Section 27 “Joint Disclosure” Requires Accused-Specific, Distinct Discovery; “Last Seen” Alone Cannot Sustain Accomplice Conviction
1. Introduction
In ANAND JAKKAPPA PUJARI @ GADDADAR v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA (2026 INSC 417, decided on 27-04-2026),
the Supreme Court considered appeals by two co-convicts (Accused No.2 and Accused No.4) whose convictions for offences under
Sections 302, 364, 404, 201 read with Section 34 IPC had been affirmed by the High Court of Karnataka.
The prosecution case was entirely circumstantial: the deceased (Bebakka) went missing on 23.03.2013, her charred skeletal remains
were later found in the Mullur forest, and the prosecution attributed the crime to her brother (Accused No.1) and three alleged associates,
including the two appellants.
The Supreme Court’s decision turns on two evidentiary pillars used against the appellants:
(i) the “last seen together” circumstance; and (ii) alleged “discovery” evidence under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
based on “simultaneous/joint” disclosure statements.
The Court ultimately held that, as against the two appellants, the discovery evidence was unusable and “last seen” alone was insufficient,
leading to acquittal.
2. Summary of the Judgment
- The Court reiterated that conviction on circumstantial evidence must satisfy the Sharad Birdhichand Sarda tests.
- As to the appellants, the Court found no admissible or reliable Section 27 discovery attributable to them:
recoveries were essentially at the instance of Accused No.1, and the “joint disclosure” process was not proved in the legally required manner.
- The Court held that “last seen together” by itself does not necessarily lead to guilt and requires corroboration,
particularly where the accused are alleged accomplices with no demonstrated motive.
- With discovery evidence excluded, the remaining material created, at best, a “may be true” scenario—not “must be true” beyond reasonable doubt.
- The appeals were allowed; the High Court judgment was set aside qua the appellants, and they were acquitted and ordered to be released if not required in any other case.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
(a) Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116
This decision supplied the governing framework for circumstantial evidence: circumstances must be fully established,
consistent only with guilt, conclusive, exclude other hypotheses, and form a complete chain.
The Supreme Court applied this directly: once Section 27 material was found unusable against the appellants,
the chain against them was incomplete (leaving only “last seen”), failing the Sharad standard.
(b) Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793
Quoted through Sharad, it anchors the “may be” versus “must be” distinction. The Court invoked this to explain why
suspicion (or probability) cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt—critical where “last seen” was the sole surviving circumstance.
This was used to restate the doctrine that “last seen” gains force only when the time-gap is so small that third-party intervention becomes improbable.
Even then, the Supreme Court emphasized that corroboration is usually sought. In the present case, the Court accepted that “last seen”
may be assumed for argument, but treated it as unsafe to sustain murder conviction of alleged accomplices without supporting links.
(d) State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600
The High Court relied heavily on this authority to admit “simultaneous/joint disclosures”.
The Supreme Court clarified the true teaching of Navjot Sandhu: such disclosures are not automatically inadmissible,
but the real problem is credibility and proof—it is practically difficult to establish who said what, in what sequence,
and how it “relates distinctly” to a discovered fact. The Court used this nuance to reject “implicit reliance” on the discovery material here,
because the prosecution evidence did not connect an accused-specific statement to an accused-specific discovery.
This precedent was applied to benchmark how Section 27 discovery should be proved:
independent panchas should hear the accused’s precise statement at the police station; the statement should be recorded accurately;
then the accused must lead to discovery; and the panchnama’s contents must be proved through testimony.
The Court found the present discovery process deficient—especially because the panch witness did not depose to the appellants’ exact words
and the recoveries were, in substance, at Accused No.1’s instance.
(f) Mohd. Abdul Hafeez v. State of A.P., (1983) 1 SCC 143
The Court relied on the rule that, where multiple accused exist, the Investigating Officer must clearly state:
who gave the information and what words were used, so the recovery is connected to that person.
This directly undermined the prosecution’s attempt to treat the disclosure exercise as a blanket “joint statement” binding all accused.
(g) Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 828
Used for the conditions of Section 27 applicability: discovery must be “in consequence of” information from an accused in custody,
and only the portion relating distinctly to the discovered fact is admissible.
The Court used these requirements to test whether anything was actually “discovered” due to the appellants’ information—and found none.
Cited for its explanation of Section 27’s logic: only that part of a custodial statement is admissible which is guaranteed by discovery
of a relevant fact previously unknown. This supported the Court’s insistence on strict construction, because Section 27 is an exception to Sections 25 and 26.
(i) Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47
The Court invoked the classic distinction between the “fact discovered” and the “object produced”.
The “fact discovered” includes the place and the accused’s knowledge of it; narrative additions about past use (“with which I stabbed A”) are excluded.
This buttressed the Court’s approach that broad confessional material (Ex.P.50–Ex.P.53) could not be smuggled in via Section 27,
and that “distinct relation” to discovery is essential.
(j) Nagamma v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2038
Cited to reiterate Navjot Sandhu: joint/simultaneous disclosures are not outside Section 27, but reliance is a matter of careful evaluation
due to practical proof difficulties. The Court used this to explain that admissibility in theory does not cure evidentiary failure in proof.
These were discussed to illustrate when “multiple accused” discovery can work:
where each accused’s conduct leads to discovery of a distinct fact (e.g., different body parts or different caches),
providing a guarantee of truthfulness. The Supreme Court contrasted those situations with the present case,
where the “discovery” was effectively the same spot being shown after Accused No.1 had already pointed it out,
and major recoveries were exclusively at Accused No.1’s instance.
Relied upon for the proposition that a panchnama’s contents are not substantive evidence;
substantive evidence is what witnesses prove in court. This prevented the State from reading panchnama contents to supply missing oral proof
about what the appellants supposedly stated.
(m) Jagannath v. Emperor, AIR 1942 Oudh 221
This authority was used to explain the concept of “accomplice” and categories of participation (principal/accessory),
framing the Court’s analysis: the appellants were, at most, alleged accomplices, so the evidentiary threshold to connect them to the crime
could not be satisfied by a weak “last seen” alone.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(a) Circumstantial evidence: chain must be complete for each accused
The Court treated the case as purely circumstantial and insisted that the chain must be complete against the particular accused.
Even if the overall narrative strongly implicated Accused No.1 (who had motive and from whose car/land items were recovered),
that could not automatically transfer guilt to alleged associates without independent, legally admissible links.
(b) “Last seen together” requires corroboration; it is not a self-sufficient rule of guilt
Accepting that PW-7’s testimony placed the deceased in Accused No.1’s car when others boarded, the Court nevertheless held that
it was “too risky” to affirm murder conviction of the appellants solely on this basis.
The Court emphasized the doctrine’s limited utility: it is strongest when the time gap is narrow and there is supporting evidence.
Here, after excluding discovery, nothing corroborated the appellants’ participation in killing, burning, or robbery.
(c) Section 27: strict construction; proof must be accused-specific
The Court’s central evidentiary move was to deny Section 27 use against the appellants because:
- No proved “exact words” of the appellants: the panch witness did not depose to any precise statement made by them.
- Recoveries were at Accused No.1’s instance: rope, petrol can, ornaments, car were discovered from Accused No.1’s places/vehicle.
- Showing the same spot after Accused No.1 does not create a new “discovery” attributable to the appellants; there is no “re-discovery”.
- Panchnama cannot substitute testimony: the State could not cure these gaps by reading documents not proved through oral evidence.
The Court accepted the doctrinal possibility of joint/simultaneous disclosures (Navjot Sandhu) but held that,
on the facts, the necessary safeguards—distinctness, sequence clarity, and discovery nexus—were absent.
(d) Resulting evidentiary posture: “may be true” is insufficient
Once Section 27 was unusable against the appellants, the prosecution case against them collapsed into a single circumstance (“last seen”),
which did not meet the “must be true” standard for murder conviction.
Accordingly, the Court acquitted.
3.3 Impact
- Higher scrutiny of “joint disclosure” claims: Investigators and courts must ensure that, for each accused, the precise information,
custody status, and the “distinct” discovered fact are proved through testimony—not merely through panchnamas or broad confessional write-ups.
- Limits on rope-in liability of alleged accomplices: Where motive and recoveries point primarily to one accused,
co-accused cannot be convicted unless independent circumstances complete the chain against them.
- Operational guidance on Section 27 proof: The judgment strengthens trial discipline by reinforcing that admissibility (in principle)
does not equal reliability (in proof), especially for multi-accused “simultaneous” statements.
- “Last seen” downgraded from standalone proof: The judgment signals that “last seen”—without corroboration—will rarely sustain conviction
for serious offences, particularly where the accused are alleged secondary participants.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
4.1 “Last seen together”
A court may infer involvement if an accused was the last person seen with the deceased and the deceased is soon found dead,
making third-party involvement unlikely. But it is not an automatic rule: courts typically require corroboration (recoveries, motive, conduct, forensic links).
4.2 Section 27 of the Evidence Act (“discovery”)
Normally, police-custody confessions are excluded (Sections 25–26). Section 27 is a narrow exception:
only the portion of an accused’s information that distinctly relates to a fact discovered because of that information is admissible.
If police already know the fact, repeating it does not “discover” it again.
4.3 “Joint/simultaneous disclosure”
Multiple accused can, in principle, give similar information close in time. Courts may admit it,
but must be satisfied about who said what and how each statement led to a distinct discovery attributable to that accused.
A vague “chorus” version is practically unreliable.
4.4 Panchnama as non-substantive evidence
A panchnama is a contemporaneous record. Its contents do not prove themselves.
What matters is what the panch witnesses (or investigating officer) prove on oath in court.
5. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision crystallizes a defendant-specific approach to circumstantial guilt:
(i) “last seen together” is a weak standalone circumstance; and
(ii) Section 27 discovery—especially in multi-accused cases—must be proved with precision, accused-wise nexus, and distinct discovery,
otherwise it cannot be used to complete the chain.
By setting aside the convictions of the two alleged accomplices, the Court reinforced the principle that criminal proof must travel
from suspicion to certainty—“may be” to “must be”—before liberty can be taken away.