Retrospective Clarificatory Statutes, One‑Time Relaxation and Notional Promotions in NITs: A Commentary on Ritu Garg v. Board of Governors, NIT Kurukshetra (2025 INSC 1285)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India's decision in Ritu Garg & Ors. v. Board of Governors, BOG & Ors., decided on 29 October 2025 (2025 INSC 1285), resolves a long-running dispute concerning promotions from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor at the National Institute of Technology, Kurukshetra (“NIT Kurukshetra”). The controversy sits at the intersection of:

  • the statutory framework governing National Institutes of Technology under the National Institutes of Technology, Science Education and Research Act, 2007 (“NITSER Act, 2007”);
  • executive policy providing a “one-time relaxation” in eligibility conditions for promotion of stagnating faculty;
  • the power of the State to retrospectively amend statutes to cure defects pointed out by the courts; and
  • the limited effect of notional promotions in service law.

Two civil appeals were before the Court: Civil Appeal No. 11897/2025 by Ritu Garg & Ors., and Civil Appeal No. 11898/2025 by Poonam Jindal. Both challenged a common judgment dated 31 May 2024 passed by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in two writ petitions (CWP No. 15972 of 2023 (O&M) and CWP No. 354 of 2024 (O&M)).

The appellants are Assistant Professors at NIT Kurukshetra since 2008 who had participated in a selection process under Advertisement No. 03/2018 for promotion/appointment as Associate Professors. Their recommendations for appointment, made on 27 November 2018, remained unimplemented due to earlier litigation that had invalidated the executive-based one‑time relaxation scheme at NIT Kurukshetra. Subsequent statutory amendments in 2023 (the “2023 Statutes”) purported to validate and operationalise this one‑time relaxation for NIT Kurukshetra. The High Court, while upholding the validity of the amendment, held that it would operate only prospectively and directed a fresh selection process.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Dipankar Datta, J. (with Augustine George Masih, J. concurring), partially corrected the High Court’s approach. While accepting the validity of Statute 9 of the 2023 Statutes, it held that this provision was clarificatory in nature and effectively validated the earlier recruitment drive initiated by Advertisement No. 03/2018. At the same time, the Court granted only notional, non-monetary promotions to the selected candidates, strictly limiting the consequences of such recognition.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Factual Background in Brief

  • The appellants are Assistant Professors at NIT Kurukshetra (appointed around 2008), aspiring for promotion/appointment as Associate Professors, a selection post.
  • Under the then applicable recruitment rules, eligibility required, inter alia, three years in Academic Grade Pay (AGP) of Rs. 8,000 at the level of Assistant Professor. The appellants did not fulfil this AGP requirement and were ineligible to be considered.
  • On 6 October 2017, the Ministry of Human Resource Development (now Ministry of Education), Department of Higher Education, issued an executive letter granting a one‑time relaxation to Assistant Professors in NITs who lacked AGP of Rs. 8,000 but had more than six years of service as Assistant Professor after obtaining their Ph.D. Such Assistant Professors could be considered for selection as Associate Professors.
  • This relaxation was implemented across 31 NITs, except NIT Kurukshetra and NIT Jalandhar, due to intervening litigation.
  • NIT Kurukshetra issued Advertisement No. 03/2018 on 10 January 2018, incorporating the one-time relaxation. The appellants applied and, according to them, were recommended for appointment as Associate Professors by a resolution dated 27 November 2018.
  • However, a group of junior Assistant Professors challenged the relaxation before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. A Division Bench, by judgment dated 5 December 2019, held the 6 October 2017 letter to be contrary to the First Statutes of NIT Kurukshetra framed under the NITSER Act, 2007, and declared that no benefit of that letter could accrue to NIT Kurukshetra’s Assistant Professors.
  • The special leave petition against that judgment (SLP (C) Diary No. 21233/2020) was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 17 January 2022.

In response to this judicial setback, the Ministry of Education initiated a proposal to amend the statutory framework (the First Statutes of NITs) so as to formally incorporate the one‑time relaxation which had earlier been given only by executive instruction.

2. The 2023 Statutes and Statute 9

Following due procedure under Section 26 of the NITSER Act, 2007:

  • The Ministry obtained approvals from the Boards of Governors of all 31 NITs and IIEST, Shibpur.
  • Draft notifications were vetted by the Legislative Department of the Ministry of Law and Justice.
  • The Visitor (the President of India), acting under Sections 26(3) and 26(4), approved the amendments on 4 May 2023.
  • The First Statutes of the National Institutes of Technology (Amendment) Statutes, 2023 were notified on 14 June 2023 and published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2023.

Of special significance is Statute 9, which provides:

“(9) The one-time relaxation or measures for the then stagnated and eligible faculty of the National Institute of Technology, Kurukshetra shall be as per the relaxations issued with the approval of the council vide communications dated the 6th October, 2017 and 17th November, 2017:

Provided that one-time relaxation or measures contained in the communications dated the 6th October, 2017 and 17th November, 2017 shall have no validity and stand exhausted after the first round of recruitments initiated after issuance of those one-time relaxations or measures and shall not have any validity for subsequent rounds of recruitment of the faculty in the National Institute of Technology, Kurukshetra.”

Section 1(2) of the 2023 Statutes stated that they apply to NIT Kurukshetra and come into force on the date of publication in the Official Gazette.

3. The Second Round of Litigation and the High Court’s View

After the 2023 Statutes came into force, fresh writ petitions were filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court challenging, inter alia, Statute 9 on the grounds that:

  • the notification was issued “only to overturn” the earlier High Court judgment (upheld by the Supreme Court);
  • this amounted to overreaching the judicial process; and
  • the amendment was allegedly given retrospective effect to benefit candidates selected under Advertisement No. 03/2018, who were otherwise ineligible.

The High Court:

  • rejected the broader attack on the validity of Statute 9; but
  • held that, because the 2023 Statutes came into force only on the date of Gazette publication, they operated prospectively (para 26);
  • consequently ruled that the selections made under Advertisement No. 03/2018 could not be validated or given effect through the new amendments (para 34); and
  • directed NIT Kurukshetra to conduct a fresh selection exercise within four months under the amended statutory regime, allowing all eligible candidates to participate (paras 35–36).

This part of the High Court’s order adversely affected the appellants, who sought to salvage their 2018 selection.

4. Supreme Court’s Holdings

The Supreme Court’s key holdings can be summarised as follows:

  1. Validity of Statute 9: The Court agreed with the High Court that the challenge to Statute 9 on grounds of legislative overreach was untenable. Statute 9 was a valid exercise of statutory power intended to incorporate, in proper legal form, the one-time relaxation earlier attempted through executive instruction.
  2. Nature of Statute 9 – Clarificatory/Explanatory: The Court held that Statute 9 is clarificatory in nature and can operate retrospectively in the sense that it validates and authorises the recruitment drive initiated by Advertisement No. 03/2018, which followed the letter dated 6 October 2017. This is notwithstanding the general provision that the 2023 Statutes come into force on the date of their publication.
  3. No Overruling of Judicial Decision: The 2023 Statutes did not impermissibly overrule or sit in judgment over the earlier Division Bench decision. Instead, they cured the legal defect identified in that decision (namely, that an executive instruction had attempted to supplant a statutory regime) by amending the First Statutes through the appropriate procedure under the NITSER Act.
  4. Error in High Court’s Prospective-Only Interpretation: While Statute 1(2) (or 1(3), as the High Court referred to it) made the 2023 Statutes operative from the date of publication, Statute 9 explicitly dealt with a one-time relaxation, “exhausted” after the first round of recruitment initiated after the 2017 communications. The High Court, by insisting on a purely prospective application and directing a fresh selection, nullified the specific purpose and design of Statute 9 and wrongly treated unequals as equals.
  5. Relief – Notional Appointments Only:
    • The Court directed that appellants and intervenors who had qualified in the 2018 selection process and were recommended on 27 November 2018 shall be considered by the Board of Governors of NIT Kurukshetra for appointment as Associate Professors.
    • If found suitable (presumably meaning no disqualification/legal impediment), they shall be offered notional appointments as Associate Professors with effect from a date after 27 November 2018, as determined by the Board.
    • They shall not be entitled to arrears of pay or monetary benefits for the notional period.
    • They shall also not be entitled to count teaching experience as Associate Professors from the notional date for future promotions to higher posts.
    • However, for the limited purpose of continuity in service and terminal benefits (e.g., pensionary calculations), they shall be treated as Associate Professors from their respective notional dates.
  6. Exhaustion of One-Time Relaxation: The Court clarified that once the Board makes its decision in terms of its directions, the one-time relaxation under Statute 9 shall be deemed to have been exhausted. It will have no applicability to any subsequent recruitment in NIT Kurukshetra.
  7. Limitation to NIT Kurukshetra: The Court explicitly stated that its order is confined to NIT Kurukshetra. There being no appeal from any faculty member of NIT Jalandhar, the judgment does not affect that institute.

III. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424

The Court quoted at length the classic exposition by O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. on statutory interpretation:

“Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation... A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted... With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word... No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation.”

From this, the Court distilled three core principles:

  • Holistic understanding: Statutes are to be read as a whole, not piecemeal.
  • Contextual interpretation: Understanding the object and circumstances prompting enactment is critical.
  • Purposive interpretation: Interpretation should promote the statute’s intended purpose and objectives.

These principles guided the Court in harmonising:

  • the general commencement provision of the 2023 Statutes (coming into force from publication date); and
  • the specific language and purpose of Statute 9 (which expressly ties the one‑time relaxation to “the first round of recruitments initiated after issuance” of the 2017 communications, and declares that the relaxation stands exhausted thereafter).

The Court thus rejected a literal, isolated reading of the commencement clause in favour of an interpretation that gives effect to the legislative intent behind Statute 9—namely, to validate and complete the stalled recruitment process initiated under Advertisement No. 03/2018.

2. S.S. Grewal v. State of Punjab, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 234

From S.S. Grewal, the Court reiterated the principle that a statute which is explanatory or clarificatory of an earlier enactment is usually taken to be retrospective in its operation. While the detailed facts of Grewal are not discussed in the judgment, its doctrinal contribution is important here:

  • If an amendment merely clarifies or explains an existing legal position or removes ambiguity, courts often treat it as being in force from the date of the original provision.
  • Such clarificatory amendments can validate past actions that were consistent with the clarified position, even if previously doubted or struck down when the statutory basis was unclear.

Applying this, Statute 9 is treated as an explanatory provision tying back to the 2017 one-time relaxation, now properly embedded in the statutory scheme. Its clarificatory nature allows it to retroactively secure and validate the recruitment initiated under Advertisement No. 03/2018, without breaching principles against ex post facto law-making in civil/service matters.

3. State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), (2009) 8 SCC 46

The Court cited PUCL to restate the boundary between legislative and judicial powers:

“In order to validate an executive action or any provision of a statute, it is not sufficient for the legislature to declare that a judicial pronouncement given by a court of law would not be binding, as the legislature does not possess that power... The legislature cannot overrule a judgment but it can remove the basis on which the judgment has been rendered.”

As further affirmed in Bakhtawar Trust v. M.D. Narayan, (2003) 5 SCC 298, a legislature (or rule-making authority under a statute):

  • cannot simply say “the court’s decision is wrong and shall not apply”; but
  • can change the underlying law so that the rationale on which the judgment rested no longer holds good for future (and sometimes past) cases.

In this case, the earlier Division Bench of the High Court had faulted the 2017 one-time relaxation letter on the ground that an executive instruction had sought to supplant the Statutes. The 2023 Statutes, by introducing Statute 9 through the procedure laid down in Section 26 of the NITSER Act (including Visitor’s approval), removed this very defect. What was earlier an extra-statutory executive exercise now stood incorporated into the statutory framework itself.

Thus, the Court held that the 2023 Statutes:

  • did not “overrule” or “override” the earlier judicial decision;
  • but lawfully cured the legal defect identified in that decision and thereby rendered lawful what had previously been held ultra vires because of procedural/formal shortcomings.

4. Union Of India v. M. Bhaskar, (1996) 4 SCC 416

The Court relied on M. Bhaskar to emphasise that:

  • grant of a notional promotion with retrospective effect does not mean that the employee has gained experience on that post from the notional date; and
  • to gain experience, one must actually have worked on the post in reality.

This precedent is invoked to justify the Court’s remedial design: even though the appellants may receive notional appointments as Associate Professors from a back date, they cannot claim:

  • monetary arrears; or
  • counting of the notional period as “experience” for further promotions.

5. Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2192

In Ravi Oraon, a recent decision, the Supreme Court reiterated the view of M. Bhaskar. By citing this contemporary affirmation, the Court reinforces that the doctrine is neither outdated nor exceptional: notional promotions are a recognised device to remedy injustice but are not a route to secure retroactive experience or financial benefits.

Together, these precedents ground the Court’s reasoning on:

  • how to read statutes (holistically, purposively, contextually);
  • how and when clarificatory amendments can be retrospective;
  • how legislatures/executives can cure defects identified by courts without trespassing on judicial territory; and
  • how to calibrate relief through notional promotions without opening the floodgates to consequential benefits.

IV. Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Analysis

1. Characterisation of Statute 9: Clarificatory and One-Time

A central issue was whether Statute 9 could validate the stalled recruitment process under Advertisement No. 03/2018, even though the 2023 Statutes came into force only on 30 June 2023. The Court’s answer turned on:

  • the language of Statute 9; and
  • the legislative intent evident from the summary note and Ministerial recommendations placed on record.

Statute 9 explicitly:

  • refers back to the communications dated 6 October 2017 and 17 November 2017;
  • states that the one-time relaxation is “for the then stagnated and eligible faculty” of NIT Kurukshetra; and
  • adds a proviso that the relaxation shall have “no validity” and “stand exhausted” after the first round of recruitments initiated after issuance of those one-time relaxations.

The Court read Statute 9 as:

  • Clarifying that the recruitment drive initiated after 6 October 2017 (i.e., Advertisement No. 03/2018) is, and always was intended to be, covered by the one-time relaxation, now given a proper statutory footing; and
  • Limiting that benefit to a single recruitment cycle, thereby preventing it from becoming a permanent dilution of eligibility norms.

By invoking the principle from S.S. Grewal, the Court treats Statute 9 as retrospectively clarificatory in its operation—at least to the extent necessary to validate the 2018 recruitment and the recommendations made thereunder.

2. Harmonising the Commencement Clause with Statute 9

The High Court had relied upon the general commencement provision (Section 1(2)/1(3)) which stated that the 2023 Statutes come into force from the date of publication. On that basis, it held that the new rules could not retroactively validate a selection process already tainted by illegality.

The Supreme Court, drawing upon RBI v. Peerless, held that this was an unduly literal reading that ignored:

  • the specific text of Statute 9; and
  • the legislative purpose revealed in the summary note and Minister’s recommendations.

By reading the 2023 Statutes “as a cohesive whole”, the Court reasoned:

  • The general clause about commencement states when the statutes come into force, but does not, by itself, forbid a provision from clarifying the legal status of an earlier recruitment or from declaring that a benefit is exhausted after a defined event.
  • Statute 9’s reference to the first round of recruitments “initiated after issuance” of the 2017 relaxations unmistakably targets the recruitment initiated by Advertisement No. 03/2018.
  • The whole purpose of the amendment exercise was, as the summary note states, to incorporate the clarifications vis‑à‑vis one‑time relaxations under Schedule ‘E’ retrospectively, so that the stagnated faculty in all NITs could be treated at par.

Thus, the Court concluded that:

“[I]t cannot be gainsaid that [Statute 9] had the effect of clarifying/explaining that the recruitment drive initiated by the NIT, Kurukshetra immediately after issuance of the letter dated 6th October, 2017... stands validated with effect from 30th June, 2023.”

3. Removing the Basis of the Earlier Judgment, Not Overruling It

The first round of litigation had ended with a Division Bench holding that the 2017 executive letter could not override or supplant the Statutes of NIT Kurukshetra. That judgment was left undisturbed by the Supreme Court (SLP dismissed).

The present judgment carefully respects that earlier decision by:

  • accepting that executive instructions alone could not confer the relaxation; and
  • acknowledging that the High Court had correctly identified a defect: the lack of a statutory basis.

The 2023 Statutes, however, changed the legal landscape:

  • Statute 9, properly enacted with Visitor’s approval and Board consents under Section 26 of the NITSER Act, became part of the First Statutes.
  • Thus, what the High Court had earlier disallowed (executive relaxation inconsistent with the Statutes) is now achieved through a legitimate amendment of the Statutes themselves.

Applying the doctrine in PUCL and Bakhtawar Trust, the Court held that this does not amount to the legislature or executive “sitting in appeal” over a judicial decision. Instead, it is a classic case of:

  • the rule-making authority recognising that the court objected to the absence of a statutory foundation; and
  • curing that defect by amending the law so that the basis of the earlier judgment no longer subsists.

4. Equality, Unequals, and the High Court’s Remedy

The Supreme Court was also troubled by the High Court’s direction to conduct a fresh selection under the 2023 amendments, open to:

  • those who were previously eligible and had already participated (like the appellants); and
  • those who were not eligible under Advertisement No. 03/2018, but would be eligible under the new statutory regime.

By holding that:

“[T]he impugned order... proceeded to extend benefits even to those Assistant Professors who might not have been qualified even to participate in the process in terms of the advertisement bearing no. 03/2018 and thereby placing unequals and equals at par.”

the Court underscored an important equality principle: recruitment processes must be assessed based on the eligibility conditions applicable at the time they were initiated. Candidates who were ineligible in 2018 cannot, purely by the happenstance of a later statutory amendment in 2023, be allowed to enter and compete in the same “first round” that was meant as a one-time opportunity for stagnating faculty as of 2017/2018.

In effect, the Court preserved:

  • the integrity of the original eligibility criteria for Advertisement No. 03/2018, as clarified by Statute 9; and
  • the one-time character of the relaxation (to be exhausted after one recruitment round).

5. Relief Design: Notional Appointments without Full Retrospective Consequences

When shaping relief, the Court balanced:

  • the legitimate expectations and career interests of appellants who had been recommended in 2018, and whose selection process is now validated; against
  • the practical and doctrinal constraints arising from the long delay and the principle that experience cannot be fictionalised.

Accordingly, it ordered:

  • consideration by the Board of Governors of the appellants and intervenors who had qualified and had been recommended on 27 November 2018;
  • if found suitable, grant of notional appointment as Associate Professors from a date post 27 November 2018, to be decided by the Board; and
  • no right to:
    • arrears of pay; or
    • count the notional period as experience for further promotions.

At the same time, the Court protected their long-term service interests by directing that they:

  • shall be treated as Associate Professors from their notional dates for continuity of service and terminal benefits (such as pension and related benefits).

This carefully calibrated remedy reflects the dual principles from M. Bhaskar and Ravi Oraon (no retrospective experience) and basic fairness to candidates whose legitimate expectations had been thwarted by a defect now cured.

V. Impact and Significance

1. For Service Law in Academic Institutions

The judgment has notable implications for faculty service jurisprudence, particularly in centrally funded technical institutions:

  • Validation of One-Time Relaxations: It confirms that “one-time” schemes to address stagnation can be legally sustainable when grounded in the governing statute or its Statutes, rather than mere executive instructions.
  • Clarity on Scope: By treating the relaxation as exhausted after the first recruitment drive, the Court prevents such schemes from morphing into permanent relaxations of standards, thus balancing concerns of quality and fairness.
  • Inter-institution parity: The Court recognises, via the summary note, that stagnating faculty in all NITs (except Kurukshetra and Jalandhar) had already benefited from the 2017 relaxations. The 2023 Statutes level the field for NIT Kurukshetra by extending equivalent treatment retroactively.

2. For Administrative and Constitutional Law

The decision reinforces and nuances several broader administrative and constitutional principles:

  • Permissible legislative response to judicial decisions: Legislatures and rule-making authorities may amend the law to remove the basis of a judicial decision, even with retrospective effect, provided:
    • they do not simply declare the decision non-binding; and
    • they follow the constitutionally prescribed procedure (here, Section 26 of the NITSER Act, including Visitor’s assent).
  • Purposive and contextual interpretation: The case is a practical application of the interpretative approach promoted in RBI v. Peerless. It rejects a rigid literalism in favour of reading specific and general provisions together in light of the legislative purpose.
  • Retrospectivity in civil/service matters: The judgment endorses the legitimacy of clarificatory or explanatory retrospective rules that primarily validate or explain earlier administrative actions, as long as vested rights are not arbitrarily destroyed and equality concerns are addressed.
  • Limits on benefits from notional promotion: It reiterates a key safeguard for fiscal discipline and merit-based progression: notional promotion is a remedial fiction for certain limited purposes, not a licence for retroactive pay or experience.

3. Potential Influence on Future Litigation

The judgment is likely to influence future disputes in at least three ways:

  1. Design of “stagnation removal” schemes: Ministries and autonomous institutions will be encouraged to:
    • design such schemes ab initio within the statutory framework; and
    • avoid reliance on purely executive instructions where Statutes or regulations exist.
  2. Judicial review of validating amendments: Courts may look favourably upon remedial legislation or subordinate legislation that:
    • openly acknowledges prior judicial findings; and
    • addresses the exact defect identified, without attempting to erase or contradict the judicial reasoning.
  3. Remedial structuring in promotion/selection cases: The calibrated use of notional appointments (with continuity but without arrears or experience) provides a template for balancing fairness to affected employees against institutional stability and the rights of third parties.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “One-Time Relaxation”

A “one-time relaxation” is a special, limited departure from the usual eligibility rules. In this case, it allowed certain Assistant Professors who did not have the prescribed AGP of Rs. 8,000 but had more than six years of service as Assistant Professor after their Ph.D. to be considered for promotion as Associate Professors. Key features:

  • It was meant to address stagnation among existing faculty stuck at a lower level.
  • It was not meant to permanently change the standard recruitment rules.
  • Statute 9 expressly states that such relaxation is exhausted after the first recruitment round initiated pursuant to the 2017 communications.

2. Executive Instruction vs. Statute/Statutory Rule

An executive instruction is an administrative direction issued by the government (like a departmental letter or circular). It can:

  • fill gaps where no statute or rule exists; but
  • cannot override or contradict existing statutory provisions or rules.

The High Court’s earlier decision had held that the 2017 one-time relaxation letter could not alter the First Statutes of NIT Kurukshetra (which had statutory force). The 2023 Statutes, by incorporating the relaxation into the Statutes, resolved this incompatibility.

3. Clarificatory/Explanatory Amendment

A clarificatory amendment is a change in the law meant not so much to introduce a wholly new policy, but to:

  • clarify doubts or ambiguities in the existing law; or
  • formally recognise what was always intended but not clearly expressed.

Courts often treat such amendments as operating from the date of the original provision—i.e., retrospectively—because they do not fundamentally change the law but explain it. In this case, Statute 9 clarified that the one-time relaxation conceived in 2017:

  • was valid for the first recruitment round initiated thereafter (Advertisement No. 03/2018); and
  • stood exhausted after that round.

4. Removing the “Basis” of a Judgment vs. Overruling It

Courts have said that:

  • Legislatures or rule-making bodies cannot simply say, “the Court’s decision is wrong and shall not apply”. That would violate separation of powers.
  • But they can change the underlying law on which the decision was based, so that the same reasoning would not apply under the amended law.

This is called removing the basis of a judgment. Once the law changes, future (and sometimes past) cases are decided under the new law. In this case:

  • The basis of the earlier High Court judgment was that an executive letter could not modify the Statutes;
  • The 2023 Statutes amended the Statutes themselves to incorporate the relaxation; so the earlier basis no longer holds good.

5. Notional Promotion and Its Limits

A notional promotion means that an employee is treated, in law, as having been promoted from an earlier date, without having actually worked in that post during that period. It is often used to:

  • correct a past injustice (e.g., an illegal denial of promotion); and
  • protect seniority or terminal benefits.

However, as held in M. Bhaskar and Ravi Oraon and reaffirmed here:

  • Notional promotion does not automatically entitle the employee to:
    • back wages; or
    • counting of that period as experience on the higher post for future promotions.
  • To gain experience, one must actually perform the duties of the post.

In this case, the appellants get the status of Associate Professor from a notional date (for continuity and terminal benefits), but not the monetary or experiential advantages for the period prior to their actual working on that post.

VII. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ritu Garg v. Board of Governors, NIT Kurukshetra is a significant contribution to Indian service and administrative law, particularly in the context of autonomous educational institutions like NITs. The judgment:

  • upholds the power of the State to enact clarificatory statutory amendments with limited retrospective impact to cure defects identified by the courts, provided such amendments are properly enacted and do not simply negate judicial authority;
  • affirms that executive instructions cannot supplant statutory provisions, but that their substantive policy can be legitimised through due statutory amendment;
  • interprets the 2023 Statutes purposively, giving effect to the one-time and exhaustive character of the relaxation for stagnated NIT Kurukshetra faculty, rather than treating the amendment as a purely prospective measure requiring a wholly fresh selection;
  • protects the rights and expectations of candidates who had legitimately participated and succeeded in the 2018 selection, by validating that process and granting them notional promotions with continuity and terminal benefits; while
  • at the same time reaffirming the doctrinal limit that experience cannot be retroactively manufactured and monetary arrears are not automatically due on the basis of notional promotions.

In wider perspective, the judgment offers a model of how courts can mediate between:

  • the need to respect final judicial determinations;
  • the power of the State to adjust policy and law in light of those determinations; and
  • the practical necessity of providing fair, carefully tailored relief to individuals whose careers have been affected by evolving legal interpretations.

For NIT Kurukshetra’s faculty, the case finally unlocks a promotional opportunity long delayed by procedural defects now cured. For future cases, it stands as authority on the legitimate use of retrospective clarificatory statutes to validate past administrative actions, and on the responsible use of notional promotions as an equitable, yet carefully circumscribed, remedial tool.