1. Introduction
This decision defines the relationship between the constitutional protection of democratic governance in co-operative societies and the Reserve Bank of India’s regulatory authority over multi-State co-operative banks.
The appellants had been elected in May 2019 to the Board of Directors of Abhyudaya Co-operative Bank Limited for a five-year term. On 24 November 2023, the RBI superseded the Board under Section 36AAA read with Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The RBI cited the Bank’s dangerously deteriorating financial condition, the need to protect depositors, and the necessity of professional management.
The supersession was subsequently extended beyond the Board’s original term, which expired on 24 May 2024. The central questions were whether Article 243ZL of the Constitution restricted supersession to six months and whether the RBI could extend supersession after the elected Board’s tenure had ended.
4. Legal Reasoning
4.1 Constitutional status of multi-State co-operative societies
Part IXB of the Constitution was introduced by the Constitution (Ninety-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2011 to promote democratic, autonomous, professional and economically sound co-operative institutions. Following Union Of India v. Rajendra N. Shah and Anr., (2022) 19 SCC 520, Part IXB remains constitutionally operative in relation to multi-State co-operative societies.
Accordingly, Abhyudaya Co-operative Bank was subject both to the democratic-governance principles in Part IXB and to the banking-regulation framework enacted by Parliament.
4.2 Effect of the third proviso to Article 243ZL(1)
Article 243ZL(1) ordinarily prohibits supersession of a co-operative society’s board for more than six months. Its third proviso, however, states that where the society carries on banking business, the Banking Regulation Act “shall also apply”.
The Court interpreted these words as additive and non-restrictive. They incorporate the Banking Regulation Act into the constitutional scheme applicable to co-operative banks. The proviso therefore operates as an independent substantive provision rather than merely as a narrow exception to the main clause.
4.3 Internal structure of Article 243ZL
The fourth proviso substitutes a one-year period for a co-operative bank other than a multi-State co-operative society. The express exclusion of multi-State co-operative banks from that rule was treated as a decisive textual indication.
The Court reasoned that an express exclusion presupposes prior inclusion. If multi-State co-operative banks were wholly outside Article 243ZL’s reference to banking societies, there would have been no need expressly to exclude them from the fourth proviso.
4.4 Section 36AAA as the controlling special regime
Section 36AAA authorises the RBI, for recorded reasons, to supersede a co-operative bank’s Board where necessary:
- in the public interest;
- to prevent conduct detrimental to the bank or its depositors; or
- to secure proper management of the bank.
The provision permits extensions from time to time, subject to an aggregate ceiling of five years. The six-month constitutional period therefore does not displace the longer, specialised period expressly authorised for multi-State co-operative banks.
4.5 Purposive protection of depositors
Banking was characterised as an activity affected by a distinctive public interest. Banks hold and deploy depositors’ savings, frequently including the life savings of persons of modest means. The RBI consequently requires sufficient time and regulatory control to stabilise a distressed bank.
A rigid six-month limit could create a regulatory vacuum or force premature elections before rehabilitation was complete. The Court preferred an interpretation preserving continuous expert supervision, financial discipline and depositor protection.
4.6 Extension beyond the Board’s original tenure
Once superseded, the former Board ceases to exist and its powers vest in the Administrator. An extension is therefore not a fresh attempt to supersede a non-existent Board; it is a continuation of the existing statutory supersession.
Section 36AAA(7) requires the Administrator to call a general meeting for election of new directors on or before the expiry of the RBI-specified supersession period. Thus, the relevant date is the expiry of supersession, not the end of the former Board’s original five-year tenure.
This power is not unlimited. Supersession must have been validly initiated, extensions must remain within the five-year aggregate ceiling, and elections must be arranged before that period expires.
4.7 Consultation requirement
The proviso to Section 36AAA(1) requires consultation where a co-operative bank is registered with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies of a State. Abhyudaya was a multi-State co-operative bank. The Court therefore rejected the argument that the RBI was required to consult either the State Government or, by substitution, the Central Government.