Press Conferences, Recusal Campaigns, and “Scandalising the Court”: Supreme Court Declines to Interdict Ongoing Suo Motu Criminal Contempt

Case: Nilesh C Ojha v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay (2026 INSC 390)
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 20 April 2026
Bench: Vikram Nath J., Sandeep Mehta J.
Appeals: Under Section 19, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (against Bombay High Court orders dated 17.09.2025 and 16.10.2025)

1. Introduction

The appeals arose from suo motu criminal contempt proceedings initiated by the Bombay High Court against advocate Nilesh C. Ojha (the appellant-contemnor). The immediate trigger was a press conference held on 1 April 2025—while a criminal writ petition filed by him was pending—where he made insinuations against a sitting High Court Judge (“Justice X”), including an allegation of disqualification/recusal based on purported familial and political links.

After Justice X wrote to the Chief Justice of the High Court reporting the press statements, the Chief Justice took suo motu cognizance and constituted a five-judge bench, resulting in Criminal Suo Motu Contempt Petition No. 1 of 2025 and a show-cause notice under the Bombay High Court Contempt Rules.

Two procedural controversies then reached the Supreme Court:

  • The appellant sought impleadment of Justice X as a party-respondent in the contempt proceedings, contending she was effectively the complainant and that her response was necessary.
  • The High Court, while rejecting the impleadment request, also directed registration of a separate contempt case (Criminal Suo Motu Contempt Petition No. 4 of 2025) based on further scandalous imputations made by the appellant in the impleadment application itself; it additionally issued an advisory remarking that the advocates involved in drafting the application were “equally liable” for contempt/professional misconduct (without imposing immediate punitive measures).

The appellant challenged these orders as an excessive and legally infirm exercise of contempt jurisdiction, also arguing that earlier contempt precedents had been “eclipsed” or diluted by later Supreme Court decisions and that findings on professional misconduct lay exclusively within Bar Council jurisdiction.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, refusing to interfere at the present stage. It held, on a prima facie appraisal, that:

  • Judicial independence and public confidence are foundational; reckless imputations against a judge—especially by an advocate—can erode the administration of justice.
  • A vital distinction exists between challenging an order through legal remedies and attributing improper motives or lack of impartiality to the judge.
  • The appellant’s press conference and pleadings contained serious imputations against a sitting judge, extending beyond reasoned criticism into allegations of motive without demonstrable foundation.
  • The High Court should proceed expeditiously and decide all issues on merits; the Supreme Court’s observations were expressly limited to deciding whether to interdict proceedings at this interlocutory stage.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(A) Authorities relied upon by the Supreme Court to frame the constitutional stakes

The Court’s core reasoning was anchored in the jurisprudence that treats public confidence in the judiciary as the “bedrock” of constitutional adjudication and judicial independence:

  • Shanti Bhushan v. Supreme Court Of India (2018) 8 SCC 396: The Court quoted at length to emphasize that the judiciary’s legitimacy rests on public trust; that credibility erosion is the “greatest threat” to independence; and that while judgments may be debated, criticism must remain within bounds that do not undermine institutional legitimacy.
  • State Of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand (1998) 1 SCC 1 (quoted within Shanti Bhushan): Used for the propositions that judges must exercise humility and self-restraint; that the constitution does not confer unlimited power; and that societal perception of impartiality is the judiciary’s greatest strength.
  • S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87 (quoted within Shanti Bhushan): Cited for the classic linkage: while courts derive authority from the Constitution, their credibility rests in the people’s faith—indispensable to which is judicial independence.
  • Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441 (quoted within Shanti Bhushan): Reinforced as a warning that constitutional democracy cannot survive if the judiciary fails to justify the people’s trust.

How these influenced the outcome: These cases provided the normative framework within which the Supreme Court assessed the appellant’s conduct not as a mere private grievance, but as conduct with systemic consequences for the justice system’s legitimacy—justifying deference to ongoing contempt proceedings rather than premature appellate intervention.

(B) Contempt precedents invoked by the appellant (and their role in this decision)

The appellant’s central legal strategy was to argue that initiating/continuing contempt proceedings (and treating his defences as contemptuous) misapplied precedent:

  • Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P. 1993 Supp (1) SCC 529 and C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta (1971) 1 SCC 626: The appellant contended these did not govern after the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and later Supreme Court jurisprudence.
  • P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shankar (1988) 3 SCC 167: Cited (especially para 39, per the appellant) to argue that the reasoning in C.K. Daphtary stood “statutorily eclipsed” and that bona fide legal submissions cannot be equated with contempt.
  • In re: C.S. Karnan (2017) 7 SCC 1: Relied upon by the appellant to contend that allegations against judges are not automatically contempt if founded on demonstrable truth, made bona fide and in public interest.

How these influenced the outcome: Notably, the Supreme Court did not undertake a point-by-point reconciliation of these contempt precedents in this appellate order. Instead, it treated the controversy as best examined in the pending High Court proceedings, and confined itself to a prima facie assessment of whether the impugned High Court orders warranted immediate interference. Thus, these authorities were acknowledged as arguments, but did not displace the Court’s central concern: prima facie scandalising imputations and the undesirability of interdicting contempt proceedings midstream.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The judgment’s legal reasoning proceeds in a structured sequence:

  • Constitutional premise—independence and legitimacy: Judicial independence is “foundational and non-derogable,” and its “strength and legitimacy” lie in public confidence, not coercive power. Therefore, conduct tending to erode that confidence has heightened institutional significance.
  • Boundary between criticism and imputations of motive: The Court reiterates a bright-line distinction: a litigant may challenge an order in appeal/review, but must not personalise the grievance by attributing motives or questioning a judge’s integrity without unimpeachable basis.
  • Heightened duty of advocates: Because advocates are “officers of the Court,” their obligation of restraint is greater. Taking a pending controversy to the media, and publicly pushing recusal with insinuations, is treated as inconsistent with professional discipline and the ethics of judicial process.
  • Prima facie appraisal and procedural restraint: The Supreme Court emphasizes the “stage” of proceedings: it declines to “interdict” ongoing contempt proceedings. It requests expeditious disposal by the High Court and expressly cabins its observations as prima facie, to avoid prejudicing the merits.

Key operational rule emerging: Where an advocate’s public statements/pleadings contain serious, unsubstantiated imputations against a sitting judge (especially amid pending proceedings), appellate courts may decline interlocutory interference and permit the contempt court to examine the controversy on merits, given the systemic stakes for judicial credibility.

3.3 Impact

  • On recusal tactics and media strategy: The decision signals that “recusal campaigns” pursued via press conferences—rather than through in-court procedures and substantiated motions—risk being treated as conduct that prima facie scandalises the court and undermines public confidence.
  • On interlocutory challenges under Section 19: Although Section 19 allows appeals, the Court’s approach reinforces appellate restraint where contempt proceedings are at a preliminary stage and the impugned orders do not finally determine guilt; parties may be directed to raise their substantive defences before the contempt court.
  • On pleadings as potential contempt material: By refusing to interfere with the High Court’s direction to register a separate contempt case arising out of scandalous imputations in an application, the decision underlines that pleadings themselves can form the basis of contempt cognizance if they cross the line into reckless allegations against judges.
  • On the Bar’s professional responsibility: The Court’s emphasis on the advocate’s “heightened obligation” may encourage stricter institutional responses to conduct that externalises pending disputes into the public domain in a way that questions judicial integrity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Criminal contempt / “scandalising the court”: Conduct or publication that tends to lower the authority of a court, scandalise the institution, or obstruct the administration of justice. Here, the concern was imputations on a judge’s impartiality and motives without solid basis.
  • Suo motu contempt: Proceedings initiated by the court on its own motion (without a private complainant), often based on information brought to its notice.
  • Impleadment: Adding a person as a party to a case. The High Court rejected impleadment of Justice X on the logic that furnishing information to the Chief Justice does not make the judge a “complainant” or a necessary/proper party in suo motu contempt.
  • Recusal: A judge stepping aside from a case due to potential bias or conflict. The Supreme Court stressed that recusal-related grievances must be pursued responsibly and through legal processes, not insinuations.
  • Per incuriam / “impliedly overruled”: Per incuriam means “through lack of care” (a decision rendered ignoring binding law). “Impliedly overruled” suggests a precedent is effectively displaced by later law. The High Court held such arguments should be pursued before higher forums; the Supreme Court left these issues to be examined in the pending proceedings.
  • “Statutory eclipse” (as argued): The appellant’s contention that an earlier judge-made rule loses force after a later statute; the Supreme Court did not resolve this definitively here, focusing instead on the propriety and effects of the appellant’s imputations and the procedural posture.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision is principally a reaffirmation of institutional-first principles in contempt jurisprudence at an interlocutory stage: (i) public confidence is the judiciary’s central asset; (ii) criticism of decisions is permissible, but imputations of improper motive against judges without demonstrable basis are constitutionally destabilising; (iii) advocates bear a heightened duty of restraint, especially regarding public commentary on pending matters; and (iv) appellate courts will be slow to halt ongoing contempt proceedings where the alleged conduct prima facie crosses the line and the contempt court is positioned to examine the issues on merits.