3.1 Precedents Cited
The Court invoked this decision to reaffirm the classic administrative/interpretive principle: when a statute prescribes that an act be done
in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner, and where the statute attaches consequences to non-compliance, the requirement is typically mandatory.
Importantly, the Court used this precedent against the petitioners’ case. The petitioners argued that Rule 2.4.3 was not complied with because
reasons were allegedly not recorded; the Court held that Rule 2.4.3 was complied with—reasons were in fact recorded—and thus the statutory manner
was followed. The precedent served to strengthen the conclusion that compliance (not quashment) followed from the record.
(b) A. Venkatrama vs The Food Safety Officer bearing Crl.O.P. Nos. 14595 and 22925 of 2016 decided on 13.04.2023
This Madras High Court decision was cited for the operational architecture of sample testing: when reports vary, the Designated Officer is to send a part to a referral laboratory,
and “The report of the referral laboratory shall be final” and forms the basis for complaint.
In the present judgment, this authority was used to justify two propositions: (i) the legitimacy of escalating the matter to the referral tier where the initial analysis is incomplete
or otherwise unreliable; and (ii) the evidentiary primacy of the referral result for prosecution decisions.
(c) Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union of India reported as 1987 SCC (CRI) 329
The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to emphasize that public health is a constitutional priority, ranking high among state obligations.
The citation underpinned the Court’s broader interpretive posture: food safety enforcement should not be neutralized at the threshold via technical objections
unless there is clear illegality, mala fides, or abuse of process.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(i) “Erroneous report” under Rule 2.4.3 includes an incomplete report omitting key safety parameters
The petitioners sought to frame Rule 2.4.3 as a narrow gateway—available only when the Food Analyst’s conclusions are demonstrably “wrong.”
The Court adopted a functional, public-health-oriented reading: a report may be treated as “erroneous” when it is deficient because it did not test
material safety parameters. On the facts, omission of testing for antibiotic residues, pesticide residues, and heavy metals was treated as a rational basis
for invoking Rule 2.4.3.
This approach effectively elevates completeness of scientific scrutiny as part of the legality of the initial analytical process. The Court viewed the
Designated Officer’s referral decision not as an adversarial step requiring participation by the food business operator, but as a statutory safeguard to prevent
unsafe products from evading detection due to partial testing.
(ii) Reasons “recorded in writing”: satisfaction is reviewable on record, not by re-appreciation of scientific merits
Rule 2.4.3 requires the Designated Officer to form an opinion “for reason(s) to be recorded in writing” that the Food Analyst report is erroneous.
The Court’s review was limited to verifying that written reasons existed and were intelligible (i.e., based on missing parameters). Having found this,
it refused to invalidate referral as arbitrary.
The judgment thus indicates that, at the Section 482 stage, the High Court will not conduct a deeper “scientific sufficiency” evaluation—its concern is whether
the statutory trigger (recorded reasons) exists and is prima facie relevant.
(iii) No pre-decisional hearing before referral: scheme prioritizes swift scientific verification
A central attack was that the sample was sent to the Referral Laboratory without consulting/giving hearing to the petitioners.
The Court rejected this on the ground that neither the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 nor the Rules require a prior hearing at this stage.
The implicit reasoning is that referral is not a punitive determination; it is an evidence-gathering/verification step designed to protect consumers.
Introducing a hearing requirement at the referral stage could delay testing, undermine sample integrity, and weaken enforcement in time-sensitive food safety contexts.
(iv) Finality/overriding effect of Referral Laboratory report
The Court accepted the respondents’ submission that once the Referral Laboratory report is received, the earlier report “loses its significance,” and
the referral result carries overriding effect. This aligns with the statutory design discussed through A. Venkatrama vs The Food Safety Officer:
a hierarchy of scientific opinions culminating in a final referral determination.
The Court also neutralized the “contradictory reports” argument by characterizing the first report as limited (few parameters) and the second as comprehensive,
making the latter not merely a contradiction but a fuller statutory determination.
(v) Company liability and the Managing Director’s arraignment under Section 66
The petitioners argued that because a nominee/person responsible for food safety existed, the Managing Director should not be proceeded against.
The Court read Section 66 as imposing vicarious liability on those “in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business,”
while the proviso addressing nominated persons/unit heads does not grant blanket immunity to top management.
The “due diligence”/“without knowledge” protections were treated as defences requiring evidence, not grounds for quashing at inception.
This pushes disputes about internal delegation, nomination scope, and operational control into the trial domain.
(vi) Section 202 CrPC objection: limited scrutiny at cognizance stage (as applied in this case)
The Court rejected the argument that the Magistrate had to conduct a Section 202 inquiry before issuing process, observing that the complaint was filed by a public servant
under a central legislation and that the Magistrate needed only to see prima facie material.
From a doctrinal perspective, this part of the reasoning signals a high threshold for quashing on “procedural” grounds in food safety prosecutions, especially where the complaint
is by a statutory authority and supported by a referral lab report. However, because Section 202 issues can be fact-sensitive (including where accused are outside territorial
jurisdiction), this aspect may invite closer scrutiny in future cases depending on the precise procedural posture and governing higher-court interpretations.
3.3 Impact
(i) Strengthening Rule 2.4.3 as a public health tool
The judgment effectively clarifies that Rule 2.4.3 is not confined to “wrong” reports; it can be invoked where a report is incomplete in a way that
undermines safety assurance. This strengthens regulators’ ability to demand comprehensive testing—especially for products like milk where chemical residues and contaminants
can pose serious health risks.
(ii) Procedural challenges at the Section 482 stage will face a steeper climb
By emphasizing the extraordinary nature of Section 482 and the primacy of public health, the Court signals that quashing will be rare where:
(a) reasons for referral exist on file, and (b) the Referral Laboratory reports the food as unsafe.
Future petitioners may need to show clear statutory breach (e.g., absence of recorded reasons, tampering, lack of jurisdiction, limitation issues, or demonstrable mala fides).
(iii) Corporate governance and prosecution risk
For food businesses, the decision underscores that nomination of a food safety/quality officer may not shield top management from arraignment.
Companies should expect courts to treat “who is responsible” as a trial issue unless the complaint is facially defective. This increases incentives for:
robust due diligence documentation, internal compliance audits, traceability, and demonstrable supervisory systems.
(iv) Enforcement tempo: reluctance to continue interim stays
The Court’s refusal to continue interim stay (noting it had operated since 21.04.2022) reflects a broader enforcement-sensitive stance:
prolonged stays in food safety matters may be viewed as jeopardizing public health, prompting courts to prioritize expeditious trial over prolonged pre-trial litigation.