Right to Summon Forensic/DNA Experts Despite Section 293 CrPC and “Fast-Track” Disposal Directions
1. Introduction
Case: Avinash Pandey v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh and Others (Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur; Order dated 13-02-2026; Criminal Revision No. 4646 of 2024).
Impugned orders: 28/08/2024 and 03/09/2024 passed by the Special Judge (POCSO Act), Sirmour, District Rewa in Special Case No. 64/2020.
Core dispute: The trial court rejected the accused’s applications (initially under Sections 91 & 233 CrPC; later framed under Sections 256 & 94 BNSS) seeking summoning/production and examination of witnesses—particularly the forensic/DNA expert—after the case was fixed for final arguments.
Key issue: Whether the defence can be denied the opportunity to summon and examine the forensic/DNA expert on grounds such as (i) delay (“why not earlier”), (ii) admissibility of expert reports without formal proof under Section 293 CrPC, or (iii) general “expeditious disposal” directions in old/POCSO matters.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The High Court set aside both trial court orders. It held that while Section 293 CrPC permits use of government scientific experts’ reports as evidence, the court retains power to summon and examine the expert, and the defence cannot be non-suited on technicalities when it seeks to test such evidence. General directions to dispose of old/POCSO cases quickly cannot justify conducting a “hurried” trial that curtails a party’s fair opportunity.
Direction issued: The trial court must summon the expert witness and other witnesses prayed for in the applications disposed of on 28/08/2024 and 03/09/2024, record their statements as per law, and then proceed to decide the case.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
(a) Criminal Reference No.06/2022 (In Reference v. Anokhilal) (DB, order dated 11/09/2023)
The High Court relied on the Division Bench approach where, upon an objection concerning the DNA report, the trial court was directed to summon and examine the DNA experts, then to conduct an additional Section 313 CrPC examination on that additional evidence, and thereafter deliver judgment. Importantly, the DB set aside the conviction and remanded the matter precisely because the expert evidence required proper testing when contested.
Influence on the present decision: This precedent undermined the trial court’s view that Section 293 CrPC alone was a sufficient answer to the defence request. It reinforced the principle that where the integrity, methodology, or conclusions of forensic/DNA evidence are put in issue, courts should facilitate examination of the relevant expert rather than foreclose it.
(b) Rahul v. State of Madhya Pradesh (NCT of Delhi), 2023 (1) SCC 83
The Supreme Court emphasised that “mere exhibiting a document would not prove its contents” and highlighted vulnerabilities where the chain of custody, sealing, storage, and reliability of techniques are not adequately established. The Court noted that in the absence of such foundational scrutiny, DNA profiling reports become “highly vulnerable.”
Influence on the present decision: The High Court used Rahul to stress why the defence must be allowed to test forensic evidence through examination of the expert and related witnesses—particularly where handling of samples, methodology, and reliability may be in contention.
Quoted within Rahul, this authority interprets Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act as conferring wide powers on the trial judge to ask “any” questions (even touching irrelevancies) to elicit truth, and rejects the notion of a judge as a passive umpire.
Influence on the present decision: The citation supported the High Court’s broader fairness framework: trial courts must actively ensure truth-finding and procedural fairness, which includes permitting meaningful testing of expert evidence rather than relying on formal admissibility alone.
Also quoted within Rahul, it cautions against the criminal court becoming a mere referee in an adversarial contest; judges should participate to ascertain truth by intelligently questioning witnesses.
Influence on the present decision: The High Court’s reasoning aligns with the idea that procedural shortcuts—particularly around decisive scientific evidence—risk substituting speed for truth and fairness.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(i) Section 293 CrPC is permissive, not preclusive
The High Court reproduced Section 293 CrPC and treated it as a rule that allows certain government scientific reports to be used as evidence, while preserving judicial discretion under Section 293(2) to summon and examine the expert. The critical move is rejecting the trial court’s implicit premise: that admissibility without “formal proof” means the defence has no meaningful right to call or question the expert.
(ii) Objection triggers the need for testing, even if the report is admissible
The Court drew a functional distinction:
- If the accused does not object, the report may be read as evidence under Section 293 CrPC.
- If the accused objects and seeks to examine the expert, the court should not reject the request on technical grounds such as delay or general case-age concerns.
This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s insistence in
Rahul that scientific reports, particularly DNA evidence, may require scrutiny on chain of custody and reliable application of technique.
(iii) Speedy disposal directions do not license a “hurried” trial
The trial court relied on the case being among the “oldest 100 cases” and on general High Court directions for disposal within six months (common in POCSO context). The High Court held that such directions are not to be read as authorising denial of proper opportunity. It crystallised the balancing principle in the line:
“justice delayed is justice denied” must be read conjointly with “justice hurried is justice buried.”
(iv) Technical objections like “why not earlier” cannot defeat substantive fairness
By setting aside the orders, the High Court signalled that when a request goes to the heart of evidentiary reliability—especially scientific evidence often treated as highly persuasive—courts should prioritise a fair opportunity to test the evidence over rigid procedural timing objections, unless the request is shown to be mala fide or plainly irrelevant (no such finding was sustained here).
3.3 Impact
On POCSO/fast-track trials: The decision reinforces that statutory or administrative expectations of expedition cannot be used to curtail defence evidence, particularly where expert forensic evidence is pivotal.
On DNA/forensic evidence practice: Trial courts are reminded that Section 293 CrPC does not create an automatic shield against summoning experts. Where the defence disputes or seeks to probe the report, examination of the expert may be necessary to ensure reliability, including chain of custody and methodology scrutiny.
On trial management: Courts should manage time by structured scheduling (day-to-day hearing if needed), not by foreclosing legitimate defence steps. This approach reduces the risk of appellate/revisional interference and retrials caused by procedural unfairness.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
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Section 293 CrPC (Reports of scientific experts): Certain government laboratory reports can be used in evidence without calling the expert routinely. However, the court may summon the expert, and when the defence seeks to test the report, summoning can be crucial.
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Section 91 CrPC: Power to summon documents or things necessary for the case.
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Section 233 CrPC: After prosecution evidence, the accused can enter defence and ask the court to issue process to compel attendance of defence witnesses or production of documents, subject to the court’s control against vexatious requests.
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Section 313 CrPC: The court questions the accused to explain incriminating circumstances appearing in evidence. If new evidence is recorded (e.g., expert examination on remand), fresh Section 313 questions may be required on that material.
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Section 165 Evidence Act: Empowers the judge to ask any questions necessary to discover the truth; the judge is not a passive umpire.
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“Admissibility” vs “proof/reliability”: Even if a report is admissible, its weight depends on reliability—chain of custody, proper sealing/storage, validated methods, and credible explanation by the expert where challenged.
5. Conclusion
The Madhya Pradesh High Court reaffirmed a fairness-centric rule for criminal trials involving scientific evidence: Section 293 CrPC cannot be used to deny the defence an opportunity to summon and examine forensic/DNA experts when the report is disputed, and general directions for expeditious disposal—especially in old/POCSO matters—cannot justify a hurried trial that sacrifices procedural justice. The decision promotes reliability of convictions by ensuring that decisive forensic evidence is not accepted untested when contested, thereby reducing wrongful conviction risks and future appellate reversals.