Prolonged Consensual Relationship & Knowledge of Subsisting Marriage: Quashing BNS §69 FIR Under BNSS §528

1. Introduction

The petition challenged an FIR (Crime No. 95/2025, Mahila Thana, Bhopal) lodged by respondent No.2 (the complainant) alleging that the petitioner induced her into a long-standing sexual relationship by a false promise of marriage, coupled with threats. The core narrative spanned from 2012 to 2025: the parties allegedly met in December 2012, had sexual relations from 25.12.2012 onward, and continued the relationship for about 12–13 years.

The complainant asserted that the petitioner initially claimed to be a bachelor and promised marriage. She further stated that in 2013 she discovered he was already married; the petitioner allegedly assured her he would obtain a divorce and thereafter marry her. In 2025, she allegedly learned he was similarly communicating with other women and then threatened her, prompting the FIR.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR and all consequential proceedings, including the charge-sheet and trial. The Court held that, on the face of the FIR and the complainant’s statement under Section 183, BNSS, 2023, the allegations did not disclose the ingredients of offences under Sections 69 and 351(2), BNS, 2023.

Applying Supreme Court jurisprudence on “promise to marry” and “misconception of fact” in the context of sexual consent, the Court concluded that the relationship appeared consensual. Given the complainant’s knowledge since 2013 about the petitioner’s marital status and the continuation of the relationship until 2025, it was not convincing that sexual relations were solely attributable to an allegedly deceitful promise of marriage. The FIR was viewed as an abuse of process, filed after a relationship breakdown to pressurize the petitioner.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and Their Role in the Decision)

The Court’s analysis is anchored in a line of Supreme Court decisions that (i) distinguish between a false promise to marry made in bad faith at inception and (ii) a subsequent failure/breach of a promise, and (iii) insist on a direct nexus between the promise and the decision to engage in sexual intercourse.

1. Prashant V. v. State of NCT of Delhi (2025) 5 SCC 764
   
   The Supreme Court emphasized that absence of a marriage promise at the outset, coupled with a consensual relationship, makes criminal prosecution an abuse of process; a “mere break up” cannot be criminalized.

   The High Court used this as a contemporary reaffirmation that consensual intimate relationships that later fail should not be retroactively given “a colour of criminality,” especially when allegations do not show initial inducement by a marriage assurance.

2. Bishwajyoti Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal and Anr. (2025) 5 SCC 749
   
   The Supreme Court held that where the complainant knew from the start that the accused was in a subsisting marriage (even if separated), she cannot ordinarily plead “misconception of fact” to frame the relationship as “rape on false pretext to marry.” It reiterated the “active and reasoned deliberation” standard for consent and applied the “direct nexus” requirement.

   This precedent directly informed the High Court’s skepticism: after the complainant learned in 2013 that the petitioner was married, the continuation of the relationship for years undermined the assertion that her consent was vitiated by a marriage promise.

3. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State Of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608
   
   This is the leading synthesis: to show consent vitiated by misconception due to promise to marry, two propositions must be established—(a) the promise was false, made in bad faith with no intention to adhere at the time it was made; and (b) the promise had immediate relevance/direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.

   The High Court substantially reproduced this test and treated it as the controlling legal standard for evaluating Section 69 allegations (even though the cited jurisprudence arises under IPC Sections 375/376/90). The Court’s conclusion—lack of a believable “direct nexus” over a 12–13 year relationship—flows from this framework.

   Embedded citations used within this discussion: the judgment also referenced Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3100 and Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala, (2013) 9 SCC 113 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 858 for the proposition that consent is an “act of reason coupled with deliberation,” assessed from all circumstances.

4. Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46
   
   The Supreme Court cautioned against a straitjacket formula and noted that consent given in a relationship of deep love, even with marriage talk, may still be voluntary rather than induced by misconception; further, Section 90 IPC requires proof that the accused knew consent was given due to misconception.

   The High Court invoked Uday to reinforce that courts must evaluate maturity, surrounding circumstances, and the nature of the relationship. In this case, both parties were “well educated” and in uniformed services, strengthening the inference of reasoned choice rather than deception.

5. Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand (2020) 10 SCC 108
   
   The Supreme Court recognized that consent may be a conscious and deliberated choice arising from affection/love, and reiterated the caution from Uday about over-criminalizing failed relationships.

   The High Court used this to support the inference that prolonged intimacy often reflects willing participation, making it difficult to attribute consent solely to a marriage assurance.

6. Deepak Gulatee v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675
   
   The Supreme Court drew a decisive distinction between (i) mere breach of a promise and (ii) a false promise made at inception with mala fide intent. Conviction requires evidence that at the initial stage the accused had no intention to marry.

   The High Court treated this distinction as essential: the record did not credibly show that at inception the petitioner’s promise (if any) was a knowingly false inducement that directly caused the sexual act.

7. Mahesh Damu khare v. State of Maharastra and Ors. 2024 11 SCC 398
   
   The Supreme Court stressed traceability: the physical relationship must be directly traceable to the false promise; where intimacy continues knowingly for a prolonged period, it becomes uncertain that sex was “purely because” of the promise.

   This reasoning aligns tightly with the High Court’s core factual inference: continuation of the relationship for over a decade (including after knowledge of existing marriage) breaks the asserted causal chain between alleged promise and consent.

8. State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
   
   The canonical quashment principles: where allegations, even if taken at face value, do not disclose a cognizable offence or where proceedings are manifestly mala fide/abuse of process, the FIR may be quashed.

   The High Court explicitly relied on Bhajan Lal to characterize the FIR as an abuse of process given the absence of essential ingredients of the alleged offences.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

• Transposition of the IPC “promise to marry” doctrine to BNS §69: Although the cited precedents largely interpret IPC Sections 375/376 and Section 90 (misconception), the High Court applied the same conceptual test—false promise at inception + direct nexus to consent—to assess whether Section 69, BNS, 2023 is attracted on the pleaded facts.
• Evaluation on admitted timeline and continuation after knowledge: The FIR itself states that the complainant learned in 2013 that the petitioner was already married. The Court treated the subsequent continuation of the relationship until 2025 as strongly indicative of voluntary participation, making it “not convincible” that consent was vitiated by deception.
• Contextual assessment of the complainant’s capacity for “active and reasoned deliberation”: The Court emphasized both parties’ education and service backgrounds (complainant: police constable; petitioner: Army). This was used to assess probabilities surrounding “misconception of fact,” concluding it was improbable that the complainant continued a prolonged relationship absent voluntary consent.
• Quashment notwithstanding filing of charge-sheet/trial commencement: Even though the complainant argued that charge-sheet had been filed and trial had started, the Court proceeded to quash, consistent with quashment jurisprudence where the foundational ingredients of the offence are missing on the face of the record.
• Finding of abuse of process: The Court inferred that the FIR was lodged to “pressurize the petitioner to continue the relationship” after it failed, bringing the case within the abuse-of-process rationale used in quashment cases.

3.3 Impact

• Signals continuity of consent jurisprudence across the new codes: The decision demonstrates that courts are likely to interpret and apply BNS-era sexual-offence allegations involving “deceit/false promise” through established Supreme Court tests developed under the IPC—especially the “false at inception” and “direct nexus” requirements.
• Higher threshold for criminalization of long relationships: Where the complainant’s own narration shows prolonged intimacy continuing after knowledge of disqualifying facts (e.g., subsisting marriage), courts may be more willing to infer consensual participation and quash at the threshold.
• Reinforces use of BNSS §528 to prevent “relationship fallout” prosecutions: The judgment strengthens the proposition that BNSS §528 can be invoked to prevent prosecution where allegations depict, at most, a failed consensual relationship rather than legally cognizable sexual offences.
• Cautionary note on factual overreach at quashment stage: While the Court relies on “improbability” reasoning (e.g., what a police constable would or would not do), future courts may need to balance such probability assessments against the general rule that disputed facts are for trial—making this an area likely to attract further appellate scrutiny if similar reasoning is applied too broadly.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Consent” (in sexual offences): Not merely absence of resistance; it requires a voluntary, informed, and reasoned agreement—an “active and reasoned deliberation” as repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court.
• “Misconception of fact”: If a woman agrees to sex because she is misled about a critical fact (e.g., a marriage promise), consent may be treated as vitiated. But courts require proof that (i) the promise was false from the outset (bad faith), and (ii) it directly caused the decision to have sex.
• False promise vs. breach of promise: A relationship may end and a promise may be broken—this is not automatically a crime. It becomes criminal (in this doctrinal line) only if the promise was never intended to be kept when made and was used as a tool to obtain consent.
• Quashment under BNSS §528: A High Court power to terminate criminal proceedings at an early stage where the complaint/FIR—even if assumed true—does not disclose an offence or continuing the case would be an abuse of the court process (as catalogued in Bhajan Lal).

5. Conclusion

Varun Pratap Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh crystallizes a BNS/BNSS-era application of established Supreme Court doctrine: a sexual-offence allegation premised on “false promise of marriage” (or comparable deceit) must show a bad-faith promise at inception and a direct causal nexus between that promise and the decision to engage in the sexual act. On the Court’s reading, a 12–13 year relationship—continued even after the complainant’s knowledge of the petitioner’s subsisting marriage—undercut the claim of vitiated consent and rendered the prosecution an abuse of process. The FIR and all consequential proceedings were therefore quashed under Section 528, BNSS, 2023.