Non-supply of Written Grounds of Arrest under Section 47 BNSS Renders Arrest Illegal and Requires Release, Despite Gravity of Offence

1. Introduction

The petition was filed by Accused No.2 (Nanjunda) seeking bail in a sessions case involving allegations of a knife assault culminating in death, attracting offences under Sections 103(1), 115(2), 118(1), 351(2), 351(3) read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). The prosecution alleged the incident occurred late night on 04.04.2025, following a dispute rooted in a prior employment-related grievance (accused No.1 allegedly removed from work by the deceased).

While the State pressed the seriousness of the offence—supported by multiple purported eyewitnesses (CWs.1 to 9) and injured witnesses (CWs.2 and 3)—the petitioner raised a procedural-constitutional challenge: non-furnishing of the “grounds of arrest” in writing before production for remand, rendering the arrest and remand illegal under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 47 BNSS.

Key Issues

• Bail on merits: Whether the petitioner should be enlarged on bail given the nature of allegations, eyewitness material, and severity of punishment.
• Legality of custody: Whether failure to furnish grounds of arrest (distinct from generic reasons for arrest) makes the arrest illegal, requiring the petitioner to be set at liberty irrespective of merits.
• Consequential course: If custody is illegal, whether the prosecution can cure the defect by subsequently supplying grounds of arrest and moving for remand/custody.

2. Summary of the Judgment

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

(i) Ahmed Mansoor and others v. State Rep. by Assistant Commissioner of Police (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2650)

This decision was relied upon by the petitioner to emphasize that “reasons for arrest” and “grounds of arrest” are not interchangeable. In bail/remand contexts, an “arrest memo” may record standardized reasons (e.g., for investigation, prevent tampering), but constitutional compliance requires disclosure of the case-specific facts that necessitate arrest—i.e., the “grounds”. Although the Karnataka High Court did not extract passages from this case, it treated the proposition as consistent with the later, more elaborated holdings in Prabir Purkayastha and Mihir Rajesh Shah.

(ii) Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254

The High Court directly relied on paragraphs reproduced from Prabir Purkayastha to crystallize the doctrinal distinction:

“There is a significant difference in the phrase 'reasons for arrest' and 'grounds of arrest'… ‘reasons’… are purely formal parameters… whereas the ‘grounds of arrest’… contain all such details… which necessitated the arrest… [and] must convey… all basic facts… to provide… opportunity of defending… against custodial remand and to seek bail.”

The critical influence of Prabir Purkayastha on the High Court’s approach lay in two connected propositions:

• Substantive communication duty: Grounds must carry basic facts enabling meaningful challenge to remand and pursuit of bail.
• Consequences: A failure to provide the grounds in writing (including failures disguised by supplying only remand papers without adequate communication) can vitiate the arrest and remand.

(iii) Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and another (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356)

This was the controlling authority for the High Court on the timing and effect of furnishing written grounds of arrest. The Supreme Court’s observations (as reproduced) were applied to the BNSS era through:

• Constitutional anchor: Article 22(1) is a fundamental right, not a procedural nicety.
• Mode of communication: Merely reading out grounds is insufficient; furnishing in writing is the effective method to realize Article 22(1)’s purpose.
• Temporal discipline: Non-supply “prior to or immediately after arrest” may not vitiate if supplied within a reasonable time, and in any case two hours prior to production before the Magistrate for remand proceedings.
• Illegality trigger: If this schedule is not adhered to, “the arrest will be rendered illegal entitling the release of the arrestee.”

The High Court’s operative direction—release with liberty to the prosecution to seek remand after supplying written grounds—tracks the remedial architecture endorsed in Mihir Rajesh Shah.

(iv) Additional authorities referenced within Mihir Rajesh Shah

The High Court notes that Mihir Rajesh Shah was reached after considering:

• Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India
• Senthil Balaji v. State (2024) 3 SCC 51
• Vihan Kumar
• Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India (1981) 2 SCC 427

While not independently analyzed by the High Court, their presence signals continuity: the requirement of communicating grounds is treated as a constitutional safeguard with enforceable consequences, and the “writing” requirement is increasingly regarded as the practical minimum to ensure effective exercise of rights.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Merits assessment (bail factors) was adverse to the petitioner

The Court first evaluated the charge-sheet material: CWs.1 to 9 were stated to be eyewitnesses; CWs.2 and 3 injured; medical evidence (PM report) indicated death due to hemorrhagic shock from penetrating chest/lung injury. The petitioner’s alleged overt act was bringing the knife and assaulting the deceased on the left ribs, followed by accused No.1’s assault on the chest.

On orthodox bail considerations—gravity, prima facie case, severity of punishment (Section 103(1) BNS carrying death/life), and witness intimidation risk—the Court held the petitioner was not entitled to bail.

2) However, legality of arrest/remand was independently determinative

Notwithstanding its view on merits, the Court treated the non-furnishing of grounds of arrest as a foundational illegality. It took the important procedural step of securing and perusing the trial court records to factually ascertain compliance, and it found that grounds of arrest were not furnished.

3) Distinguishing “reasons” from “grounds” and rejecting formal compliance

The State argued that an arrest intimation was given to the petitioner’s sister and that a guideline column indicated “reason for arrest has been intimated”. The Court, guided by Prabir Purkayastha, treated such entries as potentially reflecting generic reasons rather than constitutionally adequate grounds. In effect, the decision emphasizes that checkbox compliance or generic statements (“arrested for investigation”) do not satisfy the duty to communicate basic facts constituting the grounds.

4) Remedy: release (not “bail”), with liberty to seek fresh remand after compliance

Applying Mihir Rajesh Shah, the Court held that non-supply of written grounds within the stipulated schedule renders the arrest illegal and “entitles the release of the arrestee”. Accordingly, it ordered the petitioner to be set at liberty, but preserved the prosecution’s ability to:

• Supply the grounds of arrest in writing, and
• Move the trial court for remand/custody with reasons and necessity.

This remedial structure is significant: it treats release as a constitutional consequence, while recognizing investigatory and trial-stage necessities through a compliance-first, custody-second framework.

5) Institutional accountability direction

The Court recorded “lapse” by the CPI for non-compliance with Section 47 BNSS and directed that a copy of the order be emailed to the Superintendent of Police, Hassan (with copy to the CPI). This underscores that the violation is not merely case-specific but implicates systemic policing standards under the BNSS regime.

C. Impact

1) Strong reinforcement of Article 22(1) in the BNSS era

The judgment operationalizes Supreme Court jurisprudence in day-to-day criminal process: even in heinous offences, custody cannot be sustained if the constitutional safeguard of written grounds is breached. This elevates Article 22(1) compliance from a technicality to a determinative custody threshold.

2) Practical policing consequence: documentation quality will decide custody

Post-BNSS, police practice must adapt:

• Grounds must be case-specific, not generic;
• Grounds must be in writing and in a language understood by the arrestee;
• They must be provided within the Supreme Court’s time discipline (including the “two hours prior to production” yardstick referenced in Mihir Rajesh Shah).

Failure risks immediate release and a procedural setback requiring a fresh remand process.

3) Doctrinal clarity: “release due to illegal arrest” is distinct from “bail on merits”

A notable feature is the Court’s dual-track reasoning:

• Merits: Bail not warranted due to gravity and evidence;
• Legality: Custody cannot continue because arrest is illegal.

Future litigants and courts may increasingly separate (a) bail discretion from (b) legality of arrest/remand, with the latter acting as a threshold inquiry.

4) Litigation strategy and judicial administration

The decision signals:

• Defence counsel may press for trial court record scrutiny to test compliance;
• Trial courts/magistrates may be expected to more actively verify that written grounds were supplied before authorizing remand;
• Supervisory police leadership may face increased accountability where non-compliance is recorded and communicated.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Reasons for arrest” vs “Grounds of arrest”

• Reasons for arrest: Generic justifications commonly used in many arrests (e.g., “for investigation”, “to prevent tampering”).
• Grounds of arrest: The specific facts and allegations known to the investigating officer that justify arresting this particular person in this particular case, enabling the person to challenge remand and seek bail effectively.

Why “in writing” matters

Written grounds create verifiable proof of what was communicated, reduce disputes about whether and what was told, and enable the arrestee and counsel to prepare an immediate and effective response—central to Article 22(1)’s purpose as articulated in Mihir Rajesh Shah.

“Set at liberty” is not the same as “bail”

Bail is a discretionary release despite lawful custody. “Set at liberty” here is a corrective remedy because the custody itself is held illegal. The prosecution may still seek custody again, but only after curing the defect (supplying written grounds and moving a reasoned remand application).

Remand proceedings

“Remand” is the magistrate/trial court’s authorization for continued custody (police or judicial). The constitutional requirement is designed to ensure the arrested person can meaningfully oppose remand.

5. Conclusion

NANJUNDA v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA is significant for firmly applying Supreme Court doctrine under the BNSS framework: non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest in writing, as required by Article 22(1) and reflected in Section 47 BNSS, renders the arrest illegal and requires the accused to be set at liberty, even where the allegations are grave and bail on merits is otherwise unwarranted.

The judgment’s broader message is institutional: legality of custody is not negotiable, and compliance failures will trigger immediate corrective consequences, while still allowing the prosecution to pursue lawful custody through a fresh, compliant remand process.