Sanction Under UAP Act Section 45 Is Offence-Centric (Not Accused-Centric): Procedural Seizure Lapses and Case-Diary Access Do Not Loosen the Section 43D(5) Bail Bar

Case: SHAHID KHAN v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA (Karnataka High Court, 23-01-2026) — Criminal Appeal No.1475 of 2025 [21(NIA)]
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice H.P. Sandesh and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Venkatesh Naik T

1. Introduction

This decision arises from an appeal under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 read with Section 25 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAP Act), challenging the rejection of regular bail to the appellant (Accused No.14) in Special Case No.744 of 2023 before the NIA Special Court at Bengaluru.

The prosecution case, as reflected in the charge-sheet (Crime No.328 of 2022, Kadugondanahalli Police), alleges a larger conspiracy involving office bearers/members of the Popular Front of India (PFI) to radicalise Muslim youth, raise funds, run training camps, and support unlawful/terror-related activities. The appellant was described as a District President (Davanagere Zone) and alleged to have participated in conspiratorial meetings and fund-raising. He was arrested on 22.09.2022.

The core issues before the High Court were: (i) whether a successive bail application was maintainable absent a real change in circumstances, (ii) how Section 45 (sanction) and procedural requirements under Chapter V (seizure/forfeiture) of the UAP Act affect bail, (iii) whether delay in trial warranted release, and (iv) whether the accused could secure the case-diary for use in a bail appeal.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The High Court dismissed the criminal appeal and affirmed the rejection of bail.
• It reiterated that successive bail applications are permissible only upon a demonstrable change in circumstances; repeated re-agitation on the same grounds is impermissible.
• On sanction (Section 45, UAP Act), the Court held that sanction is a pre-condition for taking cognizance of an offence and is offence-centric, not necessarily “accused-specific” in the manner urged by the appellant.
• Alleged non-compliance with Section 25 / Chapter V procedure during seizure of cash was treated as, at most, an irregularity that does not, by itself, justify bail when there is material connecting the accused to Section 17 allegations; the Court declined to conduct a “mini-trial” at the bail stage.
• The Court dismissed I.A. No.2 of 2025 seeking summoning of the case-diary, holding that under Section 172(2) Cr.P.C. the diary may aid the Court but cannot be called for at the instance of the accused for examination.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Authorities relied upon by the appellant

Mohammad Tapseer @ Mohammed Tafseer v. State of Karnataka (Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.12446 of 2025 dated 31.10.2025)

The appellant invoked this decision in aid of bail jurisprudence in serious-statute prosecutions. While the High Court did not extract or apply any detailed ratio from it on the face of the judgment, the citation reflects the defence theme that prolonged incarceration and trial delay can justify bail even in special enactments where liberty is severely constrained. The Court, however, resolved the appeal primarily through the UAP Act’s statutory structure (notably Section 43D(5)) and principles governing successive bail.

Vernon v. State of Maharashtra and another (2 02 3) 15 SCC 56

This Supreme Court authority is frequently cited for the approach to bail under UAPA, including the “prima facie true” test and the limited evaluative scope at the bail stage. Although the High Court did not expressly parse the ratio, its reasoning aligns with the restrained bail-stage inquiry: procedural or factual disputes (e.g., seizure lapses; sufficiency of allegations) are generally treated as matters for trial rather than grounds to dilute the statutory bar.

R. Dineshkumar Alias Deena v. State represented by Inspector of Police and others (2015) 7 SCC 497

This case is commonly cited on criminal procedural fairness and the limits of the Court’s interference at interlocutory stages. The High Court’s refusal to “mini-try” the seizure irregularity and its insistence that ingredients compliance is for trial are consistent with that broader approach.

Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav and Another (2004 ) 7 SCC 528

This is a leading authority on successive bail applications: they are not barred, but must be founded on a material change in circumstances. The High Court’s articulation that re-agitation “would lead to speculation and uncertainty” and could invite “forum hunting” tracks the principle associated with this line of precedent.

Athar Parwez v. Union of India (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762)

The appellant relied on this decision to reinforce liberty considerations, especially where the trial is unlikely to conclude soon. The High Court acknowledged the delay argument as a “new contention” but did not treat it as sufficient to override the statutory bail constraints given its assessment of the prosecution material and the Section 43D(5) framework.

B. Authorities relied upon by the respondent-State

Girish Sharma and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others (2018) 15 SCC 192

The State relied on this case to emphasise discipline in successive bail and the need for demonstrable changed circumstances before entertaining repeat requests. The High Court’s threshold approach to maintainability and re-agitation is broadly consistent with this reliance.

Vinod Ramnani and Another v. Station House Officer and another (2020 SCC OnLine Kar 1269)

This Karnataka High Court authority was cited by the State to support restrictive procedural/maintainability positions in criminal process. The present Bench’s treatment of the case-diary application and the successive bail scrutiny resonates with this approach: procedural tools cannot be used to convert a bail appeal into a fishing inquiry into the investigation record.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) Successive bail: “change in circumstances” as the gateway

The Court reaffirmed the settled position: a rejected bail plea does not forever bar a fresh application, but a subsequent plea must rest on a genuine change in fact or law. Repetition of previously urged grounds is discouraged to prevent uncertainty and forum hunting. On the facts, the appellant attempted to present “new” grounds (seizure procedure, sanction, trial delay), but the Court found them insufficient to warrant interference with the trial court’s denial.

(ii) Sanction under Section 45 UAP Act: offence-centric cognizance

The appellant argued that although allegations invoked Sections 17 and 18 UAP Act, sanction was granted only for Section 17; therefore, the court could not proceed on Section 18 and this should weigh in favour of bail.

The High Court’s key clarification is conceptual and operational:

Importantly, the Court did not convert the sanction issue into an automatic bail entitlement. At the bail stage, it treated the sanction argument as insufficient to displace the continued prosecution on the broader set of allegations and the statutory bail bar logic, especially where Section 17 (raising funds for terrorist acts) remained in play.

(iii) Seizure lapses under Chapter V / Section 25: irregularity, not a bail trigger

The appellant asserted that cash seized from his residence was legitimate business money and that the Investigating Officer failed to comply with the mandatory procedure under Chapter V/Section 25 UAP Act; hence Section 17 should not apply and bail should follow.

The Court held:

• Even if the seizure procedure was not strictly followed, such non-compliance is, at most, an irregularity.
• It does not “go to the root” of the prosecution case at the bail stage when other material links the appellant to alleged fund-raising for unlawful/terror activities.
• Whether Sections 17 and 18 ingredients are ultimately proved is a matter for trial; the bail court should not conduct a “mini-trial”.

(iv) Case-diary access (Section 172(2) Cr.P.C.): court-aid, not defence discovery

The appellant filed I.A. No.2 of 2025 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking the case-diary from FIR registration till date, for use in the bail appeal. He argued the diary would expose vagueness, contradictions, and repeated examination of protected witnesses.

The Court rejected the application by emphasising Section 172(2) Cr.P.C.:

• The court may call the diary to aid inquiry/trial; it is not evidence.
• The accused is not entitled to call for or examine the diary; it is not a tool for defence inspection.
• The court also noted that in co-accused bail appeals, it had decided matters without summoning the diary.

3.3 Impact

(i) Reinforcement of high threshold for successive bail in UAP/NIA matters

The decision strengthens a procedural discipline: where UAP Act charges invoke the Section 43D(5) bail regime (as the trial court had held), courts will be reluctant to entertain repeat bail attempts unless the change is substantial and outcome-relevant, not merely a reframing of earlier issues.

(ii) Practical consequence of “offence-centric” sanction framing

By characterising Section 45 sanction as relating to the offence of which cognizance is taken (rather than being tightly accused-specific), the judgment may reduce the effectiveness of bail-stage arguments that attempt to disaggregate sanction on an accused-by-accused basis. Defence challenges on sanction may remain potent, but are likely to be treated as primarily cognizance/trial-stage objections unless they clearly negate the legal sustainability of proceeding on the relevant offence at all.

(iii) Procedural lapses in seizure: likely to be litigated at trial, not in bail

Treating non-compliance with Chapter V seizure procedure as an “irregularity” (at least for bail purposes) signals that accused persons may find it difficult to convert seizure defects into immediate liberty, unless the lapse demonstrably destroys the prosecution’s foundational link between the accused and the alleged terror-funding activity.

(iv) Limits on defence access to investigative record via “case diary”

The ruling underscores a strict view that case diaries are a judicial aid, not a discovery mechanism for the accused, including at the bail appellate stage. This affects strategy in complex UAP cases where accused often seek broader access to investigative chronology to show inconsistencies.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Cognizance”: the court’s formal act of taking notice of an alleged offence so that it can proceed judicially. The judgment stresses it is taken of an offence (the legal wrong), not of a specific person in isolation.
• Section 45, UAP Act (Sanction): certain UAP offences cannot be taken up by a court unless the appropriate government grants prior sanction, after an independent review mechanism contemplated by Section 45(2).
• Section 43D(5), UAP Act (Bail restriction): if the court finds reasonable grounds for believing the accusation is “prima facie true”, bail is statutorily restricted. Bail hearings therefore avoid deep fact-finding that would resemble a trial.
• Chapter V / Section 25, UAP Act (Seizure/forfeiture procedure): prescribes how property linked to terrorism may be seized/handled. The Court treated non-compliance as not automatically fatal at the bail stage.
• Case diary (Section 172 Cr.P.C.): an internal police diary of investigation steps. Courts may consult it for assistance, but the accused generally cannot demand it for inspection or use.
• Successive bail: a renewed bail request after rejection. It is permissible only when there is a material change (new facts, new evidence, significant delay, or change in law), not as a re-argument on old grounds.

5. Conclusion

SHAHID KHAN v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA consolidates a stringent bail posture in UAP/NIA prosecutions by (i) insisting on a real change in circumstances for successive bail, (ii) clarifying that Section 45 sanction is framed as an offence-based precondition to cognizance rather than an accused-specific shield in bail proceedings, (iii) treating seizure-procedure lapses under Chapter V as trial issues rather than stand-alone bail grounds, and (iv) reaffirming that case diaries are a court aid, not a defence-accessible investigative record.

The judgment’s significance lies less in creating an entirely new doctrinal test and more in its practical synthesis: in UAP cases, courts will generally resist converting sanction nuances, seizure irregularities, and investigative-record demands into bail-stage entitlements unless they clearly dismantle the legal basis for continued prosecution or decisively alter the “prima facie true” assessment.