Open-Court Trials and Identification Evidence: Targeted Safeguards Without Automatic Closure

Case: MOHAMMED J I, v. STATE OF KERALA
Citation: 2026:KER:76788
Court: Kerala High Court
Judge: Justice C.S. Dias
Decision: 7 October 2026
Proceeding: Crl. M.C. No. 8147 of 2026

1. Introduction

This decision addresses the relationship between open justice and the protection of identification evidence in a highly publicised criminal trial. The Kerala High Court declined to direct an in-camera trial merely because the accused apprehended that photographs or video recordings could influence eyewitness identification. Nevertheless, it imposed specific safeguards against recording inside the courtroom and required the trial court to consider restricting attendance during the examination of identified eyewitnesses.

The petitioners were thirteen accused persons—accused Nos. 1, 2, 4 to 12, 14 and 15—in S.C. No. 1068 of 2018 before the Court of Session, Ernakulam. The prosecution alleged that the accused murdered a student of Maharaja’s College, Ernakulam, on 2 July 2018. The charges invoked Sections 143, 148, 323, 324, 307 and 302, read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondents were the State of Kerala and Parijith, who had been impleaded as the additional second respondent.

With the trial scheduled between 15 October and 12 November 2026, the petitioners sought closed proceedings, particularly during eyewitness testimony. The Sessions Court rejected their application on 22 September 2026, finding no material establishing that an open trial would prejudice the fair and proper administration of justice. The present petition challenged that refusal.

The central question was whether the anticipated exposure of accused persons to witnesses through photographs, recordings or courtroom attendance justified departing from the statutory rule of open criminal proceedings.

2. The Competing Arguments

The petitioners’ concerns

The petitioners maintained that no test identification parade had been conducted and that identification would therefore require scrutiny during trial. They feared that witnesses might identify them by reference to recently circulated images rather than their recollection of the incident.

They also alleged attempts to photograph and video-record them when they attended court. Extensive media coverage, attendance by students, political workers, public representatives and others, and the ordinary congestion of the courtroom were said to aggravate the problem. Counsel additionally submitted that prosecution witnesses present while another witness testified could obtain information about the incident or the identity of the persons in the dock.

The respondents’ opposition

The prosecution emphasised that criminal trials ordinarily take place in open court and that an accused’s request does not itself create an entitlement to closed proceedings. It relied on Section 366 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”), and the trial judge’s discretion under that provision.

The Public Prosecutor also stated that:

  • A police security arrangement had been prepared to prevent disturbances and ensure the smooth conduct of the trial.
  • The injured and other occurrence witnesses had identified the accused in a photo identification parade conducted by the Executive Magistrate, besides identification before the police.
  • The prosecution had not objected when the accused wore masks during the recording of their pleas.
  • The accused had been on bail since 2018 and had remained active in their personal and social lives.

These were submissions advanced against the request for closure. In particular, the judgment did not adjudicate the evidentiary reliability or legal sufficiency of the asserted earlier identifications.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the petition and confirmed the Sessions Court’s refusal to order an in-camera trial. It held that the circumstances did not warrant departure from the ordinary rule of open proceedings.

However, the Court expressly recognised that the petitioners’ apprehension could not be left entirely unaddressed. Its operative directions had two distinct components:

  1. A mandatory recording restriction: The trial court, in coordination with the police, must ensure that nobody photographs or video-records the trial or the accused while they are inside the courtroom.
  2. A duty to consider restricted attendance: The trial court must consider, according to law and the circumstances, whether the public generally or any particular person should be excluded during the examination of eyewitnesses CWs. 1 to 7.

The second direction did not itself close those examinations to the public. It required the trial court to exercise its discretion. The result was therefore dismissal of the demand for an in-camera trial, accompanied by concrete protective measures.

4. Statutory Framework: Section 366 BNSS

Section 366 supplies the foundation of the decision. Its structure distinguishes ordinary public access, discretionary restrictions and mandatory in-camera proceedings.

Open court as the general rule

Under Section 366(1), the place where a criminal court conducts an inquiry or trial is deemed an open court. The public generally may attend, so far as the premises can conveniently accommodate them. Public access is therefore the statutory starting point, but it is not an unlimited right to overcrowd the courtroom.

Discretionary exclusion

The proviso to Section 366(1) permits the presiding judge or magistrate, at any stage of a particular inquiry or trial, to exclude the public generally or any particular person. This enables restrictions responsive to the needs of an individual case rather than requiring an all-or-nothing choice between unrestricted attendance and complete closure.

Mandatory in-camera proceedings

Section 366(2) separately requires in-camera proceedings for the specified sexual offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The present prosecution did not fall within those categories. Any restriction therefore depended on the discretionary power under subsection (1), not an automatic statutory requirement.

Section 366(3) regulates publication concerning proceedings held under subsection (2). The High Court’s order should not be confused with a general reporting prohibition under that subsection: it directed restrictions on photography and videography inside the courtroom, not a blanket ban on reporting the case.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Another [1966 SCC OnLine SC 10]

This Supreme Court authority supplied the principal justification for preserving open proceedings. The High Court reproduced paragraph 20, which explains that public trials support the healthy, objective and fair administration of justice.

The passage identifies two connected benefits of openness. First, public scrutiny acts as a check against judicial arbitrariness or caprice. Second, it strengthens public confidence in the fairness, objectivity and impartiality of adjudication. Openness is consequently more than a procedural custom: it is an institutional safeguard.

The petitioners invoked this decision in support of the availability of closed proceedings. The High Court did not deny the existence of that power. Instead, it placed the power within a framework in which openness remains the rule and exclusion requires justification in the circumstances of the case.

The High Court also described Section 327 Cr.P.C. as corresponding in substance to Section 366 BNSS. Its reasoning thus treats the BNSS provision as continuing the established open-court framework rather than displacing it.

The precedent’s decisive influence was to prevent the existence of a power to restrict access from being converted into an accused person’s automatic entitlement to demand closure.

Jollyamma Joseph @ Jolly v. State of Kerala [2023 (2) KHC 559]

The petitioners relied on this Kerala High Court decision to support their request for in-camera proceedings. Justice Dias distinguished it as a decision rendered in its peculiar factual circumstances.

The present judgment does not reproduce that case’s detailed facts or reasoning. Its treatment therefore supports a limited conclusion: the earlier decision could not be read as establishing a general rule requiring criminal trials to take place in camera.

This distinction is significant. A fact-specific exercise of discretion does not dictate the same result in every later case invoking fair-trial concerns. The relevant circumstances must independently justify departure from open justice.

Accordingly, the Court did not reject the legal availability of an in-camera trial or overrule the earlier decision. It rejected the broader application sought by the petitioners.

6. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

Power to close proceedings is not an entitlement to closure

The judgment separates the existence of judicial power from the justification for exercising it. Section 366(1) plainly authorises exclusion, but an applicant must demonstrate circumstances warranting that course. The trial court had found no material showing that an open trial would prejudice the proper administration of justice, and the High Court found no error or illegality requiring interference.

The decision does not establish a comprehensive evidentiary test for future applications. It is a fact-sensitive refusal to order closure on the material presented.

The Court identified the particular risk asserted

Although congestion and crowd attendance had been raised, the High Court characterised the principal apprehension as exposure of the accused to witnesses through photographs or recordings—not a threat of intimidation, violence or disruption.

That distinction shaped the response. The prosecution’s security assurance addressed orderly proceedings. The separate prohibition on recording addressed the particular mechanism through which identification might allegedly be influenced. Security arrangements alone were not treated as a complete substitute for protecting the identification process.

Targeted protection instead of comprehensive closure

The reasoning reflects a preference for measures directed at the identified risk. Preventing photography and videography inside the courtroom preserves ordinary public attendance while reducing an avenue for circulating fresh images of the accused.

Likewise, requiring consideration of restricted attendance during CWs. 1 to 7’s examination recognises that a sensitive evidentiary stage may require a different arrangement from the rest of the trial. This is a calibrated approach, although the judgment does not formulate a separate, formal proportionality test.

Identification questions remain for trial

The competing submissions disclosed an important distinction between an asserted absence of a test identification parade and the prosecution’s reliance on a photo identification exercise. The High Court did not decide whether the latter answered the former, whether either identification was reliable, or what weight subsequent courtroom identification should receive.

Nor did it hold that the absence of a test identification parade is legally irrelevant. Its decision concerned courtroom arrangements, not the ultimate assessment of identification evidence.

The operative directions have defined limits

The prohibition expressly concerns photography and videography of the trial or the accused inside the courtroom. It does not establish a general prohibition on photographing the accused elsewhere, suppressing previously available images, or publishing all information about the proceedings.

Equally, the direction concerning eyewitness testimony requires consideration of exclusion; it does not mandate automatic closure. Preserving these distinctions is essential to understanding the decision’s precedential scope.

7. Potential Impact

  • High-profile prosecutions: Extensive publicity will not, without sufficient case-specific justification, require an in-camera trial.
  • Applications for restricted access: Future applicants should identify the precise risk and explain why ordinary courtroom management or narrower safeguards would be inadequate.
  • Trial-court management: Judges can distinguish attendance, recording and access during particular witnesses’ testimony, rather than treating public access as an indivisible question.
  • Protection of identification evidence: Courts may take preventive procedural measures without determining in advance whether identification evidence is admissible or trustworthy.
  • Use of earlier closure orders: Fact-specific decisions permitting in-camera proceedings cannot automatically be transferred to other prosecutions.

The judgment’s contribution is therefore principally an application and clarification of established law. It preserves open justice while demonstrating that refusal of wholesale closure need not mean refusal of every protective measure.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

Open court
A court proceeding the public may ordinarily attend, subject to available space and lawful judicial restrictions.
In-camera proceedings
A hearing conducted with general public access excluded or restricted. The expression does not mean that the hearing is video-recorded.
Test identification parade
An investigative procedure in which a witness is asked to identify a suspect among other persons. Its relevance and evidentiary effect are distinct from whether the trial should be public.
Photo identification
Identification using photographs. The prosecution relied on such an exercise here, but the High Court did not determine its reliability or legal sufficiency.
Dock identification
A witness’s identification of an accused person in the courtroom. The petitioners feared that outside exposure could influence this process.
Pari materia
A phrase indicating that statutory provisions address substantially the same subject and may be understood in a corresponding way.
Bundobust scheme
A planned police deployment for security, crowd control and prevention of disturbances.

9. Conclusion

MOHAMMED J I, v. STATE OF KERALA reaffirms that open criminal proceedings remain the statutory norm. On the facts presented, apprehension about publicity affecting identification did not justify an order for an in-camera trial.

Its practical significance lies in the accompanying safeguards: a mandatory prohibition on courtroom photography and videography, and consideration of restricted attendance during specified eyewitness examinations. The decision protects transparency without treating fair-trial concerns as an all-or-nothing demand for secrecy, while leaving the reliability of identification evidence to be assessed at trial.