Mandatory Strict Compliance with Sections 251–252 CrPC for Conviction on Plea in Section 138 NI Act Cases; Appeal Bar under Section 375 CrPC

1. Introduction

The decision in ADIL AHMAD SOFI v. JAVID AHMAD SOFI (Jammu & Kashmir High Court, Srinagar; decided on 17-07-2026 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Dhar) concerns the procedural legality of convicting an accused in a summons trial—specifically a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act—on the basis of the statement recorded under Section 251 CrPC.

The complainant (respondent) alleged that the accused (petitioner) issued a cheque for Rs. 9,60,000 towards business dues. The Trial Magistrate convicted the accused by treating his Section 251 statement as an admission of guilt and imposed one year simple imprisonment with a fine/compensation of Rs. 19,20,000. The Sessions Court upheld the conviction in appeal.

The High Court was called upon to decide whether (i) the petitioner’s Section 251 statement was an unequivocal plea of guilt permitting conviction under Section 252 CrPC, and (ii) whether an appeal lay at all against such a conviction in view of Section 375 CrPC.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed the revision, set aside both the Trial Magistrate’s conviction and the Appellate Court’s order, and remanded the complaint for trial in accordance with law.

  • The petitioner’s statement under Section 251 CrPC amounted only to an admission of issuance/signature and did not constitute an unqualified, unambiguous, voluntary plea of guilt.
  • The Trial Magistrate failed to put all the necessary constituents of Section 138 NI Act to the accused—particularly the allegation relating to service of demand notice, an essential ingredient—thereby undermining the validity of any purported plea.
  • Since Section 375 CrPC bars an appeal where conviction is on a plea of guilty, the Sessions Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, rendering its order without jurisdiction.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Mahant Kaushalya Das v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 22

The High Court relied on this authority for the proposition that the statutory requirement to record a plea of guilt “as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused” (then Section 243 of the old Code; now Section 252 CrPC) is mandatory, not a formality. Non-compliance vitiates the conviction.

Importantly, the Supreme Court’s rationale—emphasised again here—is that an accused’s appellate rights depend upon whether the conviction is based on a guilty plea; hence, accurate recording protects against mistake, misunderstanding, or over-reading.

(b) New Raginaya Goods Mart and another v. State, AIR 1960 J&K 108

This Court’s earlier decision established that conviction on a guilty plea is permissible only when the accused admits in clear terms all facts constituting the offence. The High Court used it to reinforce the threshold: mere partial admissions (e.g., signature on cheque) are not enough unless the admission extends to the full offence structure.

(c) Waheed Hussain v. Mohammad Farooq Rangrez, 2006 (I) S. L. J. 155

This precedent was invoked for the duty of the Magistrate at the Section 251 stage: the Magistrate must state the particulars of the offence and ask the accused to show cause why he should not be convicted. It underscores that Section 251 is not a mechanical step; it is a procedural safeguard, especially in summons trials where no formal charge is framed.

(d) P. Saravanan v. State (Crl. R. C(MD) No.354 of 2016 decided on 13.07.2016)

The Madras High Court’s exposition was used extensively to articulate:

  • why Section 251 compliance is crucial (no formal charge in summons cases);
  • the plea must be unqualified, unambiguous, clear-cut, and voluntary;
  • the trial court has discretion to refuse to accept a plea and insist on evidence;
  • the linkage with Section 375 CrPC: because appeal is barred after plea-based convictions, procedural strictness becomes essential;
  • even if appeal is barred, revisional scrutiny remains available for illegality.

The present judgment effectively adopts this framework and applies it to a Section 138 NI Act complaint where the “plea” was not truly a plea.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) What counts as a “plea of guilty” in a summons trial?

The High Court synthesised Sections 251 and 252 CrPC to hold that a conviction may follow only when:

  • the Magistrate states the particulars of the offence to the accused (Section 251);
  • the accused is asked whether he pleads guilty or has a defence (Section 251);
  • if guilty, the Magistrate records the plea as nearly as possible in the accused’s words (Section 252); and
  • the plea must be voluntary, unqualified, unambiguous, and clear.

Applying these standards, the Court found the petitioner’s statement expressly raised a defence narrative: cheques were given as security, there were ongoing business transactions, and payment was contingent upon receiving his share. These are not admissions to the offence; they are assertions inconsistent with a clear guilty plea.

(ii) Section 138 NI Act: failure to put essential ingredients to the accused

The Court highlighted a specific procedural deficiency: while recording the Section 251 statement, the Magistrate did not put allegations regarding service of demand notice to the accused. Since service of notice is an essential ingredient of Section 138 NI Act, any “plea” recorded without confronting the accused with that ingredient cannot be treated as an admission to the offence in its entirety.

The reasoning is structurally important: an accused cannot be said to admit guilt unless he is first confronted with the full accusation constituting the offence. In summons trials, this function substitutes for a formal charge; therefore, omission is not curable by inference.

(iii) Payment during pendency is not equivalent to confession of offence

The respondent argued that the accused paid Rs. 50,000 during pendency and sought time for the balance. The Court rejected this as a standalone basis for conviction: interim payment may occur for many reasons—settlement exploration, business accounting, or without prejudice negotiation—and cannot replace the statutory threshold of a legally valid guilty plea.

(iv) Appellate jurisdiction barred by Section 375 CrPC

A notable part of the ruling is jurisdictional: the High Court held that since Section 375 CrPC bars appeal against conviction “on a plea of guilty,” the Sessions Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and its order was therefore void.

Although the High Court ultimately found that the petitioner had not in fact pleaded guilty (and thus the very premise of a plea-based conviction failed), it still treated the Sessions Court’s exercise of appellate power as legally impermissible on the footing on which the case was decided below (i.e., as a plea-based conviction). The correction, therefore, lay in revision, culminating in remand.

3.3 Impact

  • Higher threshold for plea-based convictions in Section 138 cases: Trial courts cannot shortcut trials by treating conditional or explanatory statements as admissions, even where issuance/signature is admitted.
  • Reinforcement that Section 251 is the “charge substitute” in summons trials: Magistrates must put all essential ingredients of the offence (including notice in Section 138 prosecutions) to the accused; otherwise, the process risks vitiation.
  • Jurisdictional discipline for appellate courts: When a conviction is recorded on a purported guilty plea, Section 375 CrPC restricts appellate remedies; parties must be guided to appropriate supervisory/revisional avenues.
  • Practical consequence—more remands, fewer “paper convictions”: The ruling discourages reliance on brief Section 251 statements as a substitute for proof of legally enforceable debt, notice, and other statutory elements.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Summons trial: A simplified criminal procedure for less serious offences. In such cases, the court does not frame a formal “charge.” Instead, it states the accusation under Section 251 CrPC.
  • Section 251 CrPC (Substance of accusation): The Magistrate must explain to the accused what offence he is alleged to have committed and ask whether he pleads guilty or has a defence.
  • Section 252 CrPC (Conviction on plea of guilty): If the accused pleads guilty, the court must record the plea in the accused’s words (as nearly as possible) and may convict. This is discretionary, not automatic.
  • “Unqualified, unambiguous, voluntary” plea: A plea that clearly accepts the full offence without conditions (“I issued the cheque; I owe the legally enforceable debt; I committed the offence”), not one that raises defences (security cheque, accounts unsettled, conditional payment).
  • Section 138 NI Act essentials (in simple terms): Dishonour of cheque is not enough by itself; the law also requires, among other things, a valid demand notice and failure to pay within the stipulated period after notice.
  • Section 375 CrPC (Appeal bar): If a conviction is based on a guilty plea, the accused generally cannot file an appeal. This is why courts must be extremely careful before treating any statement as a guilty plea.
  • Revision (Sections 397/401 CrPC): A supervisory remedy where higher courts correct illegality, jurisdictional error, or material irregularity—particularly relevant when appeal routes are restricted.

5. Conclusion

The High Court’s decision establishes and reinforces a strict procedural rule: conviction in a summons case—especially under Section 138 NI Act—cannot rest on anything less than a clear, voluntary, unambiguous, and unconditional plea of guilt recorded in compliance with Sections 251–252 CrPC. The Magistrate must put the full set of allegations comprising the offence to the accused; omission (notably on essential ingredients like demand notice) undermines the legality of any plea-based conviction.

Additionally, the judgment underscores a jurisdictional boundary: where courts below treat the conviction as plea-based, Section 375 CrPC constrains appellate intervention, and errors must be corrected through supervisory jurisdiction—here resulting in setting aside and remand. The broader significance lies in protecting accused persons from inadvertent forfeiture of trial and appeal rights through imprecise recording or over-interpretation of Section 251 statements.