Motor Vehicle Inspector Recruitment: Aggregate Experience Suffices, and Impossible Experience Requirements Cannot Defeat Appointment

Case: THE STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SRI SRINIVASA B N and connected petitions

Court: Karnataka High Court, Division Bench

Bench: R Devdas and Dr. K. Manmadha Rao JJ.

Date: 6 October 2026

Neutral citation: 2026:KHC:55400-DB

1. Introduction

This judgment addresses two recurring problems in public recruitment: ambiguity in prescribed experience requirements and insistence on qualifications that cannot realistically be acquired. The dispute concerned recruitment to 150 posts of Motor Vehicle Inspectors in Karnataka under a notification dated 4 February 2016.

The State of Karnataka, acting through the Transport Department, challenged a Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (“KSAT”) decision accepting a candidate’s combined experience from different workshops. Seven other petitions were brought by candidates whose claims to appointment had been rejected or remained unfulfilled following verification of their experience certificates. The Karnataka Public Service Commission (“KPSC”) was also a party.

The High Court held that the prescribed one-year experience requirement could be satisfied through aggregate experience across qualifying workshops. It also prohibited rejection merely because candidates lacked experience repairing petrol-engine Heavy Goods Vehicles (“HGVs”) and Heavy Passenger Vehicles (“HPVs”), when the authorities accepted that such vehicles had not existed in the relevant operational setting for decades.

The decision is significant because it distinguishes faithful enforcement of recruitment rules from an unnecessarily restrictive or impossible interpretation of those rules.

2. Background and Questions Before the Court

2.1 The disputed experience requirement

The relevant provision required:

“work experience of at least one year in a reputed automobile workshop which undertakes repairs of both Light Motor vehicles, Heavy Goods Vehicles and Heavy Passenger Vehicles fitted with petrol and diesel engine.”

The State interpreted this as requiring one year’s experience in every relevant vehicle category. The candidates contended that the rule prescribed one year of qualifying experience overall, not a separate year for each category.

2.2 Earlier litigation and the revised selection list

The recruitment had already generated litigation over whether the subsequent removal of the experience requirement in 2019 could benefit candidates in the recruitment commenced in 2016. In its decision dated 25 August 2021, the High Court held that the later change could not operate retrospectively.

Nevertheless, the Court directed KPSC to consider the candidates’ experience certificates, having regard to its Secretary’s affidavit dated 2 February 2021, and complete recruitment according to the original notification and applicable rules. Acceptance of certificates remained subject to verification and conformity with the Cadre and Recruitment Rules, 2013.

KPSC subsequently issued a Revised Final Selection List dated 26 October 2023. Experience certificates were forwarded to the respective Deputy Commissioners for verification. Disputes then arose over missing vehicle descriptions, alleged inadequacy of experience, lack of supporting workshop records, and adverse verification reports.

2.3 Principal legal issues

  1. Did the rule require one year’s experience separately in each vehicle category, or could qualifying experience be aggregated?
  2. Could candidates be rejected for lacking experience with petrol-engine HGVs and HPVs when obtaining that experience was acknowledged to be impossible?
  3. How should adverse verification reports and inconsistent inspection records be addressed?
  4. What appointment and consequential benefits should follow for candidates already included in the revised selection list?

3. Summary of the Judgment

3.1 Aggregate experience was sufficient

The Court upheld KSAT’s conclusion that qualifying experience acquired across two or more workshops could be combined. The rule did not unambiguously prescribe a separate year of experience for every vehicle category. Where the combined experience satisfied the prescribed duration and the workshops collectively covered the relevant vehicle types, the State could not insist on its more restrictive interpretation.

3.2 Impossible petrol-engine experience could not be demanded

The Additional Advocate General conceded that HGVs and HPVs with petrol engines had not been in use for several decades. The Court held that candidates could not be denied appointment for failing to obtain experience with those vehicles.

It sharply criticised the authorities’ acceptance of certificates from State transport undertakings claiming such experience while rejecting certificates that truthfully omitted it. The Commissioner was expressly prohibited from rejecting selected candidates on that ground.

3.3 Verification remained relevant

The Court did not dispense with scrutiny of experience certificates. Where adverse reports arose from inadequate supporting records or uncertain workshop facts, it directed reconsideration and, where necessary, fresh inspection by the Deputy Commissioners.

3.4 Final relief

Petition Disposition
W.P. No.126/2025: State’s challenge concerning Srinivasa B.N. Dismissed, leaving undisturbed KSAT’s acceptance of aggregate experience.
W.P. Nos.5483/2025, 5701/2025, 16415/2025, 27642/2025, 4958/2026 and 21767/2026 Allowed; the identified KSAT orders were quashed. Appointment orders were directed if the candidates’ names appeared in the Revised Final Select List dated 26 October 2023.
W.P. No.25888/2025: Rajashekara N M Allowed. Appointment was directed because the Deputy Commissioner’s report established more than one year’s experience across all three vehicle types and the candidate appeared in the revised list.

For the candidates covered by the operative direction granting consequential benefits, the Court ordered all benefits, including seniority, on par with candidates appointed pursuant to the revised list, in accordance with law. Appointment orders were to issue expeditiously and, in any event, within two months of receipt of a certified copy.

The judgment did not separately quantify monetary benefits or expressly adjudicate a specified amount of salary arrears.

4. Analysis of the Precedents Cited

4.1 SRI LOKESH V.R. AND OTHERS VS. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS

Reference: W.P.No.6774/2020, decided on 25 August 2021, Karnataka High Court.

This earlier decision supplied the governing framework for the same recruitment. It rejected retrospective application of the 2019 change removing the experience requirement and required the selection process to continue under the 2016 notification.

Its importance was twofold. First, candidates could not simply avoid proving experience by relying on the later deletion. Second, the direction to accept certificates for processing did not make them conclusive: verification and compliance with the recruitment rules remained necessary.

The present judgment therefore did not abandon the earlier requirement. It determined how that surviving requirement should reasonably be interpreted and applied. This distinction preserves continuity between the two decisions: the old rule continued to govern, but an ambiguous or impossible construction of it did not.

4.2 R.Vijiyaraj And Others, Vs. D.Gautham And Others

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 29057.

The State relied on this Madras High Court decision to argue for strict adherence to statutory recruitment conditions. As reproduced in the judgment, the decision states that additions to or reductions of prescribed requirements belong to the rule-making authority, not to courts seeking to accommodate candidates unable to produce the required certificates.

This authority presented the central objection to the candidates’ claims: would accepting aggregate experience amount to judicial relaxation of a statutory qualification?

The Karnataka High Court did not expressly reject the general principle of strict compliance. Instead, its reasoning proceeded on the basis that the disputed language was ambiguous and did not clearly impose a separate year for each category. Accepting aggregate experience was therefore an interpretation of the existing requirement, rather than an amendment reducing an unequivocal minimum.

Likewise, the petrol-engine issue was addressed through impossibility, not through a general discretion to waive inconvenient qualifications. The decision consequently limits the State’s reliance on strict compliance without establishing that recruitment rules may ordinarily be relaxed by courts.

4.3 Rejanish K V Vs. K. Deepa And Others

Citation: (2026) 4 SCC 513.

The candidates relied on this Supreme Court decision concerning recruitment to the post of District Judge. The passage reproduced from paragraph 159 recognises combined experience as an advocate and judicial officer when assessing the relevant seven-year experience threshold.

Its relevance was analogical: related professional experience need not necessarily be fragmented into separate, non-combinable compartments. The candidates invoked both this approach and the broader objective of securing suitable persons for public service.

However, this authority should not be overstated. It concerned judicial recruitment and a different eligibility framework. The High Court’s express basis for resolving the motor-vehicle experience issue was the ambiguity of the particular rule, reinforced by the authority discussed below. It did not hold that every form of public-service experience can invariably be aggregated.

4.4 Parvaiz Ahmad Parry Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others

Citation: (2015) 17 SCC 709.

This was the principal authority expressly applied to the ambiguity issue. Paragraph 15, reproduced by the High Court, states that ambiguity or vagueness in advertised qualifications should have been clarified by the recruiting authority and, if left unresolved, should benefit the candidate rather than the respondents.

The underlying case concerned educational qualifications involving Forestry. The Supreme Court also found that the candidate possessed the prescribed qualification on the facts.

The Karnataka High Court applied the ambiguity principle to work experience. Since the recruitment provision did not clearly demand a separate year for every vehicle category, the State could not impose that interpretation to exclude candidates whose combined experience otherwise met the requirement.

The limiting condition is important: this reasoning depends on genuine ambiguity. It does not authorise a candidate-friendly departure from clear and unambiguous eligibility conditions.

4.5 In Re Presidential Poll

Citation: (1974) 2 SCC 33.

The Court relied on this seven-judge Supreme Court decision for the proposition that the law does not compel impossible performance. The quoted passage connects impotentia excusat legam, as reproduced in the supplied judgment, with lex non cogit ad impossibilia.

The precedent explains that a person may be excused from performing a statutory duty where an unavoidable disability, arising without that person’s default, makes compliance impossible. Importantly, impossibility does not strip the statutory provision of its mandatory character.

The High Court applied that distinction to the disappearance of petrol-engine vehicles from the relevant heavy-vehicle categories. The broader experience requirement remained enforceable, but the candidates could not be penalised for failing to acquire experience that the authorities themselves accepted could not be obtained.

This was an application of the impossibility doctrine to an obsolete technical requirement, not a declaration that all inconvenient recruitment conditions are unenforceable.

4.6 W.P.No.1232/2025

The judgment also referred to an order dated 29 September 2026 in this writ petition. No case title is supplied in the text.

In that matter, a fresh workshop inspection and report had enabled reconsideration of a candidate’s claim. The Court used it as a practical model for cases where the initial verification did not adequately establish the facts. Its influence was procedural: deficient investigation should be corrected through re-verification rather than treated as an automatically decisive ground for rejection.

5. Legal Reasoning

5.1 The wording did not prescribe separate annual quotas

The provision identifies a duration—“at least one year”—and describes workshops undertaking repairs to specified vehicle categories. It does not expressly state that candidates must complete one year separately in each category.

The Court also tested the State’s interpretation against its own practice. The State accepted that a candidate employed for more than a year at a workshop handling all prescribed vehicle types would qualify without demonstrating work on every category each day.

That concession weakened the argument that candidates moving between workshops must prove separate full-year periods for individual categories. Aggregate qualifying experience could satisfy the occupational purpose of the rule without adding an unstated condition.

5.2 Interpretation was distinguished from relaxation

The State argued that accepting shorter periods in individual categories would create an unmanageable series of requests for relaxation. The Court’s answer was that this objection assumed the very proposition in dispute: that the rule prescribed a separate minimum for each category.

Once that premise was rejected, aggregation did not reduce the overall experience requirement. It identified how the prescribed experience could lawfully be accumulated.

The holding remains tied to qualifying automotive experience. It does not permit unrelated employment to be counted or excuse genuine deficiencies in the duration or authenticity of experience.

5.3 Uniform administration did not cure a defective interpretation

The State maintained that the recruiting authorities had understood and applied the rule uniformly. Consistency, however, could not make an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation legally correct. A uniform practice remains reviewable when it adds a condition that the governing language does not clearly impose.

5.4 Impossibility was not equated with inconvenience

The petrol-engine holding rested on an accepted factual impossibility, not merely on candidates finding the requirement difficult to satisfy. The State conceded the absence of petrol-engine HGVs and HPVs, and the Court treated that concession as decisive.

The resulting exemption was specific. It concerned petrol-engine experience in those two heavy-vehicle categories. The judgment did not generally eliminate Light Motor Vehicle experience or expressly dispense with petrol-category Light Motor Vehicle experience.

5.5 Truthful certificates could not be disadvantaged

The Court identified a particularly troubling administrative inconsistency: certificates from State undertakings claiming impossible experience were accepted, while certificates accurately reflecting the absence of that experience were rejected.

Its criticism establishes that the source or institutional status of a certificate cannot substitute for scrutiny of its contents. Verification must examine substantive truth, not merely the presence of prescribed terminology.

The Court’s observations should not, however, be read as a general cancellation of appointments made on other certificates. No such general operative direction was issued.

5.6 Documentary uncertainty required factual inquiry

Some cases involved workshop records or inspection findings rather than pure questions of interpretation. In W.P.No.4958/2026, for example, counsel pointed to an inspection checklist recording compliance despite a submission that the workshop did not handle petrol-category Light Motor Vehicles.

Such inconsistencies demonstrated the need to examine the actual verification material. Where supporting records had not been adequately established, the Court directed fresh inspection and reconsideration.

These general directions must be read alongside the final order: the named successful candidates received specific appointment relief, subject to the conditions stated there. The judgment was not merely a blanket remand of every petition.

5.7 The prescribed duration remains “at least one year”

Although portions of the reasoning refer to experience of “more than one year,” the quoted governing provision requires “at least one year.” The central holding accepts aggregation to satisfy that prescribed minimum; it does not announce a new requirement exceeding one year.

6. Potential Impact

6.1 Clearer recruitment drafting

Recruiting authorities should specify whether experience is cumulative, category-specific, continuous, or capable of being acquired across employers. If separate minimum periods are intended, they should be stated expressly rather than introduced during verification.

6.2 Greater scrutiny of obsolete technical requirements

The decision provides a framework for addressing qualifications overtaken by technological change. Authorities cannot insist mechanically on impossible compliance while knowing that the prescribed equipment or operational category is no longer available.

Nevertheless, the threshold is demanding: a claimant must establish genuine impossibility beyond their control, not simply personal inability to meet a valid condition.

6.3 More substantive certificate verification

The judgment discourages checklist-based rejection where the checklist itself reflects an impossible assumption. It also supports fresh investigation when an adverse report rests on incomplete inspection or uncertain records.

6.4 Protection against consequences of wrongful exclusion

The seniority and consequential-benefits direction recognises that an unlawful refusal to appoint can continue to disadvantage a candidate after eventual entry into service. The precise implementation remains governed by the operative order and applicable law.

6.5 Limits of the precedent

  • It does not make the 2019 deletion retrospectively applicable to the 2016 recruitment.
  • It does not abolish the surviving experience requirement.
  • It does not validate forged certificates or eliminate verification.
  • It does not authorise aggregation of unrelated experience.
  • It does not establish an unrestricted right to appointment merely because a person applied or appeared in a selection process.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Aggregate experience
Relevant periods of work are added together. Separate qualifying workshop engagements may collectively satisfy the one-year requirement and cover the necessary vehicle types.
Cadre and Recruitment Rules
The rules governing eligibility and recruitment to a service or category of posts. A recruitment notification must operate within the applicable legal framework.
Retrospective application
Applying a later legal change to an earlier process. The earlier decision refused to apply the 2019 removal of the experience requirement to recruitment begun in 2016.
Interpretation versus relaxation
Interpretation determines what a rule means. Relaxation excuses compliance with an otherwise applicable requirement. The Court treated aggregation as interpretation and the obsolete petrol-engine condition through the separate doctrine of impossibility.
Lex non cogit ad impossibilia
“The law does not compel the impossible.” It can excuse an impossible element of compliance without invalidating the broader legal obligation.
Certiorari
A judicial remedy used to quash an unlawful decision of a tribunal or public authority. The candidates sought this relief against the KSAT orders.
Ratio decidendi
The legal reasoning necessary to decide a case. Here, the central rules concern aggregation under an ambiguous experience provision and protection against an admittedly impossible petrol-engine requirement.
Consequential benefits
Service advantages following corrective relief, such as seniority. Their exact scope depends on the court’s wording and the governing service rules.

8. Conclusion

The judgment preserves the mandatory character of recruitment qualifications while rejecting their mechanical or unrealistic application. Qualifying experience may be aggregated where the rule does not clearly require separate category-wise periods, and candidates cannot be excluded for failing to acquire experience that objectively cannot be obtained.

Its broader significance lies in requiring recruitment authorities to combine legal fidelity with factual accuracy: ambiguous drafting should not create unstated barriers, truthful certificates should not be penalised, and genuine verification must remain distinct from formalistic rejection.