Post-Award Section 9 Interim Relief is Maintainable Even for the Unsuccessful Party (Subject to a Higher Threshold)

Case: HOME CARE RETAIL MARTS PVT. LTD. THROUGH ITS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE v. HARESH N. SANGHAVI
Citation: 2026 INSC 415 (Supreme Court of India)
Date: 24-04-2026
Coram: Manoj Misra, J.; Manmohan, J.

1) Introduction

This batch of appeals arose against the backdrop of a sharp inter-High Court conflict on a recurring arbitration question: can a party that has lost before the arbitral tribunal (i.e., has no enforceable award in its favour) seek post-award interim measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

Several High Courts—led by the Bombay High Court in Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481—had held that post-award Section 9 is meant only to protect the “fruits of the award”, effectively limiting maintainability to the award-holder/successful party. Other High Courts, including Gujarat and Telangana, took the opposite view, reading Section 9 as available to any “party” to the arbitration agreement even after the award (but before enforcement).

The Supreme Court addressed the conflict by answering the “substantial question of law” framed in the judgment: whether a post-award Section 9 petition by an unsuccessful party is maintainable.

2) Summary of the Judgment

  • Held: A post-award application under Section 9 is maintainable at the instance of any party to the arbitration agreement, including an unsuccessful party.
  • The term “a party” in Section 9 (read with the definition in Section 2(h)) cannot be judicially narrowed to “successful party” at the post-award stage.
  • The “fruits of the award” rationale adopted in Dirk India and followed in other High Court decisions was rejected as inconsistent with the statutory text and scheme.
  • Important qualification: while maintainable, the Court emphasized that the threshold for grant of interim relief will be higher for an unsuccessful party and courts must act with “care, caution and circumspection”.
  • The Court declared that the Bombay, Delhi, Madras and Karnataka High Court line (denying maintainability to unsuccessful parties) does not lay down good law, while the contrary view of Telangana, Gujarat, and Punjab & Haryana High Courts correctly reflects the statute.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Outcome)

i) High Court decisions forming the conflict

  • Restricted (unsuccessful party barred):
    • Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481 — treated post-award Section 9 as only to secure “fruits of the award”.
    • Nussli Switzerland Ltd. v. Organizing Committee Commonwealth Games, 2010, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4834 — used contextual/statutory-scheme reasoning to narrow who may invoke Section 9 post-award.
    • National Highways Authority of India v. Punjab National Bank and Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4810 — followed Dirk India/Nussli Switzerland Ltd..
    • A. Chidambaram v. S. Rajagopal and Ors., OA No. 843 of 2024 — read “party” contextually depending on stage.
    • Smt. Padma Mahadev & Ors. v. M/s. Sierra Constructions Private Limited, COMAP No. 2 of 2021, dated 22nd March 2021 — aligned with the restrictive approach.
  • Permissive (unsuccessful party may apply):
    • M/s Saptarishi Hotels Pvt. Ltd & Anr. v. National Institute of Tourism & Hospitality Management (NITHM), 2019 SCC OnLine TS 1765
    • GAIL (India) Ltd. v. Latin Rasayani Pvt. Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Guj 14836
    • M/s DLF Home Developers Ltd. v. M/s Orris Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., FAO-CARB-51-2024 (O&M), dated 21st February, 2025

The Supreme Court decisively adopted the permissive line, not by balancing policy considerations, but by anchoring its conclusion in textual interpretation (Section 9 read with Section 2(h)) and the legislature’s conscious expansion beyond the UNCITRAL Model Law.

ii) Supreme Court authorities used to ground interpretation

iii) “Affirmation” argument rejected: the status of Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2020) 17 SCC 324

The respondent argued that Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2020) 17 SCC 324 had affirmed Dirk India. The Supreme Court rejected this as a binding-precedent claim: Hindustan Construction quoted Dirk India in a different context (executability/stay regime), and did not decide the present issue (maintainability of a losing party’s Section 9 post-award). Applying the principle that a decision is precedent only for what it actually decides, the Court cited authorities including MCD Vs. Gurnam Kaur (1989) 1 SCC 101 and State of U.P. Vs. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139.

iv) Statutory interpretation guardrails

The Court supported its literal/textual approach using familiar interpretive authorities and statements of law: R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684, Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297, and comparative/common law references like R. v. Oakes, [1959] 2 Q.B. 350. It also warned against courts “making” the law, referencing Dlf Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State Of Haryana and Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 622 and classic separation-of-powers sentiment.

B. Legal Reasoning

i) The controlling textual move: “a party” means “any party”

  • Section 9 opens with “a party may… apply to a court”, and “party” is defined in Section 2(h) as “a party to an arbitration agreement”.
  • Neither Section 2(h) nor Section 9 distinguishes “successful” from “unsuccessful” parties.
  • The Court held that reading “successful party” into the post-award portion of Section 9 would “contextually modulate” the same phrase to mean different things at different stages—an outcome the statute does not support.

ii) Purpose and structure: Section 9 protection continues “till the judicial process has reached its culmination”

The Court read Section 9 as providing interim protection across the full life-cycle: before arbitration, during arbitration, and after award until enforcement. It reinforced this with the UNCITRAL comparison: Article 9 of the Model Law allows court interim measures “before or during” arbitral proceedings, but India deliberately extended it to “after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced”. The Court treated this as a conscious legislative expansion that courts cannot cut down by judicial gloss.

iii) Section 9 vs Sections 34/36: “distinct spheres”

  • Section 34 provides the mechanism to challenge an award (set aside/limited modification per Gayatri Balasamy).
  • Section 36(2)/36(3) concerns enforceability and stay of the award.
  • Section 9 is aimed at protecting the subject matter of arbitration or the amount in dispute through interim measures.

The Court’s key functional point: even if a losing party challenges the award under Section 34 and seeks a stay under Section 36, those provisions do not necessarily secure the subject matter from dissipation. Denying Section 9 maintainability could leave the losing party remediless as to preservation, even where the award is stayed and may later be set aside/modified.

iv) Rejection of the “fruits of the award” limitation

The Court identified the “fruits of arbitral proceedings” rationale as a non-textual restriction. It also held that Section 9’s statutory phrases—“subject matter of arbitration” and “amount in dispute”—are broader than “fruits of arbitration”. By narrowing the statutory breadth, Dirk India and its followers effectively amended Section 9.

v) Doctrinal safety valve: higher threshold and rare/compelling cases

While maintainability is affirmed, the Court expressly signals that post-award Section 9 relief for a losing party should not become routine. It provides examples where interim protection may be justified:

  • prima facie fraud/corruption affecting the award;
  • award rendered without proper notice;
  • need to continue protective orders (e.g., bank guarantee restraint) to prevent irreversible prejudice pending Section 34;
  • “non-prejudicial” interim relief such as confidentiality continuation (as sought in Wind World (India) Ltd. v. Enercon Gmbh and Ors., 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 1147).

The Court thus separates: (a) entitlement to approach (maintainability) from (b) entitlement to relief (merits).

C. Impact

  • Uniform rule across India: The judgment resolves the High Court split and establishes that post-award Section 9 is not confined to award-holders.
  • Stronger preservation of rights pending challenge: Losing parties challenging awards can seek protective measures to prevent asset dissipation or other irreversible harm while Section 34/Section 36 proceedings are pending.
  • Potential increase in post-award interim litigation: The Court acknowledged concerns about misuse and multiplicity (especially given appealability under Section 37), but chose to manage the risk through a higher merits threshold rather than a maintainability bar.
  • Alignment with post-Gayatri Balasamy remedial reality: Because courts can (in limited ways) modify/sever awards, interim preservation may be crucial even for the party presently “losing” on the award as written.
  • Guidance to trial courts: The decision will likely push courts to write tighter, more reasoned Section 9 orders post-award, expressly addressing why the losing party meets the heightened prima facie and irreparable injury standards.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Section 9 (interim measures): A court’s power to grant temporary protection (e.g., injunctions, security, preservation of property) connected with an arbitration—available before, during, and after the award (until enforcement).
  • Post-award stage: The period after an arbitral award is made but before it is enforced under Section 36.
  • Section 34 (challenge to award): The mechanism to set aside (and, post-Gayatri Balasamy, in limited cases modify/sever/correct) an award on specified grounds.
  • Section 36 (enforcement/stay): Governs when an award becomes enforceable and how its enforcement may be stayed pending a Section 34 challenge.
  • Maintainability vs merits: “Maintainable” means the court can hear the application; it does not mean the applicant must win interim relief.
  • “Fruits of the award”: A shorthand used by some courts to mean benefits due under the award. The Supreme Court held Section 9 is not textually limited to protecting only these benefits.
  • Section 43(4) (limitation exclusion): Time spent in earlier arbitration proceedings can be excluded for limitation computation if parties recommence proceedings after an award is set aside—supporting the idea that rights may revive and may need interim protection.

5) Conclusion

The Supreme Court in HOME CARE RETAIL MARTS PVT. LTD. THROUGH ITS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE v. HARESH N. SANGHAVI (2026 INSC 415) establishes a clear rule: Section 9’s post-award interim jurisdiction is available to any party to the arbitration agreement, including the party that lost before the tribunal. The judgment rejects the “award-holder only” restriction as an impermissible judicial rewrite of the statute, emphasizes the legislature’s deliberate post-award expansion beyond the UNCITRAL Model Law, and explains that Sections 34/36 do not substitute for Section 9’s preservation function.

At the same time, the Court calibrates the consequence: relief is not automatic. Courts must apply the usual interim-relief principles with a higher threshold for unsuccessful parties, granting protection only with careful scrutiny to avoid undermining arbitral finality while ensuring that justice is not defeated by dissipation or irreparable prejudice during the post-award court process.