Date: Apr 10, 2026

Only the Chancellor Can Annul DMU Teacher-Selection Proceedings: DP Approval OMs Cannot Override the DMU Act; Syndicate Cannot Rescind Its Own Prior Selection

1. Introduction

This common judgment of the High Court of Manipur (A. Guneshwar Sharma, J.) decided a batch of writ petitions arising from a long-delayed recruitment process for Assistant Professors in Dhanamanjuri University (DMU) under Advertisement No. 03/2020 dated 19.12.2020.

The core dispute centred on two subjects—Physics and Botany—where four candidates per subject had been declared selected by DMU’s Notification dated 29.02.2024 (issued after the Court’s earlier direction in WP(C) No. 790 of 2023 to declare results). After a change in DMU’s Vice-Chancellor, an Emergency Syndicate meeting dated 18.07.2024 treated the 29.02.2024 notification as “null and void” (mainly because it allegedly lacked “DP approval” under State OMs), claimed Physics/Botany tabulation sheets were blank, omitted these subjects from a fresh Notification dated 18.07.2024, and called a fresh viva-voce by Notification dated 19.07.2024.

The selected candidates in Physics/Botany challenged the cancellation and the proposed re-interview. The unsuccessful candidates in Botany sought continuation of the fresh interview process and/or review of the earlier selection.

Key Issues

Whether State “DP approval” Office Memoranda could govern DMU’s statutory recruitment and result-declaration.
Whether the DMU Syndicate could nullify the earlier selection/result and effectively annul its own earlier decision.
Whether the alleged blank tabulation sheets justified cancelling Physics/Botany results and holding fresh interviews.
Who, under the DMU Act, has the legal authority to annul University proceedings—Syndicate or Chancellor.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court allowed the selected candidates’ writ petitions (WP(C) Nos. 633 of 2024, 501 of 2024, 495 of 2024 & 486 of 2024) and held, in substance, that:

DMU does not require prior “DP approval” under the OMs dated 16.08.2021 and 11.04.2023 to declare recruitment results for Assistant Professors.
The Syndicate cannot annul/cancel its earlier decisions; the power to annul “any proceeding of the University” lies with the Chancellor under Section 12(8) of the DMU Act, 2017.
For “multiple persons recommendations” by a duly constituted Selection Committee, the Syndicate cannot outright reject them; it must follow Statute 27(v) (remit/reconsider; then refer to the Chancellor if unresolved).
The Syndicate’s Resolution dated 18.07.2024 cancelling Physics/Botany selections (4+4 posts) was set aside; DMU was directed to include those eight names from Notification dated 29.02.2024 into Tables ‘A’ and ‘C’ of Notification dated 18.07.2024, and to issue appointment orders forthwith to the six writ petitioners before the Court.
WP(C) No. 728 of 2024 was closed as infructuous (fresh interview for additional posts had been permitted earlier by interim modification); WP(C) No. 580 of 2025 was dismissed as not maintainable.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and Their Role)

The judgment records extensive citations from both sides; the Court’s operative reasoning relied most clearly on principles of statutory supremacy, evidentiary pleading in writs, and the permissibility of amendments to avoid injustice.

A. Court’s express reliance

Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana: (1988) 4 SCC 534
Influence: The Court used this to address the “disputed facts” objection. It stressed that writ pleadings require not only facts but supporting evidence/documentary annexures. Here, letters from subject experts and the former VC’s affidavit supported the petitioners’ case that assessment occurred; the respondents did not place adequate counter-material beyond the Syndicate minutes asserting “blank sheets.” This undercut the respondents’ attempt to defeat writ relief by branding the matter “disputed.”
LIC v. Sanjeev Builders (P) Ltd.: (2022) 16 SCC 1
Influence: Cited to justify liberal allowance of amendments in aid of complete justice where the new reliefs are not alien and do not fundamentally alter the lis. The Court treated the additional challenges (e.g., addendum/paras/minutes) as collateral to the central controversy and declined to reject them on technicalities.

B. Petitioners’ authorities (accepted in principle, aligned with the outcome)

Ratan Kumar Tandon & Others -vs- State of U.P; (1997) 2 SCC 161
Relevance: Invoked for the proposition that executive instructions cannot override statutory provisions. This cohered with the Court’s holding that State OMs could not “overwrite” the DMU Act/Statutes regarding recruitment/result declaration.
Union of India and Others -vs- N. Murugesan & Others; (2022) 2 SCC 25
Relevance: The “approbate and reprobate” principle was central to the petitioners’ criticism: the Syndicate treated 29.02.2024 as void, yet accepted the same selection recommendations for other subjects (and even additional posts) without fresh interview, excluding only Physics/Botany. While the Court ultimately resolved the case on statutory competence (Syndicate lacks annulment power) and inapplicability of OMs, the “inconsistent stance” concern strengthened the arbitrariness narrative.
Babu Verghese And Others -v- Bar Council of Kerala And Others; (1999) 3 SCC 422
Relevance: “If the manner of doing an act is prescribed by statute, it must be done in that manner or not at all.” This aligned with the Court’s approach: Statute 27(v) prescribes the pathway when the Syndicate cannot accept recommendations; the Syndicate could not short-circuit the statutory mechanism by “declaring null and void.”
Mohinder Singh Gill vs The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi AIR 1978 SC 851
Relevance: Relied on to argue that the validity of the Syndicate/University action must stand on the reasons in the impugned record, not new affidavit explanations. This principle supported scrutiny of the “DP approval” rationale and the “blank sheet” assertion as recorded in the minutes/notifications.
Dwarka Nath vs Income Tax Officer, Special Circle, AIR 1966 SC 81 and Vashist Narayan Kumar vs State of Bihar, 2024 AIR(SC) 248
Relevance: Cited for the High Court’s power under Article 226 to mould relief to do complete justice; consistent with the Court’s direction to include names in Tables ‘A’ and ‘C’ and to issue appointment orders.
Naseem Banu (SMT) -vs- State of U.P And Others; 1993 Supp (4) SCC 46
Relevance: Invoked to contend that non-traverse implies admission. Though the Court did not decide solely on this rule, it noted respondents’ failure to adequately controvert the former VC’s narrative and expert letters—feeding into its conclusion that the “blank sheet” story lacked convincing support.
Kusheshkwar Prasad Singh -v- State of Bihar And Ors; (2007) 11 SCC 447
Relevance: “No man can take advantage of his own wrong.” This underpinned the fairness logic that candidates should not suffer for University record-keeping lapses.
National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences -vs- Dr. K. Kalyana Raman and Others; 1992 Supp (2) SCC 481
Relevance: Cited to argue that selection bodies need not record reasons unless rules require it. This supported the petitioners’ position that absence/withholding of tabulation sheets before Syndicate is not per se illegality.

C. Respondents’ authorities (pressed, but distinguished/ineffective given the statutory holding)

State of Orissa v. Bhikari Charan Khuntia: (2003) 10 SCC 144, Union of India v. Tarun K. Singh: (2003) 11 SCC 768, All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K. Shyam Kumar: (2010) 6 SCC 614, Jai Singh Dalal v. State of Haryana: 1993 Supp (2) SCC 600, Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Vinay Kumar: (2022) 18 SCC 358
Attempted use: to argue there is no indefeasible right to appointment merely by selection, and that authorities can cancel/redo recruitment if vitiated.
Why they did not prevail: The Court treated the petitioners’ position as beyond a mere “expectation”; it found that the cancellation itself was ultra vires because (i) “DP approval” was not legally required for DMU, and (ii) the Syndicate lacked power to annul the earlier proceeding—making the cancellation unlawful irrespective of general “no right to appointment” dicta.
Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam: (2021) 20 SCC 454
Attempted use: to resist writ adjudication on disputed facts.
Why it did not prevail: The Court applied Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana and found petitioners supported their case with documents, while respondents failed to place adequate counter-evidence; therefore, the “disputed facts” label could not bar relief.
East Coast Railway v. Mahadev Appa Rao: (2010) 7 SCC 678
Attempted use: to highlight requirement of application of mind and reasonableness in administrative orders. Ironically, the Court’s outcome suggests the opposite: the 18.07.2024 cancellation was not legally sustainable because it exceeded statutory powers and rested on an inapplicable OM regime.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Statutory design: DMU’s recruitment autonomy

The Court’s reasoning is anchored in the DMU Act, 2017 and the Second Schedule Statutes:

Statute 13(i): Syndicate appoints teachers (including Assistant Professors) on Selection Committee recommendations.
Statute 26(ix): no teacher appointment except on Selection Committee recommendation.
Statute 27(iv) and 27(v): a structured mechanism governs Syndicate disagreement with recommendations. Crucially, the Court interpreted the Statute as follows:
- Statute 27(iv) covers rejection of a single-person recommendation (with recorded reasons; re-advertise; fresh Selection Committee).
- Statute 27(v) covers inability to accept multiple-person recommendations: remit for reconsideration; if unresolved, record reasons and submit to the Chancellor.
Section 12(8): only the Chancellor may annul any proceeding of the University not conforming to the Act/Statutes/Ordinances, after show-cause.

From this, the Court derived the key rule: the Syndicate has no power to annul its earlier decision/proceeding or to unilaterally cancel a multiple-candidate selection already approved; the Chancellor’s Section 12(8) power is exclusive.

B. Executive OMs vs statutory university governance

The cancellation’s main stated reason was that Notification dated 29.02.2024 lacked “DP approval” under OMs dated 16.08.2021 and 11.04.2023. The Court rejected this by holding:

DMU is a statutory body; executive instructions cannot trample statutory provisions.
Section 30 (removal of difficulties) could not be used as a backdoor to import a general DP-approval regime into DMU recruitment without a demonstrated “difficulty” in implementing the Act, and in any event Section 30 requires a Gazette-notified order mechanism (not shown to have been invoked in the manner contemplated).

Thus, the Court’s principle is not merely “OMs are inapplicable”; it is that statutory university recruitment powers cannot be curtailed by executive memoranda absent a lawful statutory bridge.

C. “Blank tabulation sheets” rationale and evidentiary evaluation in writs

The Syndicate minutes of 18.07.2024 recorded that Physics/Botany tabulation sheets were blank and no marks were assessed. The Court declined to treat this as sufficient to undo the earlier selection, for two reasons:

Ultra vires route: even if there were concerns, the Syndicate could not “annul” the earlier result; it had to follow Statute 27(v) and, if needed, approach the Chancellor.
Insufficient counter-material: the former VC’s affidavit explained that assessment occurred, and experts’ letters confirmed scoring; respondents did not adequately controvert this with proper evidentiary material in writ pleadings (invoking the Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana approach).

D. Vice-Chancellor’s power to convene meetings

The Court clarified that, under Statute 3(iii), the Vice-Chancellor has the power to convene meetings of the Syndicate; Registrar permission is not a pre-condition. The Registrar’s emergency convening power in Statute 7(iv)(d) is only a contingency mechanism when the VC/Pro-VC/senior Dean is unavailable.

3.3 Impact

A. On university autonomy in Manipur

The judgment reinforces that statutory universities’ internal governance and recruitment—where the Act/Statutes allocate powers—cannot be subjected to general executive “approval” regimes by Office Memorandum, unless the statute itself authorises such oversight in the manner contemplated by law.

B. On checks within university governance

The decision draws a sharp line between:

Executive authority of the Syndicate (appointments on recommendations), and
Supervisory/annulment authority of the Chancellor (Section 12(8)), especially where proceedings are alleged to violate the Act/Statutes.

Future Syndicates seeking to revisit prior selections must proceed via the statutory pathway (Statute 27(v) and Chancellor reference), not by self-declaration of “null and void.”

C. On recruitment stability and candidate rights

Although respondents relied on “no indefeasible right to appointment” cases, the Court effectively held that once a statutory selection is approved and declared, cancellation must be jurisdictionally competent and procedurally lawful. This is likely to deter post-facto reversals triggered by administrative changes.

D. On seniority and subsequent recruitment

The Court protected the selected candidates’ seniority by directing that new appointees from subsequent interviews (for additional seats) be placed below the petitioners, thereby discouraging “resetting” selection timelines to the detriment of earlier selectees.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Syndicate: The principal executive body of DMU, empowered to make appointments on Selection Committee recommendations.
Selection Committee: The expert body constituted under Statute 27 to evaluate candidates and recommend names for appointment.
Chancellor’s annulment power (Section 12(8)): A statutory “supervisory” power: only the Chancellor can annul a University proceeding that is not in conformity with the Act/Statutes/Ordinances, after giving an opportunity to show cause.
Executive instruction vs statute: Office Memoranda are executive directions; they cannot override or rewrite statutory powers and procedures fixed by legislation and statutory statutes.
“Multiple persons recommendations” vs “single person recommendation”: The Court read Statute 27(iv) as addressing rejection of a single recommended name, while Statute 27(v) governs disagreement with a list of multiple recommended candidates, requiring escalation to the Chancellor if unresolved.
Certiorari and mandamus: Certiorari quashes an unlawful decision; mandamus commands a public/statutory authority to perform its legal duty (here, to give effect to the lawful selection).
Approbate and reprobate: A party cannot accept one part of a transaction/decision and reject another part when both arise from the same basis; used here to criticise selective reliance on the earlier process.

5. Conclusion

The judgment establishes a clear governance rule for DMU (and similarly structured statutory universities): the Syndicate cannot annul its own prior selection decisions, nor can it bypass the statutory dispute-resolution route in Statute 27(v). Where annulment of a University proceeding is sought, only the Chancellor can exercise that power under Section 12(8) of the DMU Act, 2017.

Equally significant is the Court’s holding that State DP approval Office Memoranda cannot be treated as controlling DMU’s recruitment/result declaration in the face of the Act and Statutes. The decision therefore strengthens statutory university autonomy, constrains post-facto administrative reversals, and provides a structured template for handling disagreements over selection recommendations.