3.1 Precedents Cited (and Their Role)
A. Article 136 and interference with concurrent findings
The Court reaffirmed that while it generally exercises restraint under Article 136—especially against
concurrent findings—this restraint is not absolute.
It relied on Agniraj & Ors. v. State through Deputy Superintendent of Police, CB- CID
(2025 INSC 774) to emphasize that Article 136 “self-imposed constraints” cannot prevent the Court from
noticing “striking features in the evidence which demolish the prosecution’s case.”
Influence: This precedent justified a closer Supreme Court re-scrutiny of the evidentiary chain in a
circumstantial case, despite concurrent findings below.
B. The governing test for circumstantial evidence
The Court expressly applied the “five golden principles” from
Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda v. State Of Maharashtra (1984 INSC 121),
requiring each circumstance to be fully established, consistent only with guilt, conclusive in nature,
excluding all other hypotheses, and forming a complete chain.
Influence: The Court used Sharad Sarda as the measuring scale and found failure at the threshold:
the circumstances themselves were not firmly proved, hence the chain never became complete.
C. Related vs. interested witness
On the credibility of Raja Ram, the Court drew on:
State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki & Anr. (1981 INSC 94) and
Md. Rojali Ali & Ors. v. The State of Assam, Ministry of Home Affairs through the Secretary
(2019 INSC 223).
These cases distinguish “related” witnesses from “interested” witnesses, the latter being those with a motive
to see the accused punished (e.g., due to prior hostility).
Influence: The Court held it was plausible Raja Ram was “interested” given disclosed hostility and
prior litigative alignment against the appellant, making uncorroborated reliance unsafe.
D. Parity between co-accused on similar evidence
The Court invoked Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat (2023 INSC 829),
reaffirmed in Ram Singh v. State of U.P. (2024 INSC 128),
to apply the principle of parity: where evidence is similar/identical in role attribution, courts
should not convict one and acquit another, as that would amount to discrimination.
Influence: Since Accused No. 2 was acquitted where the recovery/bloodstain circumstance was treated
as insufficient, the same infirmity weakened the case against the appellant once “last-seen” was found unreliable.
E. Precedents noted via Trial Court reasoning on recoveries
While assessing Accused No. 2’s acquittal, the Trial Court had cited:
Nehru versus C.G. State, 2005 (1) Manisa 90 (C.G.) (as quoted in the judgment) and
Hanumant Govind Nardandurkar Versus State A.I.R 1960 Supreme Court 29.
The Supreme Court did not endorse Nehru’s proposition as quoted; rather, it highlighted that the Trial Court
itself held blood on weapon/clothes without proof of human blood linkage to the deceased was insufficient.
Influence: The Supreme Court used the Trial Court’s own logic (for acquitting Accused No. 2) to
demonstrate the inconsistency in sustaining appellant’s conviction on a similarly fragile recovery foundation.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
A. “Last-seen” (or merely “seen near”)—identification and probative gaps
The strongest circumstance against the appellant was Raja Ram’s claim of seeing him near the deceased’s
house at about 10:00 p.m., allegedly with an axe. The Court dismantled its probative value on multiple grounds:
-
Visibility doubts: No street lights; electricity supply to the deceased’s house was disputed.
Identification allegedly occurred via motorcycle headlight and “possibly” house light—conditions the Court
found doubtful for reliable night identification.
-
Not truly “last-seen with deceased”: Even if accepted, the testimony placed the appellant
only “near” the house, not with the deceased, and with no overt act witnessed.
-
Timing mismatch: Medical evidence did not fix death time precisely enough to conclusively
correlate the sighting with the murder.
-
Credibility concerns: Evidence indicated possible hostility and interest; additionally, despite
meeting police on the day of incident, the witness’s statement under Section 161 CrPC was recorded a month later.
The Court thus held this circumstance could not be “clinching” and could not sustain conviction without
strong corroboration.
B. Recoveries under Section 27 Evidence Act—insufficient forensic linkage and shaky witnesses
The Court acknowledged the legal framework:
Section 25 Evidence Act bars confessions to police; only the limited discovery portion under
Section 27 may be admissible. Even then, recoveries must be credible and link the accused to the crime.
The Court found multiple infirmities:
-
Template-like disclosure statements: The memorandums were substantially similar, with
verbatim language across accused, inviting skepticism.
-
Forensic limits: FSL found human blood on axes/clothes but:
(i) blood group was not determined;
(ii) hair similarity was inconclusive and not proven to be the deceased’s;
(iii) no definitive link established between recovered axes and injuries.
-
Medical linkage not pursued: The Court noted the seized weapons ought to have been shown
to the doctor to opine whether they could have caused the injuries.
-
Commonness of weapon: Evidence suggested axes were commonly kept by farmers, reducing uniqueness.
-
Witness unreliability/hostility: Key witnesses to memorandums and seizures either turned hostile
or denied contemporaneous signing and proper procedure, weakening the legal integrity of the recovery.
Critically, the Court aligned this with parity: the Trial Court had already treated similar recovery evidence
as insufficient to convict Accused No. 2, and once Raja Ram’s testimony was discounted, it was unsafe to
maintain the appellant’s conviction mainly on the same kind of evidence.
C. Alleged recovery of driving licence—chain-of-custody and procedural doubt
The seizure memo allegedly included the appellant’s driving licence found at the spot.
The Court treated this circumstance as doubtful because:
- The seizure witness could not identify the licence’s owner and stated police merely “showed” it.
- The Investigating Officer admitted the licence was not mentioned in or filed with the charge-sheet and was later exhibited as Article “A”.
- The appellant’s Section 313 CrPC stance was that police took it from his pocket; the Court held surrounding circumstances made the prosecution version unsafe to rely upon.
D. Motive and prior quarrel—supporting, not substituting, an incomplete chain
The Court found the prior-threat narrative itself unproved: key witnesses recanted or did not support the prosecution.
As to motive, the Court reiterated that motive can only support a complete chain, not replace missing links.
E. Net result—suspicion is not proof
Applying Sharad Sarda, the Court concluded the circumstances were not firmly established and did not
form an unbroken chain. The evidence might create suspicion, but “suspicion, however strong, cannot
take the place of proof.” Hence, benefit of doubt was granted.