PMMVY as a Conditional Maternity Benefit: Vaccination-Based Eligibility, Strict Compliance, and Non-Beneficiary Locus Standi

1. Introduction

AHAMED JUNAID P S v. UNION OF INDIA (2026 KER 64071, Kerala High Court, decided on 18-08-2026) concerned a challenge to the implementation of the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana (“PMMVY”) as applied to the petitioner’s family.

The petitioner (husband, appearing in person) sought (i) a direction to sanction and release PMMVY benefits to his wife in respect of their second child (a girl) and (ii) a declaration that administrative circulars/instructions requiring vaccination as a condition for PMMVY benefit were unconstitutional, arbitrary, and ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

The dispute arose because the scheme (and the 2022 Rules framed under the National Food Security Act, 2013) conditions payment for the second living child (where the second child is a girl) upon the child having received “all due vaccines” under the Universal Immunization Programme up to fourteen weeks. The petitioner asserted that making vaccination a gateway to a cash benefit amounted to indirect coercion and violated personal liberty.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the writ petition on two principal planes:

  • Maintainability / locus: The petitioner (father) had no legally enforceable right to claim payment under PMMVY because the intended beneficiary is the lactating mother and the scheme contemplates direct transfer to the mother’s bank account. Since the mother was not before the Court, the petition was held not maintainable.
  • Merits: Even otherwise, PMMVY is a conditional benefit scheme. Vaccination is an express eligibility condition under Rule 7(2)(ii) of the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana Rules, 2022. Non-fulfilment renders the beneficiary ineligible. Conditioning a welfare benefit on vaccination was held neither unconstitutional nor arbitrary. The Court rejected reliance on Jacob Puliyel v. Union Of India and Others as misplaced in the context of routine paediatric immunisation and reiterated that no one is “forced” to vaccinate; rather, the State may attach conditions to optional cash transfers.

The Court additionally invoked the principle against “approbate and reprobate” (summarised in the judgment as “cannot have the cake and eat it too”): a claimant cannot refuse scheme conditions and simultaneously demand scheme benefits.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Union of India v. Charak Pharmaceuticals (India) Ltd. [(2003) 11 SCC 689]

The High Court relied on this decision to anchor a broader administrative law proposition: where a benefit is conferred by a special scheme, courts will not extend that benefit on equitable grounds if the claimant fails to comply with the scheme’s terms.

How it influenced the outcome: PMMVY, like the Kar Vivadh Samadhan Scheme (KVSS) discussed in Charak Pharmaceuticals, is structured as a conditional policy instrument. Therefore, the Court held that strict satisfaction of eligibility conditions (including vaccination) is mandatory, and courts cannot rewrite the scheme by granting benefits despite non-compliance.

(b) Jacob Puliyel v. Union Of India and Others [(2022) SCC Online SC 533]

The petitioner invoked Jacob Puliyel to argue that requiring vaccination to access a benefit amounts to unconstitutional coercion, violating bodily integrity and autonomy under Article 21.

How the High Court distinguished it:

  • Jacob Puliyel arose in the specific context of COVID-19 vaccination during a pandemic, including questions of emerging science and emergency public health measures.
  • The Supreme Court’s formulation (quoted in the Kerala judgment) recognises both (i) the right to refuse medical treatment and (ii) that autonomy is not absolute where communitarian/public health risks justify reasonable restrictions.
  • The Kerala High Court emphasised that the Supreme Court itself acknowledged deference to expert-led vaccination policy and noted that paediatric vaccination decisions align with global scientific consensus and are not for courts to “second-guess”.

Net effect: Rather than supporting the petitioner, Jacob Puliyel was read as consistent with the proposition that (a) physical forcing is impermissible, but (b) the State may adopt policy measures that promote vaccination in the interest of public health—particularly for routine immunisation supported by established programmes like UIP.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) Nature of the entitlement under the NFSA and PMMVY

A central move in the judgment is textual: Section 4 of the National Food Security Act, 2013 begins with “Subject to such schemes as may be framed by the Central Government”. The Court treated this as a legislative signal that the maternity benefit is not self-executing and unqualified; it is operationalised through a scheme that may legitimately set eligibility conditions and modalities.

(ii) The PMMVY Rules, 2022 expressly make vaccination an eligibility condition

The Court traced the legal architecture: the earlier rules (Indira Gandhi Matritwa Sahyog Rules, 2016) were superseded, and the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana Rules, 2022 were notified under the NFSA. The judgment then relied heavily on:

  • Rule 2(f) (scheme definition) to emphasise objectives including “health seeking behaviour” and promoting positive behaviour towards the girl child; and
  • Rule 7(2)(ii) to hold that the second-child (girl) benefit of Rs. 6,000/- is payable only if the girl child receives “all due vaccines” till 14 weeks under UIP.

On this basis, the Court treated vaccination not as an “administrative circular” innovation, but as a rule-based statutory condition embedded in the scheme itself.

(iii) No compulsion to vaccinate; only conditionality for an optional cash transfer

The Court drew a line between:

  • Physical/legal compulsion to undergo a medical procedure (which would directly engage bodily integrity concerns); and
  • Conditional cash transfer design, where the State offers money only upon compliance with health-seeking behaviours it seeks to promote.

The judgment holds that parents remain free to refuse vaccination, but must accept the programmatic consequence: non-eligibility for a benefit expressly conditioned on vaccination.

(iv) Articles 14, 21, and the “no fundamental right to scheme benefits” approach

The Court’s Article 21 analysis is mediated by a threshold proposition: there is no fundamental right to receive PMMVY benefits. With that, the Court treated eligibility conditions as presumptively legitimate, provided they are not arbitrary.

On arbitrariness, the Court accepted the State’s public health rationale: UIP vaccination reduces infant mortality and protects neonatal/infant health. In the Court’s view, tying an incentive to UIP vaccination is a reasonable policy mechanism aligned with constitutional values of public health.

(v) Article 47 (Directive Principles) used as contextual support, not as a weapon against vaccination

The petitioner attempted to invoke Article 47 to suggest vaccines are “injurious drugs”. The Court rejected this for want of material and instead read Article 47 as supporting State duties to improve nutrition and public health, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of pro-immunisation policy incentives.

(vi) Maintainability: who can sue for PMMVY benefits?

A significant procedural holding is that the father, merely by claiming parentage, has no enforceable legal right under PMMVY to seek payment, particularly where:

  • the scheme identifies the beneficiary as the mother, and
  • the payment is intended to be transferred to the mother’s bank account.

The Court therefore treated the petition as defective at the threshold. The merits discussion functions as an alternative holding, reinforcing dismissal even if maintainability were assumed.

3.3 Impact

(a) Reinforcement of “strict compliance” in welfare scheme litigation

The judgment strengthens an approach commonly applied to amnesty/settlement schemes and applies it to conditional welfare transfers: courts will likely insist on strict adherence to scheme conditions, rather than crafting equitable exceptions.

(b) Clarification of the coercion boundary in Article 21 challenges

The decision signals that Article 21 “bodily integrity” arguments will have limited traction where the State is not forcing a medical intervention but is attaching conditions to a voluntary benefit— particularly where the condition is rooted in public health objectives and a statutory rule framework.

(c) Narrowing the portability of Jacob Puliyel

By distinguishing COVID-era vaccination policy disputes from routine paediatric immunisation, the judgment may be cited to resist attempts to universalise Jacob Puliyel into a general anti-conditionality doctrine for vaccination-linked welfare measures.

(d) Locus standi discipline in benefit claims

Future petitions may need to be filed by the actual beneficiary (here, the mother), with pleadings and evidence aligned to scheme entitlements. This reduces the space for third-party (even familial) claimants to litigate disbursement as if the benefit were their own enforceable right.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Conditional cash transfer: A benefit paid only if the beneficiary meets specified conditions (e.g., registration, check-ups, immunisation). It is designed to encourage socially beneficial behaviour, not merely to distribute money.
  • Maintainability / locus standi: Whether the person who filed the case has a legal right or sufficient standing to ask the court for that relief. Here, the Court held the father was not the scheme’s beneficiary and thus could not demand payment.
  • Ultra vires: Actions (including rules/circulars) that go beyond the legal power granted. The Court found the vaccination requirement was within the scheme rules and aligned with NFSA’s “subject to schemes” framework.
  • Article 21 (bodily integrity and autonomy): The constitutional protection of personal liberty, including refusal of medical treatment. The Court treated this as not being violated because there was no forced vaccination—only a conditional benefit.
  • Approbate and reprobate: A party cannot accept what benefits them while rejecting what burdens them under the same arrangement. Applied here: one cannot reject PMMVY conditions and still demand PMMVY payouts.

5. Conclusion

AHAMED JUNAID P S v. UNION OF INDIA establishes (at least within Kerala High Court jurisprudence) a clear rule-set for PMMVY disputes:

  • PMMVY benefits are conditional; vaccination under UIP up to 14 weeks for a second girl child is a valid eligibility requirement under the 2022 Rules.
  • There is no fundamental right to receive PMMVY payments; courts will require strict compliance with scheme conditions.
  • Article 21 autonomy principles do not convert a conditional welfare design into unconstitutional “coercion” where no forced medical intervention is imposed.
  • Benefit litigation must generally be brought by the actual scheme beneficiary (the mother), not by a non-beneficiary family member asserting an indirect claim.

In broader constitutional terms, the judgment aligns welfare conditionality with public health objectives and underscores judicial restraint in second-guessing expert-backed immunisation policy, while preserving the conceptual distinction between impermissible compulsion and permissible incentive-based program design.