this issue, the Court reduces reliance on a restrictive
reading that excluded appellate judgments from Section 28-A’s ambit.
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Likely effect on pending and future claims:
Landowners who missed Section 18 references may now seek Section 28-A re-determination pegged to appellate enhancements (subject to statutory timelines as applicable), increasing the importance
of tracking final appellate outcomes in acquisition matters.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Section 28-A (Re-determination of compensation)
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A statutory route for landowners who did not seek a court reference under Section 18 to still obtain the benefit of higher compensation awarded to other landowners covered by the same acquisition notification.
- Reference Court (Section 18 / Part III proceedings)
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The civil court of original jurisdiction that decides objections to the Collector’s award when a landowner seeks a reference.
- Doctrine of merger
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When a higher court decides an appeal, its decision becomes the operative one; the lower court’s decision is absorbed into it. Practically: there cannot be two “final” compensation awards at the same time.
- Per incuriam
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A decision is treated as not binding if it was rendered in ignorance of a relevant statute or a binding earlier decision of equal/higher bench strength.
Here, Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai was held non-binding because it did not consider key prior authority and principles.
- Beneficial legislation interpretation
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When a law is enacted to confer relief (here, compensation parity), courts prefer interpretations that advance the relief rather than restrict it through technicalities.
5. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s ruling in ANDANAYYA AND ORS. v. DEPUTY CHIEF ENGINEER AND ORS. recalibrates Section 28-A around its central promise—equal compensation
for similarly placed landowners—by ensuring parity is measured against the final appellate determination, not merely the Reference Court award.
The judgment establishes that (i) “Court” for Section 28-A purposes encompasses appellate courts in the compensation hierarchy; (ii) a landowner is not barred from seeking further parity through a second
Section 28-A application after an appellate enhancement; and (iii) Collectors/LAOs should not prematurely decide Section 28-A applications while appeals are pending. In the broader landscape of land acquisition law,
the decision strengthens the Act’s beneficial character by preventing compensation inequality from re-emerging through procedural sequencing.