Long Separation, Defamatory Complaints to Employer, and Removal of Thali as “Mental Cruelty” under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA

A) Precedents Cited

i) Authorities relied on by the wife (appellant) to resist divorce

• "Suman Singh /v/ Sanjay Singh" ((2017) 4 Supreme Court Cases 85): invoked for the proposition that stale/isolated allegations and acts that are later followed by cohabitation may be treated as condoned, and cannot later be resurrected as cruelty.
  High Court’s treatment: distinguished on facts; it found the wife’s accusations and quarrels to be continuing, undermining the condonation argument.
• 'Nidhi Jain /v/ Ankit Jain" (2023 SCC Online Del 4369), "Vishnu Dutt Sharma /v/ Manju Sharma" ((2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 379), and 'Anil Kumar Jain /v/ Maya Jain" ((2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 415): relied upon to argue that irretrievable breakdown is not a statutory ground under Section 13 and that High Courts lack Article 142-like powers to dissolve marriage solely on that basis.
  High Court’s treatment: accepted the doctrinal limit (no independent “irretrievable breakdown” ground), but clarified that long separation may still be evaluated as cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia).

ii) Authorities relied on by the husband (respondent) and adopted by the Court

• "Joydeep Majumdar /v/ Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar" (2021 (1) MWN (Civil) 589): central to the reasoning. The Court extracted and applied the rule that defamatory complaints to a spouse’s superiors (here, Army authorities), affecting reputation and career, can amount to mental cruelty, and relief need not wait for a judicial finding that the allegations were false if the conduct’s impact is clear.
• "C.Sivakuar /v/ A.Srividhya" (2022 (3) MWN (Civil) 572): relied on for the significance of removal of “Thali chain” as conduct constituting mental cruelty in the prevailing cultural setting.
• "Vallabhi Vs. R.Rajasabahi" (2017 (1) MWN (Civil) 128 (DB)): cited within C.Sivakuar /v/ A.Srividhya and used to reinforce that removal of “Thali” is a serious act symbolising termination of marital status and may amount to mental cruelty of a high order.
• "Rakesh Raman /vs/ Kavita" (AIR 2023 Supreme Court 2144): used to support the proposition that long separation, absence of cohabitation and prolonged bitterness can be “read as cruelty” under Section 13(1)(ia).
• "Kavitha /v/ Senthilkumaran" (Order in C.M.S.A.Nos.21 & 22 of 2023 of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court): relied on to support the approach that prolonged separate living and refusal to end a dead marriage can itself generate mental cruelty.

iii) Other citations listed but not materially analysed in the reasoning

The husband also cited "Samar Ghosh /v/ Jaya Ghosh" ((2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 511) (a leading authority on mental cruelty), as well as V.Kasthuri /v/ D.Bharath, D.Nagappan /v/ T.Virgin Rani, Roopa Soni /v/ Kamalnarayan Soni, and Beena M.S. /v/ Shino G.Babu. The judgment ultimately rested primarily on Joydeep Majumdar, C.Sivakuar/Vallabhi, and Rakesh Raman.

B) Legal Reasoning

i) Cruelty based on defamatory allegations to employer/superiors

The Court placed strong reliance on the wife’s admission in evidence that she sent complaints to the husband’s Army superiors alleging he had illegal contacts with women. The Court treated admissions as “best evidence” requiring no further documentary proof. Applying "Joydeep Majumdar /v/ Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar", it held that such conduct has the propensity to damage reputation among colleagues and superiors and thus constitutes mental cruelty, particularly where the complainant spouse fails to prove the allegations.

ii) Section 23(1) HMA: condonation and delay

The wife argued that the 1989 complaint was stale and, because the parties allegedly lived together after retirement (1991 onwards), the husband had condoned the conduct, and the 2014 petition was barred by delay/condonation under Section 23(1)(b). The Court rejected this by reading the record as showing subsequent continuing disputes around the same accusations, including later criminal litigation and quarrels. On that factual footing, the Court held the “condonation” theory did not assist the wife because the cruelty was not treated as a one-off incident that had been forgiven and buried.

iii) Removal of “Thali” as an act of mental cruelty; conversion narrative

The husband pleaded that the wife removed the “Thali” and converted to Christianity. The Court acknowledged the lack of formal documentary proof of conversion (such as baptism records), but emphasised the wife’s admission that she removed the “Thali” and did not wear ornaments. Relying on "C.Sivakuar /v/ A.Srividhya" and the embedded authority of "Vallabhi Vs. R.Rajasabahi", the Court treated removal of “Thali” as a culturally and socially significant act that can cause deep anguish to the spouse and thus amount to mental cruelty.

iv) Long separation and “irretrievable breakdown”: not an independent ground, but relevant to cruelty

The Court navigated the tension between: (a) the settled principle (pressed by the wife) that irretrievable breakdown is not, by itself, a statutory ground for divorce in High Courts; and (b) the line of authority permitting courts to treat long separation and the complete collapse of marital life as a facet of mental cruelty.

It held that High Courts cannot grant divorce solely because a marriage has “irretrievably broken down”; however, where the facts show prolonged separation (here, the wife admitted separation since 1996) and absence of meaningful marital cohabitation, coupled with litigation and bitterness, continuation of the formal tie may itself amount to cruelty. The Court drew support from "Rakesh Raman /vs/ Kavita", and also noted the wife’s failure to pursue reunion (including not filing restitution under Section 9).

v) Second appeal discipline: concurrent findings

Because the Trial Court and First Appellate Court had both found cruelty proved, the High Court treated their determinations as concurrent findings. It found no ground to interfere under the limited scope of a second appeal framed around “substantial questions of law”.

C) Impact

• Defamatory complaints to superiors as cruelty: The judgment reinforces that complaints to an employer/superior authority (particularly in disciplined forces like the Army) alleging immoral conduct—when not proved and causing reputational harm—may strongly support a decree for divorce on mental cruelty.
• Condonation is fact-sensitive: Even when parties reside together after an incident, courts may decline the condonation bar where the offending conduct is treated as continuing or recurring, rather than isolated and forgiven.
• Removal of “Thali” as evidence of cruelty: Consistent with Madras High Court precedent, the act is treated as having serious symbolic weight, capable of evidencing mental cruelty.
• Long separation as cruelty (without creating a new statutory ground): The decision exemplifies how High Courts can acknowledge “breakdown” realities by fitting them within Section 13(1)(ia) (cruelty), while still respecting that “irretrievable breakdown” is not a standalone statutory ground before them.