Religious Processions Are Protected but Not Absolute: Licensing, Public Order, and the “Essential Practice” Limit

1. Introduction

In Bhadai Chaudhary v. The State of Bihar (Patna High Court, 20-08-2026), the petitioner—claiming to be a devotee of Akhara No. 1 of village Hathaura, Siwan—invoked the High Court’s writ jurisdiction to seek a mandamus directing the State authorities to grant a licence for the annual “Mahabiri Julus” (religious procession) on the traditional route and to permit at least 300 devotees to participate.

The core grievance was that, though the procession allegedly ran since 1958, the police progressively reduced the permitted number—from 200 (2012–2013) to 150 (2014), 100 (2015), and ultimately to 5 (from 2023)—and altered the traditional route. The petitioner argued these restrictions infringed Article 25 (freedom of religion), and implicitly the assembly aspect under Article 19(1)(b).

The State defended the restrictions as law-and-order measures, asserting that the “sanctioned” number was routinely exceeded by crowds of 1700–2000 between 2015 and 2022 leading to multiple cases, and alleging serious violence in 2024.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that:

  • Rights under Articles 19(1)(b) and 25 to assemble and undertake religious processions are not absolute.
  • Religious freedom is subject to public order, morality, and health.
  • Constitutional protection extends to what is essential and integral to religious practice—not necessarily every manner, route, or scale of exercise.
  • The petitioner’s fear that future permissions would remain capped at five was deemed premature, since licensing depends on the prevailing law-and-order situation at the time permission is sought.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Dargah Committee v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 1402

The petitioner relied on this authority to argue that once a religious right is established, it should not be curtailed merely because another group objects. While the judgment text does not elaborate the ratio from this case at length, it is invoked to support a broad proposition: lawful religious practice should be protected rather than surrendered to hostile opposition.

The High Court, however, did not apply this precedent as determinative. Instead, it reframed the dispute as one governed primarily by the constitutional limits on religious exercise (public order and “essential practice”), rather than a binary “customary route versus opposition” contest.

(b) Gulam v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1981 SC 2198

This case was cited (again by the petitioner) to emphasise that the police must not “abdicate” their duty to protect lawful religious activity. In the petitioner’s narrative, the peace committee meeting allegedly compelled acceptance of the reduced number and altered route under threat of denial of licence.

The High Court’s outcome indicates that it treated the present matter as one in which the administration had asserted concrete law-and-order concerns (including allegations of repeated crowd overruns and violence), thereby justifying regulation. The Court thus did not accept the petition as a case of mere “opposition” or “abdication”; it treated it as a case of regulation for public order.

(c) Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India reported in (1994 (6) SCC 360)

The Court relied on this precedent to apply the “essential and integral part” test: while prayer/worship is religious, offering it at every location is not necessarily essential unless the location has special religious significance. By analogy, even if a procession is a protected religious exercise, the Constitution does not automatically immunize every chosen route, scale, or modality from regulation.

(d) Church of God v. K.K.R. Majestic Colony Welfare reported in ((2000) 7 SCC 282)

This authority was used to reinforce that religious activity cannot be performed in a manner that disturbs public peace or harms others (the case is referenced in the judgment in the context of loudspeakers and disturbance). The High Court used it to underline a broader principle: in a civilized society, religious exercise must be harmonized with public tranquility.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three moves:

  1. Constitutional framing: It reiterates that India’s secularism (sarva dharma samabhava) entails equal respect for all religions, but not an absence of regulation; the State remains neutral while ensuring social order.
  2. Rights and limits: The Court accepts that religious processions are protected under Article 19(1)(b) (assembly) and Article 25 (religion), but emphasizes these are expressly subject to reasonable restrictions and the Article 25 limitations of public order, morality, and health.
  3. Case-handling posture (licensing is situational): Instead of issuing a prospective mandate fixing the route and minimum number of participants, the Court holds that permissions must be evaluated based on the prevailing law-and-order situation. The petitioner’s demand for a forward-looking direction (at least 300 participants; traditional route) was treated as seeking adjudication on a future contingency.

Notably, although the petition contained allegations of arbitrariness and discrimination (including an asserted recommendation for a large Tazia procession on the same route), the Court’s operative reasoning rests on the general constitutional doctrine that regulation is permissible and that a future cap cannot be pre-judged in the abstract.

3.3 Impact

The decision is significant for administrative and constitutional practice in procession-licensing disputes in three ways:

  • No “blanket mandamus” for future processions: Petitioners may find it harder to obtain writ directions that effectively pre-fix participant numbers or routes for future years. Courts may require the administration to decide year-to-year based on contemporary inputs.
  • Reinforcement of the “essential practice” boundary: Even where a religious procession is recognized, the case underscores that the Constitution protects what is essential, not necessarily the petitioner’s preferred manner (such as a particular route or large numbers).
  • Public order as the decisive axis: Where the State places law-and-order material on record (crowd overruns, past incidents, alleged violence), courts may defer to security-driven regulation unless clear arbitrariness, non-application of mind, or mala fides is shown with specificity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mandamus: A writ by which a court orders a public authority to perform a public/legal duty. Here, the petitioner sought a command to grant a licence in a particular manner.
  • Article 25 (Freedom of religion): Protects religious practice, but explicitly allows the State to restrict it for public order, morality, and health.
  • Article 19(1)(b) (Right to assemble): Protects peaceful assembly, but permits reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order, among other grounds.
  • Essential religious practice test: Courts ask whether a claimed practice is fundamental to the religion itself. If not “essential,” it is more readily regulable. The judgment uses this to indicate that not every route/scale/mode of a procession is constitutionally guaranteed.
  • Reasonable restrictions: Legally valid limits imposed to balance individual rights with community safety and order; the judgment treats crowd control and security assessment as falling within this domain.
  • Premature/hypothetical adjudication: Courts generally avoid ruling on speculative future injuries. The petitioner’s fear of continued “cap of five” was treated as hypothetical because future permissions depend on future conditions.

5. Conclusion

Bhadai Chaudhary v. The State of Bihar reaffirms a practical constitutional rule for religious processions: while protected under Articles 19(1)(b) and 25, processions remain subject to public-order regulation, and constitutional protection does not automatically extend to every preferred modality (such as a fixed route or a demanded minimum headcount). The Court also signals that writ jurisdiction is not ordinarily used to pre-approve future procession parameters in the abstract; permissions must be assessed in light of the then-prevailing law-and-order situation.